Development and Functions of Ruling Party Exchange Mechanism Between China and Japan

Liu Jiyue & Zhang Yong

In recent years， the development of bilateral ties between China and Japan has generally maintained a positive momentum， as both countries make joint efforts to manage their remaining disputes and expand cooperation. In order to study this relationship more efficiently in the new era， we need to conduct targeted and systematic analyses in various aspects. In both China and Japan， the ruling party plays a pivotal role in making strategic decisions on major policies. This article， from the perspective of institutionalizing SinoJapanese relations in the new era， summarizes the development pattern of the coordination and dialogue mechanism between Chinese and Japanese ruling parties， and discusses its experience and challenges. This could help study and determine the trend of China-Japan relations and contribute to the overall improvement of relations between the two countries.

Establishment and Characteristics of China-Japan Ruling Party Exchange Mechanism

The ruling parties in China and Japan have emphasized the positive role of party-related diplomacy when developing bilateral relations in the new century. They have accordingly set up specialized agencies in charge of each party’s external exchanges， such as the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China （CPC）， and the International Bureau/International Affairs Committee of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party （LDP） and the Komeito Party. This ruling party exchange mechanism was officially launched in 2004， aiming to promote a mutually beneficial and stable development of bilateral relations through inter-party exchanges. Under this framework， high-ranking party representatives and other important personalities from both sides have paid regular visits to each other to exchange views， enhance trust， remove doubts， and build consensus.

Since 2006， the CPC and the LDP/Komeito have maintained regular exchanges， with the exception of 2009-2012， when the Democratic Party of Japan （DPJ） was in power， and 2013-2014， when Sino-Japanese relations were in a deadlock. The eight meetings held alternately in China and Japan between the ruling parties can be roughly divided into two periods. The first four were held between 2006 and 2009， from the end of the Junichiro Koizumi government to the year when the ruling coalition （LDP/Komeito） stepped down and such exchanges fell into a hiatus. The fifth meeting was restarted in 2015 following a thaw in bilateral relations， while the sixth， seventh and eighth meetings were held subsequently between 2017 and 2018. As bilateral relations developed more favorably， the content of the meetings also became increasingly substantial.

The very first of these exchanges was held in Beijing in February 2006， in which the two sides discussed issues such as the Yasukuni Shrine and the understanding of the history of Japanese invasion in a “frank and straightforward” atmosphere. The second meeting was held in October 2006， with the focus on enhancing cooperation and promoting strategic and mutually beneficial relations which the leaders had agreed to build. The third meeting took place in November 2007， aiming to further advance multi-level cooperation， foster mutual trust， and promote an expansion of bilateral dialogues. At the time， the Japanese delegation was received by then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. The fourth meeting was held in February 2009， under the theme of “deepening strategic and mutually beneficial cooperation and enhancing mutual understanding between the peoples.”In December 2015， the fifth exchange， including three sub-meetings， took place under the topic “strengthening policy communication and expanding mutually beneficial cooperation.” The sixth meeting， held in August 2017， mainly explored cooperation opportunities under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative （BRI）， and how to deepen policy communication and exchange experience in state governance and administration. Then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took the opportunity to meet with the Chinese delegation. The seventh meeting was held in December 2017， focusing on political， economic and people-to-people exchanges， and Chinese President Xi Jinping met with the Japanese delegation. The eighth meeting took place in October 2018， continuing the topics set out by the previous meeting. Moreover， during the last two meetings， the ruling parties agreed on a series of joint initiatives. A ninth meeting was originally planned for November 2019， but was canceled for certain reasons.

With over a decade of experience， the China-Japan ruling party exchange mechanism has developed several special characteristics and has played a unique role in advancing relations between the two countries.

The first of these characteristics is the high degree of institutionalization and the strength of its continuity. Since its inception at the end of the Koizumi government， the conversation channels of the exchange mechanism have predominantly remained active， forming an important bridge between China’s and Japan’s ruling parties， despite the fact that Japan went through eight prime ministers and two changes of the ruling party， and China-Japan relations experienced ups and downs during this period. This reflects the high degree of institutional stability and continuity of the mechanism.

