人工智能与不正当竞争——揭开人工智能监管领域一个被低估的基石

斯蒂芬·舒勒（Stefan Scheuerer） 著 / 完全法律人硕士，慕尼黑马克斯·普朗克创新与竞争研究所初级研究员

黄军 鞠金琪 译 / 青岛大学法学院

一、 引言

长期以来，“人工智能”（简称“AI”）一直是知识产权和竞争法学者的关注焦点。然而，与知识产权和反垄断不同，1. Although hinting at the Anglo-American legal sphere, the term ‘antitrust’ is preferred in this analysis over ‘competition law’ in order to avoid terminological confusion vis-a` -vis ‘unfair competition law’, since (from a European perspective) both regimes can be considered subsets of ‘competition law’, understood as an umbrella term.反不正当竞争法（简称“UCL”）在人工智能监管领域能够并且应当发挥的作用迄今为止在很大程度上被忽视了。2. But see for example WIPO Conversation on Intellectual Property (IP) and Artificial Intelligence (AI), Second Session,‘Revised Issues Paper on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence’ (21 May 2020) para 8: ‘No separate section concerning AI and unfair competition has been added. However, recognizing that IP law and competition law clearly relate,questions have been added in the various sections (...)’.当然，反不正当竞争法是一个复杂的问题——对其本身作为一个法律领域的理解存有争议，而在欧盟成员国之间，更不用说在世界范围内，其在法律秩序中的体系定位和设计存在较大差异——这一事实是解释这一缺陷的一个因素。更重要的是，这部法律体系的潜力似乎值得引起法律界人士的注意，他们对这部法律的关注还不够深入。为了填补前述分析空白，3. Implications of AI for the legal order can be approached either from a ‘legalistic’ viewpoint, ie starting from the doctrinal framework of a specific legal regime, or from a ‘technological’/‘phenomenological’ viewpoint, ie starting from factual problems that arise in an economic, technological or societal context, cf Nicolas Petit, ‘Law and Regulation of Artificial Intelligence and robots: Conceptual Framework and Normative Implications’ (2017) 2 ＜https:/ papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼2931339＞ accessed before 27 November 2020; both approaches are important and complement each other. This articles contributes to the ‘legalistic’ dimension; for a ‘technological’ perspective, see (from an IP angle) Josef Drexl and others,‘Technical Aspects of Artificial Intelligence: An Understanding from an Intellectual Property Law Perspective’ (2019) Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No 19-13 ＜https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab stract_id¼3465577＞ accessed before 27 November 2020.本文研究了被广泛称为人工智能监管的关键支柱和指导范式的一般原则在多大程度上反映在反不正当竞争法的特定子对应物中，从而阐明了反不正当竞争法为其成就作出贡献的潜力。从分析角度来看，本评估过程中的一个特别重点在于从反不正当竞争法角度考虑人工智能提出的突出问题，这些问题通常在不同法律制度下被讨论——以表明这种观点可能会补充甚至取代传统方法。在实质内容方面，将着重关注对反不正当竞争法之于人工智能创新生态系统的作用。最后，从相反的角度，本文将考虑人工智能有可能进一步助推反不正当竞争法理论体系发展的潜力，以及它对全球竞争秩序的意义。

二、场景设置：什么是人工智能，什么是反不正当竞争法，后者能对前者监管起到什么作用

人工智能与反不正当竞争法的共同之处在于，很难说它们到底是什么。人工智能是一个“包罗万象”的术语，指涉的是围绕大数据分析和先进算法的某些新技术，包括“自主”和“自我学习”的情形。为了在为本分析的目的揭开技术术语的神秘面纱时，机器学习（作为最重要和最突出的人工智能技术）将被视为主要参考点。4. For an overview on the technical functioning of ML and its relationship to adjacent AI technologies, see Drexl and others (n 3).反不正当竞争法是一个不那么时髦但同样有歧义的现象：它在国际层面首先体现在1803年 《保护工业产权巴黎公约》第十条之二，其历来被视为在竞争中保护“伦理”或者“商业伦理”，依靠“尊贵商人”的理想模式。现代学界通过运用功能经济学的维度来构建反不正当竞争法，其假定与反垄断法的最终互补性，并将保护竞争作为一项制度的中心目标。5. cf Reto M Hilty, ‘The Law Against Unfair Competition and its Interfaces’ in Reto M Hilty and Frauke Henning-Bodewig(eds), Law Against Unfair Competition - Towards a New Paradigm in Europe? (Springer 2007) 1; Rupprecht Podszun, ‘Der‘more economic approach’ im Lauterkeitsrecht’ [2009] WRP 509.尽管如此，反不正当竞争法规则的准确设计和理解在欧盟成员国和全世界范围内都有相当大的差异：从竞争法的编纂到消费者法、公法；从实质上讲，在保护竞争、消费者和作为一个竞争制度之间摇摆不定。6. For an overview, see Frauke Henning-Bodewig, International Handbook Of Unfair Competition (CH Beck/Hart/Nomos 2013);illustrative of the scattered nature, Richard Arnold, ‘English Unfair Competition Law’ (2013) 44 IIC 63, 77: ‘It is still the case that English law does not recognise any general tort of unfair competition. It does not follow, however, that there is no English law of unfair competition’; on the difficulties of determining UCL, see also Frauke Henning-Bodewig and Achim Spengler,‘Conference Report: “Framing - The ‘Hard Core’ of Unfair Competition Law”’ [2016] GRUR Int 911.尽管欧盟通过《不正当商业行为（UCP）指令》对反不正当竞争法中的企业对消费者（B2C）层面进行了协调，7. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market.但企业对企业（B2B）层面迄今为止尚未被统一。8. As far as the B2C dimension is concerned, this article will focus on European law; as far as the B2B dimension is concerned,on German law as an illustrative and doctrinally advanced example or blueprint.

然而，这种模糊性并不一定是反不正当竞争法潜在运用于人工智能监管领域的不利条件。诚然，鉴于上述分歧，它在协调监管方面几乎不会立即产生效果。然而，首先“监管竞争”的理念可能会带来收益。尤其是欧盟层面的B2B领域反不正当竞争法不协调的事实，从这个角度来看，其应被视为机遇。人工监管领域与其寻求监管的技术同样是动态的。至于如何对待反不正当竞争法视域下的人工智能，各国相互竞争的措施本身可能被视为“监管沙箱”：9. On regulatory sandboxes for data sharing, cf Rupprecht Podszun, ‘Datenpools: Ausprobieren statt differenzieren‘[2019] WUW 289.找到的最佳解决方案可以出口到其他司法管辖区——无论是在立法层面，还是在通过比较法律方法对一般条款进行司法解释的层面。第二，在相关方面，反不正当竞争法固有的特殊灵活性十分契合人工智能领域的动态属性，它将对全部法律秩序的理解最终进行统一。反不正当竞争法可以作为一种“后备”机制发挥可行的作用，在缺乏具体立法情况下以应对新的和不可预见的竞争风险。这种后备属性属于反不正当竞争法的传统特征，它为从理论发展到后来明确的法典化创造了肥沃的土壤。10. cf Herbert Zech, Information als Schutzgegenstand (Mohr Siebeck 2012) 161 f.它在数字经济中获得了更大的意义。

当前人工智能监管原则在反不正当竞争法范式中的体现程度如何？关于人工智能监管框架的争论是动态的、持续的，现在谈论是一个成熟的知识显然还为时过早。尽管如此，在学术探讨和公共及私人机构的众多政策指南中，可以找到总体上且反复出现的相关范式的某种共识。在反复被援引的原则中，包括全面实现“道德”、公平、透明、问责、自主和促进创新。11. cf only High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, ‘Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI’ (2019) ＜https://ec.europa.eu/digital-singlemarket/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai＞ ccessed before 27 November 2020; OECD, ‘Council Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence’ (2019) ＜https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/ OECD-LEGAL-0449＞accessed before 27 November 2020; this list of values is by no means exhaustive, yet these appear to be the most prominent ones.以下考虑事项将阐明，反不正当竞争法如何具体有助于实现这些目标。

