India-ASEAN Relations from the Indo Pacific Perspective

Ning Shengnan

India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations （ASEAN） are important geopolitical actors in the Indo-Pacific， and their relations bear on the Indo-Pacific concept’s richness in connotations. After the end of the Cold War， India introduced the “Look East” policy and made significant progress in its relations with ASEAN. As the idea of Indo-Pacific emerges， India has also claimed to safeguard the regional centrality of ASEAN. Under the framework of the Indo-Pacific strategy， how is the relationship between India and ASEAN going？ What progress has been made， and what challenges do they face？ Are their interests and policy preferences in the Indo-Pacific consistent？ Can the idea of Indo-Pacific promote their relations further？ These are questions that this article intends to answer.

Progress of India-ASEAN Relations

After the end of the Cold War， India has made significant progress in its relations with ASEAN in the following four areas.

Establishing and strengthening strategic partnership

The relations between India and ASEAN were not good during the Cold War. After the 1970s， India was a de facto ally of the Soviet Union， while the newly established ASEAN was Western-oriented， which focused on politics and security to defend national independence and contain communist expansion. With the confrontation between US and Soviet camps， India’s relations with ASEAN were lukewarm. In 1978 when Vietnam invaded Cambodia， India followed the Soviet Union. It did not condemn Vietnam but instead recognized the Heng Samrin regime， thus excluding itself from Southeast Asia.1 When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979， India’s silence despite its position as the top power in South Asia further displeased ASEAN members. Moreover， India’s chauvinistic approach to regional issues， including the dismemberment of Pakistan， the interference in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka and the Maldives， and the construction of naval bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands since the mid-1980s， all kept neighboring ASEAN countries wary of its military threats.

The end of the Cold War in 1991 saw the dissolution of structural barriers between India and ASEAN. After the collapse of the Soviet Union， India and ASEAN， once belonging to rivaling blocs， returned to being geographical neighbors and began to develop their respective external relations based on national interests. Issues that hampered India’s engagement with ASEAN were mostly resolved. India changed its attitude toward the Cambodian regime as the Cambodian conflict was politically settled. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan gradually eased the concerns of ASEAN countries about India. Moreover， India conducted joint naval exercises with Indonesia， Malaysia and Singapore in the early 1990s near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands2 and opened Port Blair to naval attachés from Southeast Asian countries3 to allay the concerns of ASEAN countries about its naval expansion.

In terms of economic strategy， India sees ASEAN as a gateway to integrate itself into Asian and global economy. In the early 1990s， India started its reform toward a liberal， market-oriented and globalized economy， and gradually changed its conservative and self-reliant approach in economic development， to transform itself from a regulated inward-looking economy to an outward-looking economy that responds to market needs.4 In this process， the very first challenge is to figure out where and how to open up. The Indian government realized that the fast-growing ASEAN countries could be a springboard for India’s integration into the Asia-Pacific economic circle and the world market. In 1991， India launched the “Look East” policy to upgrade its ties with ASEAN countries， especially in trade and commerce.

In terms of international relations， ASEAN has become an essential channel for India to improve its relations with neighboring and Asian countries and even the United States. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union put India in a difficult position in the new international order， because its relations with the West were still under tension while it was isolated in Asia. In an urgent need of improving relations with neighboring and Asian countries as well as the United States， ASEAN became a vital channel for India to break new ground in diplomacy. First of all， ASEAN countries border on India and some are deeply influenced by the Hindu culture. In the post-war Non-Aligned Movement， ASEAN countries like Indonesia were partners with India. There were geographical， historical and cultural conditions for improving relations. Second， ASEAN has become the most representative organization of regional integration after the 1990s. India wants to get involved and play a more significant role in Asia. Third， India expects to advance its economic and security cooperation with the United States in Southeast Asia by strengthening ties with ASEAN. This is why former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh commented on the “Look East” policy that“it is not simply an economic policy but represents India’s world outlook and a strategic shift in the changing global economy.”5

Given new historical conditions and policy directions， India’s relations with ASEAN have progressed rapidly. India became a partial dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1992， full dialogue partner in 1995， and summit-level partner in 2002. It signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and agreed with ASEAN on a framework for comprehensive economic cooperation at the 2003 ASEAN Bali summit. India was one of the founding members of the East Asia Summit when it was first launched in 2005. In December 2012， India-ASEAN relations were upgraded to a strategic partnership. In 2014， Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced at the 12th India-ASEAN Summit that India would upgrade the “Look East”policy to “Act East” policy， and give more priority to the India-ASEAN strategic partnership.

