Climate Change Policies of the EU and the US:Divergences and Cooperation Prospects

Dong Yifan & Sun Chenghao

With rising non-traditional security challenges posed by climate change， the world has gradually realized that climate change is real and brings multiple threats and challenges. Global climate governance is increasingly important in international affairs and has drawn more attention and even competition for interests among major powers. In terms of their strength and international responsibility， the climate policies of the United States and the European Union and how they interact have a significant impact on the trend of global climate governance. Since taking office， US President Joe Biden has rectified his predecessor’s climate policy by promoting a “Green New Deal” and investing more in energy transition at home， while actively advancing climate diplomacy and rebuilding US leadership worldwide. Correspondingly， there might be new changes to USEU interaction in the area of climate change. The analysis of climate change policies of the EU and the US is essential not only for understanding the trend of global climate governance， but also for managing China’s climate cooperation with the two sides and the broader trilateral relations.

Major Differences in EU and US Climate Change Policies

Since climate change was put on the international political agenda in the 1980s， the US and the EU， as major powers and developed economies，were the first international actors to focus on and engage in global climate governance. They have played an essential role in climate governance and cooperated in the conclusion of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change （UNFCCC）， the Kyoto Protocol， the Paris Agreement， and other significant frameworks on climate change. The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in June 2017， as the most severe shock to global climate governance in recent years， marked an unprecedented divergence in US and EU climate change policies. In fact， the transatlantic split has long existed in the following three aspects.

Differences in basis， preferences and rules for global climate governance

In advancing climate governance， the EU emphasizes tangible goals and means based on scientific analysis of climate change， i.e.， the actual effects of cutting emissions on climate change. The EU has long put scientific reports by institutions such as the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as the basis for its claims on global climate and emissions reduction. The goal of the Paris Agreement—limiting global warming to well below 2， preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius， compared to pre-industrial levels—affirms that the EU’s climate goals are science-based.

Also， climate change is widely recognized as a significant threat on the popular and societal level among EU countries. According to the 2019 Eurobarometer survey， 91 percent and 83 percent of the public agree that“climate change is a serious problem in the EU” and “European legislation is necessary to protect the environment，” respectively. The survey also shows that 78 percent of the public agree that “environmental issues have a direct effect on their daily life and health.”1 With rising pressure from the public and non-governmental organizations， it has become politically correct in Europe to step up response to climate change. For example， the supreme courts of Germany and the Netherlands have both ruled that the climate targets set by their governments are inadequate.

However， there has never been a consensus in the US political circle or society on the scientific basis of climate change. A 2019 YouGov survey shows that 15 percent of the US public are skeptical of climate change， the world’s highest percentage， and among Republicans the figure is even as high as 30 percent.2 This perception has influenced the US government’s position in international climate negotiations. Republican administrations have publicly questioned the scientific validity of climate change and opposed the US shouldering any obligations to address climate change.

In terms of preferences on the framework of global climate governance， the US， in anticipation of the constraints on its interests by the agreements under the UN framework， has been setting up alternative multilateral mechanisms led by itself to hedge the influence of the UN framework. During both Bush and Obama administrations， the US built mechanisms where major economies can cooperate on clean energy. On the contrary， the EU has consistently upheld the UNFCCC as the main framework for global climate governance. A primary objective of EU bilateral and multilateral climate diplomacy is to gain the support of other countries for the UN framework.

As for the rules of climate governance， the EU stresses that international agreements should be legally binding， with clear timetables and a topdown governance model. The responsibility for cutting emissions should be determined in accordance with each country’s share of global emissions， and rules for measurement， reporting， verification， and accounting should also be put in place. In essence， the EU values clear mandate and rules for emissions reduction. The US， on the other hand， has a general aversion to any limit of its hegemony. It believes in the primacy of national sovereignty over the rules of climate governance， and advocates voluntary climate commitments for each country as part of the joint contribution to tackling climate change. For the US， climate change governance should rely more on market rules and collective actions rather than “force” countries to set targets based on scientific findings and common goals. At the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference， the US disagreed with the EU on setting targets for an effective control of climate change as a global consensus that require countries to take on binding targets of emissions reduction. The EU’s request that countries cut more emissions based on their existing commitments to make the global common goal on climate change was also opposed by the US. In the end， the US pushed for the Copenhagen Accord， which was only “taken note of” but not recognized by the Conference.3 The Copenhagen Accord only includes principles on emissions reduction， means of climate governance， and funding and technical assistance to developing countries， meaning that the EU-led model and a binding “post-Kyoto system” failed to come through. In fact， the Paris Agreement was only made possible after the EU’s acceptance of voluntary climate commitments advocated by the United States and other countries.