The second characteristic is the high level and strong representativeness of the participants. From the outset， the Chinese delegation has been led by the Minister of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee or officials in comparable top-class positions， while the Japanese delegation has been usually headed by the Secretary-General or the Policy Chief of the LDP and the Komeito Party. Both sides have sent very senior members of the ruling parties， and the heads of delegation are usually given the opportunity to talk with the head of state of the other country， which confirms the exceptional importance of this mechanism. Furthermore， both the Chinese and Japanese delegations include a variety of party and congressional members in charge of a broad spectrum of key policy areas， who have used the occasions for a full exchange of views.

The third characteristic consists of the sincerity of the process and its pragmatic orientation. When looking back at the meetings that have been held so far， the most important contemporary issues concerning SinoJapanese relations have been openly addressed， and attempts have been made to reach a certain consensus and offer practical solutions. Since 2006， a series of major issues surrounding China-Japan relations have been discussed during the meetings， including the Yasukuni Shrine controversy， the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands， the incident of the “poisoned dumplings，” and how to enhance strategic and mutually beneficial relations between China and Japan， and conduct third-party market cooperation under the BRI framework. This clearly demonstrates that the mechanism was formed to achieve tangible outcomes.

The fourth characteristic concerns the correct understanding of the bilateral relations from both sides. The content of the talks during these meetings was usually an accurate reflection of the state of China-Japan relations at the particular time. The two sides would start the proceedings by first offering a basic judgement on the conditions of bilateral relations， which represented their attitudes towards the bilateral ties and was usually in line with the judgment of foreign affairs authorities and high-level officials of the two countries. In addition， the content and timing of the meetings would be affected by the general outlook of bilateral relations. When relations were tense， the content would focus largely on exchanging opinions and building consensus； otherwise it would stress more on promoting cooperation in various fields.

The Role and Challenges of China-Japan Ruling Party Exchange Mechanism

With these above mentioned four characteristics， namely high degree of institutionalization， high level of the participants， strong pragmatic orientation and a true reflection of the bilateral relations， the exchange mechanism is playing a unique role in promoting China-Japan relations. However， there are also a few limitations.

A political party is a type of social organizations， which consists of a group of people with certain political views. Unlike the government， a political party doesn’t necessarily have the status of representing a sovereign state， even if it participates in politics. Therefore， exchanges between political parties， like between any other people’s organizations， take on the character of people-to-people communication. This allows for some maneuvering room when bilateral relations are stalled and governmental exchanges seem inconvenient. As mentioned above， the exchange mechanism was launched when Junichiro Koizumi was in power and bilateral ties were at a low point. High-level exchanges between China and Japan were on hold during that period， making the term “cold politics” a frequently used expression within academic circles.1 By establishing this mechanism， the two countries intended to utilize the flexibility of inter-party exchanges to create some additional space for deliberating on bilateral relations. Since then， the exchange mechanism has provided a platform for the two countries to discuss their frictions frankly and effectively， including the so-called “poisoned dumplings” incident and the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. It allows the two sides to inform themselves about each other’s views and reduce strategic misjudgments. It has helped China and Japan to restore and reorient their bilateral ties， especially after the issues of the Yasukuni Shrine and the Diaoyu Islands had emerged.

