Borrowing Power:Climate Governance in the Pacific Islands Region

Climate governance in the Pacific Islands region has witnessed significant progress in recent years. Prominent regional organizations have made climate change a priority issue， with relevant wording in the documents they release giving more consideration to the interests of Pacific Island Countries （PICs）.1 An integrated framework for regional climate governance has been established， giving birth to governance concepts with regional characteristics， the most representative being the Blue Pacific.2 Climate governance solutions owned and led by PICs， such as the Pacific Resilience Facility， have also been implemented. All these efforts have constituted a joint force to address climate change at the regional level. Given the weakness of discussions among China’s academic community on the causality of relevant developments， this article will review how the PICs have overcome difficulties and advanced climate governance in recent years in the hope of putting climate cooperation and high-quality construction of the Belt and Road Initiative between China and PICs on a more solid footing.

Borrowing Power： Concept and Background

With the increasing importance attached to regional governance practice worldwide， a “governance turn” is also taking place in regionalism studies. Drawing from the definition in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism，3 there are four points worth our attention in the concept of regional governance： first， it focuses on the regional level； second， it is centered around specific issue areas； third， it is by nature institutionalized， with regional organizations being a common platform； and fourth， it is dedicated to providing regional public goods. Specifically， this article explores how PICs manage to provide regional public goods on climate change， with a focus on the regional level and primarily regional organizations.

For small states in terms of international relations theory， participating in international regimes is their basic survival strategy and diplomatic choice， and “borrowing power” serves as their major approach to participation.4 Based on research by Ira Zartman and Jefferey Rubin， Carola Betzold developed the concept of “borrowing power” and studied how lowpower parties in the international community can draw on external power sources and effectively exert influence in international regimes.5 Although the concept and theoretical basis of “borrowing power” have basically been constructed， case studies are still lacking in how it comes into play in specific domains of regional governance.

As the region most severely affected by climate change， PICs generally face immediate threats such as an increase of natural disasters， the deterioration of the marine environment， the degradation and exhaustion of resources， a surge of infections with tropical epidemics， and a decline of human health conditions， as results of climate change. For those small island states of low altitudes， climate change is even the overarching threat to their survival and security. As a result， coping with climate change becomes a priority concern of PICs when they participate in regional politics.

However， most of these states are small in size and population. Their economies are slowly developing and highly dependent on external assistance. They also suffer from underdeveloped science， technology and education， and face a scarcity of high-quality professionals. All these make it simply unlikely for any island country alone to overcome the threats of climate change. Therefore， besides rallying around regionalism， PICs have to leverage external power sources in their regional climate governance.

Compared with other regions， the power structure is highly asymmetric in the Pacific Islands region. The region， consisting of 14 island countries， is nevertheless characterized by the dominant influence of Australia as an external or semi-external power， which is also frequently referred to as a regional hegemony or “big brother.”6 As a member of the Pacific Islands Forum （PIF）， the most important regional organization， Australia is an influential actor in regional affairs.7 In most cases， PICs are not powerful enough to lead their own regional affairs， especially before 2014 when the Framework for Pacific Regionalism reformed the PIF’s rules of procedure and enhanced their decision-making power.8 For these countries to make a difference in regional governance， they have to handle their relations with Australia well， and taking advantage of external power sources is their inevitable course when they interact with the far more powerful actor.

Apart from the severe threats of climate change and the extreme asymmetry of regional power structure， the necessity of “borrowing power”also lies in the stark difference in positions between Australia and the island countries. As a member of the Umbrella Group， a coalition of a number of developed states with the most passive positions in international climate negotiations， Australia has been awarded “Fossil of the Day”9 multiple times due to its inaction to address climate change. On the other hand， the three largest donors of climate funds for PICs， namely Australia， New Zealand， and Japan， all belong to the Umbrella Group， and their funds are primarily channeled to the beneficiary states through bilateral assistance， without involvement from regional organizations or other multilateral mechanisms. Though helping the donor states be better informed of the use of funds， this approach does not give the beneficiaries enough discretion to set their agendas.10 As Greg Fry writes， Australia has often watered down PICs’ enthusiasm to address climate change in regional organizations. For example， the final communiqué of the 2009 PIF meeting in Cairns， due to an effective veto under the consensus procedure， represented the position held by Australia and New Zealand， despite a stronger commitment by Pacific leaders to emissions targets.11 Therefore，“borrowing power” becomes PICs’ choice to defend their positions on climate issues.