Expanding India-ASEAN cooperation

When the “Look East” policy first came out， India’s cooperation with ASEAN focused on trade and investment to get aboard the fast train of a growing East Asian economy， escape the economic crisis and embrace globalization. J. N. Dixit， a senior Indian diplomat， explained that “Economic involvement of major Western industrial countries and Japan in the ASEAN region brings a catalytic effect for India to access investment and technology.”6

In the 21st century， India and ASEAN have made significant achievements in economic and trade cooperation， with several free trade arrangements reached. The India-ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement（AITIGA） was signed in 2009， and the Agreements on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Investment were signed in 2014. In addition， India signed Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements （CECAs） with Singapore and Malaysia， and India’s market openness with these two countries has exceeded that with ASEAN as a whole. From 1993 to 2008， bilateral trade between India and ASEAN grew about tenfold， and its share of total ASEAN trade rose from 0.7 percent in 1993 to 2.8 percent in 2008.7 In January 2010， the India-ASEAN Free Trade Area （IAFTA） was officially established.

In 2003， then Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha announced that the “Look East” policy entered its second phase， with India’s cooperation with ASEAN expanding from economics and trade to a wider range of economic and security areas， including the protection of sea lanes and counter-terrorism cooperation.8 During this period， India’s “Look East” policy was extended from ASEAN to the broader East Asia， which allowed India to play a bigger role in the Asia-Pacific integration. The policy was essential for India to overcome the political limitations of the South Asian subcontinent that severely limited the country’s strategic choices.9

Since Modi came to power， India has focused more on strategic and security cooperation with ASEAN. In 2018， India invited the leaders of ten ASEAN countries to visit India en masse， and the Delhi Declaration reached on this occasion listed counterterrorism， cybersecurity cooperation， and connectivity building as priorities for cooperation. In recent years， there have been more cooperation between the two sides in joint military exercises， weapons and equipment， and personnel training. India has conducted maritime security cooperation and joint military exercises with Vietnam， Indonesia and Singapore， increased arms exports to these countries， and promoted defense dialogues， exchange of naval visits， and cooperation in operational training and capacity building. It has invited ASEAN countries to participate in the biennial MILAN joint maritime exercises to strengthen maritime ties. In September 2020， India and ASEAN agreed on a Joint Action Plan for 2021-2025， with maritime security cooperation at the top of the list.

Improving cooperation mechanisms

The mechanism building of India-ASEAN cooperation has witnessed three phases. In the first phase， India actively joined the ASEAN-led multilateral mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific， including annual summits with ASEAN since 2002， and the fourth “10+1” dialogue partner of ASEAN（the first three being China， Japan and the Republic of Korea）. In 2003， India joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia， and participated as a founding member in the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus. Based on these moves， India was able to be a part of the ASEAN-led multilateral framework in the Asia-Pacific.

The second phase started in 2014 when Modi came to power and India began to build its own multilateral architecture in the Indian Ocean. In March 2015， the Modi government proposed the SAGAR （Security and Growth for All in the Region） initiative to promote regional connectivity. In addition， more investment has been made to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation （BIMSTEC） to transform it into a multi-faceted mechanism covering economics and trade， security， and people-to-people exchanges.10 In addition， India， as a vital founding member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association （IORA）， has been actively involved in the organization’s agenda-setting to shape its leading role. India has also launched the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor （AAGC） with Japan to build an industrial corridor and economic network linking Northeast Asia， Southeast Asia， South Asia and Africa. These mechanisms led by India often include several ASEAN countries and focus on the Indian Ocean Rim to create a common identity and promote an India Ocean community.

The third phase began as the idea of Indo-Pacific emerged， marking the synergy between sub-regional mechanisms led by ASEAN and India. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific adopted in June 2019 created a blueprint for regional development， and proposed coordination and cooperation between the East Asia Summit and IORA and BIMSTEC to shape an inclusive framework in the Indo-Pacific. It is expected that the synergy will be accelerated along with the prevalence of the Indo-Pacific concept.

