Building Balanced,Stable,Coordinated and Cooperative Trilateral Relations among China, the US, and Latin America

Song Junying & Fu Liyuan

Compared with the studies on the trilateral relations among China， the US and Russia， among China， the US and Europe， and among China， the US and Japan， for a long time there has been a distinct lack of studies on the trilateral relations among China， the US and Latin America1 as an independent analytic framework.2 With the further development of China-US-Latin America relations， the effectiveness of such a trilateral framework has gradually been recognized in academic circles. But related research by Chinese scholars is relatively lagging behind， and their analysis of the trilateral relations is not comprehensive enough. At present， the development of China-US-Latin America relations is facing new opportunities and challenges. It is of both theoretical and practical significance to build balanced， stable， coordinated and cooperative trilateral relations among China， the US and Latin America with the Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy as a guidance and the building of a community with a shared future for mankind as the goal， while drawing on experience from the new type of major-country relations between China and the US featuring“no conflict， no confrontation， mutual respect and win-win cooperation，”and the China-Latin America relationship characterized by “equality， mutual benefit， innovation， openness and benefits for the people.”

Evolution and Characteristics of China-US-Latin America Relations

Concerning the historical evolution of China-US-Latin America relations， we can roughly identify three stages with different development characteristics： initial establishment and unbalanced development from the 1970s to the early 21st century， substantial interaction and overall positive development from 2001 to 2015， and deep interaction amid a complex situation from 2016 to the present.

Initial establishment and unbalanced development

Under ideological influence， Latin American countries once generally maintained “diplomatic relations” with the Taiwan authorities after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Their foreign policy positions were close to those of the US and the Western bloc， and their relations with China were relatively alienated or even hostile. In 1960， Cuba’s announcement of establishing diplomatic relations with China marked the start of China-Latin America diplomatic relations. In the 1970s， against the background of declining global bipolarity， the rise of Third World countries， and the easing of Sino-US relations， a great number of Latin American countries established diplomatic relations with China， ushering a small climax of China-Latin America relations.3

The improving China-US relations brought opportunities to develop better relations between China and Latin America. By moving closer to China， the US sent a message to its allies in Latin America that it had changed its attitude. This action also enhanced China’s popularity in the eyes of Latin American people.4 Latin American countries began to establish diplomatic relations with China one after another. The resulting chain reactions signaled the formal beginning of China-US-Latin America trilateral relations.

Due to the limited level of exchanges between China and Latin America during this stage， their political and economic ties were much weaker than those between China and the US or between the US and Latin America. The trilateral relationship structure was unbalanced because China-Latin America relations were significantly alienated， compared with the other two pairs of relationships. After the Cold War ended， the trilateral relations became less influenced by ideological factors and entered a new development period. There was no coordination mechanism among China， the US and Latin America during this stage， and their trilateral relations were not strongly interlinked. However， the tripartite relations experienced no apparent structural contradictions and were generally stable without much relevance to issues concerning national sovereignty， development and security interests.

Substantial interaction and overall positive development

At the end of the 1990s， Latin American leftists set off a “pink wave，”moving the political ecology of the continent towards the left. In November 2004， then Chinese President Hu Jintao paid a state visit to four Latin American countries， which injected new impetus into the friendly relations between China and Latin America. Later， high-level visits between the two sides became more frequent， and China established strategic partnerships and comprehensive strategic partnerships with many Latin American countries. In 2008， the Chinese government released its first policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. With the increasing presence of China in Latin America， US scholars gradually increased their discussions about China’s involvement in the affairs of Latin America and the Western hemisphere. In the report “China’s Influence in the Western Hemisphere” released in April 2005， the US highlighted its concern with developing China-Latin America relations.5 Because the US government focused on the Asia-Pacific region and anti-terrorism affairs， it did not regard China’s existence in Latin America as a threat.6 In 2006， US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon visited China， and the two countries established a consultation mechanism on Latin American affairs. During the first consultation， the two sides exchanged views on the situation in Latin America， their respective relations and policies regarding Latin America， and China-US bilateral cooperation in Latin American affairs. Shannon gave positive comments on the consultation results and believed that the mechanism would help the US understand China’s policy towards Latin America， enhance Sino-US mutual trust， and benefit China， the US， and Latin America. From 2006 to 2015， China and the US held seven consultations on Latin American affairs to coordinate their actions and positions towards Latin America. After the international financial crisis in 2008， China’s investment projects in Latin America continually increased， and China-Latin America trade and economic cooperation became even more closer. With a more vigilant attitude towards China， the US also increased its investment in Latin America.