Gap between goals and implementation of climate change policies

In terms of target setting， the EU has been striving to be the leader in the field of climate change since the Kyoto Protocol. It has not only focused on translating its climate commitments into energy policies and emissions reduction responsibilities for each member state， but has also set ambitious targets for itself as an example for other countries. The EU proposed the 20-20-20 targets4 before the Copenhagen Conference in 2009 and the 2030 climate targets5 before the Paris Conference in 2015， and set out its vision for a climate-neutral EU in November 2018.

On the other hand， the US has been passive in leading climate governance and refused to take the lead in cutting emissions or setting targets that go beyond its development trajectory. The US has also linked emissions reduction responsibilities of developing countries to its target setting. Under the Clinton administration， the US Senate passed the ByrdHagel Resolution， which opposed the US signing any legal instrument that mandates new commitments to limit or reduce emissions only for developed countries， thus effectively blocking the US from implementing the Kyoto Protocol. Under the George W. Bush administration， the US even withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. Under Barack Obama， the US target of emissions reduction proposed before the Copenhagen Conference was a 4 percent reduction in emissions by 2020 compared to 1990， but in 2010， the US pledged in the Cancun Agreement to reduce emissions by 17 percent in 2020 compared to 2005， which was only a 1.6 percent reduction compared to 1990. Before the 2015 Paris Climate Conference， the US commitment to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 was also much less ambitious than the EU’s. Moreover， the US has insisted on the year 2005 as the baseline for its climate targets instead of 1990， as advocated by the EU， to ensure that its carbon emissions from 1990 to 2005 were free of constraints.6

In terms of policy implementation， the EU has been fulfilling its climate commitments through legislation and regulations. It has formulated and constantly improved its directives on renewable energy， energy efficiency， the emissions trading system （ETS）， electricity market， and the transportation sector. To achieve its climate targets， the EU has taken the initiative to build the world’s first emissions trading market by economic means. In addition， the European Commission has paid attention to urging its member states to continuously develop and upgrade their climate legislation in line with the EU’s overall targets for the effective implementation of region-wide climate commitments. Historically， the EU has fulfilled its reduction promises in the Kyoto Protocol and the 20-20-20 targets ahead of schedule.

On the contrary， the US has failed to meet its goals. The Clinton and Obama administrations could only sign global climate agreements in the president’s name， which made it difficult for ratification through domestic legislative procedures. In addition， US climate policies have often regressed due to changes in government. For example， the Bush and Trump administrations tore up the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement respectively， and overturned their predecessors’ progressive climate and energy policies. Under Obama， the US developed a series of plans on clean power， the low-carbon transformation of the energy system， and renewable energy to translate climate goals into specific policies. These plans， however， have not been well implemented due to constraints from interest groups in the energy industry and partisan battles in the Congress， and in the end， they were repealed by Trump. Such policy turns in the US have led to almost zero implementation of its advertised climate goals.

Discrepancy in climate aids to developing countries

The EU proposed before the 2009 Copenhagen Conference that developed countries provide €100 billion in aid to developing countries each year until 2020， and offered to contribute €15 billion per year.7 Since then， EU leaders have continuously called for financial support to developing countries. The EU （including the UK） and the European Investment Bank are together the biggest contributor of public climate finance to developing countries， contributing 27 percent of total finance from developed countries in 2017 and providing €23.2 billion in 2019， an increase of 6.9 percent yearon-year.8

By contrast， the US has long promoted climate financing in developing countries through the financial market to mitigate its responsibility for official assistance as a developed country. As a result， the US government has provided limited climate aids to developing countries， with only US$7.5 billion from 2010-2012 （of which only $4.7 billion in official US government aid）.9 From 2013-2017， the US public climate finance averaged merely $2.8 billion annually. The Obama administration pledged $3 billion to the Green Climate Fund in 2015， but only $1 billion was committed before the Trump administration called it off.10

The EU and the US also hold different opinions on the responsibilities of developing countries， although they both intend to deconstruct the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” in the UNFCCC and transfer their obligations to developing countries， especially emerging countries in rapid industrialization. While playing an exemplary role by upgrading its climate commitments， the EU has also pushed for more contributions from developing countries through development assistance， partnerships， free trade arrangements， and climate diplomacy. Comparatively， the US has long linked the contributions from developing countries to its commitments of emissions reduction. The Clinton administration refused to deliver on its climate commitments because of a lack of emissions reduction plans from developing countries. Trump， once calling climate change a hoax“creating by and for the Chinese in order to make US manufacturing noncompetitive” in 2012，11 even pulled out of the Paris Agreement soon after taking office.

