ASEAN’s Perception of and Response to China-US Competition

As the most dynamic and successful regional organization， ASEAN plays a unique role in the China-US competition. Despite the limitations of the ASEAN-led series of mechanisms and the“ASEAN way” of decision-making that features a consensus-driven and non-confrontational model， in recent years it has taken the initiative and responded positively and cautiously in managing relations with China and the US as the intensifying competition between the two major powers severely squeezes its political space. The policy choices of ASEAN will not only directly affect its relations with China and the US， but will also impact the China-US relationship. For China， understanding ASEAN’s perception of， and response to， Sino-US competition can help it better understand ASEAN. It can also enhance the level of China’s cooperation with ASEAN， and will be of great practical significance in managing SinoUS competition in Southeast Asia and in stabilizing its neighborhood.

China-US Competition Highlights the Importance of Southeast Asia

In late 2017， the US National Security Strategy released by the Donald Trump administration positioned China as a “strategic competitor.” The definition was inherited by the Joe Biden administration in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in March 2021， which clarified the nature of Sino-US competition and the manner in which it would compete with China. The Biden administration’s perception of China is that of a systemic power， “the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic， diplomatic， military， and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”1 Therefore， the strategic competition with China is deemed a systemic one. According to the Guidance， “Democratic nations are also increasingly challenged from outside by antagonistic authoritarian powers. Anti-democratic forces[…] erode existing international rules， and promote alternative models of authoritarian governance.”2 In his first presidential address to the Congress， Biden also framed the China-US competition as a struggle between authoritarian and democratic leadership of the 21st century international order.3 Distinct from the US-Soviet military and ideological confrontation and the US-Japan economic rivalry， it is clear that the Biden administration sees China as an overall adversary. Based on this perception of China， the Biden administration has developed a long-term competitive strategy with the ultimate goal of outcompeting China. According to the Guidance， to achieve that goal， the United States must “renew its enduring advantages so that we can meet today’s challenges from a position of strength. We will build back better our economic foundations； reclaim our place in international institutions； lift up our values at home and speak out to defend them around the world； modernize our military capabilities， while leading first with diplomacy； and revitalize America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships.”4

Compared to the Trump era， the Biden administration’s strategic competition with China maintains both continuity and change with regard to its content and its characteristics. First， it is about building alliances to cope with China and preserving US hegemony. Unlike the Trump administration， which was fighting alone， the Biden administration wants to form a long-term united front with its allies and partners in order to deal with China together. The US-Japan joint statement issued in April 2021 and the China-related content of the G7 summit communiqué in June are both manifestations of Biden’s efforts to rally allies’ support for US policies.

Second， Biden wants to maintain overall strategic stability while launching strategic competition with China. The Biden administration has taken a relatively rational and long-term approach to China， believing that the most effective way to outcompete China is to renew the enduring sources of American national strength. At the same time， it welcomes the Chinese government’s cooperation on issues such as climate change， global health security， arms control， and nonproliferation where US interests are also served.5 In his first press conference after taking office， Biden， while not looking for confrontation， forecast “steep competition” with China.6 The opinion was reiterated by his Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs at the National Security Council， Kurt Campbell， who said “The period in US policy toward China that was broadly described as ‘engagement’ has come to an end […] The dominant paradigm is going to be competition. Our goal is to make that a stable， peaceful competition that brings out the best of us.”7

Third， the Indo-Pacific strategy has been continued and deepened with the US-Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral mechanism （Quad） at its core， and is being more assertive toward China on issues such as trade and commerce， science and technology， human rights and the South China Sea. At the same time， there have also been some policy adjustments. Examples include the establishment of a “technological alliance of democracies” based on the Quad， and the promotion of synergy between the Quad and the Mekong countries. The US economic policy toward China， while leaving the high punitive tariffs on Chinese products intact， has shifted its focus from trade to industrial and supply chains. In terms of science and technology， the US policy toward China has transitioned from comprehensive blockade under Trump to a more targeted “small yard， high fence” approach. In the South China Sea， the US has maintained its military involvement on a regular basis， with more participation from its allies and partners and more prominent features of actual combat deployment.

Finally， the US Congress has pushed for legislation on China-US competition in an attempt to affect its long-term pattern. In June 2021， the US Senate passed the United States Innovation and Competition Act（USICA）. As a collection of previous congressionally promoted anti-China bills， the USICA includes a US$250 billion federal budget to enhance and promote research and development and local manufacturing of hightech products such as semiconductors and chips. Meanwhile， it attacks China on a range of domestic and foreign policy issues， urging the Biden administration to expand cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific region， enhance US leadership in international mechanisms， and compete strategically with China on diplomatic， economic and technological fronts.8 The Act received an immediate positive response from Biden on the day it passed the Senate.9 If the content and nature of China-US competition is finally codified into US law， the room for adjustment of the Biden administration’s China policy will be significantly reduced， making the bilateral competitive situation more severe.

Southeast Asia is the core region of both the US Indo-Pacific strategy and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The importance of ASEAN countries to China cannot be overstated， not only as a source of natural resource imports and an important gateway to China’s maritime routes， but also as the forefront of China’s diplomatic efforts and as a key strategic partner in political， economic and regional cooperation. The year 2020 saw China and ASEAN become each other’s top trading partner for the first time. In the light of the adverse conditions created by the COVID-19 pandemic， the synergy between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 is accelerating， with major projects such as the China-Laos railway， the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail， the Malaysian East Coast Rail Link and the Hengyi refinery and petrochemical project in Brunei steadily advancing. ASEAN countries will also be the preferred destination for China’s new “dual circulation” development paradigm， a pattern that takes domestic circulation as the mainstay with domestic and international economic circulations reinforcing each other.