Developing relations with major ASEAN countries

Indonesia， Vietnam， Singapore and Myanmar are the four major countries for India’s engagement with ASEAN. Indonesia， the top ASEAN country， has had friendly relations with India since the era of non-alignment. During Modi’s visit to Indonesia in 2018， the two sides announced to upgrade their bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership and issued a Shared Vision of Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific， the first such document between India and a Southeast Asian country， in which they vowed to strengthen maritime cooperation and explore the convergences and complementarities between India’s “Act East” policy and SAGAR， and Indonesia’s “Global Maritime Fulcrum” vision.11 Moreover， Indonesia agreed to have India invest in the construction of the Sabang deep-water port， which is located at the northern mouth of the Malacca Strait and of important geostrategic value.

As a powerful country on the Indochina Peninsula， Vietnam also holds essential value to India. Vietnam was an ally of the Soviet Union in Asia during the Cold War and had deep friendship with India. Nhan Dan， the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Vietnam， once expressed Vietnam’s “eternal gratitude” for India’s “valuable support” on Cambodia.12 After the end of the Cold War， Vietnam and India have focused on security and defense cooperation. They signed a defense cooperation agreement in 2000 to institutionalize and normalize their defense and security cooperation.13 In May 2003， the two countries issued the Joint Declaration on the Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation， in which they indicated hope for an “Arc of Advantage and Prosperity” in Southeast Asia and promised to hold regular high-level meetings to expand defense and security cooperation. In July 2007，the two sides signed a new defense and security agreement， announcing a new strategic partnership and India’s priority to sell advanced weapons and equipment to Vietnam. After forming a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2017， they held the first joint naval exercise in May 2018. Besides， India and Vietnam reached a cooperation agreement in 2006 to develop offshore oil and gas resources in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.

Singapore has maintained a balance-of-power strategy and has been advocating a greater role for India in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. In the 1960s， then Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew had encouraged greater Indian presence in Southeast Asia as a way of restraining China.14 In 1968， when Britain withdrew its troops from Southeast Asia， Lee once even invited India to station troops to Singapore， which was rare during the Cold War when most Southeast Asian countries had misgivings about India. Since the end of the Cold War， Singapore has acted as a bridge between India and ASEAN. In 1999， Singapore took the opportunity of hosting the first ASEAN-India ministerial meeting to propose India’s accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia， the establishment of an ASEAN-India free trade area， and the ASEAN-India “10+1” leaders’ meeting.15 India sees Singapore as a springboard for closer relations with ASEAN and a gateway to Southeast Asia.

India and Singapore have close bilateral ties in economic， trade， defense and security fields. The year 2005 saw the signing of the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement （CECA） between the two countries， the first of its kind between India and a country outside of South Asia， which covered trade in goods and services. Since then， economic and trade cooperation between the two sides has advanced significantly， with total trade reaching US$23.67 billion in the fiscal year 2019-2020. Singapore not only ranked among India’s top five global trading partners， but was also India’s number one source of direct investment. The bilateral military and security cooperation has also expanded. Singapore has encouraged India to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean and is willing to secure shipping lanes to the Andaman Sea and the Malacca Strait through cooperation， while expanding and institutionalizing maritime exercises between India and ASEAN.16 The two countries have held joint naval exercises every year since 1993. India allows Singaporean troops to hold live-fire military drills in its territory and airspace， while Singapore encourages the Indian navy to visit its Changi naval base more often. The two sides have signed agreements on cooperation in all military services， including the army and the air force.

Myanmar is adjacent to northeast India， and the two countries have close historical and cultural ties. In 1992， India took the initiative to break the diplomatic stalemate with Myanmar’s military government and proposed a policy of constructive engagement to normalize bilateral relations. On the security front， India-Myanmar cooperation focuses on countering anti-government insurgency and transnational criminal activities， and maintaining border security. In the economic area， India is a major trading partner of Myanmar， importing large amounts of oil and gas resources from Myanmar and investing in oil and gas development in the country to ensure its own energy security. From a geopolitical perspective， Myanmar is the only Southeast Asian country bordering India on land， and links between the South Asian subcontinent and the Southeast Asian region. India has focused on strategic access to Southeast Asia through Myanmar， and several connectivity projects between India and ASEAN， including the IndiaMyanmar-Thailand Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project， all pass through Myanmar.

Challenges of India-ASEAN Relations

ASEAN has a core position in India’s “Act East” policy. India had expected access to the Asia-Pacific economic circle through ASEAN and then to the world market. However， India has made limited progress in trade and economic cooperation with ASEAN over the past decade， thereby not gaining enough momentum for the policy to bear fruit.