Direction of Biden’s Climate Policy

Disagreement and gamesmanship are part of the norm between US and EU climate policies. Still， Trump’s unprecedented retreats on climate change and confrontation with other countries led to significant damage to the US-EU partnership and global climate governance. The Biden administration continues the Democratic policy orientation and actively rectifies Trump’s policies. However， Biden’s climate policy is not Obama 2.0 but a Green New Deal which combines climate change with economic transformation under COVID-19 to reshape US global leadership and achieve strategic goals at home and abroad. Against this backdrop， the EU generally welcomes the US return to climate issues. The two sides are expected to increase their cooperation and coordination on climate policies.

As climate issues and other US domestic and foreign policies are increasingly interconnected， climate policy plays a more significant role in US economic recovery and transformation and the reshaping of US image and leadership during the pandemic. Therefore， Biden has dramatically raised the importance of climate issues in US domestic affairs. Biden also listed climate change as one of the five pillars of his policy agenda and proposed a Green New Deal during the 2020 US presidential election. To effectively implement his climate agenda and stress the importance of climate issues in the decision-making process， Biden has set up a strong executive team and appointed a group of professionals and officials familiar with related issues. In May 2020， during his presidential campaign， Biden formed a climate task force and named as co-chairs Democratic Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez， a leading figure in the Green New Deal， and former Secretary of State John Kerry， one of the architects of the Paris Agreement. Varshini Prakash， a Bernie Sanders supporter and co-founder of the Sunrise Movement， was also picked to Biden’s climate team.12 In November 2020， Biden announced John Kerry as the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate， the first time in US history to have a senior official in charge of climate issues. In the new cabinet， the Secretary of the Interior， Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency （EPA）， Secretary of Commerce， and Secretary of Energy all support addressing climate change. It can even be said that “every cabinet job is about climate change.”13

As outlined by Biden’s executive order in his first week of presidency， the National Climate Task Force is chaired by National Climate Advisor Gina McCarthy and includes cabinet-level leaders from 21 federal agencies and senior White House officials. The Task Force aims at the dual task of addressing the climate crisis and creating jobs.14 In February， the White House issued the Memorandum on Renewing the National Security Council（NSC） System with adjustments made to the NSC structure. The heads of executive departments and agencies， and senior officials， including the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate， shall be invited to attend meetings of the NSC on climate issues as appropriate.15

In terms of policy initiatives， Biden’s climate policy includes domestic and international dimensions. At the domestic level， Biden’s team put forward the concept of “foreign policy for the middle class” and combined it with the Green New Deal to connect climate issues with domestic and economic affairs， such as job creation， economic transformation， and infrastructure building. The Green New Deal is a crucial framework addressing climate change and has the following pillars.

First， setting clear climate goals， i.e.， to cut US greenhouse gas emissions by at least half below 2005 levels by 2030 and to have a “100 percent clean energy economy” and “carbon neutrality” by 2050.

Second， formulating a package of implementation policies， including a “once-in-a-generation investment” in clean energy， climate research， and related scientific activities； ramping up emissions reduction enforcement by the EPA and the Department of Justice to punish polluting companies within a legal framework； accelerating the transition to a clean energy economy； strengthening capacity building for emergency relief and response to the climate crisis； and more investment in new infrastructure such as highspeed rail and renewable energy. In March 2021， Biden announced a $2 trillion infrastructure investment plan， of which $400 billion goes to clean energy projects.16 The Atlantic believes that “the bill is the country’s one shot to pass meaningful climate legislation in the next few years， if not in the next few decades.”17 In addition， the Biden administration released a $2 trillion investment plan for the country’s electricity grid to be entirely carbon-free by 2035 and net-zero emission by 2050.

Third， making climate change a national security priority. For example， the intelligence community would evaluate possible impacts of climate change on national and economic security； the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would report annually to the President on how climate change affects US defense posture， combat readiness， infrastructure， and threats； the National Security Advisor would cooperate with the Secretaries of Defense， State， Homeland Security， among others， on a comprehensive strategy to tackle the security implications of climate change.

Fourth， balancing different interests in climate policies. Biden’s climate policies generally focus on infrastructure investment and innovation， an economic recovery that creates jobs， clean air and water， environmental justice， and American manufacturing.18 Biden has advanced his climate agenda and policies mainly through executive orders. As of May 2021， Biden has issued several executive orders addressing climate issues， including“Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis，” “Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad，” “Rebuilding and Enhancing Programs to Resettle Refugees and Planning for the Impact of Climate Change on Migration，” and“Establishing the Climate Change Support Office.”