三、“人工智能伦理”和“商业伦理”：监管嵌合体的(非)融合

首先，人们通常可以思考，人们所广泛宣扬的“人工智能伦理”12. cf High-Level Expert Group (n 11); IEEE, ‘Ethically Aligned Design - A Vision for Prioritzing Human Well-being with Autonomous and Intelligent Systems’ (2019) ＜https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieeestandards/standards/web/documents/other/ead1e.pdf?utm_medium¼ undefined&utm_source¼undefined&utm_campaign¼undefined&utm_content¼undefined&utm_term¼undefined＞ accessed before 27 November 2020.的愿景与“商业伦理”的概念之间是否存在联系，这种联系通常或至少在历史上与反不正当竞争法有关。这显然触及了关于反不正当竞争法到底是什么的争论内核。正如前文所述，在其历史根源上曾经是一个涉及竞争“伦理”的法律领域。13. It is worth noting, however, that now as before, irrespective of the ‘moral’ rhetoric and underpinnings, the practical application of the law has often followed a functional balancing of interests.尽管这种理解在很大程度上被现代经济功能方法所取代，但旧的理解碎片仍然渗透在法律、判决和学术探讨之中，各成员国的侧重点也各不相同。如果有人认为“商业伦理”在法律秩序中仍有一席之地，而该领域就是反不正当竞争法，那么将相关原则与“人工智能伦理”的要求结合起来似乎并不牵强。然而，本文的立场并非宣扬这一主张，而是要指出迫切需要对“伦理”叙事进行去神秘化。首先也是最重要的是，如果缺少“法律”的镜像，就很难有“伦理”价值观，尤其是与各自价值观有关的基本权利或人权，14. cf High-Level Expert Group (n 11) 37, however, considering fundamental rights a mere sub-realisation of ethics.这使得“伦理”的整个概念更令人困惑，而不是有助于实现法学研究目的。其次，通常被视为“不道德”的行为往往与反竞争行为具有一致性。在任何情况下，显然只有“人工智能伦理”中与市场和竞争相关或影响市场和竞争的部分才与反不正当竞争法相关。最后，当涉及具体法律运作时，所有这些问题，无论其形而上学的起源如何，均可归结为所有市场参与者合法利益的平衡。这种平衡是反不正当竞争法理论的核心。因此，以下考虑将包含法律而非“伦理”反思。

四、公平

人工智能和反不正当竞争法最明显、同时也是最复杂的潜在“共同点”是“公平”原则本身。从表面上看，反不正当竞争法中的“公平”和人工智能语境中的“公平”可能被认为除了术语之外并无共同之处：人工智能争论中的“公平”大多被理解为平等原则和禁止“有偏见”的歧视，反不正当竞争法中“公平”旨在保护竞争或至少与竞争相关的利益。15. Of course, some phenomena of ‘discrimination’ have immediate competitive relevance, for example the prohibition imposed on dominant companies not to apply dissimilar conditions under art 102(c) TFEU; on the connection between anti-discrimination legislation and UCL, see also section VIII.2. below.然而，这两个概念不仅具有内在的开放性和模糊性。16. cf High-Level Expert Group (n 11) 12: ‘(...) we acknowledge that there are many different interpretations of fairness (...)’.人们也不应忽视人工智能的（错误）使用可能带来的诸多负面影响，尤其是对竞争的负面影响。虽然这主要体现在反垄断场景中，如“算法共谋”，17. cf only Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt and Francisco Beneke, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Collusion’ (2019) 50 IIC 109.但人工智能影响的领域往往与传统上的反不正当竞争法相关，尤其是与“消费者保护”的相关领域。下面将提供示例。尽管禁止“不正当”商业行为的反不正当竞争法一般条款的显著特性固然可以解决新的和不可预见的竞争风险，但基于逻辑原因，本文没有对此进行进一步阐述。

虽然这不是深入探讨“公平”的实质意义（或者更确切地说：它所包含的多重维度）的持续和长期争论的地方，但反不正当竞争法对“公平”市场秩序的一个非常具体的贡献值得强调：它与反垄断法的监管互补性。从实质上讲，反不正当竞争法可以解决未能达到市场支配地位反垄断要求的竞争问题。18. cf Heike Schweitzer and others, ‘Modernisierung der Missbrauchsaufsicht fu¨ r marktma¨ chtige Unternehmen’(2018)107,110＜https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Wirtschaft/modern isierung-der-missbrauchsaufsichtfuer-marktmaechtige-unternehmen. html＞ accessed before 27 November 2020; Peter Picht and Gaspare Loderer, ‘Framing Algorithms - Competition Law and (Other) Regulatory Tools’ (2018) Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No 18-24, 33 ＜https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3275198＞ accessed before 27 November 2020: ‘Although not addressed in detail here, rules against unfair competition are another major element, both as a template for and a tool complementary to the provisions against cartels and abuse of dominance’; on data access as a concrete example where this complementarity becomes relevant, see section IX.1. below.鉴于在数据驱动型市场中确定市场力量的难度，其重要性愈加凸显。19. cf Boris Paal and Moritz Hennemann, ‘Big Data im Recht’ [2017] NJW 1697, 1699.当然，考虑到理论的体系性，必须谨慎，不要绕过或破坏反垄断法的结论性决定，即非支配主体采取的某些行为在反不正当竞争法中并不具有违法性。然而，如果人们依循对反不正当竞争法的“现代”理解，将保护竞争作为一项机制置于其目的的关注中心，那么其一般条款可以作为解决反垄断领域之外人工智能所引致的市场失灵的基石。

五、透明

透明是人工智能监管的核心准则。人们普遍希望人工智能本身的解决（与纯人类决策相反）和人工智能实现决策的具体方式（通常被称为“黑箱”问题，通过努力实现“可解释的人工智能”来反映）均是透明的。20. Of course, the feasibility of transparency in the latter regard ultimately depends on the technological state of the art, cf Deven Desai and Joshua Kroll, ‘Trust But Verify - A Guide to Algorithms and the Law’ (2017) 31 Harvard Journal of Law &Technology 1.当前透明有多种表现形式，但一个重要的形式无疑是市场透明度。保护市场透明度的传统体系领域是反不正当竞争法，其禁止误导性商业行为。21. cf Section 1, arts 6 and 7 UCP Directive.在各自理论测试下，最终具有决定性是一项决策的起源是基于算法还是人为的，以及这是否会影响消费者的商业决策。22. cf Benjamin Raue and Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, ‘Ethische und rechtliche Grundsa¨ tze der Datenverwendung‘[2020]ZRP 49, 52.

1.基于人工智能的个性化

人工智能应用的主要和最具经济价值的领域之一是用于个性化策略，尤其是个性化定价和个性化广告。23. On personalised advertising see Guido Noto La Diega, ‘Data as Digital Assets. The Case of Targeted Advertising’ in Mor Bakhoum and others (eds), Personal Data in Competition, Consumer Protection and Intellectual Property Law - Towards a Holistic Approach? (Springer 2018) 447. The extent to which such personalisation actually happens in practice remains dubious, cf OECD Secretariat, ‘Personalised Pricing in the Digital Era’ (2018) ＜https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)146/en/pdf＞ accessed before 27 November 2020; further empirical research is needed in this area.围绕是否应当禁止或限制这种个性化策略展开了激烈辩论，即使这些策略是提高整体福利的，理据在于消费者普遍认为它们是“不正当的”或者“不公正的”。24. See on this debate Christopher Townley, Eric Morrison and Karen Yeung, ‘Big Data and Personalised Price Discrimination in EU Competition law’ (2017) King’s College London Dickson Poon School of Law Research Paper No 2017-38 ＜https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id¼3048688＞ accessed before 27 November 2020; Gerhard Wagner and Horst Eidenmu¨ ller, ‘Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents, Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized Transactions’ (2019) 86 University Of Chicago Law Review 581, 587.在不深入讨论情形下，有一件事似乎是无可争议的：消费者必须知道他或她受制于个性化策略，而未得到同等对待。25. On the respective regulatory potential of UCL, see Picht and Loderer (n 18) 33; Wagner and Eidenmu¨ ller (n 24) 590; cf also the precontractual information duty on personalised pricing on the basis of automated decision-making according to art 4(4)(a)(ii) Directive (EU) 2019/ 2161.在某种程度上，如果消费者不是基于自主和知情的决策行事，个性化可能因此违反反不正当竞争法规定的透明度规则。26. cf Helga Zander-Hayat, Lucia Reisch and Christine Steffen, ‘Personalisierte Preise - eine verbraucherpolitische Einordnung’[2016]VuR 407; Franz Hofmann, ‘Der maßgeschneiderte Preis - Dynamische und individuelle Preise aus lauterkeitsrechtlicher Sicht’ [2016] WRP 1080; on the implications for consumer ‘autonomy’, see section VII. below.尤其是价格透明度的缺失会造成信息不对称，从而消除了对竞争至关重要的价格比较可能性，进而损害经济福利。27. cf Zander-Hayat, Reisch and Steffen (n 26) 407 f.当然，精确的信息要求也有争议：为了不引起“信息过载”，必须对其加以平衡，28. In this regard, personalisation offers interesting possibilities: each consumer could get personalised information, exactly suiting his or her capabilities, situation and needs. Ultimately, this is one aspect of what is currently discussed under the vision of ‘personalised law’, cf (critically) Philip Bender, ‘Limits of Personalization of Default Rules - Towards a Normative Theory’(2020) Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No 2020-02 ＜https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3544029＞ accessed before 27 November 2020.并且必须根据在特定社会或商业环境中合理预期或常见（包括人工智能的使用程度）来解释，29. According to Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz and Monika Namyslowska, ‘§ 5a UWG’ in Gerhard Spindler and Fabian Schuster(eds), Recht der elektronischen Medien (4th edn, CH Beck 2019), average consumers don’t expect prices to be personalised, and this circumstance may be relevant for their commercial decision. Conversely, should personalised pricing develop to become such common practice that the public generally expects to be subjected to personalised prices as the new digital normal, the misleading character would vanish.以及对于所讨论的商业传播媒介，哪些履行信息义务的方式和方法是适当的。30. Considerations de lege ferenda include a duty to highlight the use of AI via visual symbols, cf Martin Ebers, ‘Ku¨ nstliche Intelligenz und Verbraucherschutz’ [2020] VuR 121.