First， the trade volume between India and ASEAN is not only small but also growing slowly. From a horizontal view， India’s trade in goods with ASEAN was US$74.23 billion in 2011， accounting for only 3 percent of ASEAN’s total foreign trade in goods. By 2019， this ratio had further dropped to 0.27 percent. The trade in goods between the two sides is less than 1/6 of that between China and ASEAN. From a vertical view， there had been a lukewarm $2.9 billion increase in the trade volume over the last decade from$74.2 billion in 2011 to $77.1 billion in 2019， which was far from being any substantial growth. If trade in services is included in the statistics， according to the data of India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry， the volume of India-ASEAN trade in 2013-2014 was $74.41 billion， and by 2019-2020， the figure only increased slightly to $86.92 billion， a long way from the target of reaching $200 billion by 2022.17 Compared with the steadily growing ChinaASEAN trade in goods， the economic and trade cooperation between India and ASEAN， despite institutional safeguards such as free trade agreements and free trade zones， has a severe lack of momentum.

Second， India’s perception of being disadvantaged in the FTA with ASEAN has widened the divergence between the two sides. India’s export of goods to ASEAN has always been lower than its import， and the trade deficit has not only remained high but also been continuously growing. According to India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry， India’s trade deficit with ASEAN， which was $8.14 billion in the fiscal year 2013-2014， had risen to $23.82 billion by the fiscal year 2019-2020， growing much faster than the overall trade volume.18 The Modi government is highly dissatisfied with the deficit. Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has publicly complained on multiple occasions that the FTAs that India entered into over the years did not serve India’s interests.19 During their regular economic ministers’ meeting in late August 2020， India strongly requested ASEAN to immediately review the trade in goods agreement between the two sides to avoid ASEAN products impacting its domestic industries. ASEAN， however， prioritized the signing of the RCEP and was not responsive to India’s request. Due to their unreconciled differences， India and ASEAN did not issue a joint declaration at the end of the meeting， and India became the only one of the ten ASEAN partners without a joint declaration.20

Third， it is difficult to advance India’s connectivity with ASEAN. As a proactive party in promoting regional connectivity， India has launched initiatives such as the Monsoon Program and SAGAR， promoted the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal （BBIN） Initiative and BIMSTEC， and led the construction of the India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. However， India’s limited financial capacity， the complicated procedures of cross-border projects and the lack of executive capacity from all sides have resulted in more talk than concrete action， more proposal than real input， and more ambition than actual capacity. Moreover， India’s economy has been hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic. With its financial resources stretched to anti-pandemic efforts and economic recovery， there is no room for funding overseas projects. In the short term， most of India’s connectivity projects with ASEAN will remain halfbaked and initiatives will stay mostly in word.

Fourth， the development paths of India and ASEAN are hardly compatible. ASEAN represents Asian regional integration， and openness is the key to ASEAN’s economic growth. Openness here includes both external and internal dimensions. Externally， ASEAN adopts an export-oriented strategy to fully integrate into the world economy. Internally， ASEAN promotes an open market and its own integration to improve the business environment within the region， which is not only conducive to attracting external investment， but also gives additional momentum to regional trade and investment.21

This is not the case in India. After the country’s founding， India’s economy was closed for a long time. Not until the economic reform in the 1990s did India begin to open up to the world. However， India’s export remained in a weak position due to the absence of a complete and powerful industrial system. Moreover， the Indian government has insisted on a limited openness， and its willingness and level of opening up significantly dropped after Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in 2014. Since Modi took office， economic nationalism in India has been constantly on the rise. With frequent claims from senior officials that India does not want the domestic market to be flooded by foreign goods， the Indian government raised the trade deficit issue to the level of national interests， and continuously resorted to higher tariffs and other trade barriers. According to WTO data， since 2014， India’s practical tariff level had risen from 13.5 percent to 17.6 percent in 2019， and the weighted average of tariffs had increased from 6.2 percent to 10.3 percent in 2019. In addition， India has refused to join the ASEAN-led RCEP negotiations because it believes that the agreement will leave an open door in its domestic market and bring an accelerated influx of foreign goods to the detriment of domestic producers， small traders， farmers， and its manufacturing capacity.

Besides， India competes with Vietnam and some other ASEAN countries in export promotion and foreign investment attraction. In the international market， India and some ASEAN countries such as Vietnam have similar comparative advantages in labor and development stages， making them direct competitors in the export of rice， textiles， footwear and furniture. India and most ASEAN countries are developing countries and similarly face a shortage of capital in their economic growth， and therefore have all been making every effort to attract foreign direct investment. Amid the global economic downturn and the shrinking of world trade， Western developed countries are also encouraging investment reflow， which will lead to even more fierce competition for foreign investment between India and relevant ASEAN countries.