To sum up， subject to an external or semi-external state that is far more powerful but holds a very different position on climate issues concerning their survival and immediate interests， the real difficulty in regional climate governance prompts the PICs to seek external power sources.

Sources of External Power and How They Come into Play

Leveraging three sources of power， namely the global climate governance， the policies of extra-regional powers and those of the dominant regional power， the PICs have used various dynamics to create favorable conditions for regional climate governance.

Global climate governance

First， the PICs have taken full advantage of the global climate governance process to advance their agendas at the regional level. In the era of global governance， agenda-setting12 serves as the medium to translate global movements into regional actions. The progress in global climate governance can help the Pacific states prioritize climate change in the regional agenda.13

The global climate governance centering around the Paris Climate Conference in 2015 accelerated Pacific Islands regional progress on climate change in the same year. In July 2015 when ministerial negotiations were held in Luxembourg and Paris to prepare for the Paris conference， regional organizations of the Pacific Islands were also busy with consultations， releasing statements related to the same event. The final Paris Agreement fulfilled the appeal of regional countries， particularly in that the goal of“pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels” was written into the text. This has greatly boosted the confidence of islanders in advancing regional climate governance. Moreover， the ambiguous wording in various parts of the Paris Agreement has also enabled the island states to push forward global and regional climate governance in a favorable direction after the Paris Climate Summit was concluded.

The inaugural United Nations Ocean Conference in June 2017， held in New York with Fiji and Sweden as co-presidents， gave the Pacific another international platform to solicit global attention to climate change in the region. In this context， events under the “Pacific Year for the Ocean 2017”were held by the PIF and the Pacific Islands Development Forum （PIDF）， which heated up the subsequent introduction of the Blue Pacific concept.

The issue of climate change gained traction again in 2018-2019 with another round of progress in global climate governance. The UN Climate Action Summit， held in September 2019， came not long after the PIF Funafuti summit in the same year， and according to its agenda， a declaration issued by the PIF would be presented to the UN Secretary-General at the UN-held event. The timing thus again attached global significance to the PIF summit.

Second， the new knowledge and new concepts gained in global climate governance have lent legitimacy and discourse to the climate change narratives of the Pacific. As an “epistemic community，” the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change （IPCC） has played a crucial role in legitimizing climate policies and promoting climate agenda-setting.14 As required by the resolution of the Paris Climate Conference， the IPCC released the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5oC （1.5oC Report） in October 2018. According to the report， the world would have to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 to meet the target of limiting global warming to 1.5oC above pre-industrial levels. The report accelerated the popularity of the concept of carbon neutrality. The international community has placed higher expectations on developed countries to realize the goal as soon as possible， imposing tremendous pressure on Australia， which had so far been reluctant to announce its carbon neutrality roadmap.

In 2019， the IPCC successively issued two reports， the Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate （Ocean Report） and the Special Report on Climate Change and Land （Land Report）， which highlighted the “ocean-climate nexus” and integrated climate and ocean governance. The above three IPCC-produced reports， all closely related to small island developing states （SIDS）， have received an enthusiastic response from the Pacific， and provided an authoritative source of knowledge for discussions on the 1.5oC issue and the ocean-climate nexus.

Third， the global climate governance process has amplified the contradiction between the PICs and those Western powers that have been deeply involved in the region， notably Australia， New Zealand and the United States. According to Terrence Wesley-Smith， mounting frustration over the perceived lack of regional action on issues of immediate concern to island leaders over the existential threat of climate change has been an important driver of the changing nature of Pacific regional governance.15 On the other hand， the in-depth development of global climate governance has weakened Australia’s influence on the island states to some extent. As climate change becomes an increasingly prominent issue in global governance， the poor performance of Australia in this regard， particularly as reflected in its reception of various “Fossil prizes，” has undermined the country’s influence on the PICs.16

Climate cooperation with extra-regional powers

By more closely cooperating with extra-regional powers or blocs on climate governance， the PICs have had more policy options and thus increased their bargaining power when dealing with Australia and New Zealand.

