Measures and Constraints of India’s Renewed Focus on the Bay of Bengal

The Bay of Bengal is located in the northeastern part of the Indian Ocean （also known as the “Northeast Indian Ocean” by some scholars）， covering an area of about 2.17 million square kilometers. It is the largest bay globally， with coastal countries including Sri Lanka， India， Bangladesh， Myanmar， Thailand， Malaysia and Indonesia.1 For a long time， the Bay of Bengal has been far from the center of international affairs. Yet， with the eastward shift of the global economic center， the rising strategic importance of the Indian Ocean region and the political and economic changes in the littoral countries of the area， the Bay of Bengal has gradually become a new strategic competition locus or center under the “Indo-Pacific”perspective， which has attracted the attention of governments and scholars. As the most powerful country in the Bay of Bengal region， India’s policy toward the area has evolved from “benign neglect” to “renewed focus，” and from resetting bilateral relations to comprehensively strengthening subregional diplomacy， a trend that has become particularly prominent during Modi’s term. This article sorts out the evolution of the Modi government’s policy in the Bay of Bengal region and its strategic motives to examine the prospects of the policy and its impact on regional economic cooperation and security mechanism development.

Measures and Characteristics of India’s Renewed Focus on the Bay of Bengal

Before the end of the Cold War， India had an inward-looking， statist economy， with its domestic market separated from the outside world； in terms of security， India was preoccupied with security threats on its northern land borders and could not turn to the sea； in terms of diplomacy， it adopted a hardline “Indiraism，” causing tense relations with neighboring countries， and the Bay of Bengal was marginal in India’s foreign policy and economic relations.2 With the Rao government’s “Look East” policy， India looked beyond the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia， but continued a policy of “benign neglect” toward its close neighbors in the Bay of Bengal.3 Under the “Gujral Doctrine，” India launched the Bay of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation （BIMSTEC） in 1997， but for many years its development was slow. After the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999， the Vajpayee government developed greater interest in maritime affairs. In 2001， India established its first joint inter-services command in the Andaman Nicobar Islands， and was involved in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami relief. Overall， however， the Bay of Bengal was neither part of the post-Cold-War strategic chess game in the Asia-Pacific， nor a priority area of strategic concern for India.

After the Modi government came to power， with a stronger pursuit of great power status， India has launched proactive diplomacy in the “great periphery”far away from its mainland and neighboring areas， and paid much more attention to maritime security affairs in the Indian Ocean. With the changes in the strategic environment in the Bay of Bengal and the transformation of the overall situation in the Asia-Pacific， Modi has proposed “Neighborhood First”and “Act East，” gradually breaking the mindset of handling South Asia and Southeast Asia separately， focusing on the systematic integration of the Bay of Bengal region， and changing the strategic security layout which emphasizes the west over the east and the land over the sea， thereby comprehensively enhancing the importance of， and strategic investment in maritime security in the Bay of Bengal. On May 30， 2019， Modi invited the heads of all the members of BIMSTEC as guests to the inauguration ceremony for his second term. Some comments pointed out that this showed India would continue to pursue the“Neighborhood First” foreign policy in the Modi 2.0 period， while further increasing its engagement with countries around the Bay of Bengal.4 In fact， during Modi’s first term， India had already started to strengthen its diplomatic efforts in various fields such as political， economic， security， and people-topeople exchanges with countries along the Bay of Bengal.

Measures of India’s renewed focus

First， strengthening high-level contacts and comprehensively improving bilateral relations with countries along the Bay of Bengal. Modi visited Sri Lanka in March 2015， the first by an Indian prime minister after 28 years since the visit of Rajiv Gandhi in 1987. In May 2017 and June 2019， Modi paid two more visits to Sri Lanka. Such frequent head-of-state visits are uncommon in the history of the two countries. India-Bangladesh relations have also developed considerably， with the two countries properly resolving the issues of border enclaves and maritime disputes. Raveesh Kumar， Spokesman for the Indian Ministry of External Affairs， commented that relations between the two countries have never been so close.5 In September 2017 and December 2018， Modi and Indian President Ram Nath Kovind visited Myanmar in succession. These two high-level visits by India came at a time when Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration was under criticism for the Rohingya issue， so the understanding and support from India was indeed timely help. From May to June 2018， Modi paid visits to Indonesia， Malaysia and Singapore. During Modi’s visit to Indonesia， the two sides issued the Shared Vision for Strengthening Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region， emphasizing the synergy of India’s“Act East” diplomacy， the “SAGAR” concept and Indonesia’s “Global Maritime Fulcrum” strategy. This is the first time that such a document has been jointly launched between India and a Southeast Asian country.

Second， actively promoting and leading the building of regional multilateral mechanisms. From its inception in 1997， BIMSTEC had never really taken off. The real starting point for change was the Goa summit of BRICS leaders in 2016， during which India invited the leaders of BIMSTEC member countries to hold an extended meeting with BRICS leaders. In June 2017， Modi， speaking at the 20th anniversary of BIMSTEC， noted that it was a natural platform for India’s “Neighborhood First” and “Act East” foreign policy.6 Under India’s leadership and strong promotion， the organization has significantly improved its mechanism building and its cooperation level， expanding its cooperation areas from economic and trade to security cooperation.7 India also plays a “driver” role in other Indian Ocean multilateral governance mechanisms and Track II arrangements， such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association （IORA）， the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium （IONS）， the India-Indonesia-Australia trilateral cooperation mechanism， the Raisina Dialogue and the Indian Ocean Conference （IOC）.