At the international dimension， the Biden administration has used the climate change issue as a channel to return to multilateralism， reshape alliances and partnerships， and regain US leadership. Biden made good on his campaign promise to return to the Paris Agreement on his first day in office. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken even put the climate crisis “at the center of foreign policy and national security.”19

Biden’s international climate policies include a package of proposals. The first is to make more international commitments， for example， recognizing the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol （2016） to control emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases such as hydrofluorocarbons. The second is to advance US climate diplomacy， including convening global climate summits and increasing direct engagement with major carbon emitters to make them follow the US lead and deliver on their climate commitments. The third is to dominate the rules-making process in global climate governance， and particularly highlight the “climate dimension”of international economic and trade rules. Examples include promoting enforceable agreements to reduce emissions in global shipping and aviation， a global ban on fossil-fuel subsidies， creating the Clean Energy Export and Climate Investment Initiative， the “green debt relief” for developing countries that make climate commitments， identifying the financing sources for multilateral financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund， and advancing a G20 commitment to ending all export finance subsidies for high-carbon projects.

The Biden administration has been active on both bilateral and multilateral occasions， making climate diplomacy a highlight of America’s return to global engagement. On the bilateral front， the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry had traveled to Europe and Asia within 100 days since Biden took office. He met with European officials in London， Brussels and Paris in March， and visited the UAE， India， Bangladesh， and China in April. On March 9， Kerry and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen issued a joint statement advocating the “1.5-degree Celsius temperature limit，” and， with the demonstration effect and efforts of both sides， urging all countries to take the necessary steps to keep the limit “within reach， including through commitments to net zero emissions by 2050.”20 During his visit to China， Kerry held talks with China’s Special Envoy for Climate Change Xie Zhenhua. The two sides reached the ChinaUS Joint Statement Addressing the Climate Crisis， which made clear their further actions in response to the climate crisis and served as a good example and a new contribution to global efforts.21 On the multilateral front， Biden wants the US to be the leader more than a returnee in climate affairs. He convened an online climate summit in April 2021 attended by leaders from 40 countries and representatives from businesses and social groups， where he called for a 50-52 percent reduction in carbon emissions by 2030 compared to 2005 levels and a US solution in November’s Glasgow Climate Conference.22

With these climate policy adjustments in the US， the EU has responded positively and continuously emphasized the importance of climate issues in the transatlantic relationship. In December 2020， the EU released A New EU-US Agenda for Global Change， calling for “carbon neutrality”by 2050 as a transatlantic goal and consensus. The Agenda also proposed strengthening EU-US cooperation within the global climate governance framework and jointly shaping a series of climate-related international economic rules， such as carbon tariffs， green finance， and green trade agenda. In addition， the Agenda advocated a transatlantic green technology alliance to strengthen Western cooperation and leadership in green industry and technologies.23

Since Biden’s 2020 election victory， von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel have highly appreciated the US return to the Paris Agreement in their calls and video meetings with Biden. They called on the US to hold on to its carbon neutrality pathway by 2050 and expected transatlantic cooperation in multilateral forums such as the Glasgow Climate Conference to lead global climate cooperation within the Paris Agreement framework. At the same time， the EU has continuously increased its climate commitments and implemented its policies in multiple aspects under the European Green Deal proposed in December 2019， to pursue global leadership in climate governance and the initiative of transatlantic climate cooperation. In March 2021， the European Parliament proposed a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism （CBAM） to address “carbon leakage”24 by placing a carbon price on certain imports from outside the EU.25 On April 21， the European Parliament and the European Council reached a provisional political agreement on reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030， marking the implementation and promotion of the European Climate Law. On the same day， the European Commission unveiled a new sustainable finance package， including a proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and the EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act， to seize the first opportunity to develop international green finance rules.

Prospects for US-EU Climate Cooperation

There is a growing policy consensus between the US and the EU on climate change. Both sides are more willing to cooperate， with far more climate commitments and input than ever before. As the second and third largest carbon emitters in the world respectively， the US and the EU have advanced green and low-carbon technologies. The convergence of their climate policies has a positive impact on their cooperation and the global climate governance.

First， the Paris Agreement framework is expected to be well implemented. Currently， the prospects of global climate governance depend mainly on whether the Paris Agreement would be effectively practiced. Nationally determined contributions （NDCs） are at the heart of the Paris Agreement， and more ambitious NDCs can better respond to the demand for emissions reduction in handling climate crises and contribute more to climate governance. Therefore， the policy orientation of major countries naturally plays a decisive role. With the US returning to the Paris Agreement and announcing the target of carbon neutrality by 2050， for the first time US contribution to climate governance is close to that of the EU， which declared in 2018 to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. The Paris Agreement framework will then be jointly supported by China， the US and the EU， instead of being sustained by only China and the EU. Meanwhile， with more concerns and input by major countries， the implementation of the Paris Agreement will facilitate climate investment and specify the five-year “global stocktake”26 of NDCs.