During this stage， China and the US could coordinate on Latin American affairs， and China-Latin America relations were constantly expanded and improved， while the US-Latin America relations declined to some extent. The trilateral relations were generally more stable with a more balanced structure.

Deep interaction amid a complex situation

After the Trump administration took office， the US regarded China as the primary challenger to its international status and tightened its policies on all fronts in Latin America. The US leadership vacuum in Latin America and the ubiquitous influence of China in the region had become two primary sources of the Trump administration’s panic about China’s Latin America strategy.7 As the trilateral relationship gradually moved away from US ambitions， the Trump administration’s hostility towards China increased. The US position on China’s participation in Latin American affairs changed from suspicion to hostility， the general US attitude shifted from restrained warning to assertive threats， and the US response measure went from backhanded tricks to strategic balancing.8 Then US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross， then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo， former Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council Mauricio Claver-Carone， and Senator Marco Rubio repeatedly described China’s activities in Latin America as having geopolitical implications， and unreasonably castigated China-Latin America cooperation.9 They defamed China’s trade activities by connecting them to national security issues， claiming that China was primarily intent on acquiring technology， stealing intellectual property， forcing technology transfer， etc.

With the escalation of US containment policy toward China， the structural contradiction of control versus anti-control in US-Latin America relations further developed. As the US strategical evaluation of China’s activities in Latin America became increasingly hostile， it was gradually becoming less willing to negotiate with China on Latin American affairs. Instead. the US was increasingly intent on restoring its leadership in the Western Hemisphere， which resulted in the comeback of Monroe Doctrine in Latin America.10 Taking advantage of the rightward movement in the Latin American political ecology， the US stepped up its intervention in Venezuela and other countries， supporting the right while suppressing the left. The US appointed Claver-Carone to run for president of the Inter-American Development Bank and forged ahead with the election despite opposition from regional countries. The US launched the “Growth in the Americas” Initiative and signed memorandums of understanding with Latin American countries to strengthen their economic ties.

Amid the intensifying China-US competition， Latin American countries gradually became involved and were forced to take sides. Under US influence， their attitude towards China has also changed. On issues such as Belt and Road cooperation and the adoption of Huawei’s 5G technology， many Latin American countries were in a dilemma given the geopolitical control of the US.11 At the same time， the US has stepped up its pressure on Latin American countries on the Taiwan question， wooing or threatening the Latin American countries which had “diplomatic ties” with Taiwan in the name of the “Allied Forces of Democracy and Freedom.” After countries including Panama， the Dominican Republic and El Salvador established diplomatic relations with China， the United States expressed dissatisfaction by recalling its ambassadors and canceling security meetings with the relevant countries. Those actions served as an alarming call to the remaining Latin American countries having“diplomatic ties” with Taiwan. In addition， the US has increased its alliance with the pro-Taiwan forces in Latin America and colluded with them to promote the so-called Taiwan-Latin America anti-pandemic cooperation and support Taiwan’s bid to gain international status.

During this stage， the worsening China-US relations have negatively impacted China-US-Latin America relations. The US regards China as its top competitor in Latin America， and China’s presence and influence in Latin America becomes an essential part of US policy towards Latin America. Meanwhile， Latin American countries also have to consider the China-US rivalry when dealing with strategic synergy， 5G construction， as well as trade and economic cooperation with China. Latin America is seeking a strategic balance between China and the US. The structure of the trilateral relations， which is gradually balanced， is expected to remain stable.

New Situation in China-US-Latin America Relations

At present， with the profound global changes unseen in a century and the COVID-19 pandemic closely intertwined， the world has entered a period of turbulent changes. Since 2021， the Biden administration has made significant adjustments in its China policy. China-US-Latin America relations have therefore exhibited new features and entered a new stage of development.

The US attaches more importance to Latin America and intensifies its containment of China

Although the US has not yet issued a clear policy framework for Latin America， the contours of the Biden administration’s policy on Latin America have become evident. In brief， its policy mainly covers six major areas. The first area is the problem of illegal immigration. The Biden administration prioritizes the issue of unlawful immigration from Latin America and reforming the immigration system. In addition to assigning Vice President Kamala Harris to take charge of these matters， he also sent senior officials， in rapid succession， to Central America and Mexico to mediate. The United States’ Latin America policy in the past six months or so has overwhelmingly focused on the new immigration policy.

