The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Era

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization （SCO）， established in June 2001， is a compelling example for the significance of shaping major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics and the practice of multilateral diplomacy. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and the world’s second largest economy， China has been enriching the theory and practice of multilateral diplomacy and has taken an active role in safeguarding multilateralism while also engaging in the promotion of cooperation in various fields within the SCO framework.

The SCO： Successful Practice of China’s Multilateral Diplomacy

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China （PRC）， the country began to portray the image of New China and develop its own foreign policy principles through multilateral diplomacy， notwithstanding that its policies were once oriented toward the Soviet Union due to China’s isolation by the West. At the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955， the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence proposed by China became an essential basis for the ideas expressed in the Declaration on Promoting World Peace and Cooperation. The bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union largely confined China’s independent diplomatic activities. However， the restoration of the PRC’s lawful seat in the United Nations （UN） in 1971 marked a first milestone in China’s journey towards full multilateral diplomacy. Since the beginning of the reform and opening-up in 1978， China has stepped up its active exchanges with foreign countries， before it gradually assumed its unique role as a world power in the post-Cold War international structure. It was then when China first began to practice multilateral diplomacy in the neighboring regions. China became a dialogue partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations （ASEAN） in 1991 and commenced the cooperation process； it participated in the ASEAN+1 cooperation and ASEAN+3 （China， Japan and South Korea） mechanism in 1997； it became a member of the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation （APEC） in 1991； and China， Russia， Kazakhstan， Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan established the Shanghai Five mechanism in 1996 and continued to deepen regional cooperation until the formal establishment of the SCO in 2001.

Establishment of the SCO and China’s contribution

At the turn of the century， China had made a series of advances in bilateral relations， and its role in regional and international platforms became increasingly valued. China began to take more active steps in maintaining regional peace and stability and promoting mutually beneficial cooperation among countries. At the same time， China championed its own positions on international affairs and hotspot issues and proposed its solutions to problems. During that period， the SCO developed into one of the most important regional cooperation platforms. On June 15， 2001， the SCO was inaugurated in Shanghai， China， embodying the first regional international organization named after a Chinese city and of which China was a founding member. Based on the practice of the Shanghai Five， Chinese leaders put forward the Shanghai Spirit featuring mutual trust， mutual benefit， equality， consultation， respect for diverse civilizations and pursuit of common development， which are the values and the spirit that guides the sustainable development of the organization.

Before the establishment of the SCO， China had participated in multilateral diplomatic activities at various levels including in the UN and other international organizations， but since China was usually not a founding member of these organizations or joined them only after long negotiations，1 it was consequently often marginalized or had too few substantial voices. In contrast， China has been playing a central role in the SCO and has formed a “dual engine” together with Russia for its further development. This is closely related to the fact that China and Russia declared a strategic partnership of coordination in 1996， and that China and Central Asian countries have enjoyed continuous good neighborly and friendly ties.

The establishment and subsequent development of the SCO has some particularities that distinguish it from other regional organizations. First， promoting cooperation is a top-down political decision at the summits of state leaders， and the resolutions made at these meetings have a significant impact on the development of the organization. The first meeting of the SCO heads of state was held in June 2001 in Shanghai， setting the tone for future multilateral cooperation. Second， it is built on the earlier cooperation format of the Shanghai Five， with the priority to maintain stability and security in Central Asia based on the “new security approach” stated by Chinese leaders on various international occasions. This approach was later summarized at the SCO Qingdao summit as a vision of common， comprehensive， cooperative and sustainable security for the world. Third， it is centered around a clear philosophy and the principle of multilateral cooperation. The new model for regional cooperation which was proposed by Chinese leaders is now widely recognized by SCO member states： admission of member states regardless of their size， security as a priority， and mutual benefit.2 Among the six founding members of the SCO， Russia and four Central Asian countries are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States（CIS）， the Eurasian Economic Community （EAEC）3 and the Collective Security Treaty Organization （CSTO）. The participation of China makes the SCO a new type of organization， unlike those traditional multilateral cooperation or collective security mechanisms.

Development of the SCO and China’s role

Over the past 20 years， the SCO has developed rapidly and made remarkable achievements， thanks to the role played by China. In light of the ever-changing international and regional situation， China has put forward well-directed cooperation proposals adapted to the region when promoting multilateral cooperation under the SCO framework. In the initial phase of the SCO， when the focus was to establish cooperation mechanisms and permanent institutions， China took the initiative to propose the main areas and the general direction of multilateral cooperation. In 2003， the second meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of Government was held in Beijing， at which the Program of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation was signed as the fundamental economic cooperation document of the organization. In January 2004， the SCO Secretariat was inaugurated in Beijing. In response to China’s initiative at the SCO’s fifth anniversary summit， the heads of state of the member states， at the Bishkek summit in 2007， signed the Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness， Friendship and Cooperation， a basic document regulating the SCO’s development and setting a number of principles for multilateral cooperation. At the same summit， the member states also signed cooperation agreements on the SCO Business Council and the Banking Consortium at China’s proposal.