Second， there has been stronger global support for clean energy and economic transition. Regarding green finance， the Biden administration will impose tighter regulation of financial institutions and related companies， requiring them to disclose information on climate-related risks associated with their operations， and promote the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies and the financing of relevant projects at the international level.27 These initiatives， similar to the EU’s position on green finance and international rules， will advance the process of decarbonization in the US， the EU， and the world at large. In terms of green industries， there will be more public and private investment in global renewable energy， industrial energy efficiency， hydrogen power， electric vehicles， and rare metals with strengthening climate and energy policies. According to a report by the Energy Transitions Commission， a UK-based international think tank focusing on economic growth and climate change mitigation， achieving net-zero emission by 2050 would cost an estimated $1-2 trillion per year or 1-1.5 percent of global GDP.28 The world committed a record $501.3 billion to decarbonization in 2020， with Europe at $166.2 billion， China at $134.8 billion， and the US at $85.3 billion as the three biggest slices of global investment.29 BloombergNEF （BNEF） expects that large investment in global energy transition will continue in 2021. There will possibly be major powers competing to increase investment in green industries， advancing the world’s energy transition and climate governance.

Last， international climate cooperation is expected to witness the acceleration of carbon neutrality. All major countries in today’s world have proposed their targets for carbon neutrality. Carbon neutrality has become a viable path to global climate governance. As the world pays more attention to climate change， and with the continuous optimization of renewable energy technologies and the cost of their use， countries might achieve their targets ahead of schedule， in order to pursue more leadership in climate governance and gain more economic dividends in the energy transition. The EU has long set more ambitious targets than other countries to consolidate its leadership on climate issues and is likely to accelerate its efforts towards carbon neutrality in the face of transatlantic convergence on climate policies. The German government intends to achieve carbon neutrality by 2045， five years earlier than planned， and reduce the country’s greenhouse gas emissions by 65 percent by 2030， compared to 55 percent previously.30

However， US-EU climate cooperation and policy coordination can be plagued by the political environment and different economic interests. Their fundamental differences in policy orientation are also hard to mitigate， adding uncertainties in their cooperation and the global climate governance.

First， a conflict of interests exists on climate-related economic issues between the US and the EU. As for energy structure， despite their joint promotion of low-carbon energy transition， the US and the EU have different interests in fossil energy and related industries. With an import volume of more than €300 billion per year， the EU remains highly dependent on external fossil energy. By advocating a shift away from and reducing the absolute consumption of fossil fuels in its climate and energy policies， the EU intends to reap substantial economic and geopolitical benefits. On the other hand， the US， with the “shale revolution” in recent years， has achieved energy independence based on complete self-sufficiency in oil and natural gas， and has expanded oil and gas exports in international markets， providing the country with 10.3 million jobs and contributing to 8 percent of its GDP. The global investment by US oil and gas companies is even beyond estimates.31

Therefore， compared to the EU’s more radical stance on climate governance， the US advocates slower action and prefers a gradual approach to cut its total emissions by replacing coal with natural gas， instead of the unrealistic path to shift from fossil energy in a short time. During his visit to Europe， Kerry expressed concerns about the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and warned that it should be a last resort， showing America’s close attention to carbon tax and its potential industrial impact.32 Besides， the two sides are competing fiercely in renewable energy. Tesla held nearly 1/3 of the electric vehicle market share in Western Europe in 2019， ahead of local car companies such as Volkswagen， BMW， and Peugeot.33 In 2020， the EU and the US were neck and neck on the number of top 500 global new energy companies， at 88 and 69 respectively. Amid the global transition towards renewable energy， this field will become an economic and technological frontier with fierce competition among major powers. While the US will not give up its struggle for dominance in any emerging field， the EU will regard renewable energy technologies as the key to reviving its economy and industries， seeking strategic autonomy in the industrial sector， and even leading a new round of industrial revolution. The two sides are expected to have tough competition over technological rules， supply chains and markets.

Second， the difference between US and EU positions on climate change will limit the extent of their cooperation. In the US， the escalating popularity of climate skepticism has led to a partisan split on climate issues， which has not only prevented the US from implementing its climate obligations but also become the greatest constraint to the Biden administration’s climate policy. On the one hand， to avoid more opposition in the Congress， the Biden administration would rather keep climate change-related bills mild， thus undermining the effectiveness of its climate policy. On the other hand， Biden needs congressional support for his multiple plans， including the US stimulus package and the decarbonization of the US power industry by 2035， to achieve his climate goals. However， the Democratic Party does not have enough say in the Senate to push them forward smoothly. As a result， like Obama， Biden will implement the Green New Deal and work for carbon neutrality primarily through executive orders， which might be rescinded by future administrations should there be a change of government.