Third， enhancing military presence in the Bay of Bengal and actively developing security cooperation with countries along the Bay of Bengal. To further strengthen its surveillance capabilities in the Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Strait， India has stepped up efforts to upgrade the port facilities and armament capabilities of the Andaman-Nicobar Strategic Command， built a new base at Kohasa， and expanded runways and ancillary facilities for the long-term deployment of Su-30MKI and P-8I aircrafts.8 To enhance its control over the Bay of Bengal， India is also actively engaged in bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with countries along the Bay， especially in the area of maritime security. In recent years， the Indian defense minister and senior officials from the three services have frequently visited relevant countries and signed a series of defense and security cooperation agreements， notably the India-Indonesia Defense Cooperation Agreement in May 2018 and the India-Myanmar Defense Cooperation Agreement in July 2019. India has held annual bilateral naval exercises with Sri Lanka， Bangladesh， Myanmar， Thailand， Singapore and Indonesia in the Bay of Bengal.9 India has also been active in providing equipment such as patrol vessels， sonar， torpedoes and even submarines to the countries concerned，10 and has provided coastal radar surveillance systems to Bangladesh and Myanmar.11 In addition， personnel training is an important element of India’s military diplomacy， with 80 percent of Sri Lanka’s naval officers having been trained in India， and India will also help Myanmar train submarine personnel. In terms of multilateral security cooperation， India’s biennial Milan military exercises in the Andaman-Nicobar Islands have expanded year by year from five participating countries to 16 in 2018， including all the seven countries along the Bay of Bengal. More than 40 countries were expected to participate in the Milan military exercise originally scheduled for March 2020， which was later cancelled due to the novel coronavirus pandemic. The exercise reflects India’s attempt to build a maritime security cooperation platform similar to the ADMM Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise or the Rim of the Pacific Exercise. The increasing institutionalization of BIMSTEC is becoming another vehicle for India’s sub-regional multilateral security cooperation， such as the first BIMSTEC joint military exercise in Pune， India， in September 2018， the annual meetings of BIMSTEC heads of state held in New Delhi， Dhaka， and Bangkok successively from 2017 to 2019， and the BIMSTEC Coastal Security Working Group which is also under way. In addition， India is actively promoting mini-multilateral maritime security cooperation among India， Sri Lanka and Malaysia and among India， Australia and Indonesia.

Fourth， actively participating in infrastructure development in the region. Since Modi came to power， India has actively invested in infrastructure development in the countries along the Bay of Bengal to promote regional connectivity and has achieved great success. In Sri Lanka， India has invested heavily in the country’s refineries， ports， airports and road construction. In March 2019， India planned to invest US$3.85 billion to build oil refineries in Sri Lanka， which would be the largest foreign-invested construction project introduced in Sri Lanka. In May 2019， the governments of India， Japan and Sri Lanka signed a memorandum of understanding for India and Japan to jointly fund a new container terminal at the east wharf of Colombo Port. In November 2019， Modi prepared a big package for Gotabhaya Rajapaksa’s first visit to India after being elected as new Prime Minister of Sri Lanka： a US$400 million loan to Sri Lanka for infrastructure development， including$100 million to help Sri Lanka develop solar energy.12 India is adjacent to Bangladesh by land and sea. By way of Bangladesh is the most economical transportation route from the Indian mainland to the northeast region， and also the most convenient route from the relatively closed northeastern states of India to the Bay of Bengal. Therefore， Bangladesh has become an important country for the Modi government to promote infrastructure connectivity in India’s neighborhood. Currently speaking， the India-led Bangladesh-BhutanIndia-Nepal Initiative has witnessed more projects in Bangladesh at a faster pace. In March 2019， the Bangladeshi government launched a Tk60.14 billion （US$660 million） project to upgrade the facilities at Mongla Port， with India providing a loan of Tk44.59 billion （US$490 million）.13 In October 2019， Hasina visited India and the two sides signed several agreements on India’s use of Chittagong and Mongla ports for exporting goods. The landmark projects of India-Myanmar infrastructure cooperation are the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India-MyanmarThailand Trilateral Highway.14 In September 2016， at the Vientiane ASEAN summit， Modi proposed extending the ongoing India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway project to Cambodia， Laos and Vietnam. In May 2018， Modi visited Indonesia and the two countries announced joint development of the strategically important western Indonesian port city of Sabang.

Fifth， promoting people-to-people exchanges through multiple channels. Due to geographical and historical reasons， Indian culture has strong influence in the Bay of Bengal region.15 The Modi government has actively strengthened people-to-people exchanges with countries along the Bay of Bengal through tourism， religion， education and films. A total of 424，887 Indian tourists visited Sri Lanka in 2018， accounting for 18.2 percent of Sri Lanka’s total tourists， making India its largest source country of tourists.16 The Indian government regards Buddhism as an important tool to enhance India’s soft power， with visiting Buddhist temples a “routine practice” in Modi’s official visits. In August 2018， India announced that it would host the International Buddhist Conference in 2020， and invited the heads of all BIMSTEC members as guests of the conference （which was held online due to the pandemic）. In September 2020， Modi and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa had a video meeting， during which India announced that it would provide Sri Lanka with US$15 million in aid to strengthen Buddhist exchanges.17 India also focuses on expanding its soft power in the region via means of higher education cooperation， overseas diasporas， Bollywood movies and yoga， etc.

Characteristics of India’s renewed focus

Overall， India’s diplomatic efforts in the Bay of Bengal region have been significantly strengthened since Modi came to power， presenting the following salient features.

First， highlighting infrastructure and security cooperation， to demonstrate that India has a strong capacity to provide public goods. The Modi government has tried to connect the Bay of Bengal with the AsiaPacific region， which is reflected by the infrastructure connectivity projects it has led or participated in in the region. This is also an important area for India to strengthen its “Neighborhood First” and “Act East” policies. In addition， Modi has placed special emphasis on maritime security cooperation， actively playing the role of “net security provider，” mainly by demonstrating its credible naval presence， promoting multilateral security mechanisms， and helping relevant countries enhance their maritime security capabilities. For example， Indian warships frequently conduct port visits and bilateral exercises. India provided submarines and patrol vessels to Myanmar and Sri Lanka， and promoted joint military exercises among BIMSTEC members. They are also actively building Maritime Domain Awareness（MDA） in the Bay of Bengal to monitor submarines and ships entering the Bay of Bengal and are encouraging the navies of the coastal countries to sign the White Shipping Agreement （WSA） to exchange information on merchant ships entering and leaving the Bay of Bengal. In December 2018， India established the Information Fusion Center-Indian Ocean Region （IFCIOR）， with all Bay of Bengal countries involved in information sharing.

Second， focusing on key countries bilaterally and multilaterally and trying to build an India-centered sub-region. Among the countries along the Bay of Bengal， Sri Lanka， Bangladesh and Myanmar are the key targets of India’s diplomacy. In recent years， India has invested a lot of energy and resources in the above three countries in political， economic and security fields. With some important agreements signed and some maritime territorial disputes and historical issues properly resolved， India’s efforts have contributed to rapid improvement of the bilateral relationships. Meanwhile， since 2016， India has actively promoted the transformation of BIMSTEC from “trade-leading” to “financial control，” from an “economic body” to a“security entity，” and from “facility connectivity” to “military projection.”18 In India’s view， the destinies of the countries along the Bay of Bengal are interconnected， and the Bay represents their “common space.”19 India emphasizes， however， that this organization excludes Pakistan and rejects any possibility of absorbing China in the future. There is no doubt that India is trying to play a leading role in this emerging sub-region.