As the SCO evolves， member states often face challenges caused by the changing international and regional situation， which they can only overcome by working together. China has offered help to its partners， especially to Central Asian countries. For example， in response to the negative impact of the 2008 international financial crisis， the heads of SCO member states signed a joint declaration， followed by the first meeting of finance ministers and SCO central bank governors and China’s provision of more than US$20 billion of concessional loans to other member states. The SCO Beijing summit in 2012 adopted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Medium-term Development Strategy， which summed up the first 10 years of the organization and set the planning and priorities of multilateral cooperation for the following 10 years. After Chinese President Xi Jinping first put forward the major initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt in Kazakhstan in 2013， China has been strengthening cooperation and exchanges with SCO member states under the Belt and Road Initiative （BRI） framework.

After the Qingdao summit in 2018， the SCO has entered a new phase of development， with eight member states and the participation of leaders of ten international organizations. In his speech at the 18th meeting of the Council of Heads of State， President Xi Jinping emphasized the need to carry forward the Shanghai Spirit in the new era， pursuing the vision of innovative， coordinated， green， open and shared development， common， comprehensive， cooperative and sustainable security， open， integrated， mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation， a civilization of equality， mutual learning， dialogue and tolerance， and a global governance based on extensive consultation， joint contribution and shared benefits to resolve the problems and meet the challenges of the times. He also put forward a series of new cooperation initiatives， including the building of an SCO community with a shared future.4

The Chinese characteristics of the SCO’s development

The SCO pursues a cooperation philosophy different from many other international organizations， much of which is derived from China’s diplomatic initiatives and closely related to China’s role in international and regional affairs. From the Shanghai Spirit and the new security approach during the founding phase of the organization to the renewed Shanghai Spirit in the new era since the Qingdao summit，5 and then on to the proposal of jointly building a community of common interests and shared future， China has put forward a series of important propositions for the development of the SCO. The significant impact of China within the SCO has been highly appreciated by other member states， observers and dialogue partners， as well as widely recognized by the international community.

Economically， Central Asian countries hope to use the SCO to expand mutually beneficial cooperation with China. In terms of security， the SCO plays a vital role in assisting Central Asian countries to combat terrorism and extremism， respond to political and social conflicts， and prevent external interventions. Dialogue partners， such as Turkey with its “Look East” strategy， also strengthen their cooperation with the SCO， hoping to expand trade and economic ties with China at the multilateral level.6 China’s neighboring countries such as Nepal and Cambodia have also become dialogue partners of the SCO to gain support from and enlarge economic cooperation with China.

In addition， China is proposing and readjusting specific goals of multilateral cooperation within the SCO framework in accordance with changes in the regional situation and the conditions of the member states， many of which are intended to overcome existing constraints.To give some examples： China proposed to establish the SCO Business Council and the Bank Consortium in response to insufficient direct business participation and lack of financing platforms； streamline priority cooperation areas and projects to address an excess of areas covered by the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Program of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation； build a China-SCO local economic and trade cooperation demonstration zone in the Chinese city of Qingdao， to tap the tremendous potential of local cooperation within the SCO framework； and set up an SCO agricultural hi-tech industrial demonstration zone in Yangling， Shaanxi Province. When the first SCO Program of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation was about to expire， China proposed a renewed program， which was adopted by the 18th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of Government （Prime Ministers） in November 2019 and became a guideline document for SCO regional economic cooperation from 2020 to 2035.

Main characteristics of China’s SCO diplomacy

China’s diplomacy within the SCO has become a significant element of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics and plays a pioneering role in four aspects.

First， it is a kind of preventive diplomacy to get prepapred for emergencies through multilateral cooperation. In view of the complex situation in the region and inside member states， emergencies can cause political， security or social crises in some of the member states as well as in the entire region. Long existing regional hotspots， especially in Afghanistan， and intensified geopolitical competition between major powers can negatively affect peace and stability in the region. The SCO needs to make preventive cooperation plans for different scenarios.

Second， it is a kind of expandable and functional diplomacy based on multilateral platforms. Central Asia is a region of specific geopolitical significance， where tensions and conflicts exist not only between Central Asian countries， but also between regional countries and Russia. As this can impair the effectiveness of SCO resolutions， it is helpful to bring in other mini-multilateral mechanisms and supporting platforms which are open to countries from outside the organization， such as the ChinaMongolia-Russia and the China-Russia-India trilateral mechanisms， to enhance decision-making efficiency and the influence of the SCO. The functional nature of SCO cooperation does not require participation of all member states， nor does it exclude countries beyond the region. Therefore， consensus-based collaboration guarantees satisfactory results， as participants work together in partnership rather than in a traditional alliance.