For the US， preventing China from dominating Southeast Asia has become a central concern in the region since great-power competition returned to the center of US national security strategy. In recent years. the US has clearly intensified its rivalry with China in Southeast Asia over strategic security， digital geopolitics， as well as over institutions and governance concepts.10 The issue of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea has also become an important handle for the US to keep China in check. In response to the Belt and Road Initiative， the US has established the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific with Japan and Australia， and the US-Japan Mekong Power Partnership in the lower Mekong region. Although few concrete projects have emerged from these initiatives， they are ready made platforms for economic cooperation jointly built by the US and its allies in Southeast Asia.11 At the same time， the US has stepped up conceptual penetration of ASEAN countries in the areas of digital economy， water security and national governance. In addition， with a population of 700 million， the fourth largest economy in the world and its increasing strategic and economic value， the ASEAN region is also a hotly contested place in its own right.12

ASEAN’s Perception of China-US Competition

As a regional organization of small- and medium-sized countries， ASEAN has always been sensitive to great-power competition. This is not only the result of the huge disparity in national strength， but also a byproduct of the deep historical memory of great-power competition. During the Cold War， ASEAN countries suffered greatly from the hot wars in the region caused by confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. The intensification of China-US competition has once again pushed ASEAN to the forefront of great-power rivalry. In view of this， ASEAN has been closely monitoring the direction of Sino-US relations and actively assessing and evaluating it. Given their geopolitical location， domestic politics， and alliance orientation， there may be differences among ASEAN countries in their perceptions of Sino-US rivalry. For example， differences exist between the positions of claimants and non-claimants in the South China Sea， and countries with very different political systems and levels of economic development have different views on Sino-US trade war and their dispute over governance philosophies. Compared to other countries， US allies in the region may also hold different attitudes toward China-US competition. However， as a whole， there are some important points of consensus among ASEAN countries in their perception of China-US competition.

As a key variable affecting regional and global order， a shift of the China-US rivalry from competition to confrontation would seriously undermine the regional and international environment on which ASEAN depends. The increased competition between the two countries has led to growing concerns in ASEAN about regional political security and economic development. According to polls by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute （ISEAS） in Singapore， between 2019 and 2021 the proportion of respondents worried that ASEAN is “becoming an arena and proxies of major power competition” increased from 62 percent to 69.1 percent， even reaching 73.2 percent in 2020.13 While both China and the US have reaffirmed their political commitment to supporting ASEAN centrality， ASEAN sees increased competition between the two sides as effectively forcing it to choose sides.14 The perception is reinforced by the US practice of imposing political conditions on its cooperation with ASEAN countries.15 China and ASEAN countries are inextricable neighbors， and as China’s influence in Southeast Asia grows significantly， so do concerns of regional countries about China’s strategic intentions.16 As the abovementioned ISEAS polls show， ASEAN countries’ distrust of China has continued to increase for three consecutive years since 2019.

In terms of security， ASEAN countries are worried about the South China Sea becoming a trigger for conflict between China and the US. According to the ISEAS polls， 45.2 percent of ASEAN respondents in 2021， and 49.6 percent in 2020， expressed concern about a China-US military confrontation in the region that may lead to a political crisis. 84.6 percent of the respondents want ASEAN to adopt a principled stand on the South China Sea that upholds international law， and 80.8 percent of them agree that a code of conduct in the South China Sea must be aligned with international law.17 Among the South China Sea claimants in ASEAN， a common plea has been to peacefully settle the disputes through dialogue and consultation and refrain from direct conflict with China. Instead of letting the South China Sea issue undermine ASEAN’s internal solidarity， the claimants hope for a larger ASEAN role in synergizing the strengths of its member states and balancing major-power influence.18 After Biden’s win in the 2020 presidential election， the confidence in the US has witnessed a rapid rebound in ASEAN countries. The ISEAS polls show that the share of respondents having confidence in the US as a strategic partner and provider of regional security increased from 34.9 percent in 2020 to 55.4 percent in 2021.19 However， the frequent US military activities in the South China Sea， which the Biden administration continues despite its proclaimed priority on diplomacy， have not brought the stability and positive situation that ASEAN countries hope for.20

Economically， ASEAN countries see more challenges than opportunities from the trade friction between the US and China. 56.3 percent of respondents to the 2021 ISEAS poll expressed concern that a “China-US decoupling” will force ASEAN countries to face two exclusive blocs led by China and the US respectively， and the proportion of respondents worried about a regional economic recession has increased from 51.1 percent in 2019 to 63 percent in 2021.21 Commenting on the China-US trade friction， ASEAN Secretary-General Lim Jock Hoi said， “Tensions bring uncertainty to the global economy， and ASEAN depends on foreign trade and investment. We don’t want to see unpredictability. …The trade war benefits some countries because many producers have begun to shift their production bases， but in the long run， it does not benefit us because it will reduce the world’s economic growth.”22 It is evident that from the perspective of ASEAN as a whole， the trade friction between the US and China will undermine the free and open trading system that has benefited it for a long time. ASEAN believes that as US and Japanese companies start to redesign their production networks and shift their production bases within the region， the industrial， supply and value chains will be reshaped， and a new round of battles for investment will follow， which exposes the regional economy to more uncertainties.23 As the power and influence gap between China and the US narrows， ASEAN countries generally believe that the two major powers will have an intense geopolitical rivalry as they persuade countries to align with their views on issues such as COVID-19 vaccines， the Indo-Pacific， the Belt and Road Initiative， and 5G/6G infrastructure.24

The competition between the US and China poses a great challenge to ASEAN’s cohesion， centrality and institutional effectiveness. According to veteran diplomat Kishore Mahbubani， a key reason for ASEAN’s success in the 1980s and 1990s was an informal strategic commitment between the US and China to work together to strengthen ASEAN’s role.25 Given this， the centrality of ASEAN is constrained not only by the unity and strength of ASEAN countries， but also by the recognition from the extra-territorial countries. Under the Trump administration， the US turned the ASEAN institutional platform into an arena of competition with China for spheres of influence， drawing some key countries over to its side and launching a “free and open Indo-Pacific strategy” aimed at containing China， which seriously undermined the internal unity and centrality of ASEAN. At the Shangri-La Dialogue and the ASEAN Regional Forum in the summer of 2019， ASEAN leaders expressed their concern about the growing competition between China and the US， which they believe is seriously squeezing their political space to balance the relations with the two major powers and putting ASEAN at the risk of being marginalized.26 There is a view within ASEAN that if the USChina rivalry intensifies to the point that they will force regional countries to choose sides， individual countries will have to do whatever is relevant to protect their national interests.27 This means that if China and the US confront each other， ASEAN will also be divided as a result.