Apart from “resolving differences，” the exchange mechanism has also advanced the process of “seeking common ground.” Both the CPC and the LDP have been long-term ruling parties， which play a decisive role in policy formulation. The CPC has been the stable ruling party of China， and the LDP has enjoyed unchallenged ruling party status in Japan， with only an eight-month-long interruption before the Koizumi period since the party was established in 1955. For example， at the eighth exchange meeting， the Chinese delegation was led by Song Tao， who had been Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Executive Deputy Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group， while the Japanese team was headed by Toshihiro Nikai， who had served as Minister of Transport and Minister of Economy， Trade and Industry. The dialogue mechanism has indeed almost taken the form of an inter-governmental exchange， although it formally appears to be merely a meeting of party delegates. The consensus reached between the two parties can soon be transformed into cooperation projects between the two countries. During the first exchange meeting held in February 2006， when bilateral relations were relatively tense due to differences on historical issues， the two sides not only expressed their positions and exchanged views， but were also able to reach consensus to jointly conduct studies on history and seek objective truth. This was probably the first real achievement of the exchange mechanism. At the most recent meeting， a whole session was devoted to the promotion of the international demonstration zone of Belt and Road cooperation between China and Japan， which provided a new example for the practical implementation of meeting results.

The inter-party exchange mechanism is of special significance because of its greater flexibility compared with direct inter-governmental dialogues， making it less susceptible to the volatility of bilateral relations. Thus， it can be more quickly activated than other dialogue frameworks， and can serve as a “catalyzer” or “warm-up” for bilateral relations generally. The consensus reached between the two parties can be transformed into a consensus between the two governments through various channels， so as to achieve substantive results. The LDP and the Komeito Party have spoken highly of this mechanism since the very first meeting. At subsequent meetings， the Japanese representatives would always begin their speeches by recognizing the positive role the mechanism has played in promoting an improvement of bilateral relations. Particularly at the fourth meeting， the Japanese side praised the mechanism as a “stabilizer” of bilateral relations， a “booster” for implementing the leaders’ consensus， and a “shock absorber” for handling frictions.2 This shows that the overall evaluation of the mechanism by the Japanese political circles is positive.

Even though the exchange mechanism is highly flexible and serves as a preferred platform to complement high-level exchanges between the two countries， it also undeniably lacks sufficient stability and is vulnerable to political disruptions in Japan and the overall fluctuations in the ChinaJapan relationship. Although born out of the need to ease tensions between the two countries， the ruling party exchange mechanism is not completely immune to external factors. When the domestic political situation， especially in Japan， changes， the mechanism would inevitably be affected. The LDP， as the longest serving ruling party in Japan， has developed a set of “hidden rules” for policy-making without clear separation between the party and the government， which means that to a large extent， the will of the party could influence or even become national policies.3 However， its leadership is in no way guaranteed by law or by the political system. Once the LDP loses the majority of seats in the lower house election， it will become an opposition party， and the position of the prime minister would be filled by a leader of other parties. Due to the limited influence of opposition parties on policymaking in Japan， the exchanges between the CPC and the LDP would be suspended during the LDP’s period as an opposition party due to dramatic decline of their significance. The unpredictability of Japan’s political arena largely determines that the ruling party exchange mechanism between China and Japan lacks a reliable outlook. For example， after the LDP suffered an unprecedented defeat at the hands of the DPJ in the 2009 election， losing its role as the largest party in the House of Representatives and the position of the prime minister， the DPJ suspended the ruling party exchange mechanism as it had other channels with the CPC. The exchange mechanism was only able to restart at the end of 2012， when the LDP won the general election and became the ruling party once again.

Another risk for the proper functioning of the exchange mechanism lies in the swaying of bilateral relations generally. The effectiveness of the mechanism depends on a sound foundation of bilateral relations. Whenever China-Japan relations deteriorate to a level that ruling party exchanges are no longer being supported， the mechanism would also lose its functionality. For example， Shinzo Abe initiated his long-planned strategic， diplomatic and security-related transformation process during his second term. The “Yoshida Doctrine” which had been Japan’s benchmark since the end of World War II was replaced by the “Abe Doctrine.” The former had its emphasis on economics rather than on armament， while the latter aimed to pursue Japan’s“normalization” towards the status of a “military and political power.” The Abe administration has promoted “value-based diplomacy” and “proactive pacifism，” and tried to work with the United States and its allies to contain China in an all-round way. Against this background， the Japanese authorities naturally showed little interest in easing tensions between China and Japan， while sometimes even lending support to the “China threat” rhetoric. Predictably， bilateral relations sank to their lowest point ever at the beginning of Abe’s second term. As former LDP President Yohei Kono said， the LDP’s regaining of power at the end of 2012 was a signal that Japan had started abandoning its pacifism-based policy towards a path of confronting China.4 Most exchange channels between the two countries were abruptly suspended， including the ruling party exchange mechanism， which was not automatically restored when the LDP retook power. It was only at the end of 2015， after Sino-Japanese relations had improved after a four-point agreement and a series of negotiations got underway， that the mechanism was finally reactivated. As bilateral relations got back on the right track， the exchange mechanism was finally able to hold regular meetings.

