ABSTRACTS

Trump’s Foreign Policy Posture of His First Hundred Days in Off i ce

Shen Yamei

Domestic Cognition and Position on THAAD Deployment in South Korea

By Lyu Chunyan & Xu Wansheng

01Trump’s Foreign Policy Posture of His First Hundred Days in Of fi ce,by Shen Yamei, Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies.To evaluate Trump’s diplomatic performance in his fi rst hundred days in of fi ce cannot go without the evaluation of the diplomatic legacy left over from his predecessor. Currently, the appraisal of Obama’s foreign policy by the public opinion suffered mixed fortunes, re fl ecting deep considerations of the US diplomatic orientation, which cannot be neglect by Trump and will constrain his impulse to completely overthrow his predecessor’s foreign policy. From the new foreign policy of his first hundred days in office, Trump has established the purpose that foreign policy should serve the domestic agenda, reshaped the trade and security agendas, and continued with the Middle East, Europe and Asia-Paci fi c as geostrategic grips, which has shown the process of his “learning curve”. With the contention for decision in fl uence within Trump’s diplomatic and security team emerging, it is expected that his diplomatic decision in the future might generally tend to be self-restrained and prudent, but the possibility of partially aggressive strategies cannot be excluded. The China-US relationship is entering a more difficult run-in period, with friction and cooperation as well as challenges and opportunities co-existing.

14Viewing the Characteristics of Trump’s Diplomatic Decision-Making from the US Military Strike on Syria,by Qian Wenrong, Executive Director of the Center for American Studies, China Foundation for International Studies; Research Fellow of the Center for World Studies,Xinhua News Agency and Guest Research Fellow with CPDS. On April 4 2017, three days after the casualty incident caused by gas bombs in Northwest of Syria, the US President Trump accused the Syrian government for such an evil incident and ordered missile attacks on Syrian military air fi elds, while the US specialists and former senior intelligence officers have questioned Trump’s accusation and military actions taken.There are three factors that prompted Trump to make the hasty decision of military strike: he wanted to get out of the scandal of “contact with the Russians” quickly; to contend with Russia for dominance in the Middle East; and the security team mostly composed of militaries played a decisive role. It can be seen clearly from sorting out the US recent foreign policy and diplomatic maneuvers that Trump’s diplomatic decisionmaking is obviously characterized as “neo-interventionist”, easy to change,unpredictable, more of adventure, and militarization of diplomacy, which should be worthy of our close attention.

25An Analysis of the US Propaganda on the South China Sea Issue,by Li Zhonglin, Lecturer and Postdoctoral Fellow from the School of International Studies, Peking University. The focus of the US global strategy has moved eastward, which has uplifted the importance of the South China Sea issue in the US global strategy, resulting in the increase of the US involvement in every way in the South China Sea issue. Among them, propaganda aroused widespread concern for its unique nature and role. The US has taken propaganda as an important way to intervene into the South China Sea issue, mainly based on multi-dimensional considerations, including the US hegemony in public opinion and its historical experience, the congenital advantage of propaganda, and the US actual needs on the South China Sea issue. In waging the propaganda warfare on the South China Sea issue, the US president, high-ranking officials of various departments, the bureaucracy and non-official actors have all gotten involved, who in fl uenced and interacted with one another.The US propaganda on the South China Sea issue has resulted in negative impact on China’s international image, China-US bilateral relations, and the security situation in the South China Sea, making China suffer from relatively greater strategic pressure on the South China Sea issue.

38The Formation and Characteristics of the US Infiltration Strategy through “Internet Freedom”,by Xia Zijun, Associate Professor from the Department of Philosophy and Scientific Socialism, Party School of the CPC Zhengzhou Municipal Committee. The US infiltration strategy through the so-called “internet freedom” has influenced like a shadow China’s network ideological security. There has been technical, domestic and international background for the US to put forward the “internet freedom” infiltration strategy. The two speeches made by the former secretary of state Hillary on the issue of “internet freedom” as well as the introduction of a series of international strategies on cyber space,operational strategies and policy reports by the US have indicated that its in fi ltration strategy through “internet freedom” has come into being. The characteristics of the US “internet freedom” in fi ltration strategy include: it has taken the “global public domain” in cyber space as the starting point of argument to promote the values of “internet freedom”; accelerated the R&D of the “internet freedom technologies” and their applications with the support of huge funds; and manipulated the political communication in international network by rigorous organizational operations. In essence,the US “internet freedom” in fi ltration strategy is nothing but an extension of its in fi ltration of Cold War mentality and values as well as an expansion of its national interests to international network, which is also the network version of American hegemony as well as its pretext to monitor and control global cyber space.