Currently， India’s economic diplomacy is demonstrating a strategic shift from “Act East” to “Lean West.” For long， policymakers in India are guided by the thinking of “absolute benefit brings absolute security，” and this is no exception in economic decision-making. The Modi government believes that its past efforts to integrate into the Asia-Pacific trade network has not served India’s interests well. In its opinion， India’s trade with China， ASEAN and other economies has led to a large trade deficit， and even the deindustrialization of certain sectors in India. Given this， the Modi government has been making adjustments to its economic diplomacy. On the one hand， India announced its withdrawal from the RCEP and then launched the initiative of “a self-sufficient India，” claiming to decouple from China and put obstacles to ASEAN exports. On the other hand， the Modi government has taken an unprecedentedly proactive stance in the FTA negotiations with the United States， the European Union and other developed Western economies， lobbying hard for Western investment and reaching the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative with Japan and Australia. These moves indicate that the Modi government is gradually shifting its strategy from joining the Asia-Pacific economic integration through ASEAN， to positioning itself as a market economy that has “strong convergences with the West.”22

Divergence of India and ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Vision

The Indo-Pacific concept connects the two major geopolitical blocks of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. However， since India and ASEAN have different regional strategies and demands， the Indo-Pacific vision， because of its inability to bridge the gap between the two sides， has exposed and even expanded the strategic differences despite India’s repeated recognition of ASEAN regional centrality.

Different responses to the Indo-Pacific concept

ASEAN has acted slowly and hesitantly toward the Indo-Pacific idea， without a clear response long after the concept emerged. In June 2019， the 34th ASEAN summit released the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific， setting out the organization’s primary position on the concept and calling for ASEAN centrality in regional architecture. According to the Outlook， with the East Asia Summit and other mechanisms it leads as platforms for Indo-Pacific dialogue and cooperation， ASEAN would work to establish an inclusive structure for regional peace， security， stability and prosperity. Since then， ASEAN has had no new proposals or actions about the Indo-Pacific concept. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic， it has focused on anti-pandemic cooperation and economic recovery while the Indo-Pacific issue has largely been put aside.

India’s initial vision of the Indo-Pacific was similar to that of ASEAN. In a speech at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue， Modi noted， “India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members， nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country.”23 At that time， India emphasized the inclusiveness and openness of the Indo-Pacific and declared that “ASEAN has been and will be central to” the future of the Indo-Pacific.24

However， the positions of India and ASEAN have gone separate ways since 2019. Especially after Modi’s re-election in 2019， India has changed its previous stance of opposing the Indo-Pacific as a small bloc and part of greatpower competition. Instead， it has upgraded its bilateral strategic cooperation with the United States， become a de facto defense ally of the US， and actively participated in the quadrilateral security dialogue （Quad） with the US， Japan and Australia. India invited Australia to join the Malabar naval exercises， strengthened military intelligence sharing within the Quad， and was keen to build small-bloc mechanisms in the region. As a result， the US-led IndoPacific strategy has become more solid and the Quad has advanced rapidly， upgrading from low-profile meetings of officials to summits， with more trilateral and bilateral joint operations and military exercises. In contrast， ASEAN does not have much say on regional security governance and gets stuck in a passive position.

Reasons for the divergence

India and ASEAN’s divergent attitudes and policies toward the IndoPacific are mainly rooted in their different positions and interests in the new geopolitical landscape.

First， ASEAN and India are in different geopolitical positions. From ASEAN’s perspective， the Indo-Pacific endangers the regional centrality of ASEAN， which it has long enjoyed in Asia-Pacific regional architecture. Over the years， ASEAN has led a set of multilateral mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific and fully implemented its centrality. The centrality of ASEAN is reflected not only in its settlement of Southeast Asian affairs within the ASEAN framework through regional cooperation， but also in its ability to build up a multi-level regional cooperation network in the broader East Asia and the Asia-Pacific， despite the presence of competing powers， the complicated geopolitical situation， and the difficulty for regional cooperation to make progress due to leadership struggles and a lack of synergy. These ASEAN-led arrangements include the“10+1” mechanism with ASEAN Dialogue Partners， the “10+3” cooperation mechanism with China， Japan and the Republic of Korea， the ASEAN Regional Forum， the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus. In this network it designs and leads， ASEAN serves as a convener， platform provider and coordinator. Based on the cooperation network with powers in the region and beyond， ASEAN has effectively maintained a balance of power and taken the initiative to fight for its own interests.25 In the Asia-Pacific， ASEAN is necessary to implement any regional agenda effectively， making its role irreplaceable in Asia-Pacific regional cooperation.