ASEAN’s lack of a capability for collective action and its inefficiency in solving problems are also magnified by the intensifying ChinaUS competition. ASEAN has made great strides in leading regional cooperation， achieving a long period of post-Cold War peace and creating the “ASEAN miracle，” but its modus operandi and efficiency have been widely criticized. Amid the growing China-US rivalry， there are widespread concerns within ASEAN about its cohesiveness and ability to respond to geopolitical changes， with 71.5 percent of respondents to the 2021 ISEAS poll expressing little confidence in ASEAN’s ability to address China-US competition， believing that “ASEAN is slow and ineffective， and thus cannot cope with the fluid political and economic developments.”28 Differences in the positions of ASEAN countries on the South China Sea issue had made it difficult for ASEAN to forge a consensus， as exemplified by the failure of the 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting to issue a joint communiqué. However， judging from the Chairman’s Statements at ASEAN summits in recent years， ASEAN has reached an important consensus regarding urging restraint among all parties concerned， peaceful settlement of disputes， compliance with international law including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea， full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea， and early conclusion of a code of conduct in the area. ASEAN realizes that with the intensification of great-power competition， the only way for ASEAN to maintain its centrality is to respond in an innovative manner.29

ASEAN’s Response to China-US Competition

Based on the above perceptions， in order to mitigate the risks posed by the intensifying Sino-US competition， ASEAN has adopted a clear position of not taking sides， carefully balanced its relations with the two major powers， and enhanced its cohesion and resilience by developing a narrative of “ASEAN identity” and promoting economic integration. At the same time， to preserve its centrality， ASEAN is promoting inclusive cooperation and actively expanding its network of partnerships， thereby reducing its dependence on China and the US， and broadening its strategic space. From the development of ASEAN’s relations with the US and China in recent years and the issues on which it has focused， ASEAN’s response can be summarized as follows：

Prudently balancing between China and the US without choosing sides

From the statements of ASEAN leaders and the results of polls， 96 percent of ASEAN people hope to address the China-US competition by enhancing regional resilience and broadening strategic space， rather than by choosing sides.30 ASEAN recognizes the positive role of the US in achieving regional peace and prosperity and believes that it is in the best interest of ASEAN to develop trade and economic relations with China while maintaining security cooperation with the US. It hopes that the two major powers will exercise restraint， and calls on the US to accept the rise of China， arguing that China’s rise is within the USled system and that China has neither the power nor the intention to challenge US dominance. Meanwhile， ASEAN calls on China not to become an unfettered power，31 hoping that the US will continue to provide security for the region and use ASEAN’s multilateral mechanisms to jointly restrain China and make it a constructive force for regional peace and prosperity. ASEAN also urges the US and China to resolve their differences in an appropriate manner and find ways to cooperate in areas such as climate change， nuclear non-proliferation and public health.32 In May 2021， Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen， in a public response to the much-hyped “Cambodia leaning to China” narrative of recent years， also said that Cambodia was not choosing sides between China and the US and that it had always been open to foreign aid and trade and economic cooperation. In his opinion， China has been able to deliver on its promises of aid to Cambodia， while the US has just paid lip service.33 In the Statement on the Importance of Maintaining Peace and Stability in Southeast Asia in August 2020， ASEAN foreign ministers revisited the 1971 Zone of Peace， Freedom and Neutrality Declaration and reaffirmed ASEAN’s commitment to neutrality，34 stating that they oppose outside interference in its internal affairs and do not want to choose sides.

It is difficult for ASEAN to get rid of the dilemma of depending on the United States for security while relying on China for its economy， but judging from the evolution of ASEAN’s relations with the two major powers， it can be seen that ASEAN is carefully pursuing equidistant diplomacy with China and the US. In October 2018， ASEAN and China conducted a joint maritime exercise， the first of its kind between ASEAN and a single country. Less than a year later， ASEAN and the US also held their first joint maritime exercise in September 2019. On the South China Sea issue， ASEAN has actively accommodated itself to the situation in order to reduce the intensity of Sino-US competition under its framework. During the Obama era， when Sino-US relations were relatively stable， ASEAN tended to get closer to the US and to put pressure on China， while， when Sino-US rivalry intensified， ASEAN wielded its agenda-setting power to avoid sensitive issues which would make it an arena for bickering between China and the US.35 The ASEAN countries’ lukewarm attitude toward the US State Department’s statement on the South China Sea issued in July 2020 shows that ASEAN does not want to lean to either side on the focal issue of China-US rivalry.36 As external pressure continues to mount， ASEAN’s overall willingness to take sides is in fact declining.

ASEAN has held an open attitude toward regional initiatives from both the US and China in various functional areas of cooperation. Under the Trump administration， the US launched a series of economic cooperation initiatives represented by the Blue Dot Network， joined by allies such as Japan and Australia to encourage private sector investment in Southeast Asia， and set global certification criteria for high-quality infrastructure projects， with the intention of replacing the so-called“unsustainable， state-led growth model” offered by China. However， the inherent problems with the formulation of accreditation standards， the complexity of the accreditation process， the inclusiveness of the scheme， and the decline of US investment in Southeast Asia in recent years have made ASEAN countries skeptical about the ability of the US to provide an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative.37 This perception is likely to persist， as the Biden administration has made huge investments in US domestic infrastructure and the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic a priority agenda.