2.人工智能相关营销的进一步示例

除了个性化，反不正当竞争法还可以解决人工智能相关营销活动的透明度问题。首先，鉴于“人工智能”术语的模糊性，人们可以考虑在“AI”一个误导性实践的诱人承诺下，对“正常”计算机软件的营销行为进行讨论。其次，企业越来越多地公布与人工智能相关的行为准则，在这些准则中，其或多或少的具体说明了他们打算如何使用人工智能来造福社会，并避免欢迎的行为。31. cf Google, ‘AI at Google: our principles’ (7J une 2018) ＜https://www. blog.google/technology/ai/ai-principl es/＞ accessed before 27 November 2020.这些准则可被视为“企业数字责任”现象的一部分，即“企业社会责任”的数字化延续。32. On the latter, see comprehensively Reto M Hilty and Frauke Henning-Bodewig (eds), Corporate Social Responsibility.Verbindliche Standards des Wettbewerbsrechts? (Springer 2014).

如果一家公司违反了该准则中的声明，反不正当竞争法将在打击欺骗行为和恢复市场透明度方面发挥重要作用。33. cf Frauke Henning-Bodewig, ‘TRIPS and Corporate Social Responsibility: Unethical Equals Unfair Business Practices?’ in Hanns Ullrich and others (eds), TRIPS plus 20 (Springer 2016) 701, 714.因为，如果公司想利用他们的“良好表现”作为针对重视此种表现的消费者的竞争优势，那么唯有在所做的宣传得到切实履行的情况下，基于这些理由的竞争才能发挥作用。在这方面，法律适用的主要问题是许多声明的模糊性。34. cf ibid.例如，人们很难从诸如以“有益社会”35. Google (n 31) principle No 1.方式使用人工智能的承诺中得出结论。

再次，另一组可能越来越具有相关性的案例来自知识产权法领域，并且涉及区分无形商品尤其是在版权意义上看起来像“作品”的无形商品是由人类创造的，还是在人工智能的大力帮助下创造的必要性。对于“人工智能生成”作品的知识产权保护的正当性而言，大量的人工指导是否是必要的，这一问题一直且将进一步让知识产权学者忙碌。36. cf in more detail section IX.2. below.然而，可以肯定的是，在法律上讨论“人类制造”和“人工智能生成”的区别面临着一个现实挑战，即必须辨别各自的起源。其中的一个市场解决方案有赖于消费者对于人工生成作品的评价，而不是人工智能生成的作品，如果实际上无法区分彼此，则不起作用。37. On this ‘market solution’, see in more detail Reto M Hilty, Jo¨ rg Hoffmann and Stefan Scheuerer, ‘Intellectual Property Justification for Artificial Intelligence’ (2020) Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No 20-02, 11＜https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3539406＞ accessed before 27 November 2020.如果AI生成的“作品”被当作人造产品进行营销，这种营销无论是主动还是被动地隐瞒人工智能的来源，都可能构成不正当竞争行为：一种误导行为。38. In this regard, it should be noted that the potential non-registrability of subject matter generated ‘autonomously’ by AI may also lead companies to conceal the use of AI when registering their inventions or designs, cf WIPO (n 2) para (vii); Sven Hetmank and Anne Lauber-Ro¨ nsberg, ‘Ku¨ nstliche Intelligenz - Herausforderungen fu¨ r das Immaterialgu¨ terrecht’ [2018]GRUR 574, 581 therefore suggest that a labelling requirement as to AI involvement could be introduced as a protection criterion for AI-generated products to establish transparency; on deceptive conduct before patent offices and potential remedies, see generally Eugenio Hoss, Deceptive Conducts before the Patent Office (Nomos 2019).

六、责任

确保企业对其人工智能造成的“自动”损害负责是与人工智能相关的最“经典”的法律问题。39. An aspect worth highlighting in this context is the overestimation of the relevance of ‘autonomy’ notions: in many cases, it is simply decisive whether there has been (in)sufficient guidance of foreseeability of certain AI-induced results ‘on the human side’, irrespective of the ‘autonomy’ degree ‘on the AI side’.最典型的例子是自动驾驶汽车碾压行人。然而，AI也可能“自主地”损害知识产权或总体竞争。在反不正当竞争法的案例中，关键问题在于确定是由或者在企业人工智能帮助下实施的不公平商业行为的责任。在近期的学术讨论之中，人们便强调了对此类“归因问题”的整体概念的需要，即将围绕“次要责任”等概念的有点支离破碎的理论框架整合到一个连贯的框架中。40. cf Franz Hofmann, ‘Disziplinarita¨ t, Intradisziplinarita¨ t und Interdisziplinarita¨ t am Beispiel der Grundsa¨ tze “mittelbarer Verantwortlichkeit”’ [2018] JZ 746; on harmonisation possibilities of intermediary liability cf Matthias Leistner, ‘Intermediary Liability in a Global World’ in Tatiana Eleni Synodinou (ed), Pluralism or Universalism in International Copyright Law (Kluwer Law 2019)当具体从人工智能角度来构建这样的框架时，在已有经验基础上构建框架，即在不同法律制度的责任归因领域已经形塑的范例，而不是从零开始创造全新的概念，这种做法似乎是明智的。反不正当竞争法可以是这些理论上鼓舞人心的制度之一。

在德国，“竞争中违反注意义务的责任”的概念是根据反不正当竞争法一般条款发展而来的，从而作为知识产权法“侵权责任”的一种替代方案。41. cf German Federal Supreme Court, 12 July 2007, I ZR 18/04 - Jugendgefa¨ hrdende Medien bei ebay.它提供了将反竞争行为归责于公司的理论指导，使得公司对未履行其阻止相关行为的职责负责。该范式特别是在或者为了互联网群加以发展和改进，特别需要对相应措施的范围和“合理性”制定标准，包括它们在多大程度上包含防止未来相同或类似侵权行为的义务。42. cf Ansgar Ohly, ‘§ 8 UWG’ in Ansgar Ohly and Olaf Sosnitza (eds), Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (7th edn, CH Beck 2016) para 127.已经有人提出将这一概念作为一种潜在的合理模型移转于人工智能情形引发的违反反垄断法行为的情形。43. cf Moritz Hennemann, ‘Ku¨ nstliche Intelligenz und Wettbewerbsrecht’ [2018] ZWeR 161, 180 f.它可能为归因分歧提供有价值的架构、先例和参考因素，提升法律确定性，并在商业自由和防止损害之间实现经济上的合理权衡。最后，鉴于充分责任和创新之间的联系，这一问题也可以被视为反不正当竞争法对促进人工智能创新的贡献，这一目标将在下文第九部分进一步阐述。

七、自主性

如果我们遵循科幻小说启发的概念，人工智能的最终威胁是其取代人类的潜力。然而，保护人类自主性是人工智能监管原则的核心。44. cf only High-Level Expert Group (n 11) 12; OECD (n 11) IV.1.2.a).反不正当竞争法建立在并致力于维护人类经济的一个非常重要的子方面：消费者作为市场参与者的自主性，他们让竞争的概念在履行其“仲裁员角色”时发挥作用。人工智能在此方面提出了两方面的问题。

1.供应商使用人工智能的自主性威胁

人工智能在供应端的使用，尤其是在个性化策略中的使用，将新产品和广告完全基于既有偏好，可能会在“过滤泡沫”中捕获消费者。在这种偏好定制系统的扩散过程中，来自各种市场选项的自主性选择可能会消减。然而，好消息是，反不正当竞争法大体上提供了解决这些威胁的方法：如前所述，透明度要求至少缓解了紧张情形。45. cf section V.1. above; Wagner and Eidenmu¨ ller (n 24) 590 on personalised pricing: ‘An obligation to disclose the application of first-degree price discrimination appears innocuous and potentially effective to leverage consumer autonomy.’消费者自愿或非自愿地进入或停留在过滤泡沫之中，这是一种自主选择，尽管自愿丧失自我能力的悖论和危险人所周知。在这种情形下，反不正当竞争法似乎是对抗过度“过滤泡沫”问题的以竞争为导向的子支柱。46. A parallel problem regarding ‘filter bubbles of opinion’ threatening democracy is debated in the media law realm, cf Josef Drexl, ‘Bedrohung der Meinungsvielfalt durch Algorithmen’ [2017] ZUM 529.