Third， it explores comprehensive cooperation that integrates economy and security. In the real world， economic and security issues cannot be completely separated from each other. Food， energy， and financial security are concerns of China， Russia， and all Central Asian countries， and they may well become the priorities of SCO multilateral cooperation at this stage.

Fourth， it gives full play to the dual driving force of guiding concepts and binding regulation. The participation of India and Pakistan after the SCO’s first expansion has brought many new challenges. As domestic and foreign policies of the member states now appear to be even more diverse and their options for regional cooperation more numerous， the decisionmaking process has lost much of its efficiency. Under this circumstance， the SCO needs to develop rules-based measures to guarantee its normal functions. China has always attached great importance to advancing creative ideas for improved cooperation within the multilateral framework， while making efforts to build a stronger institution.

The SCO’s Strategic Orientation in a Multilateral Cooperation Perspective

Great changes have taken place in the international landscape after the end of the Cold War. In an increasingly globalized world， multilateral and regional cooperation has become a new international trend with the emergence of various multilateral mechanisms， frameworks and platforms. It is against this background that the SCO was established to meet the needs of countries in the region for multilateral cooperation， as well as to address urgent regional economic and environmental issues. President Xi Jinping has pointed out that “the SCO stands as a comprehensive regional cooperation organization that covers the largest area and population in the world. [...] The SCO has [...] extensive cooperation linkages with the United Nations and other international and regional organizations. With its ever rising international influence， the SCO has become an important force for promoting global peace and development and upholding international justice and fairness.”7 After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic， a virtual meeting of SCO foreign ministers was held in May 2020， where all parties expressed their common position against the politicization of the virus and condemned the unilateral sanctions by individual countries.8 In November 2020， at the 20th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State and the 19th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of Government （Prime Ministers） held online， all member states highlighted the need to strengthen cooperation in the fight against the pandemic， and uphold multilateralism for maintaining regional security， stability and sustainable development.

Major achievements of SCO multilateral cooperation

The SCO is constantly striving for comprehensive multilateral cooperation， setting cooperation goals in all areas， and playing a unique role as a new type of regional cooperation mechanism.

In terms of structure， the SCO has established a few dozen mechanisms for exchanges and consultations covering many fields on several levels， including meetings of heads of state， prime ministers， ministers， presidents of supreme courts and general prosecutors， in addition to two permanent facilities， which are the SCO secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent .

In terms of security cooperation， the major tasks of the SCO at this stage include fighting against the “three evil forces” of terrorism， separatism and extremism as well as transnational crimes such as drug trafficking， exchange of intelligence information， and joint military exercises. In addition， the SCO focuses on building emergency response mechanisms to meet new challenges such as cybersecurity and food security.

In terms of economic cooperation， the SCO has set goals to enhance trade and investment facilitation by implementing its program of multilateral trade and economic cooperation， which focuses on enhanced cooperation in the fields of transport， energy， finance， customs， agriculture and border areas development. It encourages the integration of multilateral and bilateral cooperation mechanisms and facilitates bilateral trade and economic cooperation between member states.

In terms of political cooperation， the SCO has taken a number of important measures including issuing political statements and advancing legal construction， mutual support in international affairs and domestic policies， participating in the peace process in Afghanistan， expressing common positions on issues such as UN reform and arms control， facilitating political crisis settlement in Kyrgyzstan， and deploying observers to general elections in member states.

As for people-to-people exchanges， the SCO has established the most wide-ranging meeting mechanisms in this field and carried out various activities， including the creation of a ministerial meeting mechanism for educational cooperation， the founding of SCO universities， youth and think tank exchanges， as well as the continuously expanding exchanges and cooperation in culture， health， disaster prevention， science and technology， tourism， sports and media.

With regard to international relations， the SCO upholds the principle of an open cooperation architecture. It became an observer to the UN General Assembly in 2004， and has signed cooperation documents with the CIS， the EAEC/EAEU， the CSTO and ASEAN. It has also established cooperative relations with the European Union（EU）， the International Monetary Fund （IMF）， the Asian Development Bank （ADB） and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank （AIIB）. There are overlaps between major member states of the SCO， the BRICS and the Asian Conference on Interaction and Confidence Measures in Asia （CICA）， which enables closer ties between these mechanisms. In November 2016， the 71st session of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the cooperation with the SCO， through which the SCO and UN agencies have established appropriate direct contacts.9