Due to the lack of sufficient stability， the ruling party exchange mechanism cannot be relied upon as a fundamental solution for improving China-Japan relations， despite its strong support for strengthening bilateral ties. Two reasons may explain this conundrum. First， the exchange mechanism is still based only on working-level talks and agreements although it consists of high-level participants. Second， the exchange mechanism is merely a problem-solving platform， which in and of itself does not intend to touch the deep roots of the contradictions between China and Japan. Therefore， the ruling party exchange mechanism， in spite of being more basic-level than the exchanges between heads of state or between senior officials， is still a secondary variable to advance bilateral cooperation and coordination. The mechanism can only be carried out after the two countries have already achieved a certain degree of strategic mutual trust and have reached a preliminary consensus in respect to differences on major issues. The mechanism can work as a format for both sides to maintain communication， exchange views and reach greater consensus and cooperation intentions so as to benefit bilateral relations， which in turn would favor a smoother operation of the mechanism. The importance of the mechanism lies in providing all kinds of possible communication channels which can then be utilized to solve major problems. In that respect， the influence of the ruling party exchange mechanism on China-Japan relations is rather indirect and intermediary. It can serve as a bridge between the two countries and a catalyst for improving bilateral relations， but depends highly on deeper factors such as foreign policy strategies and the regional environment.

The indirect nature also lies in the gap between the ruling party exchange mechanism and the liaison mechanisms between government departments. As an unofficial framework， the ruling party exchange mechanism is more flexible than other such schemes. However， this can also lead to a lack of timeliness and a reduction of commitment to fully achieve the consensus reached at meetings of the mechanism. Additional steps are thus required to transform the consensus into real cooperation， as the mechanism is not entirely representing the government， and the participants are not attending the meeting as foreign policy decision-makers. In addition， it is hard for the ruling party exchange mechanism to fully coordinate with government-led mechanisms， which could achieve better communication and integration of views within the government.

Last but not least， the exchange mechanism has not involved other Japanese parties. Although the LDP has been the longest serving ruling party， Japan is still a multi-party parliamentary democracy. The main opposition parties， such as the Democratic Party for the People （DPP）， the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan （CDP）5 and the Japanese Communist Party （JCP）， also play a certain role. The CPC generally maintains good contact with all opposition parties， some even with regular and systematic exchanges， but these relations are difficult to coordinate to a large extent.

Prospects of China-Japan Ruling Party Exchange Mechanism

In his address at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties HighLevel Meeting， General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out： “Political parties play an important role in the political life of our countries and progress of human civilization … We political parties in various countries should strengthen mutual trust， dialogue， and coordination.”6 As an important part of overall diplomacy between the two countries， Sino-Japanese ruling party exchanges should be based on the current foundation to continue playing a unique role in improving bilateral relations. Following the recent positive momentum， China and Japan should consolidate the basis for cooperation and expand the scope of the dialogue in order to develop bilateral ties in the new era.