2.消费者使用人工智能的自主性威胁

（甚至）更成问题的是，消费者使用人工智能的镜像维度，特别是在依赖物联网（以下简称“IoT”）应用时，“算法消费者”一词已经被创造出来。47. Niva Elkin-Koren and Michal Gal, ‘Algorithmic Consumers’ (2017) 30 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 309.一个例子是“智能家居”中的“自动冰箱”，它可以在没有人类消费者（主动）参与的情况下（根据先前的偏好）订购新的食物。一方面，这种使用可能构成一种受欢迎的“以牙还牙”对抗策略，以对抗企业对人工智能的损害，恢复技术和信息的平衡，同时，从人类学的角度来看，它可能会剥夺消费者作为理性市场代理人的能力，因为他们的所有决策均由人工智能工具来完成。48. cf the concerns articulated by Josef Drexl at the ‘Consumer Law Days 2019’ conference, reported by Jure Globocnik and Stefan Scheuerer, ‘Datenzugang, Verbraucherinteressen und Gemeinwohl - Bericht u¨ ber die Verbraucherrechtstage 2019 des Bundesministeriums der Justiz und fu¨ r Verbraucherschutz in Berlin’ (2020) 11 JIPITEC 228, 229.

关于反不正当竞争法应对自身基础威胁的潜在解决方案，在理论上接受并调整“算法消费者”，尤其是“一般消费者”标准的构建似乎是必要的，49. The ‘average consumer’ standard, against which misleading practices are judged, is not only challenged by personalisation phenomena that question the very concept of ‘average’ (cf Peter Rott, ‘Der “Durchschnittsverbraucher” - ein Auslaufmodell angesichts personalisierten Marketings?’ [2015] VuR 163). Also, with a view to ‘algorithmic consumers’, a ‘technicised’reconstruction of this hypothetical figure as ‘average algorithmic consumer’ may become necessary.但不足以解决自主性问题。相反，如同其他法律领域一样，很可能有必要“让人参与其中”。例如，冰箱可能会被迫不时查看消费者，询问他们的偏好是否发生了变化，或者是否对新的报价感兴趣。这样的义务通常必须在反不正当竞争法之外实现。

尽管如此，反不正当竞争法借助其在消费者选择模式方面的丰富经验，可以为决策者提供理论指导，以评估有多少决策权可以委托给“算法消费者”，以及有多少决策权不能委托给“算法消费者”，而不破坏市场秩序本身的功能。尤其是，反不正当竞争法理论可以在此方面影响关于通过设计实现各自规范的争论。50. cf IEEE (n 12).

八、反不正当竞争法作为与人工智能相关的特别反不正当竞争法市场行为规则的实施工具

（一）在执法环境中定位反不正当竞争法

反不正当竞争法可以作为反不正当竞争法以外各类市场行为规则的（额外）执行支柱，违反这些规则会通过“违反法定义务”这一原则对竞争产生负面影响。在程序方面，这一选择通过竞争对手和消费者协会释放了执法的可能性，许多法律秩序有赖于反不正当竞争法，从而在与反垄断法相关的国家当局之外提供了一种制度性补充。冗长的行政程序相比，这种执法方式速度更快、更灵活，因此显示出特别适合人工智能和数字经济的特征。从实质上讲，“违反法定义务”似乎是一个恰当的理论工具，可以将正在进行的有关数字经济中保护消费者利益的法律领域日益趋同的讨论付诸实施。在这些机制下可能受到制裁的众多违法行为中，有三种似乎与人工智能背景尤为相关：歧视、个人数据保护和网络安全。51. The phenomena of discrimination and personal data protection can be seen in conjunction with the personalisation problem outlined above, as personalisation can be based on data gathering in violation of data protection rules, and if the personalisation relies on traits protected by anti-discrimination laws, it may also violate the latter.

（二）市场相关环境下基于人工智能的歧视

反歧视立法是从法律上判断“人工智能偏见”问题的标准。尽管反歧视规则不是与市场行为相关的规则，但在反不正当竞争法范域内，它们可以在某些情况下适用。一个明显的例子是上述商业环境中的个性化策略，即如果个性化是基于反歧视法禁止提及的特征，如种族或性别。尽管这些方面在一开始就以非经济价值为基础，如人的尊严和个性，但它们仍然影响和限制着企业在市场上的行为表现。

（三）竞争与隐私：是敌是友?

AI对社会造成的最基本与最具体52. As opposed to the more far-reaching sci-fi dystopias circling around the discourse.的威胁在于它有能力建立全方位的监控，包括国家和私营企业的监控。53. cf Marc Amstutz, ‘Dateneigentum’ (2018) 218 AcP 438, 520, diagnosing the threat of ‘algorithmic governmentality’ based on big data gathering (although not considering data protection laws the correct or sufficient remedy).因此，将强有力的数据保护规则与竞争规则所追求的以市场和福利为导向的经济目标保持一致至关重要。54. In this regard it is worth highlighting that both welfare and data protection are collective societal interests, cf Indra Spiecker genannt Do¨ hmann at the Consumer Law Days 2019 (n 48) 233.德国竞争主管机构联邦反垄断局对Facebook的调查引发了关于竞争法和数据保护法之间关系的激烈辩论，该机构将滥用主要基于支配地位的行为视为违反数据保护规则。55. Bundeskartellamt, 6 February 2019, B6-22/16; German Federal Supreme Court, 23 June 2020, KVR 69/19 - Facebook II; see on the respective discussion Marco Botta and Klaus Wiedemann, ‘The Interaction of EU Competition, Consumer, and Data Protection Law in the Digital Economy: The Regulatory Dilemma in the Facebook Odyssey’ (2019) 64 The Antitrust Bulletin 428; Klaus Wiedemann, ‘A Matter of Choice: The German Federal Supreme Court’s Interim Decision in the AbuseofDominance Proceedings Bundeskartellamt v. Facebook (Case KVR 69/ 19)’ (2020) 51 IIC 1168.与此同时，还有一种讨论是关于违反数据保护是否可以作为违反反不正当竞争法的法定义务予以制裁。56. cf Ansgar Ohly, ‘UWG-Rechtsschutz bei Versto¨ ßen gegen die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung?’ [2019] GRUR 686.如果人们遵循上述反垄断法和反不正当竞争法之间目的互补的观点，认可两部法律本质上均是为了保护有效竞争（或最大化福利）的同一目标，然后将这两条讨论进路联系并结合起来似乎至关重要。57. cf Torsten Ko¨ rber, ‘Die Facebook-Entscheidung des Bundeskartellamtes’ [2019] NZKart 187, considering the Facebook proceedings an antitrust equivalent to UCL’s breach of statutory duty doctrine.从反垄断的角度来看，检验的是违反数据保护规则的行为是否可以被视为属于市场主导行为人“利用”客户或“阻碍”竞争对手的既定类别；在反不正当竞争法语境下，需要违反市场行为规则，并对市场参与者的（与竞争相关的）利益产生相当大的影响。然而，这两个方面的共同问题似乎是，数据保护规则在多大程度上与竞争有内在联系，或者因违反数据保护法而对竞争造成损害需要哪些特定于竞争的“额外条件”。58. As regards breach of statutory duty in the EU, the discussion is overlapped by the systematic issue of whether the GDPR sanction regime is conclusive and thus prevents relying on additional enforcement mechanisms. This question is out of the scope of this paper, as it gives no guidance on the substantive relationship between data protection law and competition law.

这个问题的答案很复杂，而且反思仍在继续。然而，本文希望强调一些理论指引：首先，将“隐私”理解为一种经济商品并将其纳入经济福利理论的努力需要进一步追求和推进。59. Welfare theory is ultimately about the (pareto-)optimal allocation of goods: if privacy can be understood as a good that has to be optimally allocated, it may well be included in an overall welfare doctrine spanning both competition and data protection law; on the economics of privacy, see Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis Taylor and Liad Wagman, ‘The Economics of Privacy’ (2016)54 Journal of Economic Literature 442; pessimistic, Bertin Martens at the Consumer Law Days 2019 (n 48) 231, considering the economic value of privacy still being insufficiently understood and economics thus being of little help for balancing welfare with data protection interests; optimistic, Ryan Calo, ‘Privacy and Markets: A Love Story’ (2016) 91 Notre Dame Law Review 649.这样，隐私作为数字经济的核心消费者利益，最终可能会被视为“消费者福利”的组成部分。遵循一种普遍思路，这是竞争法应当追求的规范性标准，同时也被认为是需要重构和适应数字时代的标准。60. cf European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Preliminary Opinion: Privacy and competitiveness in the age of big data: The interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the Digital Economy’ (March 2014) para 71＜https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/ publication/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf＞ accessed before 27 November 2020: ‘Given the reach and dynamic growth in online services, it may therefore be necessary to develop a concept of consumer harm, particularly through violation of rights to data protection, for competition enforcement in digital sectors of the economy’.其次，关于隐私/人格61. There are complex differentiations regarding the concepts of ‘privacy’ and ‘personality’ and their interrelation. Elaborating on these lies beyond the scope of this article.和知识产权概念上重叠的理论知识应纳入讨论：尽管这两种制度的侧重点不同，但都作为无形标的物权利的基础被纳入了基于经济和人格本位的理由中，同时针对知识产权与竞争法之间关系的理解似乎远比隐私与竞争法之间更为进步。62. On the relationship between privacy and intellectual property, cf Diana Liebenau, ‘What Intellectual Property Can Learn from Informational Privacy, and Vice Versa’ (2016) 30 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 285; on a historical side note,it seems illustrative to recall that the influential German scholar Josef Kohler once considered the whole body of (B2B) UCL as protecting the ‘personality interests’ of companies, cf Josef Kohler, Der unlautere Wettbewerb (Rothschild 1914) 17 ff; one can still reflect on whether to locate in particular trade secrecy interests purely in the realm of economics, to view them from an IP angle, or to theorise them in conjunction with privacy and ‘corporate personality’ paradigms.第三，无论如何，这种反思的结果很可能是数据保护规则的混合属性，包括一些可以适用于经济范式的要素和其他不能适用于经济范式的要素。63. cf the differentiation by Francisco Costa-Cabral and Orla Lynskey, ‘The Internal and External Constraints of Data Protection on Competition Law in the EU’ (2015) LSE Working Papers 25/2015, 3, assuming that ‘EU data protection norms may impose both an internal and an external constraint on the application of competition law’.第四，也是最后一点，尽管存在目的多元化和重叠性，但必须注意一条基本的系统分界线：在不损害竞争情况下，数据保护不能也不应通过竞争机制纯粹以“执法协助”为由来实施。64. Against an expansionist use of breach of statutory duty in non-market related contexts, see generally Ansgar Ohly, ‘§3a UWG’ in Ansgar Ohly and Olaf Sosnitza (n 42) para 21; anyway, the rather strong enforcement regime of the GDPR has mitigated the need of externally assisting the formerly ‘toothless tiger’ data protection law.