Alignment with China’s regional interests and strategic outlook

The SCO is an important platform and tool for China to engage in strategic interactions with neighboring countries， through which China’s multilateral cooperation can fully incorporate its foreign policy principles of building good and friendly relations with its neighbors. China has long been faced with a complex environment along its borders. Since the beginning of reform and opening-up， most of China’s border disputes have been resolved， which led to a continuous improvement of relations with the regions bordering China. However， opinions and forces hostile to China are still persistent in some neighboring countries， and historical disputes between China and some of its neighbors have not yet been fully resolved. Since neighboring countries are especially important to China， and China’s domestic development requires a stable external environment beyond its borders， China has been attaching particular importance to developing robust relations with its neighboring countries. Therefore， China always pursues friendship and partnership with its neighbors， and seeks to bring amity， security and common prosperity to its neighborhood by practicing the principles of sincerity， mutual benefit and inclusiveness. From bilateral relations to regional cooperation， China has been deepening its policy for good and friendly neighborhood. China is constantly consolidating the political and economic foundation of friendship and partnership with its neighbors， upgrading the level of bilateral cooperation， and is taking active measures to promote and participate in multilateral regional cooperation. Being one of the founding members of the SCO and a member of the ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3 mechanisms， China embraces and opens up to the world， igniting the enthusiasm of the countries of both regions to participate in multilateral cooperation. Through regional cooperation， China and many of its neighbors have ushered in an era of rapid economic development.

As China seeks to promote further multilateral cooperation within the framework of the SCO， it must also take into account the reality of some countries’ relatively weak economic power and the large disparities in development between some member states. China has offered preferential loans and investment to Central Asian countries and Pakistan， and has expanded trade with Russia and India to enhance the unity and influence of the SCO， which reflects the principle of upholding justice while pursuing shared interests underscored by Chinese leaders.

At the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs on June 22， 2018， President Xi Jinping pointed out： “In conducting work relating to foreign affairs， we must keep in mind both internal and international imperatives， maintain strategic confidence and resolve， push forward innovation in diplomatic theory and practice， promote strategic planning， advance diplomatic agenda globally， safeguard China’s core and major interests， uphold win-win cooperation and justice while pursuing shared interests， think about worst-case scenarios and raise our risk awareness. [...] To grasp the international situation， we must establish a correct view of history， the overall situation， and China’s role.”10 To establish a correct view on history， the overall situation and China’s role， it is necessary to summarize the laws of history， grasp the general trend of progress； have a precise knowledge of the essence of things and a clear overview of the general situation to stay on the right track and move forward in the right direction； and understand China’s status and role in the changing world. To promote the development of the SCO is to identify more common and converging interests with other member states based on the regional situation and China’s strategic interests， and to define China’s position and role in multilateral cooperation.

A major multilateral Belt and Road cooperation platform

The BRI is the most important public good that China offers to the world. Most of the SCO member states and observers are active participants in the BRI cooperation. The six Belt and Road economic corridors cover almost all the member states and observer countries of the SCO， bringing great common development opportunities for the region. To further deepen and substantiate the cooperation under the BRI， China has established unparalleled international platforms， on which SCO member states are active participants， whether it is at the two Belt and Road Forums for International Cooperation， or in similar multilateral exchange activities with the aim to strengthen policy， infrastructure， trade， financial and people-to-people connectivity. It should be kept in mind that while BRI cooperation has achieved many positive results in the region， it is also facing mounting pressure， caused by looming geopolitical hotspots and the unjustified allegation of “debt trap” and the “China threat.” In addition， there is a deep divide， even hostility， between some member states. Active measures should be taken to resolve tensions and create conditions for greater regional cooperation.

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic， the world situation has been undergoing severe changes， and the process of globalization and regionalization has met major difficulties. Nevertheless， as far as the SCO is concerned， the internal and external environment in the region is relatively favorable. Most member states and observers are willing and able to work together within the SCO framework. In the face of transformation and reshaping of the global order as a result of the prolonged pandemic， it is becoming increasingly important and urgent to build a global network of partnerships and a community with a shared future for mankind， as advocated by China. As President Xi Jinping pointed out， “Since its launch in the autumn of 2013， the BRI has received warm responses from more and more countries. It provides an avenue for China to participate in open global cooperation. It offers China’s approach to improving global economic governance and promoting global prosperity and common development. It is a pathway to building a global community of shared future.”11 The BRI and the SCO share the same philosophy and a similar path for development， and they support and benefit each other in practice， offering useful experience in exploring new models for regional cooperation and building a new type of international relations centered on win-win cooperation.12

It will be a long and arduous process for the BRI to deliver long-term results of multilateral cooperation across a broader geographical space， and with equally positive outcomes for every region. Russia， Kazakhstan， Uzbekistan， Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia， Pakistan in South Asia， Iran in West Asia， and Belarus in Eastern Europe are not only member states or observers of the SCO， but also important driving forces for the advancement of Belt and Road cooperation in Eurasia. The cooperation and development models of the Belt and Road Initiative and the SCO both respect the cultural diversity of nations， explore areas where national interests converge， and give full play to the advantages of each country. They can interact with each other in the region in a friendly manner and create favorable conditions for greater economic integration and openness. The SCO can serve not only as an important platform for the alignment of national strategies under the Belt and Road cooperation framework， but also as a backing and guarantee for BRI multilateral cooperation.

Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics and the Prospects of the SCO

The activities of the SCO have driven the development and success of China’s multilateral diplomacy. As the coronavirus spread around the globe in 2020， the United States repeatedly crossed the red line， stigmatizing and putting the blame on China. The international landscape and relations between major powers will undergo further dramatic adjustments in the post-pandemic era， so that China will face an increasingly complicated external environment with unprecedented challenges. The SCO will play an even more relevant role in China’s diplomacy.

Multilateral cooperation in major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics

As China’s national strength and influence constantly rises in recent years， its general diplomatic layout has also changed significantly， giving more weight to global and regional governance. Through its practice of multilateral exchanges， China conveys its diplomatic philosophy， portrays its image as a major country， facilitates its opening-up in full scale， promotes sound development of the international order， and reforms the multilateral trading system. Major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics firmly upholds multilateralism and opposes any form of unilateralism， Cold War mentality and hegemonic politics. It advocates that multilateral frameworks need to play a substantial role in international affairs， by relying on global and regional organizations or mechanisms such as the UN， the Group of Twenty （G20）， the APEC as well as the SCO， the BRICS and the AIIB， of which China is one of the major founding members. Since China has made great progress in building a community with a shared future at multiple levels， and has also received much appreciation from the international community， it is now in an improved position to promote world peace， development， fairness and justice， and advance the reform of the global governance system.

China is committed， through multilateral diplomacy， to make the voice of developing countries heard in global institutions and forums， bring about changes to the situation where very few major powers have a monopoly on decision-making and discourse in important international organizations. China’s specific contributions to multilateralism include advocating South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue to narrow development gaps， maintaining the authority of the UN and the United Nations Charter， and preventing any interference in the internal affairs of other countries by bypassing the United Nations Security Council. China has also been respecting and maintaining the binding nature of multilateral treaties and agreements， and calling for multilateral cooperation to meet non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism， cybersecurity， climate change， and infectious diseases. China fully participates in global governance， supports the reform of the UN Security Council， and commits itself to a global governance based on extensive consultation， joint contributions and shared benefits. To shape a just and equitable new international order and global governance system， China has expressed its views and offered its proposals at various multilateral summits and forums. The “China pivot” and “China pillar” are now emerging in multilateral diplomacy.13

Since the establishment of the SCO， China’s foreign policy has undergone significant adjustments and changes， with a clearer overall diplomatic approach where major powers are considered as key players， neighboring countries as priorities， developing countries as the foundation， and multilateral mechanisms as important platforms. In recent years， the role of multilateral platforms has become more prominent， and has effectively supported China’s diplomacy towards major countries， neighboring countries and developing countries. China’s further integration into the international community has been accompanied by greater confidence in putting forward cooperation initiatives.14 Now， China is deeply and comprehensively involved in many multilateral platforms， such as the SCO， the Boao Forum for Asia， the East Asia Summit， ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3， the China-EU summit， the China-Central and Eastern European Countries （CEEC） cooperation and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation （FOCAC） summit. Today， China’s multilateral diplomacy is all-encompassing， multi-layered， and covers a wide range of fields. With these new characteristics， it has not only greatly improved and enhanced China’s international status and influence， but also directly promoted the all-round development of domestic economic and social undertakings.

Through multilateral diplomacy， China has become a responsible and constructive major country in the international community， promoting practical cross-border and trans-regional cooperation in the areas of security， development， aid， environment and climate change， pandemic prevention， disaster relief， and combating transnational crime. In the 21st century， China has successfully carried out multilateral activities in various forms and of different types， enhancing the voice of emerging economies and developing countries in the global governance system， thus providing new momentum for an open world economy. Driven by China， the SCO has become more capable of setting examples and demonstrating ways forward in the aforementioned areas. This has drawn extensive attention and praise from the international community， whether in the extensiveness of pragmatic cooperation， as reflected in the fruitful outcomes of the Qingdao summit and the Zhengzhou meeting of heads of government， or in the cooperation with the UN and other international organizations， including international financial institutions.

The SCO’s special significance to China’s multilateral diplomacy

China’s participation in the SCO signifies major changes in its foreign policy and a shift of its role to a leader in multilateral cooperation and a practitioner of multilateralism. The SCO has a unique geostrategic value for China， because it addresses not only a wide range of its security concerns， but also its long-term economic interests. SCO member states are close neighbors of China， and development in these countries helps to create a good neighborly environment for China and promote friendship and cooperation.