49Domestic Cognition and Position on THAAD Deployment in South Korea,by Lyu Chunyan, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor from the PLA University of Foreign Language and Xu Wansheng, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor from the PLA University of Foreign Language. The deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system by the US in South Korea has not only increased the uncertainty of political developments within the ROK, but also harmed the situation in the Korean Peninsula as well as the security and stability of Southeast Asia. Based on the studies of the political process, this paper has sorted out various cognitions and positions on THAAD deployment within the South Korean government,among political parties and in the society. Hereinto, the attitude of the South Korean government has changed from “strategic ambiguity”to “strategic clarity” based upon comprehensive considerations of the South Korean national security, while the ruling and opposition parties have never reached consensus on the issue, and the public opinion has been seriously divided, re fl ecting from certain angle the negative impact of THAAD deployment in the ROK that would damage the regional strategic balance. This multiple opposition in cognition and position is not only the manifestation of the interest gaming among various forces within South Korea, but also the re fl ection of the evolution context of the THAAD deployment issue and its complex in fl uence, which may be taken as the premise or the basis for determining the development of THAAD deployment in the ROK.

63The Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue and the Views of Chinese Scholars,by Zhou Xiaojia, Doctoral Student from the Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University. The Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is the major challenge confronted by China’s diplomacy in Northeast Asia, the resolution of which concerns China’s major strategic interests. How to remove DPRK’s nuclear weapons and maintain its regime at the same time remains a huge problem put before the decisionmakers of China’s diplomacy. The Chinese scholars are divided in views on the cause that the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue has remained long unresolved, which may be summarized as the following: failure in cooperation, North Korea’s own responsibility, the responsibility of the US, and the responsibility of China. In regard to the issue of how to deal with the DPRK, the Chinese scholars also have three different views:limited support, North Korea first, and cutting off with North Korea.The debate of the Chinese scholars on the issue of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue may be understood from three dimensions: China’s national interests without ideological considerations, China further emerging into the international system, and the intensifying security competition between China and the US.

77Strategic Predicament under the Double Dependences: Australia’s South China Sea Policy and Its Characteristics,by Wang Xuesong,Graduate Student of Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies of Nanjing University and Liu Jinyuan, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor of Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies of Nanjing University. Since 2010, Australia began to pay very close attention to the situation of the South China Sea, as the South China Sea issue has become a hot topic in Asia-Pacific region. Australia’s policy toward the South China Sea concentrates in the main on reef construction,freedom of navigation, and the international arbitration of the South China Sea issue. In actual practice, Australia’s South China Sea policy manifests basically the following features: strengthening cooperation with the disputing countries in order to avoid independent intervention; keeping China away from “controlling” the South China Sea, and manifesting certain ambiguity of Australia’s South China Sea policy orientation. Currently, in the fi elds of economic and security interests, Australia has become “doubly dependent” on both China and the US. With the game-playing between China and the US over the South China Sea going deep, Australia has become passive in the South China Sea disputes, whose strategic choice for its South China Sea policy has become more and more dif fi cult.

92The Current Gaming Situation of International Marine SOx Emission Reduction and Its Impact on China,by Xiao Yang, Director and Associate Professor of the Arctic Research Center, Beijing International Studies University and Guest Research Fellow with CPDS. Marine SOx emissions cause serious air pollution, which has caught close attention of the international community. IMO has issued a series of regulations on international maritime emission reduction and set up the strategic target on maritime environment protection, showing a “hardening legalization”trend. SECA is an institutional innovation of IMO and the inevitable outcome of the Western countries’ environmental hegemony. In marine SOx emission reduction, China is faced with the dilemma to honor the treaties in responsibility, funds, discourse power and supervision.China can propose new topics for discussion and gradually form its countermeasure system by engaging in IMO’s regulation formulating process, promoting the international transfer of emission reduction technologies, raising the quality of proposals and boosting international cooperation within the boundary of IMO’s regulations.

105The Current Brazilian Antarctic Policy and Its Prospects,by Zhao Ningning, Lecturer of China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies of Wuhan University. With the strengthening of its economic power, Brazil has recently adjusted and optimized its Antarctic policy, including strengthening the construction of Antarctic exploration support capability, working out specific Antarctic research programs, and promoting international cooperation regarding Antarctic affairs and its environmental protection.Such adjustment and optimization have been determined by Brazil’s strategic interests in the realm of politics, economy, scientific research and environment over the Antarctic region, and specially in fl uenced by its political ambition to become a global power. Nevertheless, confronted with the political fact that the US and Australia have further strengthened their dominance over the Antarctic affairs, and restricted by shortage of funds,Brazil has met with great uncertainties in fully implementing its Antarctic policy, which would constrain the momentum and extent of Brazil’s current involvement in the Antarctic region. As a stakeholder of the governance of the Antarctic, China has similar national identity and interest demands like Brazil. As a result, China should maintain close consultation and communication with Brazil over the Antarctic affairs, which is conducive to broadening their bilateral cooperation and enriching the political connotation of the China-Brazil comprehensive strategic partnership.