（四）网络安全

网络安全对于人工智能和物联网生态系统的运行和信誉至关重要。需要防止黑客入侵的“自动驾驶汽车”再次提供了一个例证。虽然网络安全的法律理论仍处于起步阶段，但其作为一套市场行为规则的性质似乎是无可争议的。65. For a comparative law overview on the legal framework, cf DennisKenji Kipker and Sven Mueller, ‘International Regulation of Cybersecurity - Legal and Technical Requirements’ [2019] MMRAktuell 414291.如果违反此类规则，反不正当竞争法规定的责任可以作为（额外）诱因，促使企业充分维护各自的标准。66. cf Thomas Riehm and Stanislaus Meier, ‘Rechtliche Durchsetzung von Anforderungen an die IT-Sicherheit’ [2020] MMR 571, 574 f.

九、反不正当竞争法对促进人工智能创新监管框架的贡献

人工智能的另一个关键承诺是促进创新。反不正当竞争法至少可在三个方面为促进创新法律框架作出贡献，以下概述之。

（一）反不正当竞争法背景下的数据访问

数据访问是人工智能创新的关键之所在。特别是“机器学习”严重依赖数据。过去几年里，关于获取这些数据的争论已经取得了很大进展。67. Numerous possible doctrinal foundations de lege lata and de lege ferenda have been invoked for granting such access; for a comprehensive overview, cf Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection and Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition (eds), Data Access, Consumer Interests and Public Welfare (Conference Volume on the Consumer Law Days 2019)(forthcoming).然而，在讨论中很少考虑从反不正当竞争法领域推断数据访问机制的选项。68. See the proposal of Drexl at the Consumer Law Days 2019 (n 48) 237 and 238; in detail, Josef Drexl, ‘Connected Devices- An Unfair Competition Law Approach to Data Access Rights of Users’ (2020) Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No 20- 22 ＜https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3746163＞ accessed before 31 December 2020.如果数据访问利益可以定位于传统上与反不正当竞争法的相关领域，那么出于体系一致性的原因，它们应该位于那里而非其他领域。69. On the value and necessity of locating claims in the fitting legal regime, see the discussion at the Consumer Law Days 2019(n 48) 238; from the perspective of applicable law, Drexl (n 68) 42.然而除此之外，还应探究反不正当竞争法作为竞争相关问题的创新“蓄水池”的潜力，对于这些问题，其他任何系统领域都不是直观的、显眼的或在眼前的。70. On this feature of UCL, see section II. above.反不正当竞争法进路可以解决与B2B和B2C维度相关的访问问题，而且似乎不需要明确的法律提案，71. But see in this vein Drexl (n 48) 237.尽管这肯定利于法律的明确性。相反，就目前而言，反不正当竞争法一般条款可以胜任此项任务。

首先，横向请求可能导致“故意阻碍竞争对手”的后果，德国反不正当竞争法针对B2B行为设置了“小一般条款”，其基于整体利益平衡，认定B2B行为是不正当的。72. § 4 No 4 UWG (‘gezielte Behinderung’); this doctrinal option was first brought to my attention by an oral statement of Matthias Leistner.作为这样一种利益，根据反不正当竞争法的基本原理，人们可以突出整个市场的运行和竞争。其优势尤其在于，在反垄断法意义上没有主导地位的情况下，市场失灵可以得到补救。73. On the antitrust framework for data access, cf Josef Drexl, ‘Designing Competitive Markets for Industrial Data’ (2017) 8 JIPITEC 257, 280 ff; under a UCL approach, it is also conceivable to draw on the antitrust criteria the CJEU has established in its ‘essential facility’ doctrine (cf Case C-418/01 IMS Health ECLI:EU:C:2004:257) as a starting point and then develop them further, duly heeding differences and specificities; on FRAND principles as a potential role model for data access, cf Heiko Richter and Peter R Slowinski, ‘The Data Sharing Economy: On the Emergence of New Intermediaries’ (2019) 50 IIC 4; in any case, aligning the ‘fairness’ element of FRAND with a claim based on unfair competition law appears apt at least on the terminological surface.在获取数据方面，市场失灵是多方面的，不仅限于滥用垄断权力的情形。74. For an overview of potential market failures relating to data access, see Bertin Martens, ‘Data Access, Consumer Interests and Social Welfare: An Economic Perspective’ (2020) ＜https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id¼3605383＞accessed before 27 November 2020.这也应该放在源于德国反垄断法（《反限制竞争法》第20条）“输出”的“相对市场支配地位”概念背景下进行看待，尽管在欧洲层面上缺乏类似规定，但其在规范数字经济方面具有相当大的潜在意义。75. cf Heike Schweitzer at the Consumer Law Days 2019 (n 48) 231; Drexl (n 68) 33, 36, 41.

在反垄断中，其他司法管辖区考虑采用这样的考量因素，似乎并不令人信服； 相反，一个有效的选择是将它们解释为反不正当竞争法中的体系混合现象。从实质上讲，某种权力不对称（但低于支配阈值）可能会（共同）决定干预的衡量标准。76. cf Martin Peitz and Heike Schweitzer, ‘Ein neuer europa¨ischer Ordnungsrahmen fu¨ r Datenma¨ rkte?’ [2018] NJW 275,280, encouraging the development of case groups of ‘data-related exclusionary conduct’ in B2B relationships beyond market dominance constellations.

其次，尤其是在消费者的访问意愿方面，反不正当竞争法似乎是理想的体系空间，因为其B2C维度通常被归类为“消费者保护法”领域。77. See Drexl (n 48) 237, arguing that the constellation resembles the rules of advertising, a traditional key realm of UCL;comprehensively, Drexl (n 68) 40 ff; see also Jo¨ rg Hoffmann and Begonia Gonzalez Otero, ‘Demystifying the Role of Data Interoperability in the Access and Sharing Debate’ (2020) Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No 20-16, 20 ＜https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id¼3705217＞ accessed before 27 November 2020.在某种程度上，访问与可移转性相对应，基于反不正当竞争法的可移转性机制可与通用数据保护条例（GDPR）的第20条的行为范式结合，在数字消费者福利的共同愿景下进行理论化。关于授予此类访问权的实质性标准，有人建议，为了最佳使用连接设备，必须使用某些数据，并将该声明构造为“连接性声明”，甚至超出了可移转性。78. According to Drexl (n 48) 238, it appears ‘fair’ to grant data access to consumers who need such access in order to use their device in an economically sound manner; on consumer access needs in the IoT, cf also Drexl (n 68); Josef Drexl, ‘Data access and control in the era of connected devices’ (2019) ＜https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2018-121_ data_access_and_control_in_the_area_of_connected_devices.pdf＞ accessed before 27 November 2020.

（二）反不正当竞争法与“人工智能与知识产权”对话，第1部分：市场敏感型投资保护

虽然整个学界似乎均在讨论人工智能及其输出的传统知识产权，尤其是版权和专利保护，79. cf Jyh-An Lee, Kung-Chung Liu and Reto M Hilty (eds), Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property (OUP 2021)(forthcoming); Ryan Abbott, ‘I Think Therefore I Invent’ (2016) 57 Boston College Law Review 1079; Ana Ramalho, ‘Will robots rule the (artistic) world?’ (2017) 21 Journal of Internet Law 15; Annemarie Bridy, ‘Coding Creativity’ (2012) 5 Stanford Technology Law Review 1.但立足反不正当竞争法对相关主题的保护却鲜有受到学界关注。80. But see Tim W Dornis, ‘Artificial Creativity: Emergent Works and the Void in Current Copyright Doctrine’ (2020) 22 Yale Journal of Law and Technology 1, 25 ff; Tim W Dornis, ‘Der Schutz ku¨ nstlicher Kreativita¨ t im Immaterialgu¨ terrecht’ [2019]GRUR 1252, 1256 f; Daniel Gervais, ‘Exploring the Interfaces between Big Data and Intellectual Property Law’ (2019) 10 JIPITEC 3, 19 para 84; Drexl (n 73) 270 para 62.是填补这一空白的时候了。81. Trade secret protection as a hybrid regime between IP and UCL will be considered separately in section IX.3. below.