The second area is anti-pandemic cooperation. In Biden’s attempt at global vaccine diplomacy， Latin America is the continent that receives the most vaccines. According to US statistics， as of September 2021， the US had donated 43.5 million doses of vaccines to 27 Latin American countries.12

The third area is cooperation on supply chains. Biden intends to build a supply chain alliance to help the United States optimize and integrate its supply chain. The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance issued by the White House in March 2021 proposed that democratic countries with similar economic ideas should jointly defend the critical supply chain and technology chain infrastructure.13 Particularly， Mexico is a vital link. The recent supply chain crisis in the US has once again triggered domestic discussions about supply chain relocation to Mexico.14 Some scholars considered the vast Central American and Caribbean region should also be part of the US supply chain outsourcing.15

The fourth area is climate change cooperation. Since taking office， Biden said that he would put climate change at the core of US foreign and national security policies.16 On the issue of protecting the Amazon， Biden has repeatedly pressured Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. He invited several Latin American heads of state to attend the Leaders’ Summit on Climate organized by the US. He reestablished the overall cooperation between the US and the Caribbean Community （CARICOM） to discuss a comprehensive plan for addressing climate change.

The fifth area is supporting democracy. Compared with the Trump administration， the Biden administration pays more attention to democracy in Latin America. For more than half a year， the US incited the “color revolution”in Cuba and created obstacles for negotiations between the Venezuelan government and opposition. It also severely criticized the so-called “democratic retrogression” in Nicaragua， El Salvador and other countries.

The sixth area is development cooperation. To counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative， Biden advocates the “Build Back Better World” （B3W） infrastructure construction initiative， in which Latin American countries take a prominent place.17

The increasing US-Latin America interaction reflects the importance of Latin America for the Biden administration. This came about for two reasons. First， the US is trying to repair the US-Latin America relations damaged during the Trump era. During Trump’s time in office， US-Latin America relations fell to a low point. In 2018， Trump refused to attend the 8th Summit of the Americas， becoming the first US president to be absent from the event. For a long time after the COVID-19 pandemic broke out， the US ignored Latin America and did nothing to help the region fight the pandemic. After Biden took office， repairing US-Latin America relations became one of the priorities of his administration. So far， US leadership in Latin America has recovered to some extent. The other reason is that Latin America has again assumed geostrategic importance for the US. As the world has entered a period of turbulent changes， the geostrategic significance of Latin America as the United States’ backyard has again become prominent. In particular， the illegal immigration crisis and the growing supply chain crisis have forced the US to pay more attention to this region.

On the issue of China-Latin America cooperation， the US strategy has shifted from outright suppression to soft containment. The US appears willing to compete peacefully with China in Latin America. For example， Biden emphasized that the basic principle in competition with China is that the US should do better instead of blindly suppressing and constraining China. However， the “competition， cooperation and confrontation” trichotomy adopted by the US is a thinly veiled attempt to contain and suppress China， with the real emphasis on the adversarial aspect， the collaborative aspect as just an expediency， and the competitive aspect as a narrative trap.18 Regarding Latin American issues， the US has not changed its strategy of containing China in any way， only that it has done so behind the scenes. While US officials said that they did not oppose countries like Ecuador and El Salvador to cooperate with China， they hypocritically “reminded” those countries of China’s investment in sensitive areas and the risk of a “debt trap.” The US is also acting covertly in Guyana and other countries， provoking Taiwan-related issues and anti-China intrigues. On the whole， compared with the Trump era， China and the US have moderated their tones regarding their relations with Latin America. Still， the risks and challenges confronting China are on the rise.

Latin American countries have different expectations concerning China and the US， but they don’t want to choose sides

First， Latin America has been more dependent on China. To Latin American countries， China has become their most significant source of vaccines. By the end of October 2021， China had provided more than 300 million vaccines to 18 Latin American countries. The presidents of Chile and the Dominican Republic and Peru’s former president were among the first to be vaccinated， demonstrating the effectiveness and reliability of Chinese vaccines. China has also helped Brazil， Mexico and Chile to localize their vaccine research， development and production. China’s vaccines and stock solutions have accounted for nearly 80 percent of the total received by Brazil.19 China has provided 65 percent and 62 percent of the total vaccinations in Chile and Ecuador respectively and 50 percent in both Bolivia and Uruguay.20 China has also provided nearly 40 percent of Argentina’s vaccines. In Honduras， which has no diplomatic relations with China， some public officials wrote to the president of El Salvador to buy Chinese vaccines. China has taken practical action to promote the accessibility and affordability of vaccines in Latin America.