The establishment of the SCO has accelerated negotiations on border issues between China， Russia and Central Asian countries. By creating the SCO as a model for resolving bilateral issues and building a new type of friendly relations between countries within a multilateral framework， China’s overall bilateral relations with these countries have greatly improved. The development of the SCO has continuously enriched China’s multilateral diplomacy in economic cooperation， people-topeople exchange and other fields， and has effectively promoted trade and investment facilitation， as well as mutual exchange and dialogue among civilizations. Meanwhile， major multilateral activities within the SCO framework have provided new ideas for head-of-state diplomacy and international events hosted by China.

In the past 20 years， China has hosted four meetings of the SCO Council of Heads of State， three meetings of heads of government， dozens of ministerial meetings， as well as various forums， art festivals and cultural exhibitions. Hosting international events allows China to take the initiative in agenda-setting， shape the SCO’s development， expand cooperation areas， upgrade forms of cooperation， and promote exchanges in various fields， levels and localities， all of which is enhancing a first-hand understanding of China by other member states and the international community as a whole. Leaders from China and other SCO member states have also established firm personal friendships through close exchanges. Whether it be relations with major powers， neighboring countries， developing countries， or multilateral events， the major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics continues to gain new ground， which is closely related to the strategic guidance and solid advancement of summit diplomacy and high-profile diplomatic events at home.15

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has altered global and regional economic and security patterns， causing a dramatic shift in major-country relations and severely impacting regional organizations and multilateral cooperation mechanisms. In the future， the SCO will play new geopolitical and economic functions. There is a call for an innovative philosophy and vision of cooperation both for diplomatic ventures with Chinese characteristics and for a more stable and mature stage of development of the SCO. Some American scholars argue that largely due to pressure by Western countries the Sino-Russian partnership has become closer than ever， and that the two countries are able to mediate conflicts and maintain regional stability through the SCO.16 Under this circumstance， there are several points to be noted for China to promote cooperation within the SCO framework. First， China needs to well handle the SCO’s internal and external relations， enlarge its geographical space for cooperation， promote teaming-up instead of ganging-up and dialogue instead of confrontation， and prevent any interference directed against third parties. Second， China needs to look for new breakthroughs in key areas and growth points for multilateral cooperation. Third， China must firmly defend multilateralism， uphold the principle of open cooperation， and support the UN playing a central role in international multilateral affairs. Finally， China needs to galvanize greater international consensus for building a community with a shared future for mankind， and support the institution-building of platforms including the SCO to develop a more equitable and effective global governance system.17

Difficulties and challenges for SCO multilateral cooperation

When the SCO was founded， there were huge economic and military disparities among member states， and the reconstruction of their interstate relations had only recently begun. It took only a little more than 10 years for the SCO and its member states to achieve a “great leap forward”from normalization of state-to-state relations to friendly and goodneighborly cooperation， from restoration of economic and trade ties to the promotion of regional cooperation， and from ending mutual hostility to all-round security cooperation. Despite the successful launch of various dialogue mechanisms and permanent institutions， there are still border issues to be settled between some member states， cross-border transport to be connected， historical resentment to be overcome， and conflicts of interest to be solved. Under such circumstances， any regional organization planning for future integration must to some extent expect some mismatch between development goals and reality， as well as unexpected difficulties and obstacles.

First， the foundation on which the interests for multilateral cooperation rest is still weak. There are obstacles to trade and economic cooperation and to people-to-people exchanges between SCO member states， and historical border issues between Central Asian states， between China and India， and between India and Pakistan have a negative impact on cooperation at various levels.

Second， there are some divergences concerning China and Russia when it comes to the goals of regional cooperation. Although China and Russia are known as the “dual engine” for SCO development， each has its own priorities in choosing regional cooperation paths and development goals and may even compete with each other in Central Asia. Some Russian scholars even argue that large-scale Chinese investment would undermine Russia’s monopoly on transportation， energy and resources in the region.18 Russia also has concerns about the SCO’s multilateral economic cooperation， worrying that it may negatively affect the cooperation process of the EAEU under its leadership.

Third， there are external disturbing factors. The SCO member states cover three quarters of the territories of Eurasia. China， Russia， India and other major countries are internationally influential and at the same time are likely to be influenced by various external factors. As a multilateral mechanism， the development of the SCO is to a large extent subject to changes in the regional environment. Any geopolitical infiltration from outside forces will affect the unity of the SCO.

Fourth， development priorities and goals at different levels are not always very clear in general. The expansion of SCO membership blurs its geographical boundaries and makes it more difficult to define its functions. As its geographical area expands and member states diversify， it becomes a pressing task to determine cooperation goals that can be accepted by all member states.