1.通过反不正当竞争法保护人工智能创新：实践风险和理论视野

一个长期而有争议的讨论围绕着在多大程度上可以根据反不正当竞争法同时或在既有的知识产权法之外授予对模仿无形主体的保护。这些理论的具体设计在欧盟成员国和国际上各不相同。82. In the Anglo-American sphere, they appear as ‘misappropriation doctrine’, which is to some extent comparable to continental European UCL approaches, but very narrowly construed, cf Tim W Dornis, ‘Artificial Creativity’ (n 80) 26 ff.除了反不正当竞争法特定情形（如欺骗模仿）之外，鉴于传统理论禁止基于“道德”理由的“照搬式”或“寄生式”模仿，83. This ‘moral’ rhetoric still resonates in the French terminology of ‘parasitisme’.无论是市场效应，还是事实上不断扩大的知识产权保护范围，现代理论强调了反不正当竞争法作为灵活且对市场敏感的保护机制的潜力。84. See Hilty (n 5); Ansgar Ohly, ‘A Fairness-Based Approach to Economic Rights’ in Bernt Hugenholtz (ed), Copyright Reconstructed (Wolters Kluwer 2018) 83; Annette Kur, ‘What to Protect, and How? Unfair Competition, Intellectual Property,or Protection Sui Generis’ in Nari Lee and others (eds), Intellectual property, unfair competition and publicity: convergences and development (Edward Elgar 2014) 11, 27 f; Ansgar Ohly, ‘The Freedom of Imitation and Its Limits - A European Perspective’(2010) 41 IIC 506, 522.认识到这一区别是以下考虑的关键: 然而在实践中，反不正当竞争法的现有形式——如法院所适用的，仍部分地沿用着旧的道德原则——造成了过度保护公共领域事项的危险，85. See on this danger Drexl (n 73) 270 para 63.现代的、市场敏感型的经济观点具有相当大的潜力。这种潜力可能体现在三个方面：首先，在一个抽象的法律理论阐释中，它象征着一种为数据经济量身定制的无形商品保护方法的总体监管范式，即灵活性；其次，在不确定情况下，作为引入新的权利的替代方案，从中提取且与应然法相关的考量因素；第三，考虑到人工智能可能会从根本上改变知识产权格局，并相应地重塑与反不正当竞争法的互动局面，这是一个经典而又错综复杂的阐释，与知识产权实然法的补充保护功能相关。虽然这三个维度显然紧密联系，但下面的分析将把它们作为一个宽泛的三重结构予以建构起来。

2.灵活的经济功能侵权评估

从现代意义上反不正当竞争法的总体法律理论特性开始，这些似乎使其成为人工智能创新监管的完美匹配。简言之，反不正当竞争法的保护是基于行为，而非主体导向;86. cf Drexl (n 73) 278 para 112: ‘This however questions the very appropriateness of a property approach to regulating that economy. IP systems are largely based on the paradigm of protecting intangible assets, such as technologies in particular, that play a role as input in the production of physical goods. Such a paradigm does not seem to fit a world in which customers have to rely on real-time and accurate information as an input.’它是高度灵活的，而不是依赖于标准化、预先确定的标准；它对福利经济观点很敏感，即在必要的程度内补救市场失灵——无论这种市场失灵是由知识产权领域的过度保护，还是保护不足造成的。不利的一面是缺乏法律确定性，经济学知识的众多不足之处以及实际应用的复杂性。87. cf Rupprecht Podszun, ‘Der ,,more economic approach“im Lauterkeitsrecht’ [2009] WRP 509, 517.在灵活性特点中值得注意的是，反不正当竞争法未有预先确定的条款：因此，从理论上讲，它具有持续投资摊销所需时间的潜力，88. See Markus Deck, ‘§ 17 Wettbewerblicher Nachahmungsschutz (§ 4 Nr. 3 UWG)’ in Gordian Hasselblatt (ed), MAH Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz (5th edn, CH Beck 2017) para 164, on the duration of protection for traditional computer programs under UCL.而正式保护期限与实际保护需要之间的差距长期以来一直被认为是知识产权法的一个危及福利的问题。89. cf Reto M Hilty and Thomas Jaeger, ‘Gesamtanalyse und Erkenntnisse’ in Reto M Hilty and Thomas Jaeger (eds),Europa¨isches Immaterialgu¨ terrecht - Funktionen und Perspektiven (Springer 2018) 665, 675.这在人工智能背景下变得更加重要，人工智能的特征具有十分动态的生产周期，难以与抽象的保护条款保持一致。90. See Hilty, Hoffmann and Scheuerer (n 37) 20; Drexl (n 73) 278 para 112: ‘In an environment where it is key to capture the moment and where being late leads to wrong decisions, asking the question of how long data should be protected will simply miss the needs of this economy.’此外，保护可以根据特定的行业需要进行调整，以因应人工智能行业特定的变化。91. In a way, contemplating sector-specific protection constitutes the mirror image of the current debate on sector-specific data access regimes.

关于行为依赖的特征，人工智能和物联网领域的一个常见问题是难以界定92. This relates in particular to the dynamism of subject matter such as self-learning or ‘evolutionary’ algorithms.和定位93. This is reflected in the prominent debate on who should own the rights in ‘AI-generated’ output; on a more visionary note,a general blurring of ‘actors’ within global informational networks has been diagnosed, with the proposal of responding by ultimately holding ‘conduct itself’ liable, cf Gunther Teubner, ‘Digitale Rechtssubjekte?’(2018) 218 AcP 155, 202.保护对象。在这种可疑情形下，它似乎是一种可行的“解决方法”，而不是关注行为的福利效应，从而将问题从技术领域转移到经济领域。94. Comparable proposals have been made as to the reconstruction of copyright law: namely, instead of technically looking at ‘reproductions’, undertaking a ‘principle-based assessment’ inspired by modern trademark infringement doctrine, cf Taina Pihlajarinne, ‘Should We Bury the Concept of Reproduction - Towards Principle-Based Assessment in Copyright Law?’ (2017)48 IIC 953.此外，反不正当竞争法的经济功能属性似乎特别适合保护“人工智能生成的”无形物。法学界争论中所关注的问题案例的特点是缺乏显著的人力努力或指导。95. For a critical assessment of the technological state of the art vis-a` -vis scholarly ‘autonomy’ assumptions, see, however,Daria Kim, ‘AIGenerated Inventions: Time to Get the Record Straight?’ [2020] GRUR International 443.因此，反不正当竞争法的市场焦点似乎是一个特别合适的监管选择。保护人类“创造者”（从广义上理解，不限于版权）的人格和利益一直是授予知识产权的一个关键理由。96. See Hilty, Hoffmann and Scheuerer (n 37) 4 ff.然而，在没有人的情况下，他们的利益必须在平衡工作中得到重视，“发明家”被“投资者”所取代，97. See Herbert Zech, ‘Artificial Intelligence: Impact of Current Developments in IT on Intellectual Property’ [2019] GRUR Int 1145, 1147: ‘Ultimately, AI generated innovations will only be protected or protectable by investment protection rights. The inventor (author) will be replaced by an investor using AI.’基于反不正当竞争法理论上合理的理由，对其采取“更多”而非“纯粹经济的方法”似乎是一个适当的框架。98. Robert Yu, ‘The Machine Author’ (2017) 165 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1245, 1266 ff suggests using the ‘hot news misappropriation doctrine’, a ‘quasi-property-fairness-standard’, for handling AI creations.在每种情况下，均必须调查谁进行了相关投资，以及他们的补偿是否因搭便车而受到威胁。从法律理论角度来看，一方面可以坚持区分欧洲大陆版权传统中以人类为中心建立起的“经典”知识产权法，另一方面是人工智能的纯粹经济市场机制。99. Of course, this goes with the caveat that the ‘romantic’, anthropocentric understanding of IP has to a certain extent been overridden by industry-determined market realities, see Hilty, Hoffmann and Scheuerer (n 37) 27.