Third， adopting a cooperative and relatively moderate approach by combining soft and hard measures and making constant efforts， with a particular focus on practical results. Historically， India always regarded itself as the “big brother” in this region， and was accustomed to being patronizing when handling relations with neighboring countries， and arbitrarily resorting to force intervention （as in the case of Sri Lanka） or democratic intervention（such as its policy toward Myanmar） when it felt the need. Modi’s diplomacy is relatively more flexible and pragmatic， not limited by local interests or moral constraints. For example， it has properly handled enclave and maritime disputes with Bangladesh by making concessions. On the Rohingya issue， it has also tried to consider the Myanmar government’s difficulties and showed understanding. While developing relations with Sri Lanka， India’s concern for the Tamil issue is also outweighed by its own strategic interests there. On the other hand， India also pays attention to enhancing its own strength， especially its military strength， and does not conceal its determination and confidence in using hard power to maintain its regional dominance.

Fourth， developing partnerships with major countries outside the region to expand India’s influence in the Bay of Bengal. India was extremely sensitive to the penetration and military intervention of powers outside the Bay of Bengal for a long time. Now that the situation has changed significantly， India regards some countries outside the region as “like-minded”partners， which mainly include the United States， Japan， Australia， France and Singapore， and is continuously improving the level of maritime security cooperation with them and introducing advanced technical equipment， so as to strengthen its influence in the region. The navies of India， the US， Japan， and Australia frequently conduct bilateral or trilateral military exercises in the Bay of Bengal.20 India has also turned a blind eye to the bilateral maritime cooperation activities of the US， Japanese and Australian navies with smaller neighbors in the Bay of Bengal.21 India has cooperated with the US and Japan to carry out infrastructure construction， an example being the construction of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor by India and Japan， their infrastructure cooperation in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka， and the introduction of Japanese capital to develop northeastern India and the Andaman-Nicobar Islands.22 India has also worked with Japan and the US in intervening in the elections of related countries， often performing two-man dramas in the general elections of Maldives and Sri Lanka.23 In January 2018， Indian and Japanese coast guards conducted a joint maritime exercise in the waters of India’s Chennai Port， in which Sri Lanka and Maldives participated for the first time. In the future， such a maritime security cooperation model featuring India-Japan （or India-Australia） plus a third-party will be further promoted.

Entering 2020， despite the outbreak of the novel coronavirus pandemic， security cooperation between India and countries outside the Bay of Bengal was accelerating. In July 2020， four Indian naval vessels and the US Nimitz aircraft carrier fleet held a joint exercise near the AndamanNicobar Islands. In September， the US P-8A anti-submarine patrol aircraft received refueling and logistical supplies on the Andaman-Nicobar Islands for the first time. In October， then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited India， and the two sides signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation （BECA）. The next step would be to sign the Maritime Information Sharing Technical Arrangement （MISTA）. In June 2020， the Indian and Australian leaders held a video summit， released the Shared Vision of Indo-Pacific Maritime Cooperation， and signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement （MLSA）. In September， the Indian and Australian navies held air defense exercises in the East Indian Ocean. In November， Australia participated in the “Malabar” joint military exercise again after 13 years. With Japan in September 2020， India signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement （ACSA）， which offered convenience for the two countries to mutually use each other’s bases in the Indian Ocean.

Motives of India’s Renewed Focus on the Bay of Bengal

India’s active management of the Bay of Bengal is closely related to its strategic culture， history， diplomacy as well as national interests. It aims to maintain and consolidate its sphere of influence and ensure its regional dominant position in the geopolitical， economic and cultural arenas.

Reshaping the regional strategic order and restoring India’s traditional dominant position

Since the withdrawal of Britain from the east of the Suez Canal in 1968， India has long dominated the Bay of Bengal by virtue of its special geographical location and comparative strength. In recent years， the geostrategic importance of the Bay of Bengal has become increasingly prominent. Countries have increased their attention to， and participation in， Bay of Bengal affairs under the guidance of the Indo-Pacific strategy. India believes that these changes may turn the Bay of Bengal into a new gladiatorial arena in the era of major-power competition， which India is not fully prepared for and is concerned about. Indian scholar Raja Mohan has long argued that the next Indian government after Manmohan Singh must recognize the Bay of Bengal as a strategic hub and exert a strong leadership that can “effectively combine a vigorous strategy for domestic growth and the rapid development of its border regions with the imperatives of India’s economic regionalism，”as the rest of the world is ready to “chip in” if India just stands by.24 He also pointed out that what India does in the sub-region is far more important than the abstract debates on the Indo-Pacific concept.25

Based on the above understanding， India is eager to reshape the strategic order in the Bay of Bengal， and restore and consolidate its traditional dominant position in this region. In February 2015， Modi vowed to lead India towards a global leading power， rather than just having it serve as a balancing force.26 To achieve this goal， Modi has， on the one hand， emphasized the principles of realist diplomacy based on Hindu nationalism. Unlike Nehru， who stressed India’s role as a moral power， Modi prefers to play a security role based on increased strength， for example by building up military power， securing sea lanes and acting as a“net security provider.” In particular， against the backdrop of the relative decline of US power， the ambitious Modi government’s mode of action in the Bay of Bengal combines the characteristics of a free-rider and a constable， with the latter becoming increasingly prominent.27 On the other hand， it has focused on regional diplomacy by building on its strengths to shape a favorable neighborhood environment. India’s traditional neighborhood diplomacy was designed to isolate small states from each other and from the outside world， and to keep them at India’s mercy. As Mohan pointed out， India never took the initiative to think about how to implement activism in the neighborhood to consolidate its security in the region. With globalization and the political and economic transformation of the countries involved， India has found that this line of thinking does not work. In the Bay of Bengal region， it is clear that India is integrating“Neighborhood First” and “Act East，” proactively providing various regional public goods， and actively shaping an exclusive， India-centric subregional community that is beneficial to India. In the case of BIMSTEC， for example， the Indian government has always emphasized “consolidation before expansion” and opposed Sri Lanka’s proposal for expansion， with the intention of maintaining its dominance and preventing competitors from diluting its leadership by gradually penetrating the organization as observer states.

Promoting infrastructure connectivity and regional cooperation to boost domestic economic development

About 300 million people in India live on the east coast of the Bay of Bengal （including Tamil Nadu， Andhra Pradesh， Orissa and West Bengal）， and another 45 million people live in the relatively closed and underdeveloped northeastern region. How to promote the economic development of these regions， strengthen their ties with Asia-Pacific economies， and get rid of poverty and backwardness is an important internal reason for Modi to actively promote the integration of the Bay of Bengal region.