On the contrary， China-ASEAN trade and economic relations have bucked the epidemic， with trade volume between the two sides reaching$684.6 billion in 2020， up 6.7 percent year-on-year.38 For the first time in history， China and ASEAN became each other’s top trading partner. In addition， the ASEAN-initiated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership （RCEP） was signed by 15 countries， including China， at the end of 2020. In fact， the RCEP was initially an ASEAN attempt to seek a balance between China and the US after the US dominated the TransPacific Partnership （TPP） negotiations， which aroused ASEAN’s concern that the regional economic order would be hijacked by the US.39 In the 5G sector， where competition between China and the US is fierce， ASEAN countries have remained open to Chinese technology companies despite US pressure， believing that Chinese technology is crucial to realizing their national economic and technological development strategies， and upholding an open attitude toward technology companies from all countries， including China and the US， to create an inclusive regional 5G network ecosystem.40

Enhancing cohesion and resilience by promoting collective identity and integration

ASEAN’s internal unity and resilience is the foundation for its centrality. In the process of building the ASEAN community， sociocultural integration has been lagging behind the development in the economic and political-security dimensions， and this disadvantage is compounded by the growing competition between China and the US， which highlights the differences in the positions of ASEAN countries. In order to address the risk of being divided， ASEAN first proposed the idea of developing a narrative of “ASEAN identity” in October 2018， taking the initiative to promote a collective identity of its member countries as a preventive measure to enrich the content of ASEAN identity and enhance its attractiveness. The year 2020 was designated as the Year of ASEAN Identity， and the document “Narrative of ASEAN Identity” was adopted to foster a sense of belonging and identity among the people of ASEAN countries. The ASEAN themes of the recent two years， “Cohesive and Responsive ASEAN” in 2020 and “We Care， We Prepare， We Prosper” in 2021， also reflect the desire of ASEAN countries to work collectively to address common challenges.

The fight against the COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity for ASEAN to increase its cohesive strength. In the process， ASEAN has made efforts to forge consensus and strengthen cooperation in improving regional public health governance and stabilizing regional economy. Against headwinds， regional integration has witnessed steady progress. In 2020， ASEAN declared a community-wide approach to addressing external challenges. At the special summit on COVID-19 in April that year， ASEAN countries showed unprecedented unity and agreed to set up the COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund. Since then， ASEAN has established the Regional Medical Supplies Reserve for Public Health Emergencies， created the Strategic Framework for Public Health Emergencies， and launched the ASEAN Center for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases. Building upon the Declaration on ASEAN Vaccine Security and Self-Reliance in 2019， ASEAN countries have stepped up sharing antiepidemic technologies to jointly address regional vaccine shortage and security.

Under the impact of China-US competition， ASEAN has， on the one hand， pledged to continue to open up its markets and give full play to its competitive advantage of an open market in a situation where some countries have turned inward-looking and isolationist. On the other hand， ASEAN continues to promote its internal connectivity as well as trade and economic ties， to improve its flexibility and operational efficiency and enhance the proactive adaptation capacity of its economic integration. Since 2018， the four ASEAN Chairs - Singapore， Thailand， Vietnam and Brunei - have made enhancing regional resilience， sustainable development and pandemic response key agendas. Under Singapore’s chairmanship， ASEAN focused on promoting the transformation of the regional digital economy. As the result of this effort， the ASEAN Smart Cities Framework advocates sustainable urban development with innovation and technology to bridge the development gap between cities and provide a new growth point for building the ASEAN Economic Community. Under the Thai chairmanship，significant progress was made in the negotiations for the RCEP， which was finally signed when Vietnam became ASEAN Chair and underscored ASEAN’s strong commitment to an open， transparent and equitable multilateral trading system. The year 2020 saw the completion of the mid-term review of the ASEAN Political-Security， Economic and Socio-Cultural Community Blueprints and the alignment of subregional development with the overall ASEAN development agenda for the first time.41 The outcome documents adopted at the 37th ASEAN Summit， such as the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework and its Implementation Plan， the Declaration on an ASEAN Travel Corridor Arrangement Framework， and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration Work Plan IV （2021-2025）， demonstrate ASEAN’s commitment to economic recovery， narrowing internal development gaps and enhancing overall competitiveness. In response to the technological decoupling between the US and China and to further drive the digital transformation of its economy， ASEAN convened its first Digital Ministers’ Meeting in January 2021. The meeting adopted the ASEAN Data Management Framework， the ASEAN Model Contractual Clauses on Cross Border Data Flows， and the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025， which set the direction for ASEAN’s digital development and identified several key areas， such as adopting a digital approach for driving economic recovery， expanding the reach and quality of digital infrastructure， and providing trusted digital services.42

Maintaining ASEAN centrality and promoting inclusive regional cooperation

Following the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy， which aimed to contain China， ASEAN’s choice on the Indo-Pacific issue would not only affect its relationships with China and the US， but also impact its own regional role. In order to avoid the dilemma of choosing sides， ASEAN launched the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific， in which the ten member states stated their common position on the development， security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. The Outlook both denies the legitimacy of major powers to dominate regional affairs and defuses the risk of ASEAN taking sides on Indo-Pacific issues. Although the term “Indo-Pacific” is used， the content of the Outlook entirely reflects ASEAN’s position and discourse， which is very different from the exclusivist US Indo-Pacific strategy. While reiterating its long-held foreign policy principles such as non-interference in internal affairs， the Outlook also emphasizes ASEAN’s commitment to developing an inclusive regional architecture while maintaining its centrality and the role of its mechanisms in promoting closer cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. According to the Outlook， ASEAN expects to further exert its collective leadership and continue to be “an honest broker” for the various competing stakeholders， while promoting the synergy between different cooperation mechanisms and regional programs， including the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-Pacific strategies of the US and other countries.43 This role is a positive expression of ASEAN’s desire to use its institutional strength and initiative in the face of the most intense competition between major powers in Southeast Asia in the three decades since the end of the Cold War. Southeast Asia is not only the frontier of competition between China and the United States， but it has also become in recent years an important area for countries such as South Korea and India to expand their foreign strategies. As an honest broker， ASEAN hopes to actively dovetail and integrate cooperation mechanisms in the region and beyond， both to broaden its partnership network and to provide conditions and platforms for regional cooperation for extra-territorial countries， including China and the US.