The Indo-Pacific vision poses a threat to ASEAN’s regional centrality. As a geopolitical concept popularized by the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States， the Indo-Pacific manifests US regional security， political and economic interests. This concept and its corresponding mechanisms and agendas are all designed according to the will of the US. To maintain its power advantage and contain China more effectively， the United States would either create a new regional architecture which reduces the ASEAN centrality， or strengthen its control over the existing structure while gradually hollowing out ASEAN. In either case， ASEAN’s privileged position and unique role in the AsiaPacific would hardly persist. Moreover， as ASEAN has limited influence on major powers and the existing mechanisms are not binding enough on their behaviors， ASEAN’s role will be seriously squeezed once great-power competition intensifies and sensitive regional issues come to the fore.

For India， the Indo-Pacific is a better concept to lift its international status than the Asia-Pacific. In the ASEAN-led multilateral architecture， India is just one of the regional powers and not even in the core circle because of its limited economic influence and geographical location on the periphery of the Asia-Pacific. Suppose the existing Asia-Pacific multilateral mechanisms are truly replicated in the Indo-Pacific as envisaged in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. In that case， India will still be one of the powers that ASEAN needs to balance， and may even be marginalized due to its withdrawal from the RCEP. By comparison， the Indo-Pacific concept puts India at the core. In the past， India was placed by the US under the South Asia regional policy framework， but it is now regarded from the broader Indo-Pacific and even a global perspective， labeled a natural strategic partner， a “net provider of security in the Indian Ocean，” a “cornerstone of democracy，” and a strategic“offshore counterweight.” The US explicitly supports India’s demands for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and permanent membership in the UN Security Council.26 Thus， the Indo-Pacific vision aligns more with India’s strategic goal of becoming a global leader. Despite Modi’s emphasis on the ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific， he is not interested in the ASEANled multilateral mechanisms.

Second， the Indo-Pacific concept has different effects on India and ASEAN. For India， the Indo-Pacific vision can achieve four goals and maximize its national interests， which is more consistent with the Modi government’s pragmatic principle. The Indo-Pacific concept not only helps strengthen India’s global image and consolidate its position as the top power in the Indian Ocean， but also serves to contain the so-called Chinese “penetration” and the expansion of China’s power in the region that India considers its backyard with the help of the US and its allies. By connecting the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean， the concept facilitates India’s strategic expansion into the Pacific. Moreover， it helps India achieve its major-power aspiration with the capital， market， technology and other resources brought by its close relations with countries such as the US and Japan.

On the contrary， for ASEAN， the Indo-Pacific vision may pose an existential danger to the organization by disintegrating its internal cohesion. First， ASEAN countries have different perceptions of the IndoPacific. Indonesia and Thailand advocate making full use of the diplomatic opportunities brought by the concept. As a sovereignty claimant in the South China Sea， Vietnam responds positively to the Indo-Pacific vision， believing that the Indo-Pacific concept can help maintain its sovereignty and benefit its infrastructure construction and defense modernization. Malaysia advocates the Asian Values and has kept a distance from the Indo-Pacific concept， while Laos， Cambodia and other land-based ASEAN countries remain noncommittal to the Indo-Pacific idea. Second， the US has long pursued the principle of emphasizing sea over land in Southeast Asia. It has focused more on maritime countries such as Indonesia， Singapore and the Philippines，which are positioned along important sea lanes and control key straits， than land-based ASEAN countries.27 In this context， the unity of ASEAN faces serious challenges with the prevalence of Indo-Pacific concept.

In addition， the military and security implications underlying the IndoPacific concept are contrary to ASEAN’s fundamental interests. ASEAN is a collection of small- and medium-sized developing countries， where development and people’s livelihood are the priority. By taking the lead in building mechanisms of regional coordination and dialogue， ASEAN aims to create a peaceful and stable environment for its development. However， the US version of Indo-Pacific concept puts emphasis on military security， highlights geopolitical competition， and advocates containing China to maintain its own power advantage in the Indo-Pacific while neglecting investment in the regional economy. Therefore， it is difficult for ASEAN countries to reap economic dividends from the Indo-Pacific. Instead， they are susceptible to be dragged into great-power competition in the Indo-Pacific to the detriment of their development interests.