Trump’s Foreign Policy Posture of His First Hundred Days in Off i ce

Shen Yamei

The fi rst hundred days of the US new president in off i ce is usually called the “honeymoon period”, which is the key period for the president to show his leadership style and expand his influence of power. As a result, the “first hundred days” has become an index for measuring the new president’s merits.To evaluate Trump’s diplomatic performance in his fi rst hundred days in off i ce cannot go without the evaluation of the diplomatic legacy left over from his predecessor. Currently, the appraisal of Obama’s foreign policy by the public opinion suffered mixed fortunes, reflecting deep considerations of the US diplomatic orientation, which cannot be neglect by Trump and will constrain his impulse to completely overthrow his predecessor’s foreign policy. From the new foreign policy of his fi rst hundred days in off i ce, Trump has established the purpose that foreign policy should serve the domestic agenda, reshape the trade and security agendas, and continue with the Middle East, Europe and Asia-Pacif i c as geostrategic grips, which has shown the process of his “learning curve”. With the contention for decision inf l uence within Trump’s diplomatic and security team emerging, it is expected that his diplomatic decision in the future might generally tend to be self-restrained and prudent, but the possibility of partially aggressive strategies cannot be excluded. The China-US relationship is entering a more diff i cult run-in period, with friction and cooperation as well as challenges and opportunities co-existing.

I.Currently, “Easier Said than Done” for Trump’s Diplomacy

Given the relative stability of the Obama administration’s foreign policy and in consideration of Trump himself having experienced the election campaign and sent clear political signals, Trump is not under the pressure to start something new in diplomacy by “opposing his predecessor”. His diplomatic proposals reflect “what are really in his mind”, which can be said to truly reflect his intentions. Although the US mainstream media has persisted in “badmouthing”,asserting Trump’s foreign and security policies are entering “unknown waters”and implying possibility of greater international turmoil, Trump has shown a relatively clear “learning curve” in his “f i rst hundred days” in off i ce. His policy proposals such as reshaping the alliance and restructuring trade relations are returning to mediocre, and his anti-Russia and anti-China postures have taken a major reversal, embodying that his diplomatic thinking is returning to tradition after realistic grinding, so that there are both Chinese and American scholars coming to the conclusion that Trump’s diplomacy is “old wine in a new bottle”.

A. Diplomacy is based on “American First”.The election in 2016 has ref l ected that the Western society as represented by the US is confronted with the “hollowing” of the Middle Class and the backlash against globalization,while the pressure of resource allocation and employment competition brought about by huge inf l ux of refugees have intensif i ed the anti-elite and popularism sentiment. Trump upholds two basic values in his governance ----“American First” and “Make America Great Again”, with the revitalization of American economy and improvement of American people’s livelihood as the top-most goals of his administration, as he has pledged to wage a defending war to return to and strengthen “American characteristics”, and protect the “beautiful country under God”. To this end, since the beginning of his administration, Trump has spoken bluntly about putting domestic affairs fi rst and boldly carried out political, economic and social reforms, in pursuit of immediate results in a short run. As ref l ected in diplomacy, the US, driven by radical nationalism, is made trying to get out of the burdensome responsibility of global affairs by pursuing tough egoist diplomacy, revising the over liberalized international line and adjusting its foreign policy. Affected by social anxiety, Trump’s diplomacy is seen in the form of general contraction. There even have been suggestions that the US get rid of the burden of leading the international affairs, as the “American leadership has never gained broad international support, with new science and technologies further diluting America’s power and inf l uence, which have made relative efforts too expensive”.

Presently, the basic consensus within the American strategic circle is that the US national security is confronted with three major rivals: IS is the pressing matter of the moment, Russia poses potential threats and China is a long-term challenge. In view of this, Trump has stuck to eliminating the hidden troubles in American economy, society and security, and explicitly made fi ghting against IS as the US diplomatic theme. Of course, for a political novice without much experience and whose words and deeds are full of controversy, it is quite possible, when internal troubles multiply, that Trump would take tougher measures in diplomacy to mitigate domestic pressures. In areas directly related to American actual interests, partial aggressiveness would likely increase, as shown in the US military retaliation to Syria chemical weapon incident earlier last April, which may ref l ect the domestic needs from certain respect for Trump to consolidate his reign.