Given that ASEAN’s dependence on China and the US would increase its vulnerability to changes in Sino-US relations， the optimal path for ASEAN has been to seek new partnerships and deepen thirdparty cooperation to reduce such dependence， hedge against the deterioration of China-US relations and expand its strategic space. In recent years， ASEAN has been seeking to expand practical cooperation with third parties in various fields. In November 2019， the British Mission to ASEAN was established with the appointment of the first British Ambassador to ASEAN. Also， cooperation between ASEAN and the UK has deepened in areas such as defense， science and innovation， and public health.44 In 2020， France and Italy became ASEAN Development Partners， and the UK became ASEAN’s 11th Dialogue Partner. Cuba， South Africa and Colombia joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia， and the ASEAN-EU dialogue relationship was upgraded to a strategic partnership. The level of cooperation with the UK， EU， Japan， South Korea， India， Australia and Russia was elevated across the board. In June 2021， ASEAN and the EU and its member states concluded the negotiations on the ASEANEU Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement， which will help rebuild air connectivity between the two sides.45 With increasing cooperation with the United Nations， ASEAN has also gained international recognition and support for its centrality and community building. In January 2020， the UN Security Council held its first open debate on strengthening cooperation between the UN and ASEAN. Dato Lim Jock Hoi， Secretary-General of ASEAN， made remarks to the Security Council on ASEAN’s role in enhancing cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organizations to maintain international peace and security. In 2021， Brunei， the rotating chair of ASEAN， will continue to focus on the expansion of partnerships， such as launching the CanadaASEAN free trade agreement and expanding the scope of ASEAN’s global trade and economic cooperation.

Challenges of ASEAN’s Response to China-US Competition

Given that neither China nor the US is currently in a position to become the dominant power in Southeast Asia， a balance of power strategy remains the optimal choice for ASEAN. However， ASEAN’s response will still be constrained by a series of internal and external factors. The combination of the Biden administration’s China policy， the two major powers’ respective policies toward ASEAN， as well as the internal challenges of ASEAN， will add many variables to ASEAN’s response.

First， Biden’s perception of China as a systemic power has exacerbated ASEAN’s dilemma of choosing sides. By building a coalition of “like-minded countries” to compete with China in a comprehensive manner， the Biden administration wants to put China under systemic pressure and prevent it from becoming the dominant power in the region. Some ASEAN countries have thus become key targets for the US to win over. Promoting the Indo-Pacific strategy is the focus of Biden’s foreign policy in his first 100 days in office， and the Quad summit was the first multilateral meeting held after Biden took power. Coming out of this event， the quadrilateral mechanism has not only been upgraded， but has also expanded its focus from maritime security to more diverse areas such as science and technology， public health， infrastructure and climate change， with the intention of creating multiple “issue coalitions” to target China. In addition， the US Indo-Pacific strategy is being fleshed out with the “Quad plus” mechanism as the core， and the Mekong countries in particular have become the key targets for alignment with the Quad. At the Mekong-US Partnership Track 1.5 Policy Dialogue in March 2021， US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Atul Keshap， while making unfounded accusations against China， proposed the alignment of regional countries with the Quad mechanism.46 The Biden administration’s efforts to build “issue coalitions”against China will test ASEAN’s cohesion and its commitment to the principle of inclusiveness.

Second， the Biden administration’s economic and technological policies toward China are challenging ASEAN’s ability to respond. Most ASEAN countries are the producers of components for final products made in China. In the context of China-US trade frictions， ASEAN countries’ exports to China have suffered greatly due to a fall in Chinese demand for intermediate goods. Although in the short term a surge in reexports and growth in exports to the US will offset the negative impact of lower Chinese demand， it seems that Vietnam has been the predominant beneficiary in ASEAN so far.47 In fact， only five ASEAN countries have been able to fill the gap created by the decline of Chinese exports to the US and vice versa. According to data as of August 2019， Vietnam’s GDP gains from China-US trade tensions amounted to 7.9 percent， followed by Malaysia （1.5 percent）， Singapore （0.7 percent）， Thailand （0.5 percent） and the Philippines （0.1 percent）.48 Hit by the COVID-19 pandemic， Vietnam’s benefits witnessed further increase in 2020， while Malaysia’s gains shrank.49 Even though the China-US trade frictions have accelerated the industrial shift of multinational companies to Southeast Asia， it has currently been limited to low-end manufacturing， as many companies are increasingly concerned with the poor infrastructure and logistics networks in some ASEAN countries， which increases business costs.50 In the long term， ASEAN countries will still face challenges in terms of labor quality， technological innovation and infrastructure conditions. Even in the short term， since few countries in ASEAN will be able to benefit from the industrial transfer， the development gap within the organization will be further widened.

Increased China-US competition in science and technology will expose ASEAN countries to the scenario of technological “bifurcation.”Judging from the White House’s 100-day reviews on America’s supply chains51 and the United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021， the Biden administration intends to further promote technological decoupling with China by fostering a so-called “democratic technology alliance” and establishing local industrial bases for key products such as semiconductors. The technological decoupling between the US and China is particularly evident in the semiconductor sector. In the short term， Southeast Asia， as a major semiconductor industrial base， will benefit from the shift. However， Biden’s nationalist approach will not only result in technological fragmentation that leads to losses in the order of 5 percent of GDP for many economies，52 but also undermine international technological cooperation and weaken the positioning of some ASEAN countries in semiconductor industrial development. In 2018， on the grounds of national security， the US blocked the Singapore-based Broadcom from acquiring Qualcomm due to concerns that the deal might spur Chinese dominance in 5G technologies.53 Biden’s rhetoric of “foreign policy for the middle class”is less strident than Trump’s “America First，” but both hide behind what they perceive to be an isolationist public attitude rather than shape public understanding54 and serve to sustain Trump’s protectionist tendencies. With such a governing philosophy， if technology companies and suppliers move more to the ASEAN countries rather than back to the US， the US is likely to impose punitive economic measures on ASEAN countries， especially those that are not part of the “democratic technology alliance.”