Cooperation between the island states and the European Union （EU） is the most representative. In international climate negotiations， the EU’s overall favorable position is at odds with those of the more passive Umbrella Group members， including Australia， New Zealand and the United States， which can become more explicit on critical issues. Considering itself as a global leader in fighting climate change， France views the Pacific Islands region as an ideal venue for demonstrating its leadership. For example， the fourth France-Oceania Summit， held in 2015 before the Paris Climate Conference， discussed the interaction between climate change and the protection of coral reefs， public health， marine environment， biodiversity and disaster risk management， a topic closely aligned with the agenda of the Paris Conference.17 The EU endorsement of the concerns of the PICs has been rewarded with the latter’s backing in critical moments of climate negotiations. In the last days of the Paris Climate Conference， some island states took the initiative to organize the High Ambition Coalition with the EU’s support. While promoting the PICs’ position， the platform galvanized a coalition in support of the European draft text of the Paris Agreement.18

The successful coordination between the two sides has brought a greater European boost to the Pacific Island states. In 2016， the EU proposed five priorities of its cooperation with regional countries in the“post-Paris era，” including disaster preparedness and resilience， renewable energy， green economy， sustainable use of natural resources， and land and marine biodiversity. It was also committed to providing direct financial and intellectual support for PICs to formulate a regional climate governance framework.19 In October 2017， the EU and the PIF signed an agreement on the 45-million-euro Pacific-EU Marine Partnership program to be implemented in the Pacific in support of their climate and ocean governance.

The diplomacy of Japan toward the Pacific islands focuses on the environment and the ocean， which considers the concerns of regional countries about climate change. In particular， the seventh Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting （PALM）， a summit-level meeting hosted by Japan to enhance its partnership with regional countries， issued the Fukushima Iwaki Declaration and identified climate change and disaster risk reduction as the most important areas of cooperation between the two sides. Japan also offered direct financial support for regional cooperation on environmental protection， climate change and marine governance， helping strengthen the governance capacity of the PICs.20

As with the United States， in the last years of his term， President Barack Obama， out of the consideration to leave a political legacy on his Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy and efforts to address climate change， was active in providing climate assistance for the PICs. He announced the establishment of the Pacific-American Climate Fund （PACF）， and committed to contributing US$3 billion to the Green Climate Fund （GCF） within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change （UNFCCC）， indicating that the PICs would be a priority destination of these funds. As the succeeding Trump administration withdrew from the Paris Agreement in disregard of international rules and morality， the island states lodged stiff opposition and urged the US to return to the hard-won climate pact on various regional occasions.21

In addition， several developing countries， including China， India and Indonesia， have strengthened their climate ties with the Pacific. By building relevant platforms， enhancing policy communication， promoting pragmatic cooperation and giving necessary assistance， China has been playing an outstanding role among the developing countries in facilitating Pacific regional efforts against climate change within its capacity. The Chinese assistance has covered regional organizations such as the PIF， the PIDF and the Melanesian Spearhead Group （MSG）. Moreover， China has given direct backing to the climate governance concepts and initiatives put forward by regional countries. For instance， China has proposed a synergy between its Blue Partnership initiative and the Pacific’s Blue Pacific， and supported the Pacific Blue Carbon Initiative raised by regional countries to protect and restore coastal and marine ecosystems for their role in reducing impacts of global climate change. In general， China has provided regional countries with another choice， whose increasingly prominent presence helps boost the island states’ confidence and capacity of independent development， and also motivates many other actors to forge stronger ties with the island countries.22 As a result， the PICs have frequently leveraged the China factor in regional climate governance to impose pressure on Australia in recent years. For instance， at the 2019 PIF summit in Funafuti， Tuvalu， Frank Bainimarama， Prime Minister of Fiji， accused his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison of causing an extraordinary rift between Australia and Pacific countries， even saying that the Australian prime minister’s “insulting behavior” at the meeting would push nations closer to China， in a bid to pressure Australia into making more concessions on climate change.23 Apart from China， India and Indonesia have also been deeply involved in the Pacific Islands regional climate governance. In May 2017， the India-Pacific Islands Sustainable Development Conference， held in Fiji and co-sponsored by the pro-Fiji regional organization PIDF， was attended by representatives from 14 PICs.24 India has also broadly supported the activities organized by regional countries to address climate change. As with Indonesia， it has concentrated its engagement in the region on the financial support for the MSG’s work on climate change.25