The Bay of Bengal is rich in energy， mineral and fishery resources. It has great potential for developing a blue economy. In northern Bay of Bengal， the scale and density of oil and gas resources are quite large. According to the data of IHS Markit， as of the end of 2017， 82 oil and gas fields had been discovered； 10 million tons of recoverable oil reserves and 1 trillion cubic meters of recoverable natural gas reserves had been found， with a cumulative production of 2 million tons of oil and 170 billion cubic meters of gas. In recent years， large oil and gas deposits have been discovered successively in several places in the basin of northern Bay of Bengal， and the above assessments are estimated to grow. The abundance of hydrocarbon resources in the region has attracted the attention of a large number of international energy companies. India， as a major energy importer， also wants to participate in the development in order to ensure its energy security， especially its supply of natural gas.28

The countries along the Bay of Bengal have a large young population with huge infrastructure needs and great market potential. The population of India， Bangladesh， Myanmar and Indonesia are not only large but also young， with tremendous potential for demographic dividends and consumption. In recent years， Sri Lanka， Bangladesh， Myanmar and India have seen good economic momentum， with growth rates ranging from 3.4 percent to 7.5 percent between 2012 and 2016. IHS Global Insight， a US think tank， ranked Sri Lanka as one of the top 10 most attractive Asian markets. According to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s （AIIB） newly released Asia Infrastructure Finance 2019， Bangladesh needs US$24 billion in annual infrastructure investment to achieve its “Vision 2021” of moving into middle-income status. Myanmar， which is opening up， is also seen as a promising Asian market. The development prospects of Indonesia are also very promising. It is expected to become the world’s fifth largest economy by 2030. These countries are attractive to the Modi government， which advocates “Made in India” production. Improving regional infrastructure connectivity， enhancing the level of trade in the region， exploiting the advantages of human capital and strengthening ties with the Southeast Asian markets are compelling reasons for India to refocus on the Bay of Bengal.

Due to contradictions between India and Pakistan， the development of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation （SAARC）， which was once expected highly by India， has been slow and even stagnated， which forces India to shift its focus of regional cooperation from SAARC to BIMSTEC.29 In June 2019， India’s Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar publicly stated that promoting BIMSTEC cooperation would be among India’s top priorities for the next five years.30 The spread of the novel coronavirus pandemic in 2020 has hit the Indian economy hard. India is eager to strengthen cooperation with its BIMSTEC neighbors to jointly build regional value chains， revive its economy early， and reduce its overdependence on China’s industrial chain.31

Addressing traditional and non-traditional security challenges in the Bay of Bengal

India has long regarded the Bay of Bengal as the first barrier to India’s security. K.M. Panikkar’s view has always influenced Indian security policymakers： control of the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea is vital to India’s security， and having the Andaman and Nicobar Islands would provide protection for the east coast and ensure adequate control over the Bay of Bengal.32 Australian scholar David Brewster calls this region a key space for India to defend itself against potential threats from or through the Southeast Asian archipelago.33 India is therefore sensitive and alert to changes in the power structure of the region and any presence of extraterritorial states.While during the Cold War， India was primarily concerned about the United States （hence its introduction of the Soviet fleet as a counterweight）， it is now focusing its attention on China. India sees China’s economic and security cooperation with Myanmar and Bangladesh， normal Chinese naval activities in the Bay of Bengal， and the proposed Kra Isthmus Canal as evidence that China is pursuing a “string of pearls” strategy to encircle India. Although there is no official confirmation， it is entirely possible that China’s antiaccess/area denial in Southeast Asia could be the catalyst for India’s response in the Bay of Bengal. Raja Mohan pointed out that the anticipation of Chinese ships and submarines carrying out missions in northern Andaman Sea will have serious implications for India’s projection capabilities. This will inevitably lead to a number of aggressive counter-maneuvers by the Indian Navy. For example， when China provided a submarine to Bangladesh， India responded by handing over a Kilo-class submarine to Myanmar. In December 2019， the Indian Navy dislodged a Chinese maritime research vessel， Shi Yan 1， in the Bay of Bengal. In addition， China was not invited to the Milan military exercises scheduled for March 2020. Wary of China’s growing maritime presence in the region， India is vigorously enhancing its own capabilities in sea lane control and surveillance， long-range projection， and maritime denial operations， while trying to draw in or pressure Sri Lanka， Bangladesh and Myanmar to conduct joint combat exercises with it and establish an India-led hub-and-spoke security cooperation system.

India also needs to address non-traditional security challenges， such as climate disasters， piracy， cross-border refugees， and drug-related crimes. The Bay of Bengal has a volatile climate and is prone to major natural disasters， such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that killed and injured hundreds of thousands of people. Among all the countries affected， the number of India’s casualties was the third highest. The Bay of Bengal is also a major “drug corridor” linking the Golden Triangle to Afghanistan. India is trying to use non-traditional security cooperation as a breakthrough to bring together the countries along the Bay， cultivating the habit of cooperation， and preparing for the future creation of a multilateral regional security mechanism.

Generally speaking， the new changes in the geostrategic environment of the Bay of Bengal， the positioning of India’s interests in the region， the policy-makers’ changing threat perception in this direction and their resulting strategic anxiety， are important reasons for the Modi government’s renewed focus on the Bay of Bengal. In addition， changes in the overall strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region and the competition for India’s attention by regional powers have also given India the opportunity to “reshape and dominate” the regional order in the Bay of Bengal. A key element of the US Indo-Pacific strategy is to bring in India， which it would delegate as the primary partner responsible for the US “offshore balance strategy” in the Bay of Bengal. The promise to help India upgrade its armament in the Bay of Bengal and encourage it to move eastward into western Pacific Ocean is a huge lure for India. On the one hand， the US is trying to play up the so-called “Chinese submarine threat” and “military objectives behind China’s port construction，” and， by taking advantage of India’s natural sensitivity and vigilance to China’s entry into the Indian Ocean， intends to persuade India into actively disrupting and countering China. On the other hand， the US is trying to draw India on board by providing advanced equipment， cultivating habits of cooperation and helping India enhance its military capabilities. The US has actively helped India upgrade the anti-submarine capabilities of its eastern naval bases （such as the sale of P-8I and MQ-9B） and construct underwater early warning systems. In a report by the Center for a New American Security， it is also suggested that India could rely on foreign strategic allies to enhance its maritime surveillance capabilities if China and India were to come to blows in the Bay of Bengal in the future.34 Other US scholars have fervently argued on the basis of the historical lessons of Britain’s withdrawal from the east of Suez that without a dominant and generally amicable maritime power to prevent “emerging powers” from competing for the sea， competition or conflict will ensue.35 Some Indian scholars have also chimed in， saying that it is because India alone cannot stop the powerful and unruly China from moving into the sea that it is necessary to seek support from the US， Japan and Australia. Mohan has written an article analyzing why India must draw Australia into the Bay of Bengal.36 India and Japan have jointly launched the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and developed third-party cooperation in the Bay of Bengal， with the intention of countering the Belt and Road Initiative （BRI）.37 In a nutshell， the US hopes to share its strategic burden of containing China in the Bay of Bengal by boosting India’s naval strength， and play the role of “offshore balancer” by provoking maritime competition between India and China. India is also willing to cooperate with the US and other countries’ navies to buy time for its own capability building and achieve its “small goal” of strengthening strategic control over the Bay of Bengal.