The other example is trade and economic cooperation. Since the pandemic outbreak， trade between China and many Latin American countries has increased despite the global downturn trend. At present， China has become Chile’s largest trading partner， Uruguay’s largest export market， Paraguay’s largest source of imports， Ecuador’s second-largest export market， Brazil’s largest export market of agricultural products， and Argentina’s largest export market of beef and soybeans. Ecuador has begun advancing negotiations with China on a free trade agreement to facilitate trade between the two countries. Uruguay also announced that it would launch a feasibility study concerning free trade negotiations with China.

Second， Latin America has a growing awareness of independence. History has shown that the tug-of-war between the US and Latin America as to who decides policy in Latin America has never stopped. Recently， Latin America has become notably vocal in its demands for resisting US influence and control. For one thing， Latin America’s perception of the US has become more negative. The “America First” policy in the global anti-pandemic effort has bitterly disappointed Latin American countries. President Luis Abinader of the Dominican Republic pointed out that “some big countries lack the necessary sympathy.”21 For another， the resurgence of the left boosts antiAmerican forces in the region. Mexico， Argentina， Peru and Bolivia all have left-wing governments. Former Brazilian left-wing President Lula is staging a comeback for the 2022 general election. The Maduro government in Venezuela has become more stable while the opposition led by Guaido declines. The Lima Group， led by the US， was embarrassed to lose its members because of Peru’s turn to the left. Mexican President Lopez Obrador has even more ambitions to promote regional integration. At the recent VI Summit of the Community of Latin America and the Caribbean States， he argued that “Latin American countries should seek to establish a group like the European Union to wrest influence away from the Washington-based Organization of American States.” He bluntly stated that “the Organization of American States pursues interventionism and is the tool of the US.”22

Despite this， Latin America’s reliance on the US is still hard to shake in the short term. Objectively speaking， the recent low tide in US-Latin America relations reflects some short-term incremental changes of their bilateral ties， but the considerable foundation of their existing connections has not been significantly affected. Dissatisfaction with the US of Latin American countries cannot outweigh their continued dependence on and compliance with the US in many aspects. Although the total quantity of US vaccines is far behind that of Chinese ones， the US vaccines still hold a significant market share in some Central American and Caribbean countries. In terms of security， the US-Latin America cooperation in combating transnational organized crimes such as drug trafficking is deep-going and with a long history. In October 2021， US and Mexican officials just met to discuss a new bilateral security agreement.23 Economically， Mexico has been deeply integrated into the US-led North American economic system， and the interdependence between Mexico and the US is highly asymmetric. The so-called “poison pill” clause in the US-MexicoCanada Agreement is widely believed to affect the future establishment of new trade arrangements between Mexico and China or other so-called “non-market economies.” On Taiwan-related issues， the intense pressure from the US may make it difficult for Paraguay and other countries to shift allegiances.

China has always adhered to win-win cooperation to promote China-Latin America and China-US relations

Regarding relations with Latin America， China has always adhered to promoting China-Latin America relations in a new era featuring equality， mutual benefit， innovation， openness and benefits for the people. China’s established diplomatic policy has always been to pursue the greater good and shared interests， develop closer ties with developing countries including those in Latin America， and jointly build a new type of international relations with win-win cooperation at its core.

China has always upheld the “three adheres” in its cooperation with Latin America. First， it adheres to the cooperation principle of mutual respect and mutual trust. China always upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence， insisting that all countries， big or small， strong or weak， rich or poor， are equal members of the international community. China respects the rights of Latin American and Caribbean states to choose their development paths， which is highly appreciated by regional countries. When visiting China in 2019，Brazilian President Bolsonaro expressed gratitude to China for supporting the sovereignty of Brazil on the Amazon rainforest issue.24 In a telephone conversation with President Xi Jinping， Prime Minister of Dominica Roosevelt Skerrit also pointed out that “since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries， both sides have always respected each other and treated each other as equals， setting an example in the relations between large and small countries.”25