3.在市场失灵的不确定情况下替代新的知识产权

谈及反不正当竞争法的应然法的考量因素时，反不正当竞争法传统上被视为“标兵职能”，这意味着在相关理论最终成为完整的知识产权之前，可以基于反不正当竞争法的理由给予保护。100. On the ‘pacesetter function’ of UCL vis-a` -vis introducing new intellectual property rights, see Zech (n 10) 161 f; Ohly (n 84) 522 f; Kur (n 84) calls UCL an ‘incubator’ for new IP rights; emphasising the ‘interim’ character of a UCL solution in the AI context, Dornis, ‘Artificial Creativity’ (n 80) 44; Dornis, ‘Der Schutz ku¨ nstlicher Kreativita¨ t im Immaterialgu¨ terrecht’ (n 80)1252.在考虑潜在的新保护机制时，尤其是对于计算机生成的“作品”，以及数据或ML模型，应该记住这一属性。101. cf Ce´line Castets-Renard, ‘The Intersection between AI and IP: Conflict or Complementarity?’ (2020) 51 IIC 141,142: ‘(...) the lawmaker may be led to consider that a sui generis system of IP rights for AIgenerated inventions should be raised to adjust innovation incentives for AI’; in favour of new IP regimes, Dornis, ‘Der Schutz ku¨ nstlicher Kreativita¨ t im Immaterialgu¨ terrecht’ (n 80) 1257 and 1264.只要不清楚引入此类权利是否有经济需要，即是否存在需要补救的市场失灵，102. Outlining the context-dependency of market failure regarding AI outputs as opposed to not identifying market failure regarding AI tools, Hilty, Hoffmann and Scheuerer (n 37) 15 ff; considering market failure possible regarding training data,Philipp Hacker, ‘Immaterialgu¨ terrechtlicher Schutz von KI-Trainingsdaten’ [2020] GRUR 1025, 1033; assuming an economic need for protection, Dornis, ‘Der Schutz ku¨ nstlicher Kreativita¨ t im Immaterialgu¨ terrecht’ (n 80) 1264; yet all authors acknowledge the lack of clear empirical evidence. Absent such evidence, the whole market failure standard ultimately comes down to an allocation of the burden of proof or burden of justification, with the option of either the status quo or the freedom principle as a starting point.相反，人们可以全面监控事物的发展，收集经济证据和见解，灵活地根据反不正当竞争法的理据给予保护，并在持续地保护需求实现后，将相关领域中确定的规则法典化。103. Critical on the introduction of new IP rights for trained AI, Zech (n 97) 1146: ‘Any reaction of IP law beyond jurisprudence and interpretative guidance has to be handled with care. New investment protection rights should only be introduced if otherwise a clear market failure is to be expected. In the area of artificial intelligence, this seems not to be the case’; on the sufficiency of(inter alia) UCL with regard to protection of AI data, cf also Peter R Slowinski, ‘Rethinking Software Protection’ (2020) Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No 20-17, 18 ＜https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3708110＞ accessed before 27 November 2020.当然，基于不确定背景下潜在的功能失调的市场干预经济成本，104. Dysfunctional effects of IP in the data economy are especially identified as regards the database sui generis right, see Matthias Leistner, ‘The Existing European IP Rights System and the Data Economy - An Overview With Particular Focus on Data Access and Portability’ (2020) 13 ff ＜https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3625712＞ accessed before 27 November 2020.必须与在没有明确定义权利105. Highlighting the problem of legal uncertainty when relying on UCL protection, Hacker (n 102) 1032; criticising UCL as‘rather shaky ground for the protection of industrial data’, Andreas Wiebe, ‘Protection of industrial data - a new property right for the digital economy?’ [2016] GRUR Int 877, 879; considering UCL ‘patchy at best’, Dornis, ‘Artificial Creativity’ (n 80) 59.的情况下的法律不确定性成本，以及与B2B领域的反不正当竞争法缺乏协调相关的成本进行权衡。106. Dornis, ‘Der Schutz ku¨ nstlicher Kreativita¨ t im Immaterialgu¨ terrecht‘(n 80) 1260; Wiebe (n 105) 879.

4.需要根据数字经济的需要对理论要求进行微调

最后，关于反不正当竞争法保护的具体应用，应强调微调评估理论要求的必要性。法律秩序中常见的具体标准可分为两类：首先，从历史和体系角度来看，它们是与反不正当竞争法的其他传统范式相一致的“特定不正当性”规范，尤其是对来源的混淆，即市场透明度问题，或者与违反商业秘密有关的知识收集；107. In Germany, for example, such criteria are codified in an explicit norm of the German Act against Unfair Competition (§4 No 3 UWG), while there is a long-standing discussion on under which circumstances further protection can be granted on the grounds of the general clause (cf Ansgar Ohly, ‘Hartplatzhelden.de oder: Wohin mit dem unmittelbaren Leistungsschutz?’ [2010]GRUR 487); Dornis, ‘Artificial Creativity’ (n 80) 27 considers ‘deceptive and goodwill-appropriating conduct’ as lying at the heart of misappropriation prevention in European and civil-law UCL.其次，它们可以作为知识产权保护阈值的功能等价物，如德国理论要求标的物呈现“竞争属性”。这一标准一直存在疑问，而且，由于它依赖于视觉范式，其适用性也受到了数字化背景的新挑战。108. cf Maximilian Becker, ‘Lauterkeitsrechtlicher Leistungsschutz fu¨ r Daten‘ [2017] GRUR 346, 347 f.然而，在法律方法的范围内，此类标准通常可以由法院和学界灵活制定，因此，应根据数字经济的需要和特点制定相应的标准。109. On the difficulties of applying ‘competitive originality’ to non-visual contexts, see Maximilian Becker, ‘§ 64 Lauterkeitsrechtlicher Leistungsschutz fu¨ r Daten’ in Wolfgang Gloy, Michael Loschelder and Rolf Danckwerts (eds),Handbuch des Wettbewerbsrechts (5th edn, CH Beck 2019) 47 ff.最终，他们的目标必须是在更具体的抽象层面上，为法院进行市场失灵评估提供指导。在此情形下，如果将基于反不正当竞争法的数据访问机制的概念（见上文第IX.1节）与数据保护机制相结合，则综合的反不正当竞争法方式具有逐步促进在访问和保护之间找到广泛寻求的最佳平衡的潜力。反不正当竞争法可以为从头开始考虑的全新方法提供有利空间。一个具体的相关领域似乎正在推动特殊数据库保护权的革新：要求进行这种改革的呼声愈演愈烈，110. cf Leistner (n 104) 17 f; Drexl (n 68) 45.其中包括在形成一个新的和适当的机制时，需要将数据保护和数据访问结合起来看待。

（三）反不正当竞争法与“人工智能与知识产权”对话，第2部分：人工智能组件的应用

当将这些考虑因素具体应用于人工智能时，它似乎倾向于按照机器学习过程的步骤来构建评估，即训练数据、学习过程和输出。111. This structure is inspired by Drexl and others (n 3).对这些现象的市场失灵的实质性评估超出了本文的范围。112. For some literature cf n 102.相反，本文旨在阐明一些抽象的理论范式，以应对潜在的市场失灵。

1.训练数据

从训练数据开始，将反不正当竞争法保护应用于数据113. On the basic premise of what ‘data’ actually is, cf Zech (n 10) 32 f.总体上已经讨论了很长一段时间，特别是作为一种替代方法或者反对在数据中引入新产权的论点。114. cf Josef Drexl and others, ‘Data Ownership and Access to Data - Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 16 August 2016 on the Current European Debate’ (2016) Max Planck Institute for Innovation& Competition Research Paper No 16-10, para 18 ＜https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab stract_id¼2833165＞ accessed before 27 November 2020; Drexl (n 73) 270; it is worth noting that although a purely economic perspective on the data property issue has in general rightfully been criticised as too short-sighted (cf Amstutz (n 53) 441), in the concrete doctrinal context of UCL as a competition-oriented regime, the standard must be an economic one; on data as subject matter of UCL protection, see generally Becker (n 108) 346; theoretically open towards applying the UCL general clause to data, Ansgar Ohly, ‘Anmerkung zu BGH, Unlauteres Verhalten als Voraussetzung fu¨ r wettbewerbsrechtlichen Nachahmungsschutz - Segmentstruktur’ [2017]GRUR 79, 92; Rupprecht Podszun, ‘§ 3 UWG’ in Henning Harte-Bavendamm and Frauke Henning-Bodewig (eds), UWG (4th edn, CH Beck 2016) para 178.如此一来，反不正当竞争法还可以构成一种防止数据的特定子现象（即人工智能训练数据）被盗用的保护手段，这意味着防止通过使用与竞争对手相同的训练数据创建另一个人工智能模型。115. cf Hacker (n 102) 1031, himself critical as to the sufficiency of such an approach.时间动态性的特点促使学者们对进行了数据的比较，并相应地考虑了在反不正当竞争法下对时尚的动态法律保护。假设两者均具有很高的价值，但是短暂的，因此至少注册的知识产权似乎不适合对其进行最佳保护。116. On protection regimes for fashion, see Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman, ‘The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design’ (2006) 92 Virginia Law Review 1687, 1692; a further role model could be financial information for stock market transactions, cf Gervais (n 80) 9 para 30; for applying old misappropriation doctrines to new data contexts, cf also Victoria Ekstrand and Christopher Roush, ‘From “Hot News” to “Hot Data”: The Rise of FinTech, the Ownership of Big Data, and the Future of the Hot News Doctrine’ (2017) 35 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment LJ 303.无论人们认为这些相似是否令人信服，在任何（和每种）情况下，都必须考虑人工智能培训数据的特定经济特质，尤其是生成或获取这些数据所需的投资。117. On the need to differentiate between personal data, industrial raw data and AI training data, cf Hacker (n 102) 1025.至于评估进一步取决于上述相应法律秩序的理论要求，118. According to Hacker (n 102) 1031, an example for UCL-specific ‘unfair conduct’ would be that employees take training data with them when changing their workplace to a competitor.特别是数据是否表现出“竞争性原创性”存在争议，并且假设在大多数情况下它们没有。119. Dismissive, Christoph Zieger and Nikolas Smirra, ‘Fallstricke bei Big Data-Anwendungen’ [2013] MMR 418, 421; very critical also Hacker (n 102) 1032.