Constraints of India’s Renewed Focus on the Bay of Bengal

Compared with his predecessor Singh， Modi’s policy on the Bay of Bengal can be described as vigorous. India’s multi-pronged approach in political， economic， military and cultural fields will have a new impact on India’s external relations and the regional order. Modi’s regional reintegration policy， which focuses on infrastructure connectivity and multilateral mechanism building， will objectively help improve and upgrade the infrastructure in the Bay of Bengal， and create favorable conditions for the development of regional economic integration and cultural exchanges. India’s vigorous reinforcement of military security investment and foreign aid in the Bay of Bengal will help jointly address non-traditional security issues in the region，but may also intensify the militarization trend in the Bay of Bengal. India’s intervention in the internal affairs of its neighbors along the Bay under the banner of “democracy” has obvious geopolitical purposes， and its adoption of double standards towards these countries according to their perception of China does no good to improving mutual trust. In the multilateral area， India’s exclusive and targeted approach in mechanism building will pressure the small participating countries to take sides， and the prospects for the mechanisms’ long-term development are worrisome. Whether India can successfully integrate the Bay of Bengal region with its neighboring countries and transform this “fragmented zone” into a prosperous and stable “regional community” with India at the center is an open question， and the attempt is bound to be fraught with challenges and uncertainties. Whether India’s policy can achieve the pre-determined strategic objectives will be constrained by the following factors.

Gap between India’s strength and strategic intentions

The fate of India’s renewed focus on the Bay of Bengal fundamentally lies in how much it is willing to commit to the region， and how strong and enduring are its political and security commitments. One of the most important features of India’s neighborhood diplomacy is the lack of continuity： it talks too much and does too little， and is lacking in patience and persistence. Take infrastructure connectivity as an example. The annual funding gap for infrastructure development in the Bay of Bengal is as high as US$250 billion， a gap that India alone is simply unable to meet， especially in the face of significantly slower economic growth. Sri Lanka is under pressure from India to reject Chinese-invested projects， but India is unable to fill the need. Given its surplus position in trade with its small neighbors， India’s central role in the Bay of Bengal’s economic integration is not particularly prominent. As India is unable to give more and take less， integration process in the region has been at a low level for a long time， and economic ties among the countries are even weaker than their external connections. In terms of provision of regional security public goods， India’s capacity has improved considerably， but it is still a long way from playing a major role as a“net security provider.” The Indian Navy is known as the “Cinderella Force”among the three services， and its share of the defense budget is much lower than that of the Army and the Air Force. In India’s 2019-20 defense budget， the Navy’s share of the budget was only 13 percent， down 5 percent from 2012.38 India plans to have 200 warships by 2027， compared to 137 today， but the current economic situation makes it difficult to achieve this plan.39 There are also diverse and complex non-traditional security challenges in the Bay of Bengal region， and relying on India alone to provide security public goods is not sustainable.

In terms of strategic will， Modi’s determination to move eastward into the Bay of Bengal is strong， but is hampered by India’s strategic culture， which has a tradition of disdain for the sea， and by land-based constraints from Pakistan. There are also dissenting voices within India who fear that the expansion of the front will result in a failure to balance east and west， sea and land. Since Modi’s second term， he has put a lot of energy into dealing with border disputes and domestic political affairs， and has no time to worry about the east. In addition， once the term of political strongman Modi ends， it is uncertain whether India can continue to invest in the Bay of Bengal. Moreover， the Bay of Bengal region， especially the South Asian part， is a typical “fracture zone” full of complex religious， ethnic and regional conflicts between countries. Whether India can properly deal with it is also a problem.

Contradiction between “India First” and “Neighborhood First”

India and its neighbors have a low level of mutual trust and different perceptions of the future of the regional order. Historically， India intervened in the internal affairs of neighboring countries many times. While the Modi government has not resorted to the usual Cold War-style military intervention in neighboring countries， it has made no secret of its intervention in the internal affairs of its neighbors. It is with this in mind that these countries also remain somewhat wary of hosting Indian investments. In Sri Lanka， for example， the sites chosen by India for investment are concentrated in the relatively Tamil-populated Jaffna region， and the Sri Lankan government is concerned that the Indian investment may affect its economic independence and ethnic issues， among other things. Lanka IOC， an independent subsidiary of Indian Oil Corporation， is the largest domestic supplier of lubricants in Sri Lanka， with a 17 percent market share. India’s proposal for the company to take over 99 oil storage tanks in Trincomalee was met with strong protests from Sri Lankan workers.40 Similar situation exists in Bangladesh， where suspicions between India and Bangladesh still run deep， especially because of conflicts over migration and water distribution. Bangladesh’s home minister and foreign minister have cancelled their visits to India due to dissatisfaction with India’s passage of the Citizenship Act amendment. Modi’s planned visit to Bangladesh on March 17， 2020， and participation in the 100th anniversary of the birth of Bangladesh’s founding leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was also cancelled due to strong opposition from Bangladeshi Muslims.

In addition， the small- and medium-sized countries around the Bay of Bengal have a tradition of non-aligned or neutral diplomacy and are unwilling to become victims of major-power competition， so they generally adopt a “hedging strategy” or “soft balance.” For example， in BIMSTEC， small countries hope to follow the example of ASEAN and use multilateral mechanisms and norms to check and balance， or “socialize” and “reverse，”the norms of major powers， so as to prevent them from using their institutional power for self-aggrandizement. One important feature of the Modi government’s vigorous promotion of BIMSTEC is the “Indianization of the Bay of Bengal，” which is unacceptable for countries that are already suspicious of India. In terms of specific countries， Sri Lanka tries to maintain an equidistant balance between China and India， and has taken a regional leadership role in the middle of major-power competition by means of mechanism building and norm shaping， so as to achieve the overall stability of the region.41 Before his visit to India at the end of 2019， Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa said that the country is practicing equidistant diplomacy to remain neutral in the competition between major powers. Bangladesh and Myanmar also have largely similar ideas to those of Sri Lanka. When faced with an asymmetrical partner like India， the small countries usually expect India to play a peaceful， tolerant and generous role， rather than emphasizing “India First” at all times. As for Indonesia， it is also unlikely to accept Modi’s vision as an Indian Ocean leader. If India fails to walk away from the myth of a “Monroe Doctrine”and the obsession of “India First，” it will be difficult to dispel the doubts of its neighbors， and the healthy development of BIMSTEC will be further out of reach.