Second， China adheres to the cooperation goal of exchange and mutual learning. Exchange and mutual learning are essential requirements of civilizational development. China and Latin America have always attached great importance to strengthening exchanges among governments， legislatures， judicial organs， political parties and local governments. They also focus on strengthening exchanges and cooperation in the fields of education， science， technology， culture， sports， health， journalism and tourism. Since 2020， China has attached great importance to strengthening policy communication and anti-pandemic cooperation with Latin American countries and tried its best to help， by sending medical expert groups at the request of relevant countries， jointly cooperating on vaccine research and development， and providing vaccines as public goods on a large scale. China has supported national public health projects in Latin America based on China-Latin America infrastructure special loans. In order to support Latin America in food security challenges amid the pandemic， China actively engaged the Food and Agriculture Organization （FAO） to earmark funding from the China-FAO South-South Cooperation Trust Fund.

Third， China adheres to flexible and pragmatic cooperation methods. China-Latin America cooperation takes various forms and focuses on comprehensive cooperation at multiple levels and in multiple fields. At present， given the weak cohesion of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States （CELAC）， China has adjusted its thinking and adopted a two-pronged approach. Following the strategic path of stressing both overall cooperation and bilateral relations， China has begun to strengthen sub-regional cooperation. To promote their anti-pandemic cooperation， China held a vice-ministerial special meeting with the Caribbean countries having diplomatic relations with China on pandemic response and a meeting with Andean countries to share relevant experience. Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered remarks to the Pacific Alliance via video link.

In its relations with the United States， China’s attitude has also been positive and open. China is committed to developing China-US relations in Latin America based on mutual respect， peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation. Among these， “mutual respect and peaceful coexistence” is the bottom line， and “win-win cooperation” is the highest goal. China is willing to work with the US to build consensus and take active measures to develop their relations in Latin America. China also hopes that President Biden will exercise political leadership and push US policy toward China back to a rational and pragmatic track.

Opportunities and challenges coexist in promoting positive trilateral interaction

First， given the inherent structure and external environment， the trilateral relations among China， the US and Latin America will not deviate from the main theme of cooperation. In terms of inherent structure， the process of China-Latin America cooperation is irreversible. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has laid a solid foundation for closer China-Latin America cooperation. As it heads towards national rejuvenation， China is bound to deepen its solidarity and cooperation with developing countries.26 In particular， Latin America is China’s important trading partner and investment destination， and the prospect of expanding and improving China-Latin America cooperation is promising， which will make the China-US-Latin America trilateral relations more balanced and stable.

In addition， the common pursuit of mutually beneficial cooperation by China and Latin America will prevent the trilateral relations from being derailed. For China， building a new type of international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind is the general goal of majorcountry diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the new era. No matter how the international situation changes， China will unswervingly uphold this basic foreign policy. China will always be the “motor” and “adhesive” in the ChinaUS-Latin America relationship， resolutely abandoning zero-sum game and never allowing trilateral relations to develop in a vicious direction. For Latin America， as a region where developing countries are concentrated， development is the top priority， and cooperation with both China and the US is consistent with its interests. Any conflict between China and the US in the region is not in line with the development interests of Latin American countries.

Regarding the external environment， building a community with a shared future between China and Latin America and promoting ChinaUS cooperation are prevailing trends. With rising global multi-polarity， sustained development of economic globalization， and the increasingly complex international security situation， the COVID-19 outbreak has further highlighted the necessity and urgency of international cooperation and common development. For China， the US and Latin America， there are three lessons to learn. First， the road of China-Latin America common development will surely become ever wider. The close cooperation between China and Latin America in this pandemic proves that building a community with a shared future has become the only way for the development of China-Latin America relations. Second， the United States’ attempt to “decouple” Sino-US relations has completely failed， and Sino-US cooperation， at least in some areas， is imperative， which leaves room for coordination and cooperation between China， the US and Latin America in tackling climate change and related issues. Third， the US control over Latin America will inevitably gradually weaken. Under new circumstances， the non-traditional characteristics of international security are becoming more important， the grip of the Monroe Doctrine on Latin America is loosening， and the concept of “backyard” can hardly characterize US-Latin America relations. In the future， US-Latin America relations will be more open and inclusive， leaving room for China to further participate in regional cooperation.