Australia’s middle power diplomacy

Besides leveraging the global governance and extra-regional powers， the middle power diplomacy of Australia has also given Pacific Island states more bargaining chips in their dealing with Australia on regional climate issues.

On the one hand， Australia’s foreign policy as a middle power requires more coordination with the PICs in international affairs. With 12 votes in the United Nations， the island states have emerged as a non-negligible force in multilateral diplomacy for Australia. Given such importance， Canberra has resorted to trade-off between different issues to win support from the island states， a tactic that the latter have consciously used. For example， known to actively seek non-permanent membership at the UN Security Council， Australia eventually conceded over the wording of climate issues at the 2015 PIF summit in Port Moresby.26

On the other hand， the middle power diplomacy has trapped Australia into a dilemma， limiting its policy options in Pacific affairs. According to Jonathan Schultz， despite being a regional “superpower，” Australia is still a weaker actor at the global level compared to global major powers， which results in inconsistency and inherent contradiction between its strategy of playing the weak and holding the moral high ground in international affairs， and its often unilateral and strong-handed attitude toward its island neighbors.27 Moreover， what Schultz neglects is the Pacific agency as a part in it： the island states’ emphasis on morality and rules in regional climate governance has aggravated Australia’s dilemma. If Australia were to act on its rhetoric at the global level， it should have supported the islands’ demands， which are based on international climate rules， regimes and morality. Instead， if Australia chose unilateral actions， it would probably be accused of adopting double standards between its global commitment and regional behavior. Under the middle power diplomacy， Australia may sometimes choose to make good on its promises to preserve its moral integrity. This is especially the case around the time when global climate politics makes critical breakthroughs. For instance， before the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit， Australia announced that it would allocate 500 million Australian dollars to help Pacific Islands invest in renewable energy and climate and disaster-resilient infrastructure as part of its Pacific Step-up strategy， though redirected from its existing aid funds.28

The Pacific Agency and Effectiveness of Power Borrowing

Instead of passively subjecting themselves to the above-mentioned external power sources on climate governance issues， the Pacific has given full play to their initiative in the process of “borrowing power，” which is also referred to as Pacific Islands agency or Pacific agency.29 By consciously taking advantage of favorable external conditions， including the changing global governance priorities and balance of power， the island states have successfully translated the external power resources into substantial progress in regional climate governance. To make the strategy of power borrowing bear fruit， the tactics and measures adopted by the countries include establishing a regional governance framework， leveraging competition among institutions， and setting regional agendas.

Establishing a regional governance framework

In the process of global climate governance， the PICs have worked to establish a favorable framework for regional climate governance， with trade-off used as an important negotiating tool.

An overarching top-level design had been absent in the Pacific Islands regional response to climate change for a long time. This situation was not conducive to coordinating different resources and cooperating with extraregional aid donors for regional countries. The Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific （FRDP）， endorsed at the 2016 PIF summit in Pohnpei， became the global-first regional strategy in the medium to long term which advocates an integrated approach to addressing climate change. The FRDP， whose institutional design received intellectual support from the German Corporation for International Cooperation （GIZ）， proposes three major goals： strengthened integrated risk reduction and adaptation to enhance climate change and disaster resilience， low-carbon development， and strengthened disaster preparedness， response and recovery. It classifies climate governance actors into four groups： national and subnational governments and administrations， civil society and communities， the private sector， and regional organizations and other development partners. Actions that should be implemented as relevant to the individual needs and priorities of stakeholders are listed under the three goals respectively.30 The FRDP’s institutional design is basically consistent with the climate cooperation priorities in the postParis era put forward by the European Union.31 The integration of climate change and disaster resilience not only meets the needs of the PICs for disaster preparedness and mitigation， but is also in line with the global trend of integrating climate governance and sustainable development.