B. To highlight the trade and security agendas.Currently, as the external economic environment the US is confronted with is not so optimistic, there does exist with strong political sentiment against free trade within the US society,resulting in Trump’s diplomatic agenda quickly transformed into domestic agendas, especially economic and trade agendas. For example, Trump has attributed the declining of the US manufacturing to “trade failures”, and further attributed the latter to its trade partners using such unfair means as “exchange rate manipulation”. As a result, the US should “use trade policies to protect American sovereignty and make use of all means to open foreign markets for American exports; and not tolerate such unfair trade practice that would distort the market as exchange rate manipulation, unfair government subsidies and misappropriation of intellectual property rights”. Moreover, the US would go further to restructure the international trade rules. Between last February and March, the US Secretary of State Tillerson and Secretary of Treasury Munuqin went to Germany respectively for G20 foreign ministers’ meeting and G20 finance ministers and central bank governors’ meeting, starting the efforts that would “focus on fairness and restructure trade relationship”. From the facts that Trump has demanded the “fair-sharing” of defense expenditure with its allies and even has once linked the “One-China” principle with China making trade concessions to the US, Trump is inclined to “commercialize”international relations, set the price for political relations and principles of political communication in accordance with the formula of “American First”,and indulge in the negative “trade” and “zero-sum” thinking.

Another outstanding agenda of his is military and security. In fact, Trump has relied mainly on the defense industry to get elected, as the important basis to “Make America Great Again” is military expansion. In addition,there are several retired generals taking important positions within the Trump administration, including the three major decision makers in the area of national security, namely Secretary of Defense Mattis, National Security Advisor McMaster and Secretary of Homeland Security Kelly. From the White House budget proposal published recently, about 18 departments of the government will undergo 20 percent budget cut, while the defense budget will increase by 10 percent, which has shown Trump’s determination to strengthen military capabilities and the possibility that military forces would become the major tools for Trump’s diplomacy.

C. To revitalize three strategic blocks.As restricted by the US interest demands and internal as well as external environments, Trump’s adjustment on specif i c foreign policies assumes the feature of both change and continuation.The basically stable and constant elements include: safeguarding America’s international leadership, taking strict precautions against the challenges posed by other major powers, using democratic values as means to realize national interests, and taking military alliance as the grip. The changes would include:the relative decline of the US power and its international inf l uence, the rise of distrust of the US by its allies, and increasing introverted inclining of the US.Presently, the external strategy of the Trump administration continues to take the strategic blocks of the Middle East, Asia-Pacif i c and Europe as pivot and grip,with the US strategic layout undergoing no fundamental or subversive changes.

First, the new round of policy adjustment has taken the Middle East as the “pressing matter of the moment”, with heavy attack already in place.The Trump administration has deemed IS as a global threat and changed the cognition by re-weighing the importance of counter terrorism and overthrowing the Syrian Bashar regime. On the tactical level, although the US hoped to end the war in Syria through some kind of cooperation with Russia, the more pressing matter for the US is to impede Russia’s strong return to the Middle East and reverse the situation that the US is unable to lead the political process in Syria. Trump has obviously increased proactive diplomatic actions in the Middle East, including increasing military deployment in Syria and launching air attacks, extending the Iran Sanctions Act, inviting the leaders of both Israel and Palestine to visit the US, sending high off i cials to visit Turkey and Iraq, and hosting an international conference on combating terrorism on the 22nd of last March in Washington D.C. to fi ght against IS with the participation of foreign ministers from 68 countries.

Second, “the Pacific region is still one of the priorities”. As the US has exited from the TPP, the US Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton declared that “Obama’s Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy is ended”, which was misinterpreted by some media as the signal that the US would withdraw from the Asia-Pacific region. In reality, since getting into office, Trump’s relations with the Asia-Pacific region have increased rather than decreased.The US Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State have respectively paid exclusive visits to countries within the region. To Japan, the US has reiterated its commitment to help defense the Diaoyu Island; to the ROK, the US is promoting the deployment of THAAD on time; to China, the US has emphasized that “the definition of China-US relations can only be friendly”;to India, the US has called India a “true friend and cooperation partner” in coping with global challenges. The Trump administration has also regarded the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue as its primary concern in Asia-Pacific security, reappraising policy options towards DPRK, intimating to strike DPRK militarily, concentrating the US strategic weapons to Northeast Asia.