Contradiction between strategic autonomy and free-riding

As discussed earlier， India has tacitly approved or even supported the expansion of the presence of the US， Japan and Australia in the Bay of Bengal. India’s intention is to seek the rapid growth of its own power by free-riding and cooperating with so-called “like-minded” countries to impede or balance China’s rise. Since Modi came to power， India has loosened its policy of strategic autonomy. Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party are less bound by the traditional policy of non-alignment and believe that non-alignment should not be understood dogmatically； instead， strategic autonomy should be followed according to India’s national interests.42 However， as the US is betting more and more on India with the development of US-India military and security cooperation， India has become more cautious， because after all， the long-standing feud between the two countries will not be resolved overnight. As US scholar George Perkovich pointed out， India may not be fully aligned with Washington about when， where and how to exercise its sea power， and thus may shock and disappoint the US government.43 India’s exclusion of Chinese access to the Bay of Bengal is not the same as joining the four-nation coalition of Quad to confront China. The seemingly benign US-India cooperation will not last long as India pleases the US by exaggerating the China threat and welcoming a heightened US naval presence in the Bay of Bengal， while the US acquiesces to India’s more aggressive and intrusive regional security policy. As Shiv Shankar Menon puts it，“Is it likely that two emerging powers like India and China， with old traditions of state-craft， would allow them to be manipulated by other countries， no matter how elegantly expressed？ I think not.”44 Once India’s economic and military strength continues to grow， the structural contradictions between the two in the Indian Ocean will again come to the fore.

Contradiction between promoting regional cooperation and excluding Chinese participation

In June 2018， Modi delivered a speech on India’s Indo-Pacific strategy at the Shangri-La Dialogue， saying “India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy， nor does it see it as a club with limited membership， nor is it a bloc that is trying to dominate. In no way do we think it is directed against any country.”45 From Modi’s remarks， many scholars noted the optimistic signal of his emphasis on inclusiveness， which should be in line with the BRI’s spirit. Objectively speaking， Indian scholars do not deny that China and India have common interests in infrastructure development in the Bay of Bengal， in trade and economic cooperation， and even in addressing non-traditional security issues.46 Coupled with the fact that the two countries do not have conflicting maritime rights in the Bay of Bengal， it is entirely possible for them to cooperate. But the reality is that Modi’s Bay of Bengal diplomacy is very exclusive， especially in its prevention and exclusion of China （and even of Indonesia）. India’s recent construction of a coastal radar surveillance system with Bangladesh has an element of mistrust of China， and this mistrust will certainly affect the development and stability of the Bay of Bengal region. With its growing power and the BRI’s steady progress， China will become a force to be reckoned with in the region， and any Bay of Bengal cooperation is unrealistic without China’s participation.

Conclusion

The Modi government has rediscovered the importance of the Bay of Bengal from the geostrategic and regional integration perspective， changing its role from a passive adaptor to an active shaper， with the aim of establishing an India-led order in the region based on India’s growing power. Though claiming to build a regional community， Modi’s Bay of Bengal diplomacy is actually a move to consolidate India’s sphere of influence， which is clearly contradictory to the open， inclusive， non-confrontational Indo-Pacific strategy advocated by Modi in his Shangri-La Dialogue speech. If India wants to gain respect and benefit in the Bay of Bengal region and maintain a stable maritime security order in its neighborhood， it should uphold the concept of mutual benefit and cooperative security， abandon the temptation of hegemony and cooperate with all stakeholders on an equal footing through joint consultation and collaboration， so as to promote sub-regional integration and contribute positive energy to sub-regional governance.

As key countries influencing the order of the Bay of Bengal region， China and India should do their best to avoid repeating the historical lessons of European powers competing for the Indian Ocean in the late 18th century or in the 1960s when the US and Soviet Union contested fiercely in the Indian Ocean vacuum. China has legitimate interests in the Bay of Bengal， and should actively cooperate with India in non-traditional security areas there， such as anti-piracy and disaster relief， to lay a good foundation for maritime security confidence-building measures.47 In the meantime， China and India can further explore a new model of coordinating maritime rights in the Indo-Pacific， while taking account of international principles and historical basis， taking the initiative to consider each other’s security concerns and respecting each other’s rights in specific adjacent waters in order to avoid provocation and interference from extraterritorial forces. Currently there is a trend of increased militarization in the Bay of Bengal， but in general the real pressure of military competition and confrontation is relatively low compared with Eastern Mediterranean， the Arctic and the Baltic Sea， and it is the common desire of regional countries to seek stability and development. Under the impact of the novel coronavirus pandemic， countries along the Bay of Bengal urgently need to join hands to get out of the predicament. China and India should seize this window of opportunity， proceed from the overall historical situation and long-term strategic goals， enhance their strategic communication and consultation led by summit diplomacy， and take the common interests of the region as the greatest common denominator. By respecting each other’s interests and concerns， properly handling their differences， and carefully cultivating their cooperation areas and mechanisms， the two countries can work together to make the Bay of Bengal a bay of hope， prosperity and stability.

Li Yibo is Associate Professor at the School of Marxism， Beijing Institute of Graphic Communication.

1 This is the geographical definition of the Bay of Bengal region， yet in the geopolitical and geo-economic sense， there is no uniform scope. For example， the only multilateral organization in the region that includes the term “Bay of Bengal” - the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation （BIMSTEC） - does not include Indonesia， Malaysia or Singapore， while landlocked Nepal and Bhutan are included. Considering geographical and practical factors， this article adopts a middle way in referring to the Bay of Bengal region as the Bay of Bengal waters and the six countries bordering it， namely Sri Lanka， India， Bangladesh， Myanmar， Thailand and Indonesia. In a broader sense， apart from the above six countries， the Bay of Bengal region should also include other geographically close stakeholders such as Malaysia， Singapore， China， Nepal， Bhutan and Maldives.

2 Jayati Bhattacharya and Silvia Tieri， “India’s New Geopolitical Paradigm and Reintegration of the Bay of Bengal，” ISAS Working Paper， No.296， June 4， 2018， p.4. During this period， India’s relations with Southeast Asian countries along the Bay of Bengal （Myanmar， Thailand， Indonesia and Malaysia） were mostly “distant” and “distrustful.” See Li Yibo， “India-Thailand Strategic Partnership： Status， Impetus and Prospects，” Southeast Asian and South Asian Studies， No.1， 2014； and Li Yibo， “Indo-Burmese Relations： From Estrangement to Cooperation，” Southeast Asian Studies， No. 1， 2006.