In 2017， heated up by a series of global and regional actions such as the UN Ocean Conference， the PIF Apia summit adopted the Blue Pacific concept， which covers climate change， fishery， sustainable development， and other issues of particular concern to the Pacific. Introducing the global governance concept of ocean-climate nexus into the region， the Blue Pacific integrates regional climate governance and ocean governance.32

Besides， drawing upon the influence of the IPCC’s 1.5oC Report， the PICs have promoted relevant discussions in regional organizations and put forward the concept of climate security. The Boe Declaration on Regional Security， adopted at the 2018 PIF Yaren summit， highlights an “expanded concept of security” inclusive of “human security，” two terms also used by the 1.5oC Report. Reaffirming that “climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods， security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific，”the Boe Declaration incorporates climate cooperation into the purview of Pacific Islands regional security.33 While relegating cybersecurity， which the Australian side had tried to put on top of regional security issues that deserve increasing emphasis， the PICs managed to identify “human security， including humanitarian assistance， to protect the rights， health and prosperity of Pacific people” as the topmost regional security priority. A year later in 2019， the PIF Funafuti summit passed the Boe Declaration Action Plan， in which the concept of climate security formally came up and was listed as top among the six strategic focus areas of regional security cooperation. In addition， as the most important financial guarantee for the Action Plan， the Pacific Resilience Facility （PRF） is the Pacific-owned， Pacific-led solution to the financing needs of regional countries for resilience building and disaster preparedness. After the Facility is established as a formal international organization， Samoa will undertake its secretarial work. By so doing， the PICs will gain a direct say over the use of relevant international climate funds， which will mitigate the severe lack of independent climate funds for regional states.

The Blue Pacific concept， the FRDP， the Boe Declaration and its Action Plan collectively constitute the framework of Pacific Islands regional climate governance in the new era， and lay an institutional foundation for regional voice and practical action in the face of climate change. By leveraging the momentum in global climate governance， the PICs have facilitated these breakthroughs.

Leveraging competition among institutions

In recent years， competition among different institutions is an emerging global trend， whether through structural adjustment within existing institutions or new ones.34 Despite their small sizes， the PICs can gain their interests by leveraging inter-institutional competition while drawing upon the momentum of global climate governance and the strength of extra-regional major powers.

Traditionally， the PIF is the decision-making hub of Pacific Islands regional climate governance， while the Pacific Community （SPC） provides technical support and the Pacific Regional Environment Program （SPREP） is responsible for planning and implementing climate-related projects. However， with Western powers as members of all the three regional organizations， and some even in control of their budgets， the Pacific voice had been limited.

In recent years， the island states have been working to construct a governance architecture responsive to their priorities and interests in existing regional organizations， while setting up several new groupings on their own， including the PIDF， the Pacific Small Island Developing States （PSIDS）， and the informal-mechanism-turned MSG. Though maintaining general interinstitutional cooperation， these new regional organizations have to some degree competed with the PIF and other traditional organizations in some circumstances. For example， the PIDF and the PIF are competitors in terms of winning international support according to studies： due to its Third World identity， the former has been able to build a more extensive global network for climate action than the latter in a short time.35 At the same time， there is also cooperation between the two organizations on specific issues， as reflected in their joint promotion of the Pacific Year for the Ocean.36 The relationship with both competitive and cooperative features has amplified the collective voice of the Pacific in regional climate governance.37