Third， the direction of US and Chinese policy toward ASEAN will add to the difficulties of an ASEAN response. Amid a more complex situation of Sino-US competition， it requires greater wisdom for ASEAN to handle its future relations with the two major powers. Southeast Asian scholars noted that Biden has yet to match expectations of increased US economic engagement with Southeast Asia， and Southeast Asia has not been a priority for the Biden administration despite its “Indo-Pacific” location.55 Nevertheless， the US has on several occasions reaffirmed its support for ASEAN centrality， and emphasized the need to work with ASEAN to maintain the regional and international order. It also pledged to increase support for ASEAN countries in their fight against COVID-19， and expressed the hope of further deepening trade and economic ties and enhancing the USMekong partnership.56 At the same time， the Biden administration has continued to put pressure on ASEAN countries with regard to China-related issues. During her visit to Cambodia in June 2021， US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman wantonly interfered in Cambodia’s internal affairs and used debt forgiveness as an inducement to undermine the country’s relations with China.57

The South China Sea issue is the biggest challenge for ASEAN in dealing with its relations to China and to the US. Since Biden took office， the frequency of US military and reconnaissance activities in the South China Sea has exceeded the same period in 2020，58 and the continuation of such a hardline stance toward China on the South China Sea issue will increase the risk of a local conflict between the two countries. In contrast， the willingness of ASEAN and China to maintain peace in the area is increasing. Since the COVID-19 outbreak， the two sides have maintained active consultations on the full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea while promoting practical maritime cooperation. The year 2021 marks the 30th anniversary of China-ASEAN dialogue relations and the fifth anniversary of the launch of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation. Standing at a new starting point， the two sides will promote cooperation in a wider range of areas and at a deeper level. Politically， the two sides are actively exploring ways to upgrade their relations. Economically， China and ASEAN became each other’s largest trading partner for the first time in 2020， and the signing of the RCEP will bring their trade and economic ties even closer. Cooperation between the two sides will also be further enhanced in pandemic response， economic recovery， and the synergy between the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation and ASEAN’s subregional cooperation mechanisms.

Fourth， ASEAN’s internal challenges are testing its ability and conditions for managing China-US competition. First， the increasingly aggravated pandemic in Southeast Asia has dealt a heavy blow to economic recovery. Since April 2021， the rapid rebound of COVID-19 in the region has led to the shutdown of some factories and the closure or headcount restrictions in the service sector again， which seriously drags down the process of economic recovery. The International Monetary Fund once forecast a 5.2 percent GDP growth rate for ASEAN in 2021，59 but the new wave of COVID-19 has strained ASEAN’s antipandemic resilience and increased the difficulty of economic recovery. Second， there is a long way to go in building the ASEAN Community. GDP per capita varies greatly among ASEAN member states， with data in 2020 showing that Singapore has a GDP per capita of about $58，000， the highest among ASEAN countries， while the figure for Myanmar， the lowest， is only about $1，300.60 Besides， trade among ASEAN countries has consistently accounted for less than 25 percent of total ASEAN trade since 2015， and only 15 percent of investment is generated within the region.61 How to activate the intra-regional development potential， narrow the internal development gap and maintain its resilience and competitiveness has thus become a major issue facing ASEAN. Finally， the response to the most recent Myanmar crisis is a touchstone for ASEAN’s crisis management capability and centrality. ASEAN successfully helped resolve crises in the country twice， in 2007 and 2008. In the face of the sudden coup this time， ASEAN has now taken the lead in crisis resolution， with broad support from major powers outside the region. ASEAN leaders have reached a five-point consensus on the situation in Myanmar， and whether it can be effectively implemented will deeply affect ASEAN’s central role as well as the trajectory of China-US competition.

Conclusion

A balanced approach to major powers best suits ASEAN， allowing it sufficient strategic autonomy to serve its member states， rather than the interests of hegemonic powers. Therefore， there is an important consensus among ASEAN countries that the increased competition between the US and China undermines the regional and international environment and poses significant challenges to them. In the face of intensifying great-power rivalry， ASEAN seeks to play a more active and constructive role between China and the US， dovetailing with regional cooperation initiatives of the two countries as a way to enhance its ability of shaping the relationship.

Given ASEAN’s perception of and response to Sino-US competition， China should firmly uphold ASEAN centrality and deepen its consensus with ASEAN on adhering to the principles of multilateralism， free trade， and inclusiveness. It needs to fully accommodate ASEAN’s concerns， make efforts to reduce the intensity of Sino-US competition in Southeast Asia， while exploring the potential for cooperation with the US in the region， so that ASEAN can play the role of a communicator of concepts， and serve as a strategic bridge between China and the US. On the other hand， China should pay close attention to the real needs of ASEAN and increase relevant practical cooperation to advance a closer community of shared future with ASEAN. In fact， the signing of the RCEP has put the future of China-ASEAN trade and economic relations on a more promising pathway. In addition， China should more precisely dovetail its new dual-circulation development paradigm with ASEAN’s priority development agenda in the areas of public health， human security， economic integration， inclusive digital transformation and sustainable development， as a gesture of genuine support for the building of the ASEAN Community and a testimony to its commitment to jointly maintaining regional peace and prosperity with ASEAN.

1 The White House， Interim National Security Strategic Guidance， March 2021， p.8， https：//www. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.

2 Ibid.， p.7.

3 “Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by President Biden - Address to a Joint Session of Congress，” April 28， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/28/remarks-as-preparedfor-delivery-by-president-biden-address-to-a-joint-session-of-congress.