Fifth， the working mechanism needs to be improved. Although many discussion platforms were initiated by the SCO， only few working mechanisms exist. Permanent institutions are often under-funded and under-staffed， preventing them to do efficient coordination and organization. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic， many countries have encountered difficulties in social development， while transnational crime such as terrorism and drug trafficking have escalated.19 Short of adequate means and tools， the SCO is not capable of acting swiftly enough to deal with emergencies and major crises.

Future development of the SCO a test for China’s wisdom

In recent years， China has made renewed contributions to international and regional peace by exploring solutions with Chinese characteristics to global problems. By hosting a series of multilateral events on its soil， China has forged vital exchanges between people and has conveyed a positive image of itself. A particularly relevant example was the SCO summit in China in 2018， during which more than 400 events were organized. In the near future， the SCO will be entering a critical phase， characterized by unpredictable problems and difficult challenges. To be specific， there are three factors determining whether the SCO can achieve its cooperation goals.

First， it depends on how the SCO is handling the complex and changing security situation in the region and beyond. Turbulences in the surrounding regions and development gaps between member states have led to tremendous pressure on domestic stability， with the most prominent security threats coming from regional hotspots， extremism and transnational crime. Security cooperation has always been the top priority of the organization. As one of the core issues， the security situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate after the US military withdrawal. Although their organization was overthrown， the extremist “Islamic State”still has its influence given the fact that a few thousand people from Central Asia had joined in the jihad. If they returned to Central Asia from West Asia， they would pose high security risks to the region. Increasing social disparity and extremism in Central Asia are equally worrisome， particularly if the threat of international terrorism continues to grow against the backdrop of the pandemic.

Second， it depends on whether the SCO will help bring about a steady political and economic transformation in Central Asian states and prevent new crises. After the enlargement of the SCO， Central Asia continues to be the core of multilateral cooperation， because on the one hand the current functions of the SCO are not able to fully cover South Asia， and on the other hand the Central Asian countries， which account for half of the SCO member states， do not want to be marginalized. In recent years， the political， security， and economic situation in Central Asia has generally remained stable and has improved in various ways， in spite of some local turbulences. For example， in October 2020， during the parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan， changes in the political situation led to the resignation of President Sooronbay Jeenbekov and subsequent regime change. In Kazakhstan， after the resignation of the first president Nursultan Nazarbayev， the country entered a phase of power transition. In Uzbekistan， the new president Shavkat Mirziyoyev met strong opposition in implementing his new policies. Governments in Central Asian countries have launched medium- to long-term social and economic development strategies and are seeking international assistance to create more opportunities for multilateral cooperation. The SCO needs to offer assistance for sub-regional cooperation among these countries.

Finally， it depends on how the SCO will play a leading role in an ever changing geopolitical and economic environment. New trends have emerged in the form of geopolitical and geoeconomic competition between major powers in the SCO region. Many countries in the region have welcomed China’s BRI and are participating in cooperation projects， as most of them have also signed agreements with China to align their national strategies with the BRI. At the launch of the Greater Eurasian Partnership， some Russian scholars have argued that in an intensifying China-US rivalry Russia must not “tie itself up” with China， but rather become the “guardian” of a new Non-Aligned Movement.20 India and Japan are also strengthening cooperation with Central Asian countries to offset China’s influence. The United States， despite pulling out its troops from Afghanistan， still attempts to influence its peace process， using it as a pawn on the geopolitical chessboard. As the confrontation between the West and Russia continues， the Ukraine crisis still lingers， and Belarus has been thrown into uncertainty again after the presidential election in August 2020， which may well escalate into a new regional hotspot. All this has a direct impact on the process of SCO multilateral cooperation.

The SCO’s activities are an efficiency test for China’s philosophy and practice of its multilateral diplomacy. The new situation demands that multilateral mechanisms and platforms are put in place to coordinate internal and international factors and balance development and security imperatives. Given the importance of multilateral diplomacy， President Xi Jinping attended four important multilateral online conferences and one international forum between November 10 to 22， 2020， including the 20th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State， at which he proposed building a community of health， a community of security， a community of development， and a community of cultural exchanges for all. He emphasized in his remarks that “history has proven and will continue to prove that good-neighborliness will prevail over a beggar-thy-neighbor approach， mutually beneficial cooperation will replace zero-sum game， and multilateralism will win over unilateralism.”21 As the SCO enters into a more pluralistic development phase， it becomes all the more important to recognize and respect differences between member states and to build on this basis a stronger consensus for cooperation.