Second， the US is the biggest variable for the sound development of China-US-Latin America trilateral relations. Future development of the trilateral relationship will depend to a great extent on the United States’attitudes towards China and on the development of China-US relations. Since taking office， Biden has seemed to define Sino-US relations by competition， which is in line with the logic behind Trump’s China policy. The approaches of both Trump and Biden are full of zero-sum thinking deeply rooted in the Western World， inferring that the US cannot tolerate China’s rise and revival， and suppression and containment will remain the only choice for its China policy. In Latin America， the United States’ real intention is to weaken and suppress China-Latin America cooperation and to disrupt or even reverse the balanced trend of China-US-Latin America relationship. In the US， there is still great uncertainty about whether the Biden administration and the Democratic Party can maintain long-term governance. Recent polls and gubernatorial election results show that it is still possible for Trump and the Republican Party to make a comeback in the next general election， which may also endanger the future development of ChinaUS-Latin America relations.

Finally， the lack of progress in Latin American integration is also a destabilizing factor in the trilateral relations. In recent years， Mexico has been very eager to act as the flag bearer of Latin America. However， because of the absence of Brazil as a traditional regional power， the cohesion of the Latin American Community is far from strong. In the short term， it is difficult for Latin America to form a regional integration organization that can speak with one voice like ASEAN or the African Union. This means that when dealing with the US， Latin American countries lack a platform that can facilitate consensus and represent their common interests and are more likely to be used by the US as a bargaining chip to restrain China.

Approaches for Developing the Trilateral Relations

The uncertainty and flexibility of the prospect of China-US-Latin America relations makes it possible to build an overall stable and benign trilateral relationship， which is both an ideal state and a realistic choice for the three sides. Starting from China’s core concept of building a community with a shared future for mankind and a new type of international relations， efforts can be made to build “balanced， stable， coordinated and cooperative” China-USLatin America relations that match the proposal for building a new model of major-country relations between China and the US featuring “no conflict， no confrontation， mutual respect and win-win cooperation，” and China’s series of propositions for developing China-Latin America relations.27

Balance is the precondition， which means that the depth and breadth of the three pairs of bilateral relationships in the trilateral relations should be more balanced. In particular， the gap between China-Latin America relations and US-Latin America relations should be narrowed to make them more balanced. Stability is the overall goal， which requires that the trilateral relations maintain a stable pattern with no major changes. China-US rivalry does not affect the fundamentals of China-Latin America cooperation. The Latin American side does not need to take sides， and China-US factors will not cause discord between the Latin American countries and China. Coordination means that the three sides， especially China and the US in Latin America， should achieve healthy interaction， maintain basic policy communication， and avoid malicious competition. Cooperation means that China and the US need to cooperate on the basis of policy coordination and work to synergize the Belt and Road Initiative with “Build Back Better World，” which will contribute to the prosperity of Latin America and fundamentally promote the common interests of China and the US.

Coordination and cooperation are the basic approach to stable trilateral relations. While being cooperative is the best form of healthy trilateral relations， coordination is the second-best alternative. Even if it is difficult for China and the US to cooperate in Latin America， they should maintain a certain degree of policy coordination to avoid vicious competition and mutual sabotage. From 2005 to 2016， China and the US did a lot of work in policy coordination， as reflected in their seven consultations on Latin American affairs， which played an essential role in strengthening policy communication and preventing strategic misunderstanding and misjudgment.

Building balanced， stable， coordinated and cooperative China-US-Latin America relations is in line with the times， the fundamental interests of the three sides， and the shared expectations of the international community. As two great powers， China and the US are responsible for working together to achieve this goal. For China， while following the guidance of the Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy and holding high the banner of building a community with a shared future for mankind and a new type of international relations， it should strive to push the US and Latin America to move in step with China， by counteracting the role of the US as a “passive saboteur” while encouraging Latin America to serve as an “active balancer.”