Third, the US-EU relationship continues to progress despite constant bickering. Trump once highly praised “Brexit”, “bad-mouthed” the EU and“played up to” Russia, which has indicated Trump’s deviation from the norms,so that Tusk, President of the European Council, wrote to the leaders of the EU member states, calling Trump as “one of EU’s biggest external threats”. Both before and after British Prime Minister Teresa May and German Chancellor Merkel visited the US, their bilateral relationships with the US are full of noises. Nevertheless, Trump has sent important cabinet members to Munich Security Conference, NATO defense ministers’ meeting, and he will personally attend the NATO Summit to be held in May, reiterating his determination to“strongly support the NATO” and reconf i rming NATO as the “cornerstone” for the US and the entire Transatlantic Community. After the incident of “secrete communication with Russia” got fermented, Trump has taken a sharp turn to show toughness on Russia, demanding Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine,increasing military deployment in the frontline states in Eastern Europe and the Baltic, and strengthening operations to contain Russia. The US-Russia relationship has once again fallen into the old mold of geostrategic gaming,which may be of some help to mitigate Europe’s worries that the US could fail in its security commitment to Europe, so that the US-Europe relationship could be stably maintained on the expected track with their differences under the control.

D. Contention for influence over diplomatic decisions has emerged.Since assuming office in January of 2017, Trump has met repeated setbacks,which have hastened his breakaway from the political circle in Washington D.C., seriously undermined his authority as the new President, strengthened the public impression that his cabinet team does not run very well, though it has to be proved. It is reported by American media that the advisory team of the White House has broken into three factions: one led by the White House chief strategist Bannon, adhering to the ultra conservative ideology; one led by his family members, namely Kushner and Ivanka, taking a relatively liberal stance;and one composed of the mainstream Republicans, such as Vice President Burns and the White House Chief of Staff Priebus. These factions blame one another on personnel assignment and policy propositions, causing a quite chaotic situation. There have also appeared different factions on trade policies,with the unyielding Navarro, Chairman of the White House National Trade Commission on one side, and the US Secretary of Treasury Munuqin, Secretary of Commerce Ross and Chairman of the National Economic Council Cohen stand orthodox on the other, as the former is losing power in the game-playing with a tendency of being marginalized. As President Trump is inexperienced in diplomacy, he will rely more heavily on the opinions of his diplomatic team and professionals. Under the inf l uence from different sides, especially with the need to keep balance among different factions, President Trump has to face deep level contradictions and long-term constraint of various kinds, which would make him more self-disciplined and prudent in his decisions, resulting in relatively eclectic and conservative schemes for practice in the end.

II.ProspectsIn the early phase after taking office, Trump seemed to be hostile to the whole world, with the Islamic world, refugees, media, the EU and all American economic rivals at once becoming the subjects of his struggle. Contrary to his internal reforms, which are loud but fruitless, Trump’s policy adjustment in diplomacy began with coarseness and impulsion, but staggering along towards clarity.

In recent years, the trend of American foreign policy adjustment indicates that the alliance system that has supported American hegemony since the end of the Second World War has partially been weakened, which has forced the US to attach more importance to the voices made by other countries on international affairs, pursuing an external strategy characterized by overall contraction and partial expansion. A fact that cannot be neglected is that the US Intelligence Committee warned in a recent report entitled Global Trends: Paradoxical Progress published every four years that “the Pax Americana is coming to an end, as the rising process of the West has gone into reverse, while the weight of Asia in global economy is recovering”, which happened to coincide with the worries of the Western mainstream media lasting for some time that the world is entering the “post-truth, post-West and post-order” age. Hereafter,would Trump’s diplomacy safeguard the liberal international order the US has carefully molded over the 70 years since the end of the Second World War or overturn it? Would he only resort to conf l ict management on hot issues or engage in a military confrontation that could lead to a war? What effects would he bring to the regional situation around China and international situation?These are issues worthy of our concern.

With regard to China-US relationship, as the heads of both states met earlier last April for the first time at Mar-a-Lago in Florida, engaging in strategic communication on such topics as bilateral trade, the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, regional and international security, the China-US relationship has gotten out of the jolt caused by the Taiwan issue earlier and will hopefully get stabilized on the strategic level. The two countries have also established four high level dialogue mechanisms, namely the diplomatic and security dialogue,the comprehensive economic dialogue, the law enforcement and cyber security dialogue, and the social and humanistic dialogue, as well as started the 100-day plan, which are conducive to the realization of an orderly “docking” in their cooperation agenda.