The tactic of leveraging competition among different institutions is made possible by the deepening of global climate governance and the changing landscape of extra-regional great-power involvement. For instance， the PIDF settled on the mission “to provide an enabling environment for Green/Blue Pacific economies” amid the global prevalence of green development concept， which was facilitated by the progress in global climate governance， especially the convening of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development （Rio+20） in 2012. In addition， the PIDF’s establishment was supported by non-government organizations （NGOs） like the International Union for Conservation of Nature （IUCN） and the World Wide Fund for Nature （WWF）， who have served as the PIDF’s technical partners. As extra-regional development partners， several Asian countries， including China， Turkey， Kuwait， Qatar and the United Arab Emirates， also offered assistance or other kinds of support to the inaugural PIDF meeting. Thanks to the endorsement of these developing countries outside the region and the NGOs dedicated to climate governance， the PIDF， owned and led completely by the islanders， has grown and remained active to this day despite its relatively limited resources.38

The Pacific agency has made their act of power borrowing more effective. As a regional organization composed entirely of Pacific Island Countries and Territories （PICTs）， the PIDF is inherently short of resources in terms of funding， staff， and experience， resulting in its limited capacity to raise climate funds and conduct specific projects. To make up for its shortcomings， the PIDF has paid particular attention to occupying the moral high ground and leading regional agenda-setting by releasing political declarations and documents， proposing new concepts and carrying out promotions in the region and beyond. In the process， its deficiencies in funding， staff， and organizational capacity have been bridged mainly by NGOs， including the IUCN， which is also conducive to the interconnection of global and regional climate agendas. Moreover， by convening meetings one to two weeks before the PIF summits， the PIDF has managed to influence the PIF’s political atmosphere， especially when it popularizes an issue or concept proposals in its declarations.39

Setting regional agendas

Based on the favorable global governance and geopolitical environment， the PICs have actively set agendas and promote regional climate governance.

A case in point is the 2015 PIF summit in Port Moresby， where multiple factors came into play to influence the regional climate agenda. Before the summit， other organizations and institutions in the region had issued their declarations on climate change in the months leading up to the Paris Climate Conference. These included the Taputapuatea Declaration on Climate Change of the Polynesian Leaders Group， the SPREP Nuku’alofa Declaration for Sustainable Weather and Climate Services for a Resilient Pacific， and the Port Moresby Declaration on Climate Change of the Pacific Smaller Island States. Besides， various stakeholders were scrambling in and outside the PIF summit to make their voices heard， making climate change the top highlight of the event. In particular， the third PIDF summit of leaders， held on the eve of the PIF summit， adopted the Suva Declaration on Climate Change， which called for limiting global temperature increase to below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and implementing an international moratorium on the construction of new coal mines.40 The PIDF’s ambitious agenda successfully stirred up public debate. At the subsequent PIF Port Moresby summit， the Forum island countries insisted on incorporating the 1.5°C goal and the coal mine moratorium in the final communiqué， to such extent that they suggested at the beginning of the summit that “Australia should consider leaving the PIF if it cannot accept the regional body’s firm stance on climate change.”41 After nine hours of tense closed-door talks in the Leaders Retreat， the final communiqué acknowledged the existence of the 1.5°C goal， in saying “Leaders noted the decisions of the Smaller Island States （SIS） Leaders Meeting … including the SIS Leaders’ Port Moresby Declaration on Climate Change.”42 Despite the ambiguity of wording， this was a compromised success for Forum island countries.

The PIDF has also launched the agenda of formulating a regional climate treaty. In 2016， it commissioned the University of the South Pacific（USP） to draft a Pacific Climate Treaty to help ensure swift and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement. In particular， by so doing， it tried to make more legally binding the parts of the Paris Agreement where the wording remains ambiguous， thus demonstrating the Pacific Island states’ambition to transform climate change into a legal issue in the post-Paris era. One of the biggest attractions of the draft treaty was that for the first time it imposed a total ban on the construction of new coal and other fossil fuel mines on the territories of signatory states， setting a pioneering example as the world’s first legal instrument to ban or phase out fossil fuels.43 The draft treaty also included a forward-looking and relevant clause to secure the “perpetual sovereignty” and rights of Pacific Islands peoples and their territories. In other words， according to the draft， the island states would still possess their sovereign rights under international law even if climate change and the rising sea level deprived parts or even all of their territories.44 Even though the efforts toward a Pacific Climate Treaty have not yet come to effect， they have made a difference in leading the moral high ground and shaping public opinion.