Third， India and ASEAN have different judgments about the current international landscape. India considers itself a world power and a critical third party in the international landscape. It is confident in expanding its maneuvering space in the China-US strategic competition. The Indian strategic community believes that， similar to the 1970s when China gained strategic space and economic opportunities amid the US-Soviet confrontation， India today can seize a rare period of strategic opportunity in the China-US strategic competition. Therefore， India does not reject but even welcomes the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy and the intensifying China-US strategic game.

India’s increased suspicion of China， coupled with the imbalance of power between the two sides， has prompted it to join the US in containing China and embrace the Indo-Pacific strategy. India has long regarded China as its number one competitor. In recent years， there has been an increasing imbalance in national power between the two countries. China’s total GDP is more than five times that of India and its national income per capita is four times that of India. China has also significantly outpaced India in defense spending and military modernization. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic， this gap in strength is expected to widen due to the two countries’ different paces of economic recovery. As a result， India’s vigilance and precaution against China has risen sharply. Raja Mohan， India’s leading strategic scholar， wrote in 2019，“This power imbalance translates into an unpleasant fact on the diplomatic front. That China is under no pressure to please India.” “Recognizing the power imbalance with Beijing should liberate Delhi form the prolonged illusions about strategic parity with China and false hopes about building a new global order with it.” He added that India should not “voluntarily limit its partnership with the US and its allies” but should follow new realism and prepare itself to “wrestle intelligently with a China that is in a higher weight class.”28

On the contrary， while most ASEAN member states are dependent on the United States for military security， they have fully benefited from China’s rapid economic growth. As the regional economic integration process represented by the RCEP accelerates， ASEAN does not want to choose sides between China and the US and make the Asia-Pacific a battlefield for greatpower games. Regarding the intensifying tensions between China and the US， Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong claimed that “Southeast Asian countries， including Singapore， are especially concerned， as they live at the intersection of the interests of various major powers and must avoid being caught in the middle or forced into invidious choices.”29

Conclusion

As the Biden administration strengthens ASEAN’s role in the US Indo-Pacific strategy， India is expected to invest more in the management of its relationship with ASEAN in the future， which would bring new developments in India-ASEAN relations. For India， it needs the support of ASEAN countries， especially the maritime ASEAN countries， to consolidate its role as a major power in the Indian Ocean. Therefore， in the short term， India will not abandon its position on ASEAN centrality， and may actively strengthen its strategic ties with ASEAN.

Even so， with a lack of endogenous momentum in their economic connection， coupled with the Modi government’s perception that India has more to lose than to gain in its trade and economic cooperation with ASEAN， the economic motive of India-ASEAN relations， which was traditionally at the core of the relationship， has been severely weakened. On the other hand， the Indo-Pacific concept has significantly elevated India’s strategic status while weakening the ASEAN centrality in regional cooperation. The sharply contrasted strategic effects of the Indo-Pacific concept on India and ASEAN have exposed the two sides’ fundamental divergence on the vision. Looking from the two perspectives above， India’s relations with ASEAN have reached a bottleneck， and it is not easy to make any substantial progress.

India has been the relatively proactive party in the India-ASEAN relations， which have been evolving with the adjustment of India’s policy. The year 2021 marks the 30th anniversary of India’s “Look East” policy. Three decades after the policy was put forward， India is no longer a country in economic crisis and international isolation， but the world’s fifth-largest economy widely recognized for its economic prospects and geostrategic value. For India， ASEAN’s strategic and economic values are fading， and the“Look East” policy is no longer in line with India’s ambition to become a great power. Amid new historical conditions and major changes unseen in a century， it seems that the Indian government has now put more emphasis on the Indo-Pacific strategy than the “Act East” policy， and has dwarfed “Act East” as part of its Indo-Pacific diplomacy.

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2 G.V.C. Naidu， “Whither the Look East Policy： India and Southeast Asia，” Strategic Analysis， Vol.28， 2004， p.331-346.

3 Admiral R.H. Tahiliani （Retd）， “Maritime Strategy for the Nineties，” India Defence Review， July 1989， p.24.

4 Lin Chengjie， History of India， People’s Publishing House， 2014， p.503.

5 “PM’s Keynote Address at Special Leaders Dialogue of ASEAN Business Advisory Council，”Government of India， December 12， 2005， https：//archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details. php？nodeid=238.