4 The White House， Interim National Security Strategic Guidance， p.3.

5 Ibid.， p.21.

6 Vivian Salama and Gordon Lubold， “Biden Says U.S. Wants Competition， Not Confrontation， with China，” March 25， 2021， https：//www.wsj.com/articles/biden-says-u-s-wants-competition-notconfrontation-with-china-11616701220.

7 Noa Ronkin， “White House Top Asia Policy Officials Discuss U.S. China Strategy at APARC’s Oksenberg Conference，” May 27， 2021， https：//fsi.stanford.edu/news/white-house-top-asia-policy-officialsdiscuss-us-china-strategy-aparc%E2%80%99s-oksenberg-conference.

8 “The United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021： Division-by-division Summary，” https：// www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/USICA%20Summary%205.18.21.pdf.

9 “Statement of President Joe Biden on Senate Passage of the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act，”June 8， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/08/statement-ofpresident-joe-biden-on-senate-passage-of-the-u-s-innovation-and-competition-act.

10 Yang Yue， “Great-Power Competition and the Trump Administration’s Southeast Asia Policy，” The Chinese Journal of American Studies， No.6， 2020.

11 “US-China Strategic Rivalry in Southeast Asia，” The Brookings Institution， February 9， 2021， https：// www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/the-us-china-strategic-rivalry-in-southeast-asia.

12 “The Battle for China’s Backyard： The Rivalry between America and China will Hinge on South-East Asia，” The Economist， February 27， 2021.

13 “The State of Southeast Asia： 2021 Survey Report，” ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute， February 10， 2021， pp.10， 17 & 9； “The State of Southeast Asia： 2020 Survey Report，” ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute， January 16， 2020， p.10； “The State of Southeast Asia： 2019 Survey Report，” ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute， January 29， 2019， p.14 & 13.

14 Maria Siow， “US-China Rivalry： Is the Pressure on for ASEAN Countries to Choose Sides？” South China Morning Post， April 11， 2021， https：//www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3128986/us-chinarivalry-pressure-asean-countries-choose-sides.

15 This is an opinion the author learnt at a webinar held by ISEAS on April 23， 2021， “Autonomy and Agency in Southeast Asia： Rethinking ‘Don’t Make Us Choose’ and Resolving the Deer-Dragon Dilemma.”16 “The State of Southeast Asia： 2021 Survey Report，” p.42.

17 “The State of Southeast Asia： 2021 Survey Report，” p.5； “The State of Southeast Asia： 2020 Survey Report，” p.7.

18 “Malaysia Should Not Be ‘Dragged and Trapped’ between Superpowers in South China Sea Dispute： Hishammuddin，” CNA， August 14， 2020， https：//www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/south-china-sea-malaysiashould-not-be-trapped-hishammuddin-609846.

19 “The State of Southeast Asia： 2021 Survey Report，” p.4.

20 Mark J. Valencia， “Biden Must Rethink US Approach to the South China Sea： Early Signs Are Not Promising，” South China Morning Post， February 2， 2021， https：//www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/ article/3119970/biden-must-rethink-us-approach-south-china-sea-early-signs-are-not.

21 “The State of Southeast Asia： 2021 Survey Report，” pp.10 & 31； “The State of Southeast Asia： 2020 Survey Report，” p.4； “The State of Southeast Asia： 2019 Survey Report，” p.13.

22 “Trade Spat Will Not Affect RCEP： ASEAN，” Bangkok Post， October 7， 2019， https：//www. bangkokpost.com/business/1766264/trade-spat-will-not-affect-rcep-asean.

23 This is the view the author learnt when discussing the concept paper for the 2021 Network of ASEAN-China Think Tanks （NACT） working group meeting， “Global and Regional Supply Chain Shifts： Implications for Sustainable Development in ASEAN and China，” with the NACT national coordinators from ASEAN countries.

24 “Asia’s Take on Biden’s First 100 Days，” May 14， 2021， https：//lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/gia/article/asia-stake-on-biden-s-first-100-days.

25 Kishore Mahbubani and Amrita V. Nair， “ASEAN and Geopolitical Rivalries，” Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development， No.9， Autumn 2017， pp.198-207.

26 Catharin Dalpino， “ASEAN Centrality under Siege，” Comparative Connections， Volume 21， Issue 2， September 2019， p.47.

27 Jongsoo Lee， “Vietnam， ASEAN， and the US-China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific，” The Diplomat， March 13， 2021， https：//thediplomat.com/2021/03/vietnam-asean-and-the-us-china-rivalry-in-the-indo-pacific.

28 “The State of Southeast Asia： 2021 Survey Report，” p.10.

29 K. Yhome， “‘ASEAN Centrality’ and the Emerging Great Power Competition，” October 30， 2020， https：//www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/asean-centrality-and-the-emerging-great-power-competition.

30 “The State of Southeast Asia： 2021 Survey Report，” p.32.

31 Lee Hsien Loong， “The Endangered Asian Century： America， China， and the Perils of Confrontation，”Foreign Affairs， July/August 2020.

32 The US Chamber of Commerce， “Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong Talks Coronavirus and Economic Recovery，” May 19， 2021， https：//www.uschamber.com/on-demand/international/prime-minister-lee-hsienloong-talks-coronavirus-and-economic-recovery.

33 “Hun Sen Responds to Narrative of Cambodia Choosing China over US，” The Cambodia China Times， May 20， 2021， https：//cc-times.com/posts/13964.

34 “ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Importance of Maintaining Peace and Stability in Southeast Asia，” August 8， 2020， https：//asean.org/asean-foreign-ministers-statement-importancemaintaining-peace-stability-southeast-asia.

35 Liu Ruonan， “The Strategic Competition between China and the United States and the Order Transformation in Southeast Asia，” World Economics and Politics， No.8， 2020.

36 Yang Yue， “Great-Power Competition and the Trump Administration’s Southeast Asia Policy，” pp.107-108.

37 Yang Yue and Li Fujian， The Belt and Road Initiative： ASEAN Countries’ Perspectives， Singapore： World Scientific Publishing， 2019.