It can currently be seen that the Trump administration is inclined to “do business” rather than “engage in confrontation” with regard to China-US relationship, with the pragmatist mentality on China increasing. On the 18th of March, US Secretary of State Tillerson, when exclusively interviewed for the fi rst time on China-US relationship, said “China and the US are discussing issues that would determine the future directions of the two countries in 50 years”, which has in fact repudiated the notion that the relations between China and the US have been intensified to the “breaking point” alleged by the American media. High ranking off i cials of the US State Department have expressed several times at briefings that the Trump administration wished to construct a “result-oriented”, constructive and mutual-beneficial China-US relationship, calling people to refocus their attention from the wording and grammar of China-US relationship to the practical issues. It is expected that China-US relationship will return to stability after short-lived frictions or even tremor, with increasing space for the expansion of bilateral cooperation.

Looking forward to the future, the difficulties should not be belittled,as stress factors in China-US economic and trade relationship have made the running-in more difficult. First, the anti- globalization trend and the calls against free trade will make it diff i cult to eliminate the stress factors in China-US economic and trade relationship. Second, from Trump’s consistent expressions on China, he is rather ignorant about the complexity of China-US relationship and inclined to put pressure on China as he, from the economic perspective, saw the US trade deficit with China as the biggest external agent that has made the US economy problematic, and attributed American difficulties to China. The game-playing between China and the US is likely to return to the traditional front, namely their potential frictions will mainly concentrate on trade, security and the Taiwan issue, with the two sides playing“political cards”, “economic cards” and “security cards” in a mixed way, which would definitely make their bilateral relationship more confrontational. Last,the overall cognition of American strategic circle on China tends to be negative,resulting in constant increase of American toughness on China.

In addition, we should also see that the profound evolution of globalization is changing the world pattern, in which the US dominance in world affairs and its ability to reform the world is decreasing, with some of its allies in the Middle East, Asia-Pacific and Europe beginning to consider seriously the “Scheme B” for the “post-America” and “post-West” world. Correspondingly, China’s interaction with the international order is entering a new era, which calls China to engage in long-term planning and formulate a comprehensive global strategy and strategy toward the US, so as to play a bigger role in interacting with the US and the world by proactive scheming.

(The author is Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies. This article was received on May 4, 2017.)

Domestic Cognition and Position on THAAD Deployment in South Korea

By Lyu Chunyan & Xu Wansheng

There has been a decision process within the government of South Korea from“strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity” with regard to accepting THAAD deployment in the ROK. On July 8 of 2016, the Park Geun-hye government of South Korea formally declared its decision to allow THAAD deployment in South Korea. To this, political parties and various social circles within South Korea expressed varied cognitions and positions, which not only revealed the deep division and opposition within South Korea on the issue of THAAD deployment, but also reflected from one side the negative impact of THAAD deployment in South Korea that would damage the regional strategic balance.

I. THAAD Deployment in the ROK and the Strategic Choice of South Korean Government

Since the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK came up, till the end of 2015, the South Korean government had assumed a position of “strategic ambiguity”, responding negatively to the external concerns in an “evasive” way to avoid intensifying contradictions with the neighboring countries including China. During this period, the South Korean government always denied discussions with the US on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK.Nevertheless, there appeared some differences between the South Korean government’s denial of discussions with the US on THAAD deployment in the ROK and the relevant information revealed by the US, which may indicate that there do exist discussions “under the table” between the US and the ROK on THAAD deployment in the ROK. In addition, although the South Korean government has denied discussions with the US on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK, it has never denied the possible prospect of deploying THAAD in the ROK.

Entering 2016, against the backdrop that North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear tests, the expressions of the South Korean government on the issue of THAAD deployment became “positive and definite”, and made a quick decision to allow THAAD deployment in the ROK. On January 25 of 2016, South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo expressed that from military perspective, it was necessary to discuss matters concerning THAAD deployment in the ROK, which may be understood that Han Min-koo showed a positive position on THAAD deployment in the ROK from a purely military point of view. On the 4th of March, a joint working group of the US and South Korea responsible for consultation on THAAD deployment by the US forces stationed in the ROK was established, which started the formal consultation between the two countries on the schedule, the site and the cost of THAAD deployment. On the 8th of July, South Korea and the US declared to the outside world the decision to deploy THAAD in South Korea from the perspective of the ROK-US alliance.

Meanwhile, the South Korean government further emphasized that the decision to deploy THAAD in the ROK was a matter within the scope of national sovereignty, which was not targeted any third party except North Korea. Since Park Geun-hye was impeached on December 9 of 2016 for the“bestie of hers meddling with national policies”, Prime Minister Kwang Kyoahn acted as the acting president, who showed the will to implement the decision of THAAD deployment in the ROK despite the political unrest.