6 J.N. Dixit， Indian Foreign Policy and Its Neighbors， New Delhi： Gyan Publishing House， 2001， p.340.

7 Xu Liping and Xue Song， “Adjustments and Future of India-ASEAN Relations after the Cold War，”Southeast Asian Studies， No.1， 2012， p.29.

8 Mu Xiaoming， “India’s Act East Strategy Is Lost，” Global， No.1， 2018.

9 C. Raja Mohan， “Look East Policy： Phase Two，” The Hindu， April 11， 2002， https：//mea.gov.in/articlesin-indian-media.htm？dtl/15614/Looking+East+phase+two.

10 Lu Guangsheng and Li Jiangnan， “The Development of Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation from the Perspective of Geopolitics and Geo-Economics，” Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review， No.3， 2020， p.55.

11 Li Yibo， “India’s Refocusing on the Bay of Bengal： Initiatives and Constraints，” China International Studies， No.6， 2020， p.97.

12 “Vietnam’s Gratitude for India’s Support on the Cambodia Issue，” People’s Daily， July 17， 1980， p.6， https：//cn.govopendata.com/renminribao/1980/7/11/6/.

13 “India and Vietnam Strengthen Military Cooperation in Response to China，” China Youth Daily， October 2， 2016， https：//mil.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJXTTV.

14 Sunanda K. Datta-Ray， Looking East to Look West： Lee Kuan Yew’s Mission India， Penguin Books， 2009， p.5.

15 Wang Xiaofei， “A Study on Singapore’s Diplomacy of Balancing Great Powers （1965-2014） Based on the Theory of Power Balance，” PhD dissertation of Yunnan University， 2015， p.175.

16 “India and Singapore Sign Naval Cooperation Agreement to Balance China： Indian Media，” Cankao Xiaoxi， December 1， 2017， http：//www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/world/20171201/2245681.shtml.

17 Luo Yongkun， “India’s Act East into Southeast Asia： Developments， Motivations， and Implications，”Peace and Development， No.4， 2019， p.71.

18 “Foreign Trade （ASEAN），” Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India， https：//commerce.gov.in/ about-us/divisions/foreign-trade-territorial-division/foreign-trade-asean.

19 “FTAs Have not Served India’s Economy Well： External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar，” The Economic Times， July 20 2020， https：//economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/ftas-have-notserved-indias-economy-well-external-affairs-minister-s-jaishankar/articleshow/77073554.cms.

20 “India Wants to Urgently Review its ASEAN Goods FTA， But Other Countries Are Slow to Play Ball，”The Wire， Sep 27 2020， https：//thewire.in/trade/asean-goods-fta-india-rcep.

21 Zhong Feiteng， “The COVID-19 Pandemic and the U-Shaped Recovery of Southeast Asian Economies： An International Political Economy Analysis，” Southeast Asian Studies， No.5， 2020， pp.7-10.

22 “S. Jaishankar in Conversation with Raja Mohan at RNG Lecture in 2019，” Ministry of External Affairs of India， November 17， 2019， https：//mea.gov.in/interviews.htm？dtl/32049/S_Jaishankar_in_Conversation_ with_C_Raja_Mohan_at_RNG_Lecture_2019.

23 “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue，” Ministry of External Affairs of India， June 1， 2018， https：//www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm？dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018.

24 Ibid.

25 Zhang Yunling， “Understanding ASEAN： Lessons from the Principle of Tolerance，” Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies， No.1， 2015， pp.10-15.

26 Hu Shisheng， “India’s Position in US Geostrategy Reaches Historic Height，” World Affairs， No.24， 2018， p.21.

27 Fan Sicong， “US Indo-Pacific Strategy Southeast Orientation and its Impact on ASEAN，” Asia Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs， No.5， 2020， p.111.

28 C. Raja Mohan， “With China， India Must Recognize Power Imbalance， Liberate Itself from Prolonged Illusions， False Hopes，” The Indian Express， October 11， 2019， https：//indianexpress.com/article/opinion/ columns/narendra-modi-xi-jinping-meeting-india-china-relation-jammu-kashmir-6063189.

29 Lee Hsien Loong， “The Endangered Asian Century： America， China， and the Perils of Confrontation，”Foreign Affairs， July/August 2020. https：//www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2020-06-04/lee-hsienloong-endangered-asian-century.