38 “Overview of China-ASEAN Trade and Economic Cooperation in 2020，” Ministry of Commerce of China， January 25， 2021， http：//asean.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/202101/20210103033653.shtml.

39 Rozman Gilbert and Joseph Chinyong Liow， eds.， International Relations and Asia’s Southern Tier， Asan-Palgrave Macmillan Series， Springer Singapore， 2018， pp.45-61.

40 Seungha Lee， “Southeast Asian Struggle： Caught up in the U.S.-China 5G Rivalry，” The SAIS China Studies Review， May 1， 2020， https：//saiscsr.org/2020/05/01/southeast-asian-struggle-caught-up-in-the-u-schina-5g-rivalry.

41 “Chairman’s Statement of the 37th ASEAN Summit： Cohesive and Responsive，” November 20， 2020， https：//www.asean2020.vn/xem-chi-tiet1/-/asset_publisher/ynfWm23dDfpd/content/chairman-s-statementof-the-37th-asean-summit-cohesive-and-responsive.

42 “ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025，” January 22， 2021， https：//asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/ ASEAN-Digital-Masterplan-2025.pdf.

43 Zhang Jie， “Rebuilding ASEAN Centrality and the Development of China-ASEAN Relations，” China International Studies， No.3， 2021， p.128.

44 “UK-ASEAN Factsheet，” May 4， 2021， https：//www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-aseanfactsheet/uk-asean-factsheet.

45 “Aviation： ASEAN and the EU Conclude the World’s First Bloc-to-Bloc Air Transport Agreement，” June 4， 2021， https：//ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/news/2021-06-04-conclusion-asean-eu-comprehensiveair-transport-agreement_en.

46 “Remarks at the Mekong-U.S. Partnership Track 1.5 Policy Dialogue Opening Plenary，” US Department of State， March 18， 2021， https：//www.state.gov/remarks-at-the-mekong-u-s-partnership-track-1-5-policy-dialogue-opening-plenary.

47 Shen Jianguang， Zhu Taihui， and Xu Tianchen， “Despite Growth in Trade， Risks of ASEAN Industrial Chains Cannot Be Ignored，” Yicai， August 12， 2020， https：//www.yicai.com/news/100731771.html.

48 Carmen Reinicke， “These 8 Asian Countries will Get the Biggest Boost if the Trade War Forces US Companies to Leave China，” August 28， 2019， https：//markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/8-asiancountries-that-could-benefit-us-china-trade-war-2019-8-1028481289.

49 Kira Schacht， “The Real Winners of the US-China Trade Dispute，” October 29， 2020， https：//www. dw.com/en/the-real-winners-of-the-us-china-trade-dispute/a-55420269.

50 Alec Lei， “Is Southeast Asia Winning the US-China Trade War？ Not So Fast，” The Diplomat， September 5， 2019， https：//thediplomat.com/2019/09/is-southeast-asia-winning-the-us-china-trade-war-not-so-fast.

51 The White House， “100-Day Reviews under Executive Order 14017： Building Resilient Supply Chains， Revitalizing Amirian Manufacturing， and Fostering Broad-based Growth，” June 2021， https：//www. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf.

52 Diego A. Cerdeiro et al.， “Sizing up the Effects of Technological Decoupling，” March 12， 2021， https：//www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/03/12/Sizing-Up-the-Effects-of-TechnologicalDecoupling-50125.

53 Muhammad Faizal and Dymples Leong， “Impact of US-China Technationalism on ASEAN，”November 7， 2020， https：//theaseanpost.com/article/impact-us-china-technationalism-asean.

54 Kori Schake， “Biden Brings More Class Warfare to Foreign Policy，” The Atlantic， May 27， 2021， https：// www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/05/biden-foreign-policy-america-first-middle-class/618999.

55 Sebastian Strangio， “Amid Chinese Push， US Official to Visit Three Southeast Asian Nations，” The Diplomat， May 25， 2021， https：//thediplomat.com/2021/05/amid-chinese-push-us-official-to-visit-threesoutheast-asian-nations.

56 “Briefing via Telephone with Wendy R. Sherman， Deputy Secretary of State，” US Department of State， June 2， 2021， https：//www.state.gov/briefing-via-telephone-with-wendy-r-sherman-deputy-secretary-ofstate； “34th U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue，” US Department of State， May 6， 2021， https：//www.state.gov/34th-u-sasean-dialogue； “U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement： ‘U.S.-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era’，” The White House， April 16， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/us-japan-joint-leaders-statement-u-s-japan-global-partnership-for-a-new-era； “G7 Foreign and Development Ministers’ Meeting Communique，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， May 5， 2021， https：//www.mofa. go.jp/fp/pc/page6e_000238.html.

57 Sebastian Strangio， “US Official Warns Cambodia over China Ties， Human Rights，” The Diplomat， June 2， 2021， https：//thediplomat.com/2021/06/us-official-warns-cambodia-over-china-ties-human-rights.

58 Song Runqian and Wu Lei， “A 100-Day Review of Biden’s South China Sea Policy，” May 26， 2021， https：//www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_12869913.

59 International Monetary Fund， “World Economic Outlook，” January 2021， https：//www.imf.org/en/ Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/01/26/2021-world-economic-outlook-update.

60 “ASEAN Countries： Gross Domestic Product （GDP） Per Capita in Current Prices from 2010 to 2020，”April 1， 2021， https：//www.statista.com/statistics/804307/gross-domestic-product-gdp-per-capita-in-theasean-countries.

61 Wanasin Sattayanuwat， “ASEAN Trade after COVID-19，” February 5， 2021， https：//www.mof. go.jp/pri/research/conference/fy2020/asean2020_02_02.pdf； “ASEAN Seeks to Boost Intra-Regional Trade and Investment，” January 10， 2020， https：//asean.org/asean-seeks-boost-intra-regional-tradeinvestment.