Conclusion

The SCO is a multilateral cooperation mechanism founded and developed in the new international environment after the Cold War. The organization has great significance to China’s multilateral diplomacy in the new era and plays a unique role in international and regional governance. In the past 20 years， the SCO has actively explored a new type of international relations and new models of regional cooperation with distinctive characteristics. First， it has established a new vision for cooperation to overcome the old zero-sum mentality； second， it is an all-round multilateral cooperation platform， giving equal importance to security， political， economic and people-to-people cooperation； third， it upholds the principle of equality， mutual benefit， openness and cooperation， emphasizing cooperation on the basis of partnership instead of mere alliance； fourth， it has adopted a topdown decision-making mechanism， in which political resolutions from leaders’ summits and high-level consultations play a decisive role in the development of the organization； and fifth， it respects the authority of the UN and the norms of international law to promote and defend democracy in international relations.

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic is both a public health crisis and a major non-traditional security challenge. The pandemic poses a real threat to the economic development and social stability of SCO member states， and it also exerts a negative impact on multilateral cooperation. The rise of unilateralism， trade protectionism， racism and xenophobia in the post-pandemic era will continue to disturb the process of multilateral cooperation. In regional organizations such as the SCO， China needs to take more active steps to deepen pragmatic cooperation， give full play to the leading role of rules and systems， and strive to make more breakthroughs in key areas.

Multilateral diplomacy is of utmost importance for China to participate more efficiently in global and regional governance， to shape the international landscape， and to deepen and expand its international cooperation. By participating in and helping develop multilateral cooperation platforms， and by spearheading the role of the SCO， China will help enhance its international influence. This is also the inevitable course for China to handle major crises and challenges in the future.

1 To give an example， it took 15 years for China to be a member of the World Trade Organization.

2 Jiang Zemin， “Deepening Unity and Cooperation to Create a Beautiful Century： Speech at the Inaugural Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization，” People’s Daily， June 26， 2001.

3 The Eurasian Economic Community was replaced by the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015. The current members of Eurasian Economic Union are Russia， Kazakhstan， Kyrgyzstan， Belarus and Armenia， and the observers Moldova， Uzbekistan and Cuba.

4 Xi Jinping， “Forward the Shanghai Spirit to Build a Community with a Shared Future -- Speech at the 18th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization，” People’s Daily， June 11， 2018.

5 The renewed Shanghai Spirit can be generalized as the new “five visions” on development， security， cooperation， civilization and global governance.

6 Zhang Bo， “A Study on the Relationship between Turkey and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization，”Arabic World Studies， No.6， 2014， p.71.

7 Xi Jinping， “Carrying Forward the Shanghai Spirit to Build a Community with a Shared Future： Remarks at the Eighteenth Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”， People’s Daily， June 11， 2018.

8 “Главы МИД стран ШОС подтвердил инеприятие односторонних санкций，” https：// iz.ru/1010586/2020-05-13/glavy-mid-stran-shos-podtverdili-nepriiatie-odnostoronnikh-sanktcii.

9 Rashid Alimov， The Establishment， Development and Prospects of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization （Chinese edition）， translated by Wang Xianju et al.， People’s Publishing House， 2018， p.9.

10 Xi Jinping： The Governance of China， Vol.III， Foreign Languages Publishing House， 2020， pp.426-427.

11 Xi Jinping， “Speech at the Meeting of the 5th Anniversary for the Promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative，” People’s Daily， August 28， 2018.

12 Sun Zhuangzhi， “The Belt and Road Initiative and the SCO Interactive Development，” Qiushi Theory， No.8， 2017， pp.44-46.

13 Liu Xinghua， “Building China’s International Relation Pattern in the New Era with Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics，” Hongqi Wengao， No.24， 2019， pp.35-36.

14 Qi Pengfei， “The Evolution and and Basic Experience of Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics in the 40 Years of Reform and Opening-up，” Xuehai， No.1， 2019， pp.10 & 12.

15 Ruan Zongze， “Thorough Grasp of Theoretical and Practical Significance of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy，” China International Studies， No.2， 2020， p.18.

16 Nikolas K. Gvosdev， “Russia and US National Interests： Maintaining a Balance of Power in Europe and Asia，” https：//russiamatters.org/analysis/russia-and-us-national-interests-maintaining-balance-powereurope-andasia.

17 Wang Yi， “Braving Waves and Sailing Forward with Resolve，” China International Studies， No.1， 2020， p.26.

18？Лузянин？С.Г.，Россия—Китай？формирование？обновленного？мцра，Москва：Издательство？Весь？Мир，？2018，？C.165.

19？Станислав？Васильевич？Зась，“Террориз？муможно？противостоять？только？сообща，”https：//nvo.ng.ru/ realty/2020-06-05/1_1095_terrorism.htm.

20？Сергей？Караганов，“Будущее？большого？треугольника，”https：//globalaffairs.ru/articles/budushhee？ bolshogo-treugolnika/.

21 Xi Jinping， “Carrying Forward the Shanghai Spirit and Deepening Solidarity and Collaboration

for a Stronger Community with a Shared Future： Remarks at the 20th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization，” People’s Daily， November 11， 2020.