First， efforts should be made to deal with the US. On the one hand， it is vital for China to strengthen communication with the US and guide it towards a correct understanding of China. On the other hand， China should be prepared for a long-term game with the US， and work to expose and limit its destructive moves. Currently， US policy-making and academic circles have had a more negative view of China’s presence in Latin America and China-Latin America relations. Part of the reason is the severe lack of consultation and communication between the two sides on Latin American affairs. Official consultation mechanisms are stalled， while dialogue and communication between think tanks and academic communities is inadequate. In the future， China should focus on the overall development of China-US relations， promote the restart of the consultation mechanism on Latin American affairs at the right time， strengthen policy communication， and make clear its bottom line and red line to eliminate strategic misunderstanding and miscalculation. It is also necessary for research institutions on Latin American studies in the two countries to strengthen academic exchanges and dialogues on relevant issues. China should be prepared for a long-term game with the US in Latin America and respond firmly and rationally to its public opinion offensive. While doing what has to be done with a magnanimous mind， China should let the facts speak for themselves and tell the good story of China-Latin America cooperation.

Second， it is crucial to continue consolidating cooperation between China and Latin America， guiding Latin America to play a more active role， and ensuring that the trilateral relations are not derailed. At present， the fundamentals of China-Latin America relations have not changed. China should pay more attention to development issues in the coming period and strive to synergize the development strategies of Latin American countries with the Belt and Road Initiative. In this way， Latin America will understand that the development of China-Latin America relations is in its fundamental interests. Given the United States’ huge lingering influence in the region， when developing relations with Latin America， China should fully understand the difficulties and concerns of Latin America and pragmatically advance the China-Latin America comprehensive cooperative partnership.

Finally， it is necessary to promote a pragmatic cooperation mechanism under the trilateral framework. The China-US-Latin America trilateral relations should not only be handled at the bilateral level， but should also be developed and consolidated under a tripartite framework. Currently， the ties between the three sides have evolved and become more interconnected， but relevant mechanisms have yet to be built. Although the previous ChinaUS consultation mechanism involved Latin America， it was still a bilateral consultation without the active participation of Latin America. While there are not yet ripe conditions for building a high-level trilateral mechanism， it is feasible to start from cooperation on specific or non-sensitive issues to form platforms for exchanges and cooperation. For example， it is desirable to promote the construction of a trilateral think tank dialogue mechanism or a trilateral cooperation platform between enterprises. Think tanks of China， the US and Latin America can start with joint seminars or joint research before gradually regularizing their cooperation mechanism. This approach can also be applied to private enterprises. Through regional organizations like CELAC， sub-regional organizations such as the Pacific Alliance， and international organizations such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean， Latin America can launch trilateral cooperation initiatives and set up trilateral cooperation groups to synergize with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the United States’ “Build Back Better World”initiative. Whether it is trilateral think tank cooperation or enterprise cooperation， Latin America can choose to conduct relevant cooperation through regional organizations or individual countries.

Conclusion

The interactions between China， the US and Latin America will be further enhanced with the three sides’ constant policy changes and adjustments and the evolution of profound changes in the world. Against this backdrop， building balanced， stable， coordinated and cooperative trilateral relations would serve the three sides’ real interests. In building such a relationship， China needs to encourage Latin America to serve as an “active balancer” to counteract the role of the US as a “passive saboteur.” In the spirit of mutual respect， peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation， China， the US and Latin America should strengthen their communication and coordination， seek common ground while reserving differences， and learn from each other through the creation of dialogue and exchange mechanisms. In this way， the trilateral cooperation will bear more fruitful and substantial achievements and benefit the people of the three sides and beyond.

Song Junying is Director and Associate Research Fellow at the Department for Latin American and Caribbean Studies， China Institute of International Studies （CIIS）； Fu Liyuan is Research Assistant at the Department for Latin American and Caribbean Studies， CIIS.

1 Latin America here refers to Latin America and the Caribbean region， with a total of 33 countries.

2 A search of China’s CNKI literature database reveals that there are fewer than ten results with “China， the US and Latin America” as the keyword， far lower than the number of results for “China， the US and Japan，”“China， the US and Europe” or “China， the US and Russia，” https：//kns.cnki.net/kns8/defaultresult/index.

3 He Shuangrong， History of Relations between China and Latin American and Caribbean Countries， China Social Sciences Press， 2016， p.138.

4 Francisco Luis Perez Exposito， Relaciones Entre Taiwan y America Latina， Liwen Cultural Group， 2006， p.70.

5 “China’s Influence in the Western Hemisphere，” US Department of State， April 6， 2005， https：//2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2005/q2/44375.htm.

6 Marcos C. Pires and Lucas G. do Nascimento， “Neo-Monroe Doctrine and Trilateral Relations Between China， America and Latin America，” Journal of Latin American Studies， No.4， 2020， pp.33-48.