3 The reasons are as follows： First， as the Cold War confrontation subsided， the United States and the Soviet Union reduced their intervention in the Indian Ocean and South Asia， relieving India’s security concerns in the direction of the Bay of Bengal； second， after the failure of intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war， India practiced the “Gujral Doctrine” of good neighborliness， which eased the tensions with neighboring countries； third， in the early days after the end of the Cold War， India was facing a severe economic and political crisis and had no time to attend to other concerns.

4 Maha Siddiqui， “Invited for Modi’s Swearing-in， Are BIMSTEC Nations Now India’s Preferred Choice Over SAARC？” May 30， 2019， https：//www.news18.com/news/india/invited-for-modis-swearing-inbimstec-nations-are-indias-preferred-choice-for-engaging-with-neighbours-2164735.html.

5 “India-Bangladesh Likely to Ink 6-7 Pacts； Sheikh Hasina， Narendra Modi to Inaugurate Three Projects，”Indian Express， October 5， 2019， https：//www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2019/oct/05/india-bangladeshlikely-to-ink-6-7-pacts-sheikh-hasina-narendra-modi-to-inaugurate-three-projects-2043264.html.

6 “Prime Minister’s Message on 20th Anniversary of Establishment of BIMSTEC，” Indian Ministry of External Affairs， June 6， 2017， http：//www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm？dtl/28514/Prime_ Ministers_message_on_20th_anniversary_of_establishment_of_BIMSTEC.

7 Dai Yonghong and Wang Jianping， “The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation： Transformation and Prospects，” South Asian Studies Quarterly， No. 3， 2019.

8 Sohini Bose， “The Andaman Sea： India’s Geostrategic Gateway in the Indo-Pacific，” South Asia Voices， July 3， 2019， https：//southasianvoices.org/andaman-sea-indias-indo-pacific-gatewa； Darshanam Baruah， “The Andaman And Nicobar Islands： India’s Eastern Anchor in a Changing Indo-Pacific，” War on the Rocks， March 21， 2018， https：//warontherocks.com/2018/03/the-andaman-and-nicobar-islands-indias-eastern-anchorin-a-changing-indo-pacific.

9 In March 2018， the navies of India and Myanmar held their first bilateral joint military exercise in the Bay of Bengal； in November 2018. The Indian and Indonesian navies held their first joint military exercise named Samudra Shakti， and in November 2019， this exercise moved to the Bay of Bengal. India-Singapore bilateral naval exercises have been conducted for more than two decades， alternating annually between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea， and with the inclusion of Thailand in January 2019， the three countries held a joint naval exercise in the Andaman Sea for the first time， which will reportedly become a regular annual exercise. In October 2019， navies of India and Bangladesh held their first bilateral joint exercise at the Visakhapatnam military port bordering the Bay of Bengal.

10 In April 2017， Bangladesh Prime Minister Hasina visited India and the two countries signed a security cooperation agreement， according to which India provided Bangladesh with a $500 million loan to help it purchase military equipment from India， the first time India has provided such a defense loan to a South Asian neighbor. In July 2019， India and Myanmar signed an important defense cooperation agreement and provided a “Kilo” submarine to Myanmar at the end of 2019， the first time India has provided submarines in foreign assistance. India’s Goa Shipyard delivered two advanced offshore patrol vessels to the Sri Lankan Navy in 2017 and 2018 respectively.

11 This coastal radar surveillance system has been deployed by India in Mauritius， Seychelles and Maldives. With this system， India can monitor vessels （especially submarines） entering the Indian Ocean. India first had this proposal in 2015， but Bangladesh had not agreed until October 2019， when it was officially finalized during Hasina’s visit to India. India’s next plan is to deploy the system off the coast of Myanmar.

12 Archana Chaudhary， “India Offers Sri Lanka $400 Million to Develop Infrastructure，” Bloomberg， November 29， 2019， https：//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-29/india-offers-sri-lanka-400-million-to-develop-infrastructure.

13 “India to Provide Loan for Bangladesh’s Mongola Port Upgrading Project，” Ministry of Commerce of China， March 28， 2019， http：//www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/j/201903/20190302847465. shtml.

14 For more information about the Kaladan Project， see Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Pratnashree Basu， “India-Myanmar Connectivity： Possibilities and Challenges，” ORF， December 2015， https：//www. orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IndiaMyanmar.pdf.

15 This point has been discussed in detail by both George Coedès in his The Indianized States of Southeast Asia and Amrith in his Crossing the Bay of Bengal. For details， see George Coedès， The Indianized States of Southeast Asia， Commercial Press， 2018； Sunil S. Amrith， Crossing the Bay of Bengal： The Furies of Nature and the Fortunes of Migrants， Boston： Harvard University Press， 2013.

16 “India-Sri Lanka Economic and Trade Engagement，” https：//hcicolombo.gov.in/Economic_Trade_ Engagement.

17 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury， “India Extends $15 Million Grant for Promotion of Buddhist Ties with Sri Lanka，” The Economic Times， September 26， 2020， https：//economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politicsand-nation/india-extends-15-million-grant-for-promotion-of-buddhist-ties-with-sri-lanka.

18 Dai Yonghong and Wang Jianping， “The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation： Transformation and Prospects.”

19 “Prime Minister’s Message on 20th Anniversary of Establishment of BIMSTEC.”

20 In December 2013， the Indian Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force held their first bilateral military exercise JIMEX-13 in the Bay of Bengal. In July 2017， the United States， Japan and India held the “Malabar” exercise in the Bay of Bengal， with the US and Japan sending aircraft carriers to participate. In 2018， the Indian and French navies held the “Varuna-18” exercise in the Arabian Sea， the Bay of Bengal and the Southwest Indian Ocean. In April 2019， the Indian and Australian navies held a bilateral exercise AUIEX-2019 in the Bay of Bengal. In May 2019， the French， US， Japanese and Australian navies held a joint military exercise in the Bay of Bengal. In November 2019， the US and India held a three-services joint exercise “Tiger Triumph” for the first time in the Bay of Bengal. These exercises are of great help in improving the combat readiness of the Indian Navy， especially its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

21 In October 2017， the US Nimitz aircraft carrier fleet visited Colombo. In March 2019， the Australian Navy’s Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2019 （IPE 19） Joint Task Force visited Sri Lanka and held a joint exercise with the country. In September 2020， the US and Maldives signed the Framework for a Defence and Security Relationship， which India welcomed despite its previous opposition. See Suhasini Haidar， “India Welcomes US-Maldives Defense Agreement，” The Hindu， September 14， 2020， https：//www.thehindu.com/ news/national/india-welcomes-us-maldives-defenceagreement/article32601889.ece.