We can fi nd from the above sort-out that although THAAD deployment in the ROK was decided upon by the South Korean government in a relatively short period of time in the first half of 2016, it was a policy issue that had existed for years and been carefully considered by the South Korean government, which was a strategic choice made by the Park Geun-hye government after a comprehensive consideration over the situation of the Korean Peninsula and the international relations with the major powers in the Asia Pacif i c region.

II. THAAD Deployment in the ROK and the Mixed Reactions of the Political Parties in South Korea

On the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK, there has never been a consensus among the major political parties within South Korea, which has made the party politics characterized by confrontation between the government and the oppositions more complex.

In the political circle of South Korea, the call for THAAD deployment came fi rst from a congressional inquiry raised by the ruling New National Party.On November 3 of 2014, at a congressional inquiry conference on government televised to the whole nation, Congressman Yoo Seong-min from the New National Party strongly advocated an early deployment of THAAD in the ROK,formally starting the policy debate between the government and the opposition parties on THAAD deployment in the ROK. The US Ambassador to the ROK Mark Leppert was attacked on March 5 of 2015, which has not only led to the decline of the inf l uence of the domestic left-wing parties that opposed THAAD deployment in the ROK, but also made the strong advocate by Yoo Seong-min of early THAAD deployment in the ROK quickly becoming a public opinion,while the New National Party has decided to endorse THAAD deployment as the party’s stance.

Different from the ruling party, the opposition parties, out of the need of checks and balances as well as contention for power, would keep distance from the government and the ruling party on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK, mostly taking ambiguous or opposing attitude.

On the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK, the biggest opposition party DPK has taken an attitude of “strategic ambiguity”, as it would not make THAAD deployment in the ROK as a “position for the party”. Within the party,the leadership as represented by the party chairman Kim Jong-in has taken an attitude that “if the deployment brings actual benef i ts, it would not oppose it”, while some congressmen from the party ran contrary to the opinion of the leadership, claiming that the decision process of THAAD deployment in the ROK was problematic. The second biggest opposition party PP has opposed THAAD deployment in the ROK, as its congressman Ahn Cheol-soo proposed a referendum on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK. The third biggest opposition party JP has also opposed THAAD deployment in the ROK,as its congressman Kim Jong-dae advocated that the deployment should be approved by the parliament.

Entering 2016, the momentum of the biggest opposition party DPK further expanded, which forced the party to adjust its policy advocate on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK. On April 14 of 2016, the results of the 20th parliamental election came out, with the ruling New National Party failing to obtain more than a half of the 300 parliament seats, which made the opposition DPK the biggest party in the parliament, resulting in a situation of “weak government and strong opposition” in the parliament for the first time in 16 years. On August 28, DPK held the second national meeting of its parliament members, which elected Choo Mi-ae as the new party leader. Different from her predecessor Kim Chong-in, who assumed an ambiguous and relatively neutral attitude on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK, Choo Mi-ae has always opposed THAAD deployment in the ROK. When interviewed by the media after elected as the new party leader, Choo Mi-ae expressed that she would make the opposition to THAAD deployment in the ROK as a unified policy of the party, to prevent conf l icts between China and the US in the Korean Peninsula. In its operations in the parliament, DPK united with other opposition parties to jointly oppose THAAD deployment in the ROK.

In 2016, the tendency of DPRK’s nuclear and missile development was a major external factor that influenced the policy position of the South Korean opposition parties on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK.For instance, on July 19, both the ruling party and the opposition parties unanimously condemned the missile test, with a range covering the whole of South Korea, conducted by DPRK earlier that day, but assumed entirely different attitudes from one another on THAAD deployment in the ROK.The ruling New National Party took the opportunity of DPRK’s repeated provocation to further stress the necessity of THAAD deployment in the ROK,while the opposition parties of DPK and PP tried to avoid discussing the issue of THAAD deployment or expressed denial. Additionally, DPRK conducted the fi fth nuclear test on September 9, which was the largest in history that forced the South Korean opposition parties to “soften” their position on THAAD deployment in the ROK. On September 20, according to the reports of the South Korean media, DPK’s leader Choo Mi-ae said her party would fully study the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK and there would be no fi nal time-table for writing the opposition to THAAD deployment into the “party policy”, while in the past she had insisted on writing it into the “party policy”.And the ex-Chairman of PP Ahn Cheol-soo expressed that “if China refused to put sanctions on DPRK, it would be reasonable for THAAD deployment in the ROK as a way of self-defense”, while in the past he took the lead in writing opposition to THAAD deployment in the ROK into the “party policy”.