In contrast， green politics has been widely accepted in the EU. Green parties in Europe are ahead of those in other areas regarding ideological influence and political engagement. They have succeeded multiple times in essential elections， including the 2019 European Parliament elections and the 2020 regional elections in France， and become a key partner in Austria and Ireland that traditional parties must draw on when forming a cabinet. After the 2021 general election in Germany， the winning party will probably form a cabinet with the Green Party， expanding the influence of green politics. At the same time， green politics and public pressure in Europe have pushed both center-left and center-right traditional parties to actively promote climate and energy policies to handle challenges from the Greens. A coalition between center-right parties and the Greens has even become a new trend in European politics. Under such public pressure， the Eurosceptic ruling parties in Central and Eastern European countries such as Poland， Hungary and the Czech Republic will not openly attack any response to climate change but will only emphasize their higher costs in the low-carbon transition due to their domestic energy structure and industrial workforce， in a bid to seek more financial assistance from the EU.

The different climate claims between the US and the EU will also hamper their climate policies from becoming an international consensus. The EU is expected to set more ambitious climate goals and carry out stricter climate measures， while the climate policies of the US will inevitably fall short of the leader’s vision under the current domestic politics. Biden’s goals of halving emissions by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 are unlikely to be fulfilled on schedule. Besides， as the two sides’ progress in dealing with climate change becomes out of sync， there is bound to be a wider gap in the effectiveness of their policies. Out of the consideration to protect domestic interest groups and economic interests， the US will have reservations about some of the EU’s more progressive initiatives.

For instance， during the G7 summit in June 2021， the US and Japan objected to a specific timeline for complete decarbonization of the power sector in the communiqué， significantly weakening the summit’s climate commitments. Eventually， the summit communiqué only committed to“accelerate the transition away from unabated coal capacity，” and “achieve an overwhelmingly decarbonized power system in the 2030s.”34 In the statement of the US-EU summit in the same month， the two sides only agreed to end new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation in third countries by the end of 2021，35 a target far less ambitious than the EU and the European Investment Bank’s goal of stopping all financing for coal projects within and outside the EU. Both were results of the obstruction of progressive climate policies from domestic political forces and interest groups in the US.

Another example of the US stopping short of more ambitious commitments is in the global green investment. The EU has been promoting its green finance taxonomy rules as the basis of the world’s comprehensive and sustainable finance standards through the G7 and G20 mechanisms and multilateral financial institutions. Meanwhile， the US wants relevant international rules to strengthen disclosure of climate-related information and incorporate climate risks into regulations， while opposing categorization of areas and projects in terms of sustainability. The US position has constrained additional funding for tackling climate change and thwarted international efforts to weaken financing for fossil energy projects.36

Third， the difference between US and EU diplomatic positioning of climate change will weaken the efficacy of global climate governance. With its power in relative decline， the US has increasingly adopted an instrumentalist attitude toward multilateralism， and become more skeptical about upholding international responsibilities at the expense of national economic interests. This is the diplomatic legacy of the Trump administration that may prevail for a long time. Biden’s climate policy under the banner of “returning to multilateralism” still serves his overall diplomatic strategy of preserving US hegemony in the great-power competition. The US cares more about its geopolitical interests than addressing common challenges in terms of climate policy. In fact， the Biden administration not only wants a climate alliance with Europe to repair transatlantic relations， but also intends to draw in allies to jointly contain China in pursuing the international climate change agenda. In this sense， climate changerelated issues are being construed by the US as a tool to suppress China’s development. According to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken， “It’s difficult to imagine the United States winning the long-term strategic competition with China if we cannot lead the renewable energy revolution.”“If we don’t catch up， America will miss the chance to shape the world’s climate future in a way that reflects our interests and values， and we’ll lose out on countless jobs for the American people.”37

However， the climate policy is both ends and means for EU diplomacy. On the one hand， the EU sees it as a diplomatic mission to realize its climate commitments and shape the rules of global climate governance. Climate diplomacy is also vital to the EU’s environmental values and serves to accommodate its internal political environment. On the other hand， EU diplomacy has long emphasized rules-based multilateralism. The climate policy and its extension to other areas are essential for the EU to develop itself into a normative power different from the US and China.