22 Vindu Mai Chotani， “India and Japan： Conneting in the Bay of Bengal，” ORF Paper， 2016.

23 Constantino Xavier， “India’s ‘Like-Minded’ Partnerships to Counter China in South Asia，” Carnegie India， September 11， 2017， https：//carnegieindia.org/2017/09/11/india-s-like-minded-partnerships-tocounter-china-in-south-asia-pub-73079.

24 “Losing the Bay of Bengal，” The Indian Express， March 4， 2014， https：//indianexpress.com/article/ opinion/columns/losing-the-bay-of-bengal.

25 C. Raja Mohan and Ankush Ajay Wagle， “Returning to the Andaman Sea.” Carnegie India， January 1， 2019， https：//carnegieindia.org/2019/01/01/returning-to-andaman-sea-pub-78132.

26 “PM to Heads of Indian Missions，” Press Information Bureau Government of India， February 7， 2015， https：//pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx？relid=115241.

27 As defined by James R. Holmes， the “free-rider” model occurs in a scenario where the US Navy continues to protect freedom of navigation and does not pose a threat to India while providing a significant public good， and where the Chinese Navy has yet to grow and develop in the Indian Ocean. The “constable”model has the following characteristics： India is confident enough to adopt a more assertive regional policy to ensure its dominance and to maintain security in the seas around the subcontinent. India would use everything from mediation to blue-water naval forces to maintain law and order around the subcontinent. Holmes goes on to point out that the Indian government could be spurred into a “constable” or even“strongman” model if there is tangible evidence that external forces want to compete with India for regional dominance. See James R. Holmes et el.， Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century， Ju Hailong， trans.， People’s Publishing House， 2016， pp.78-88.

28 In response to climate and environmental changes， India’s future demand for natural gas will increase significantly to reduce crude oil consumption， from the current 145 million cubic meters per day to 500 million cubic meters per day by 2030， further deepening its dependence on energy imports. See Aslam Jony， “How Energy Demand Affects the Bay of Bengal，” Dhaka Tribune， April 16， 2019， https：//www. dhakatribune.com/opinion/op-ed/2019/04/16/how-energy-demand-affects-the-bay-of-bengal.

29 Fizza Batool， “Why Dismissing SAARC’s Revival is Premature，” South Asian Voices， April 15， 2020， https：//southasianvoices.org/why-dismissing-saarcs-revival-is-premature.

30 “SAARC Has Problems， BIMSTEC Full of Energy， Says Jaishankar，” The Economics Times， June 6， 2019， https：//economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/saarc-has-problems-bimstec-full-ofenergy-says-jaishankar/articleshow/69684367.cms.

31 Suparna Karmakar， “Reimagining India’s Engagement with BIMSTEC，” ORF Issue Brief， No.404， September 30， 2020， https：//www.orfonline.org/research/reimagining-indias-engagement-with-bimstec.

32 K.M. Panikkar， India and the Indian Ocean： An Essay on the Influence of Seapower on Indian History， London： G. Allen & Unwin， 1945， pp.92-96.

33 David Brewster， India’s Ocean： The Story of India’s Bid for Regional Leadership， Du Youkang and Mao Yue， trans.， Social Sciences Academic Press， 2016， p.169.

34 The report implied that the US could provide India with air-based and sea-based surveillance information at critical times. Daniel Kliman et al.， “Imbalance of Power： India’s Military Choices in an Era of Strategic Competition with China，” CNAS Report， October 2019， p.19.

35 James R. Holmes et al.， Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century， p.243.

36 C. Raja Mohan and Darshanam M.Baruah， “ Why India Must Draw Australia into the Bay of Bengal，”Carnegie India， June 7， 2017， https：//carnegieindia.org/2017/06/07/why-india-must-draw-australia-into-bayof-bengal-pub-71193.

37 On India-Japan infrastructure cooperation in the Bay of Bengal region and its impact， see Li Yibo，“Japan’s Entry into the Bay of Bengal： Present Situation， Motivations and Impact，” South Asian Studies Quarterly， No.2， 2019.

38 Abhishek Bhalla， “Navy’s Modernization Plans Take A Blow with Massive Fund Crunch，” India Today， December 3， 2019， https：//www.indiatoday.in/india/story/navy-s-modernisation-plans-take-a-blow-withmassive-fund-crunch-1624872-2019-12-03.

39 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan， “The Trouble with India’s Slow Naval Buildup，” The Diplomat， October 4， 2019， https：//thediplomat.com/2019/10/the-trouble-with-indias-slow-naval-buildup/.

40 Avijit Goel， “Is India’s Sri Lanka Policy Working at All？” ORF， August 28， 2017， https：//www. orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-srilanka-policy-working.

41 Prashanth Parameswaran， “Asanga Abeyagoonasekera on Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy Challenges，” The Diplomat， February 12， 2019， https：//thediplomat.com/2019/02/asanga-abeyagoonasekera-on-sri-lankasforeign-policy-challenges； Shakthi De Silva， “Trapped between the Dragon and South Asia’s Big Brother： The Case of Sri Lanka’s ‘Balanced’ Foreign Policy，” Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences， Vol.41， No.2， 2018； Barana Waidyatilake， “A New Role for Sri Lanka in Asia’s Changing Geopolitics？” The Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute， January 7， 2019， https：//www.lki.lk/publication/a-new-role-for-sri-lanka-in-asiaschanging-geopolitics.

42 Lou Chunhao， “Modi’s Strategic Vision and Maritime Security Strategy，” Foreign Affairs Review， No.5， 2018. p.106.

43 C.Raja Mohan， Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific， preface.

44 Shiv Shankar Menon， “Maritime Imperatives of Indian Foreign Policy，” Maritime Affairs： Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India， Vol.5， No.2， 2009， pp.15-21.

45 “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue，” Indian Ministry of External Affairs， June 1， 2018， https：//www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm？dtl/29943/ Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018.

46 Raj Mittal， “Sino-Indian Relations in the Indian Ocean： Conflict or Convergence？” Future Directions International， November 26， 2019， http：//www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/sino-indian-relations-inthe-indian-ocean-conflict-or-convergence/.

47 In November 2017， during the multilateral maritime search and rescue exercise of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium， the Chinese naval frigate Yuncheng participated in the exercise of searching and rescuing crashed aircrafts together with five other ships from Bangladesh， India and Indonesia.