Entering 2017, the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK is becoming the drogue for the presidential election in South Korea. On the issue of the US and the ROK accelerating THAAD deployment process in the ROK, the ruling Liberty Korea Party and the right-wing opposition Bareun Party believed that it was reasonable to complete THAAD deployment in the ROK as scheduled, as it would relieve the burden of the next government if the deployment is completed before the election.In contrast, the mainstream opposition parties, such as DPK and PP, have expressed strong opposition, believing it might violate the constitution and requesting the acting President Hwang Kyo-ahn to put aside the disputes and leave the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK to the next government, as they believed the matter should not be promoted by a government impeached by the people. Besides, the ex-Chairman of PP Ahn Cheol-soo expressed concern over the government accelerating THAAD deployment process in the ROK, advocating that the government should make detailed explanation of the decision process on THAAD deployment in the ROK to the public.

III. THAAD Deployment in the ROK and the Division of South Korean Public Opinion

Within South Korea, the interest groups that support THAAD deployment in the ROK mainly include the military (including the armed forces and the military industrial complex), the support base of the ruling New National Party, the elderly that are concerned with security issues and groups that attach importance to the US-ROK alliance.The interest groups that oppose THAAD deployment in the ROK mainly include the residents of Seongju-gun, the chosen site for THAAD deployment; some residents of Gyeongsangbuk-do, to which Seongju-gun belongs; the support bases of most of the opposition parties;the young that are concerned with the economy; people from the economic circle who have trade relations with China; and the intellectual elites who have the comprehensive interests of South Korea in mind. As early as the issue of THAAD deployment came into being, the South Korean National Association of Economists took the lead to oppose it.

As the public opinion surveys indicated, there have been greatly varied cognitions of the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK at different phases of its development, which has made the South Korean society seriously divided. For example, at the time when the South Korean government assumed an attitude of “strategic ambiguity” and made no decision on THAAD deployment in the ROK, South Korea’s JoongAng Ilbo published its survey results in February of 2015 that 55 percent of the interviewees agreed with THAAD deployment in the ROK as “it was intended against the threats from DPRK”, while 32.6 percent of the interviewees opposed the deployment as they considered “relations with China and Russia”. A year later, when the South Korean government decided to discuss the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK, according to the South Korean public opinion survey published by Realm eter in February of 2016, 49.4 percent of the interviewees agreed with the deployment, while 42.3 percent opposed it. When the US and the ROK formally decided to deploy THAAD in South Korea, in accordance with the public opinion survey by Gallup Korea published in August of 2016, 56 percent agreed with THAAD deployment in the ROK, while 31 percent opposed it.

Against the background of the public opinion division found in the surveys,the social mass movement against the THAAD deployment in the ROK did have certain impacts on the government decision process and forced the South Korean government to change the site for THAAD deployment in the ROK.

In addition to the survey results and social mass movement, the public opinion division on the issue of THAAD deployment in the ROK has also shown in the form that there are some South Korean intellectual elites worrying about the development prospect of the China-ROK relationship. In reality, for South Korea, the tensing relationship between it and China is bound to hit its domestic economy, as the South Korean economy is highly dependent on China’s market. In 2015, South Korea’s export to China was about 26 percent of its total export, with more than US$ 50 billion trade surplus from the trade with China, while Chinese tourists visiting South Korea accounted for 45 percent of the total tourists visiting South Korea. As a result, after the Park Geun-hye government formally decided on THAAD deployment,those duty-free shops, hotels, travel agencies and on-line retailers that depend heavily on China became so worried about their sales performance, that the news about China placing “bans on South Korea” got fermented within the South Korean society.

The division of the public opinions within the South Korean society ref l ected from an angle the weighing of advantages and disadvantages as well as gains and losses by various interest groups in South Korea based on different stances, putting some kind of pressure on the government decision of THAAD deployment in the ROK. Although it cannot fundamentally change the decision on THAAD deployment in the ROK, it remains one of the variables that affect the development of the political situation in South Korea.

In sum, in the political process of THAAD deployment in the ROK, the South Korean government has changed from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity” on the basis of comprehensive security considerations, while the ruling party and the opposition parties have never had consensus on the issue and the social opinions have remained seriously divided. This plural opposition in cognitions and stances not only has ref l ected the evolution and complex effects of THAAD deployment in the ROK, but also has increased the uncertainty of the South Korean political development, which has in turn damaged the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.

(Both of the authors are Professors and Doctoral Supervisors from the PLA University of Foreign Language. This article was received on May 30, 2017.)