7 “China Fills Trump’s Empty Seat at Latin America Summit，” The New York Times， April 13， 2018， https：//www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/opinion/china-trump-pence-summit-lima-latin-america.html.

8 “Latin America Should Not Rely on China： US Secretary of State Tillerson，” Reuters， February 1， 2018， https：//www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diplomacy-latam-china-idUSKBN1FL6D5.

9 “From the Republican New Favorite to a Political Submissive： Who Are Behind the ‘Anti-China Strongman’ Marco Rubio，” Huanqiu， June 21， 2019.

10 “The Ghost of Monroe Doctrine Still Lingers in the Americas： Who Is the Imperialist Power in Latin America？” Huanqiu， February 3， 2018.

11 “Mexican Think Tank： It Is Difficult for the US to Contain China’s 5G Technology in Latin America，”Cankaoxiaoxi， August 10， 2021， http：//column.cankaoxiaoxi.com/g/2021/0810/2450835.shtml.

12 US Consulate General in Shanghai， “The US Has Donated More Vaccines than All Donor Countries Combined，” Sina Weibo， September 24， 2021.

13 Li Wei， “Alliance of Democracies and Supply Chain Alliance： Two Wheels of Biden’s Diplomacy，”The Paper， March 11， 2021， https：//www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_11624551.

14 “Supply Chain Relocation to Mexico and North American Economic Competitiveness，” PIIE， October 21， 2021， https：//www.piie.com/events/supply-chain-relocation-mexico-and-north-american-economiccompetitiveness.

15 “Widening the Aperture： Nearshoring in Our ‘Near Abroad’，” Wilson Center， April， 2021， https：//www. wilsoncenter.org/publication/widening-aperture-nearshoring-our-near-abroad.

16 “Biden Puts Climate Crisis at the Center of US Diplomatic and National Security Policy，” January 18， 2021， https：//new.qq.com/omn/20210128/20210128A05I1800.html.

17 “Looks Like Latin America Will Be the First Place Where B3W Will Take on China’s BRI，” The Chinafrica Project， September 29， 2021， chinaafricaproject.com/2021/09/29/looks-like-latin-america-willbe-the-first-place-where-b3w-will-take-on-chinas-bri/.

18 “Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng Holds Talks with US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China， July 26， 2021.

19 “Chinese Ambassador to Brazil： China Provides Nearly 80 Percent of Total Vaccines and Stock Solutions in Brazil，” Jiemian News， September 28， 2021， https：//www.jiemian.com/article/6647349.html.

20 Zhang Jieyu， “China-Latin America Vaccine Cooperation Should Not Be Subject to External Interference，” Global Times， October 29， 2021， https：//m.huanqiu.com/article/45MZHSPHkSv.

21 “The Dominican Republic Announces COVID-19 Vaccination Program，” People.com， February 16， 2021， http：//world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0216/c1002-32029922.html.

22 “Mexico’s President Lashes out at the Organization of American States as the Summit of the Community of Latin America and the Caribbean States Seeks to Remove US Influence，” Cankaoxiaoxi， September 20， 2021， http：//www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/world/20210920/2454437.shtml.

23 “US and Mexico Hold High-Level Security Dialogue， New Bilateral Security Agreement May Be Signed，” The Paper， October 8， 2021， https：//www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_14813184.

24 “Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Brazilian President Bolsonaro，” November 14， 2019， http：//www.gov.cn/ xinwen/2019-11/14/content_5451806.htm.

25 “Xi Jinping Has a Phone Call with Prime Minister of Dominica Skerrit，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China， January 25， 2021， https：//www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1848381.shtml.

26 “Speech by Xi Jinping at a Ceremony Marking the Centenary of the CPC，” July 1， 2021， https：//www. mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus/eng/zgyw/t1889022.htm.

27 In accordance of the evolving situation， China has put forward a series of propositions for ChinaLatin America relations. For example， China and Latin America will develop a comprehensive cooperative partnership of mutual benefit and common development. The new pattern of China-Latin America relations will have five salient features： sincerity and mutual trust in the political field， win-win cooperation on the economic front， mutual learning in culture， close coordination in international affairs， as well as mutual reinforcement between China’s cooperation with the region as a whole and its bilateral relations with individual countries in the region. China and Latin America will forge a community with a shared future， and work for a relationship characterized by equality， mutual benefit， innovation， openness and benefits for the people， etc.