Therefore， the US obsession with the geopolitical value of climate change and energy issues will divert the focus of US-EU cooperation from jointly addressing the global climate challenge. For example， during the 2021 G7 summit， the US proposed Build Back Better World （B3W）， a global infrastructure initiative widely interpreted as a “green” counterproposal to China’s Belt and Road Initiative （BRI）. Gaining support from European countries through their concerns about climate change， the B3W sets socalled high standards in the infrastructure sector under the banner of being green and sustainable， which in fact aims to constrain the BRI and incorporate infrastructure investment into US-China competition. However， the US initiative is vague on how to increase funding for infrastructure projects in developing countries and will ultimately hinder the green and low-carbon development in these countries due to insufficient financial support. Also， in the case of the Nord Stream II pipeline project， the Biden administration， once together with the European Greens saying that the project did not help handle climate change as a pretext for sanctions and pressures， partially lifted the sanctions later to bring the EU on board. This shows that the US sees climate and energy issues more from a geopolitical perspective than based on scientific conclusions and environmental concerns. In the future， the US political manipulation on climate issues will hinder the efficacy of transatlantic cooperation， weaken relevant consensus， and adversely affect global climate governance and the substantial contribution of other countries to addressing climate change.

Conclusion

For a long time， structural differences have existed between the US and the EU in their economic interests， domestic political environment， diplomatic pursuits， and security demands related to climate issues. As a result， the two sides have marked disputes over the approaches， goals， commitments and willingness to deal with climate change. For the US， this gap may be narrowed under the Democratic Party but will significantly widen under Republican administrations. Biden’s policy shift on climate change will create a favorable environment for transatlantic cooperation but will not truly address the existing structural barriers on climate issues. In addition， due to changing political landscape， the US climate policy may still witness fluctuations in the future. Domestic politics will significantly constrain Biden’s climate goals and policy implementation， and transatlantic disputes are likely to endure in setting ambitious climate goals and formulating binding rules.

For China， the limited policy convergence between the US and the EU will bring both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand， China， the US and the EU share a valid consensus on more contributions from and cooperation between major powers in tackling climate change. Both the US and the EU see China as an indispensable partner in global climate governance. In fact， climate change is a highly potential candidate on the agenda of China-US and China-EU relations to expand cooperation and mitigate competition. On the other hand， compared to the US and the EU， China is at a different stage in dealing with climate change. While the US and the EU have now focused on emissions reduction， China is still on the way to reaching its emissions peak. The US and EU strategic communities， trying to incorporate climate issues into their competition with China， have been firing up the rivalry in the areas of renewable energy， batteries and electric vehicles. Climate change could become part of transatlantic policy coordination on China， leading to more unfavorable collective actions in this regard. For example， the US and the EU may pressure China to make more commitments to emissions reduction at a faster rate， discredit the energy projects under the BRI framework， weaken China’s renewable energy industrial chains for rare metals and equipment manufacturing， and unilaterally formulate a set of standards on green technology and financing. Amid the complicated situation， while balancing its national interests and international responsibilities in global climate governance， China needs to pay closer attention to and appropriately address the potential impact of US-EU cooperation on climate issues， and resolutely oppose the attempt of some developed countries to turn climate change into a geopolitical issue.

1 The European Commission， “New Eurobarometer Survey： Protecting the Environment and Climate is Important for over 90% of European Citizens，” March 3， 2020， https：//ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/ detail/en/IP_20_331.

2 John Burn-Murdoch and Leslie Hook， “Survey Underscores High Levels of US Skepticism on Climate Change，” Financial Times， September 15， 2019.

3 “Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session， Held in Copenhagen， from 7 to 19 December 2009，” p.4， https：//unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.

4 In March 2007， the European Council adopted a comprehensive package of measures to establish an integrated climate change and energy policy， setting the targets of by 2020， reducing by 20 percent the emissions of greenhouse gases compared to 1990 levels， reaching 20 percent of renewables in total energy consumption in the EU， and increasing by 20 percent the energy efficiency in the EU.

5 In October 2014， the European Council agreed on the 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework， with the targets of by 2030， an at least 40 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990， at least a 27 percent share for renewable energy consumption， and at least a 27 percent improvement in energy efficiency.

6 Liu Sisi， “The Construction of EU Climate Discourse and Lessons for China，” Deutschland-Studien， No.2， 2016， pp.34-35.

7 Joshua Chaffin and Ed Crooks， “EU Sets out €15bn Climate Aid Plan，” Financial Times， September 9， 2009.

8 The European Commission， “International Climate Finance，” February 4， 2021， https：//ec.europa.eu/ clima/policies/international/finance_en.

9 Zou Ji， Global Climate Governance and Building a New International System of Human Development， Chinese Plan Publishing House， 2015， p.206.

10 Jennifer Dlouhy and Ari Natter， “Biden to Pledge Climate Aid for Developing Nations Next Week，”April 16， 2021， https：//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-16/biden-to-pledge-climate-aid-fordeveloping-nations-next-week.

11 “Yes， Donald Trump Did Call Climate Change a Chinese Hoax，” PolitiFact， June 3， 2016， https：//www. politifact.com/factchecks/2016/jun/03/hillary-clinton/yes-donald-trump-did-call-climate-change-chinese-h.