Maintaining flexibility and building a multi-level and wideranging exchange model

Any high-level diplomacy between the two countries is often standing on the bedrock of basic-level exchanges. Whenever bilateral relations are frozen up， it is particularly necessary to exchange information， prevent misjudgments and gather consensus. Participants involved in the meetings of the China-Japan ruling party exchange mechanism include not only party leaders， but also China’s grassroots cadres responsible for the government’s and party’s external liaison work， as well as Japan’s key party members in charge of specific policy-making. Their information exchange constitutes the basis for mutual understanding and even mutual trust between China and Japan. The foundation on which China-Japan relations are standing is still fragile and needs to be developed through consolidation， building consensus， setting aside disputes and seeking mutual understanding on contentious issues.7 In the future， the two sides should expand personnel exchanges at all levels and maintain parallel exchange channels at multiple levels including the ruling party level， so as to ensure smooth communication between the two countries.

In addition， China and Japan should adopt extensive ways of exchanges to promote cooperation in areas where the two countries have common interests and complementary advantages. Third-party market cooperation under the BRI framework， which has been frequently mentioned in recent meetings， is a major driving force for developing bilateral relations. As Japanese scholar Satoshi Amako pointed out， the top priority for ChinaJapan relations is to create common interests， and the two countries should expand cooperation on economic， environmental， energy and natural resources issues.8 The prominent Japanese-born scholar Akira Iriye believes that the foundation of China-Japan relations is the cultural link. Japan should avoid military confrontation with China， he argued， and choose the route of economic and cultural exchanges instead.9 Therefore， the ruling party exchange mechanism should continue to cover a wide range of issues and promote the development of other exchange mechanisms， in order to further promote the improvement of bilateral relations.

Actively building mutual trust and enhance stability of the mechanism

Although the exchange mechanism is a product of the two countries’attempts to build mutual trust， it is nevertheless quite vulnerable to the overall political environment， which， if it deteriorates， would render the mechanism less effective or even defunct completely. To build a more efficient and sustainable exchange channel， China and Japan need to reach at least some consensus on basic issues， build mutual trust in principle， and thus ensure the durability of the exchange mechanism between the two sides.

The stability of the exchange mechanisms between China and Japan is largely determined by the foreign strategies and policies of the Japanese government. Whether the Japanese government can persist in building friendship with neighboring countries and maintain the momentum of improving China-Japan relations is still uncertain to some extent. While Japan has expressed a positive attitude towards implementing the BRI and has established a working mechanism for promoting third-party market cooperation with China， it has never explicitly stated that it will cooperate with China under the BRI framework， which reflects its lack of trust in China.

Even though the Sino-Japanese exchange mechanism will not be completely independent from the overall China-Japan relations， its stability can be strengthened by various means. Both sides need to further explore cooperation space and common interests at their future meetings， manage differences， and expand bilateral relations on the basis of stable party exchanges， to lift mutual trust to a higher level.

Constructing exchange mechanisms with Japan’s opposition parties

Whereas it is difficult to fundamentally alter the semi-official and instrumental nature of the ruling party exchange mechanism， the CPC can strive to improve its overall relations with all parties in Japan based on its experiences with the ruling-party cooperation， in order to improve the catalytic and transformative efficiency of this channel for China-Japan relations. The CPC should not neglect the opposition parties in its inter-party exchanges. On the one hand， the opposition parties bear less “political burden” and are more flexible than the ruling party. For example， at the time before the normalization of ChinaJapan relations， politicians from Japan’s opposition parties made full use of their flexibility and played an important role as informal actors to connect the two countries without formal diplomatic ties.10 On the other hand， the CPC needs to engage in friendly ties with those Japan’s major opposition parties which may take power in the future. The realization of general coordination between the CPC and Japan’s ruling and opposition parties can provide a strong foundation for a form of cross-party and cross-administration cooperation between China and Japan， which is more conducive to maintaining the long-term stability of bilateral relations. A regular exchange mechanism between the CPC and the DPJ， Japan’s main opposition party， was established in 2007. When the DPJ merged with another opposition party， the Japan Innovation Party， and rebranded itself as the Democratic Party （DP） in 2016， the International Department of the CPC Central Committee also invited its president Katsuya Okada to visit China.11 As the DP was split into the DPP and the CDP in 2018， and formed a coalition with other opposition parties for electoral and parliamentary power struggle purposes， China might consider adjusting its cooperation mechanism with Japan’s opposition parties in due course.