2.算法和模型

关于人工智能算法的保护，必须在技术上和法律上加以区分：在训练模型的基础上，优化算法基本上由经典软件组成，它们某种程度上是用计算机代码编写的，120. cf Zech (n 97) 1146.而此类算法永远不受知识产权保护。因此，它们不仅在著作权法和专利法下的待遇与经典软件相同，121. ibid.而且也适用反不正当竞争法对软件保护的一般范式。122. In this context, it should be noted that the correct doctrinal realm for locating software protection has always been debated and the introduction of a ‘sui generis’ right been discussed as an alternative, cf Reto M Hilty and Christophe Geiger, ‘Patenting Software? A Judicial and SocioEconomic Analysis’ (2005) 36 IIC 615, 643 f; Slowinski (n 103) 9 ff; thus, when rethinking the respective paradigms against the backdrop of AI, UCL appears a valuable option to be taken into consideration in discourses on the apt systematic location of protection.在这方面，值得一提的是，上述关于计算机程序的流行观点也是如此。123. On the comparability of fashion and (traditional) computer programs under UCL, see Deck (n 88) para 163.这些通常可以受到反不正当竞争法的保护，124. As with data, the established requirements of the doctrinal acquis, at least under German law, may pose some problems.As far as ‘competitive originality’ is understood as an indication of origin, it is doubtful to what extent computer programs in general and AI models in particular can be considered to display such character. Also, the traditional visual element associated with this notion hardly fits computer programs, cf Deck (n 88) para 159.然而必须注意著作权法和专利法关于它们（非）保护范围的结论性决定，鉴于对这些现象特定的知识产权保护，反不正当竞争法的现实相关性几乎缺失。这个案例更为复杂，比如训练有素的人工智能模型，即实际的人工智能工具：这些模型，包括它们所构成的“权重”，是否或在多大程度上受版权法和专利法的保护存在争议，125. cf Slowinski (n 103) 16 ff; Bego～na Gonzalez Otero, ‘Machine Learning Models Under the Copyright Microscope: Is EU Copyright Fit for Purpose?’ (2020) Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No 21-02 ＜https://ssrn.com/abstract¼ 3749233＞ accessed before 31 December 2020; Patrick Ehinger and Oliver Stiemerling, ‘Die urheberrechtliche Schutzfa¨higkeit von Ku¨ nstlicher Intelligenz am Beispiel von Neuronalen Netzen’ [2018] CR 2018 761.尤其是它们的动态、不断变化的性质可能会改变传统的知识产权范式。126. cf Zech (n 97) 1146, pointing at the possibility of UCL protection for trained AI.因此，一方面，与优化算法相比，可以认为反不正当竞争法的相关性更大，因为其基于行为的灵活性，将反不正当竞争法应用于训练有素的ML模型可以灵活地解决这些不确定环境下的市场失灵。 另一方面，如果模型不受知识产权软件保护，则此决定通常不应被反不正当竞争法保护所规避或者推翻。

3.生成物

对于人工智能生成的产物，遵循知识产权法的系统决策必须再次成为适用反不正当竞争法的关键指引。如前所述，它的潜在相关性尤其体现于由于缺乏人类作者、发明家或设计师而无法为人工智能生成物提供知识产权保护的情形下。127. cf Zech (n 97) 1146; Dornis, ‘Der Schutz ku¨ nstlicher Kreativita¨ t im Immaterialgu¨ terrecht’ (n 80) 1256 f.然而，无论这种缺失是系统性的故意还是偶然的仍然模棱两可：“人工智能生成物”在相关法律颁布时根本无法想象，这一论点可以转向一个或者另一个方向。128. Dornis, ‘Der Schutz ku¨ nstlicher Kreativita¨ t im Immaterialgu¨ terrecht’ (n 80) 1257 identifies a ‘gap’ of IP law regarding this issue.无论如何，与人工智能生成的无形物品相关的两项进展需要密切监测：第一，对市场结构的经验经济学洞察，以确定市场失灵或其缺失；第二，关于缺乏人参与可能对“公共领域”的知识产权范式产生的影响的法律理论讨论。129. cf Mauritz Kop, ‘AI & Intellectual Property: Towards an Articulated Public Domain’ (2020) 29 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal ＜https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3409715＞ accessed before 27 November 2020.

（四）商业秘密保护的反不正当竞争法维度

最后，商业秘密保护的反不正当竞争法维度可以作为监管人工智能经济的法律理论基石。在欧盟，商业秘密保护同一时期已被编纂为一项独立的法律。130. Directive (EU) 2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed knowhow and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure.然而，它仍然植根于并援引反不正当竞争法，特别是当它依赖（不）正当标准作为侵权法的附属一般条款时。131. cf Drexl (n 78) 97: ‘Here, the Directive integrates EU trade secrets protection into a broader unfair competition law framework.’商业秘密保护是人工智能/知识产权保护领域的一个重要组成部分。132. Josef Drexl and others, ‘Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 11 February 2020 on the Draft Issues Paper of the World Intellectual Property Organization on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence’(2020) 9 ＜https://pure.mpg. de/rest/items/item_3193085_2/component/file_3193086/content＞ accessed before 27 November 2020.数据、算法、模型和生成物均可作为商业秘密进行保护。133. cf Tanya Aplin, ‘Trading Data in the Digital Economy: Trade Secrets Perspective’ in Sebastian Lohsse, Reiner Schulze and Dirk Staudenmayer (eds), Trading Data in the Digital Economy: Legal Concepts and Tools (Nomos 2017); specifically on trade secret protection for AI training data, Hacker (n 102) 1032.尽管存在某些福利主义的模糊性，134. The effects of trade secret protection on AI innovation are ambivalent insofar as on the one hand, the regime provides some extent of exclusivity, thereby protecting investments and safeguarding innovation incentives, while on the other hand, it also creates obstacles vis-a` -vis third parties that want to use e.g. certain data to train their ML models.但欧洲商业秘密制度作为一个平衡且充分的制度在排他性和获取性之间实现最佳权衡而被广泛赞誉。135. Leistner (n 104) 18 ff.这主要归功于它采取了受到反不正当竞争法启发的、灵活的、基于行为的方法。136. Drexl (n 73) 269 para 56: ‘(...) such further limited protection can be considered as better suited to serve the purposes of the data economy, by focussing on the particular way in which a third party has specifically acquired access to the data instead of granting exclusive protection against the use of data’.该制度不是一个成熟的财产角度，137. ibid 291, para 182: ‘Rather than recognising exclusive control over any use of protected information, as would be typical for intellectualproperty regimes, EU trade secrets law implements a tort law approach that bans specific conduct related to the acquisition, dissemination and use of trade secrets that can be considered unfair.’而是作为知识产权和反不正当竞争法的理论混合体构建的，将彼此的优点结合起来。138. On the advantages of legal hybrids, see Ohly (n 84) 86 ff.根据这些优点，商业秘密指令可被视为上述反不正当竞争法方法的整体法律理论特征的具体化。不仅是为了法律的一致性，商业秘密保护和反不正当竞争法不应被视为两个独立的领域，而是应当（仍然）以相互的观点理解和解释。毕竟，TS指令对反不正当竞争法标准的明确依赖性，也有可能使反不正当竞争法作为一个利益和重要领域重新焕发活力，并在其B2B维度上重新推动欧洲的协调对话。

十、结论与展望

事实证明，在日渐由人工智能决定的市场秩序方面，反不正当竞争法将发挥切实可行的作用。它可以在许多方面促进中央监管模式的落实，旨在为了社会利益最佳的利用这一新技术。因此，反不正当竞争法能够而且不应该只是被动地因应和调整其既有标准，而是应凭借其理论灵活性，积极参与制定应对人工智能所提出的多种挑战所需的新标准。与此同时，人工智能所引发的法律问题为进一步反思和完善反不正当竞争法的本质和核心提供了契机，反不正当竞争法是一个仍未有得到充分理解的法律体系。由于其特有的灵活性，反不正当竞争法对社会、经济和技术变革表现出高度的依赖性和回应性。这些变化目前和今后一段时间均是由人工智能推动的。反不正当竞争法可能会以这种方式被重塑与改进，成为调整数字经济、竞争秩序和社会的真正基石。

致谢

感谢弗诺克·亨宁·博德维希教授、约尔格·霍夫曼和克劳斯·维德教授提供的有益意见。