At the fifth PIDF summit of leaders in 2019， held two weeks before the PIF Funafuti summit， “climate change crisis” was hotly debated. The Nadi Bay Declaration on the Climate Change Crisis in the Pacific， adopted at the PIDF meeting， explicitly tabled the concept and influenced the subsequent PIF summit. With the UN Climate Action Summit upcoming， the Pacific Islands leaders demanded the PIF communiqué declare a climate change crisis in the Pacific. However， Australia opposed the use of strong words such as “crisis” in the document and instead advocated a more moderate phrase， “climate change reality，” trying to reduce a possibly influential new concept in global climate governance to merely an ordinary expression by replacing a single word. At the closed-door retreat， the island leaders insisted on a reference to climate change crisis. They even imposed pressure on Scott Morrison by mentioning the influence of the European Union and China， thus backing the Australian PM into a corner.45 Eventually， the phrase“climate crisis” was adopted in the main text of the communiqué， while the Kainaki II Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Action Now， an annex to the communiqué， declared for the first time that “We， the Leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum， meeting in Tuvalu see first-hand the impacts and implications of the climate change crisis facing our Pacific Island Nations.”Besides， the communiqué drew on the IPCC’s 1.5oC Report and explicitly put forward the goal of achieving net-zero carbon by 2050， while urging“members of G7 and G20，” an apparent reference to Australia in this case，“to rapidly implement their commitment to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.”46 This was a substantial leap forward from Australia’s original position， which was to merely “recognize” the information in the IPCC 1.5oC Report and to quash references to carbon neutrality or fossil fuel subsidies phase-out in the text.47 Despite the concessions made to Australia over coal development， which Australia considers of vital significance to its economic interests， as an exchange for progress， the PICs were widely viewed to have prevailed in regional climate governance at this PIF summit. Then Vanuatu Foreign Minister Ralph Regenvanu said after the meeting， “Most of the key language we want to be included that has not been included in the past is there.”48 Dame Meg Taylor， then PIF Secretary-General， described the Kainaki II Declaration as “the strongest statement the Pacific Islands Forum has ever issued collectively on climate change.”49

Constraints to Power Borrowing

In the climate governance of the Pacific Islands region， several features are outstanding. First， it focuses on providing “soft” public goods for the region， such as rules， frameworks and agendas. Second， its topmost priority is to acquire a dominant say in regional organizations. Third， it is heavily reliant on external support. While being proved effective to some extent， as mentioned above， these characteristics also mean its regional governance is fragile and limited in what it can deliver. Notably， in the event of changes to the external circumstances， the inherent weakness of the island countries is easily exposed， constraining the effectiveness of their power borrowing acts.

First， regional agenda-setting may be affected as the focus of global governance may be shifted away from climate change. In the context of the novel coronavirus pandemic， the emphasis of global governance is largely forced to shift toward public health， thus risking marginalizing climate governance. In the Pacific Islands region， preventing the spread of the virus and ensuring the regular operation of societies has become the priority of regional governance. Climate issues are relatively less urgent for regional countries， and unlikely to garner as much attention as before 2019.50 As mentioned above， the effect of power borrowing on advancing regional climate governance is dependent on the popularity of global climate governance and its ability to set regional agendas. With the attention paid to climate issues on the decline， it is more difficult for climate governance in the Pacific Islands to receive as much international support as before the pandemic.