Conclusion

China attaches great importance to inter-party exchanges and will continue to actively construct new types of inter-party relationships in the future， exerting the leading role of party ties on political relations. Abe once made it clear in his congressional speech that the ruling party exchange mechanism has contributed a lot to improving China-Japan relations.12 Though Abe has resigned as Prime Minister， his rich institutional legacy and personal influence will have a lasting effect on his successor， and the “Abe Doctrine” will hardly be entirely eradicated， at least not in the short-term.13 The ruling party exchange mechanism is a political tradition of the Abe administration and an important supplement to ChinaJapan relations. However， the extent of its positive role and its effectiveness are not yet foreseeable. At present， peace and cooperation have become the broadest consensus between the two countries， despite the existing issues on territory， history， security and mutual trust. This undoubtedly poses new tasks and demands new requirements for strengthening the exchange mechanism， which will definitely play a more important role in China-Japan relations in the new era. The development of China-Japan inter-party exchanges does not only enhance relations between the parties， but also helps the CPC accumulate more experience in engaging with its international counterparts. This is of particular significance to China and Japan as they both have long-term stable ruling parties. On the one side， the building and maintaining of the exchange mechanism raises new tasks for the party leaders and meeting participants. On the other side， it is also a touchstone for the sincerity and sustainability of Japan’s new government in improving relations with China. Meanwhile， China should maintain its fine tradition of foreign exchanges， providing new and broader platforms to further improve its bilateral and multilateral relations， including Sino-Japanese relations.

1 Liu Jiangyong， “Warm Economics and Cold Politics： The Crux and Solution of China-Japan Relations，”Contemporary International Relations， No.4， 2006， p.28.

2 Zhou Zhaojun， “The CPC Is More Mature and Confident to Integrate into the International Community with an Open Image，” China News， July 2， 2009.

3 John C. Campbell， Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics， Keiso Shobo， 2014； Kentaro Oku and Yasuko Kono， eds.， Origin of LDP Politics： Perspective of the System of Preliminary Review， Yoshida Shoten， 2015， pp.117-248； Yuzo Yabuno， Contemporary Japanese Politics： Focus on LDP Administrations， Hokkaido University Press， 2019， pp.78-112.

4 Yohei Kono， Reflections and Recommendations on Japanese Diplomacy， Iwanami Shoten， 2015， pp.4-5.

5 Both the DPP and the CDP emerged from the splits of the opposition DPJ， which was once the ruling party.

6 “Xi Jinping’s Keynote Speech at the CPC in Dialogue With World Political Parties High-Level Meeting，”Beijing Review， December 1， 2017， http：//www.bjreview.com/CHINA_INSIGHT/Special_Edition/201802/ t20180212_800117836.html.

7 Shigenobu Yoshida， Japan-China Relations at 40 Years Old， Nippon Hyoron Sha， 2012， p.110.

8 Satoshi Amako， How to Deal with China， NHK Publishing， 2003， pp.218-220.

9 Akira Iriye， China and Japan in the Global Setting， Iwanami Shoten， 1995， pp.184-185.

10 Ryuji Hattori， The Normalization of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations， Chuko Shinsho， 2011， pp.58-64.

11 “Song Tao Meets with Permanent Advisor and Former President Katsuya Okada of Japan’s Democratic Party，” International Department of the CPC Central Committee， November 3， 2016， https：//www.idcpc.org. cn/bzhd/wshd/201912/t20191216_114492.html.

12 Record of Meetings of the 196th Diet Session， Budget Committee of the House of Representatives， No.11， February 14， 2018.

13 Zhang Yong， Escaping from Defeat： The Dynamics of Domestic Politics in Japan’s Transformation of Diplomatic Strategy， Social Sciences Academic Press， 2020.