12 Marianne Lavelle， “Biden Names Ocasio-Cortez， Kerry to Lead His Climate Task Force， Bridging Democrats’ Divide，” May 13， 2020， https：//insideclimatenews.org/news/13052020/biden-ocasio-cortezkerry-climate-task-force.

13 Ben Adler， “Every Cabinet Job Is about Climate Change Now，” The Washington Post， January 21， 2021， https：//www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/biden-cabinet-climate-change/2021/01/21/a288a12e-5b5d-11eb-b8bd-ee36b1cd18bf_story.html.

14 The White House， “Readout of the Second National Climate Task Force Meeting，” March 18， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/18/readout-of-the-second-nationalclimate-task-force-meeting.

15 The White House， “Memorandum on Renewing the National Security Council System，” February 4， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/04/memorandum-renewingthe-national-security-council-system.

16 Jim Tankersley， “Biden Details $2 Trillion Plan to Rebuild Infrastructure and Reshape the Economy，”The New York Times， March 31， 2021.

17 Robinson Meyer， “The Weekly Planet： The 1 Thing to Understand about Biden’s Infrastructure Plan，” The Atlantic， April 14， 2021， https：//www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2021/04/the-one-thing-tounderstand-about-bidens-infrastructure-plan/618587.

18 The White House， “President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S. Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies，” April22， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-presidentbiden-sets-2030-greenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-union-jobs-andsecuring-u-s-leadership-on-clean-energy-technologies.

19 Antony Blinken， “Tackling the Crisis and Seizing the Opportunity： America’s Global Climate Leadership，” April 19， 2021， https：//www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-remarks-to-the-chesapeakebay-foundation-tackling-the-crisis-and-seizing-the-opportunity-americas-global-climate-leadership.

20 “Joint Statement： The United States and the European Union Commit to Greater Cooperation to Counter the Climate Crisis，” March 9， 2021， https：//fr.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-the-united-states-andthe-european-union-commit-to-greater-cooperation-to-counter-the-climate-crisis.

21 “Full Text： China-US Joint Statement Addressing the Climate Crisis，” Xinhua， April 18， 2021， http：// www.china.org.cn/world/2021-04/18/content_77417219.htm.

22 The White House， “President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S. Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies，” April 22， 2021.

23 The European Commission， “A New EU-US Agenda for Global Change，” Brussels， December 2， 2020.

24 Carbon leakage refers to the situation that may occur if， for reasons of costs related to climate policies， businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints.

25 The European Parliament， “MEPs： Put a Carbon Price on Certain EU Imports to Raise Global Climate Ambition，” March 17， 2021， https：//www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210304IPR99208/ meps-put-a-carbon-price-on-certain-eu-imports-to-raise-global-climate-ambition.

26 According to Article 14 of the Paris Agreement， “global stocktake” means that the parties to the Agreement shall periodically take stock of the implementation of the Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and its long-term goals.

27 Zhao Xingshu， “The Biden Administration’s New Climate Policy and its Impact，” Contemporary World， No.5， 2020， pp.39-46.

28 Stephanie Butcher， “Europe’s Chance to Lead the Green Technology Race，” Financial Times， April 1， 2021.

29 BNEF， “Energy Transition Investment Hit $500 Billion in 2020-For First Time，” January 19， 2021， https：//about.bnef.com/blog/energy-transition-investment-hit-500-billion-in-2020-for-first-time.

30 “Germany Targets More Ambitious 2045 Net-Zero Emission Goal，” May 7， 2021， https：//www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-05/germany-targets-more-ambitious-climate-neutrality-goalof-2045.

31 American Petroleum Institute， “Oil & Natural Gas Contribution to U.S. Economy Fact Sheet，” https：// www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/taxes/oil-and-natural-gas-contribution-to-us-economy-fact-sheet.

32 Leslie Hook， “John Kerry Warns EU against Carbon Border Tax，” Financial Times， March 12， 2021.

33 Matthias Schmidt， “Record 0.35 Million Pure Electric Cars Registered in W-Europe in 2019，” March 3， 2020， https：//www.schmidtmatthias.de/post/record-0-35-million-pure-electric-cars-registered-in-w-europein-2019.

34 “Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué，” June 13， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ statements-releases/2021/06/13/carbis-bay-g7-summit-communique.

35 “US-EU Summit Statement，” June 15， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/06/15/u-s-eu-summit-statement.

36 Karl Mathiesen and Zack Colman， “4 Sore Points between the US and EU on Climate，” Politico， June 15， 2021， https：//www.politico.eu/article/eu-us-climate-arguments.

37 Antony Blinken， “Tackling the Crisis and Seizing the Opportunity： America’s Global Climate Leadership.”