Second， Pacific Island states may have fewer policy options as extraregional Western countries are likely to strengthen coordination on regional politics with Australia and New Zealand. Climate talks passivists in the Umbrella Group like the United States， Japan， Australia and New Zealand are incorporating the Pacific into the Indo-Pacific strategic framework， and are working to advance the strategy in multilateral settings. On the other hand， the United Kingdom and France， despite their more active positions on climate change， are more and more aligned to the above countries strategically. These extra-regional Western powers may set a bar to the cooperation between Pacific Island states and the countries outside the region， and interfere or even impede the climate cooperation between China and regional states. In June 2021， Australia even unilaterally announced the termination of a climate research partnership between its top science body and China on Southern Hemisphere oceans and their impact on the Pacific climate including more frequent El Nino events.51 The strategic convergence of these Western powers may result in more imbalance of influence in the region， further undermining the bargaining power of the PICs and their say in regional climate governance.52

Third， Australia has taken the opportunity of the pandemic and regained more control of regional affairs. Despite their contradictions with Australia on climate issues， the island states are heavily reliant on Australia regarding pandemic response and relevant medical supplies. The increasing dominance of Australia in regional affairs may weaken the PICs’ bargaining power in regional climate governance. In addition， the PIF’s capability to act on the various climate governance programs in the region is likely to face more uncertainty as five Micronesian countries initiated the formal process of withdrawing from the PIF in February 2021 due to a bitter leadership dispute over the election of the organization’s secretary-general.53

Fourth， climate governance in the Pacific Islands region is haunted by a lack of “hard” public goods and especially self-owned funds. Although the island countries have registered outstanding records in proposing initiatives， setting agendas and shaping public opinions， they are short of the resources and capabilities necessary for implementation. External assistance is still the major source of funds for regional projects. Though the Boe Declaration Action Plan launched the Pacific Resilience Facility， which is Pacificowned and Pacific-led， its preparatory work was delayed by the pandemic and its secondary consequences. Not until May 2021 did the PRF release its prospectus as the first step of seeking global funding support.54 The deficiencies in terms of human resources， technology and management may also prevent their sophisticated regional climate governance framework from being implemented and translated into concrete projects.

Conclusion

Existing research on regional governance focuses on the role of major powers in providing public goods and building governance mechanisms， but pays inadequate attention to the influence of small countries. The article reveals that Pacific Island Countries have advanced regional climate governance by drawing upon three kinds of external power sources： global climate governance， the policies of extra-regional powers， and those of the dominant regional power. They have managed to establish a regional governance framework， leverage competition among institutions， and set regional agendas. Despite the multiple constraints to the power borrowing acts of Pacific Island states， this article shows that small states， when united， can contribute regional public goods under certain external circumstances， and even be able to bargain with the regional hegemon to some extent. Such a study may be of reference value to further research on the regionalism of small states.

China is an important development partner of Pacific Island states. In the momentum brought by the power borrowing acts of regional countries， China should continue to pursue synergy with the regional climate governance framework they build， and continue its support for established and new regional organizations such as the PIF， the PIDF and the MSG in their responses to climate change. On post-forum dialogues in the PIF， China can elaborate its position and measures on climate cooperation with the Pacific， and extend more support to the Blue Pacific concept. While having helped regional countries to enhance their capacity-building in response to climate change and bridge the gap in human resources， technology and management， China should also make conscious efforts to make what it has achieved in China-Pacific climate cooperation better known. In the post-pandemic era， these measures will be relevant to the high-quality construction of the Belt and Road Initiative between China and the Pacific.

1 Pacific Islands Countries （PICs） here include 14 islands countries： Cook Islands， Federated States of Micronesia， Fiji， Kiribati， Nauru， Niue， Palau， Papua New Guinea， Marshall Islands， Samoa， Solomon Islands， Tonga， Tuvalu， and Vanuatu.

2 The concept of “Blue Pacific” is an attempt to reposition Pacific Island Countries as large ocean states， rather than small island states.

3 According to Tanja A. B？rzel and Thomas Risse， regional governance is understood as institutionalized modes of social coordination at the regional level to produce and implement binding rules， or to provide public goods in one or some issue areas. See Tanja A. B？rzel and Thomas Risse， eds.， The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism， Oxford University Press， 2016， p.9.

4 Different from the financial term of the same name， “borrowing power” here refers to a behavior or process in international relations， more notably reflected in international negotiations.

5 Carola Betzold， “‘Borrowing’ Power to Influence International Negotiations： AOSIS in the Climate Change Regime， 1990-1997，” Politics， Vol.30， No.3， 2010， pp.135-137. For an application of the concept of “borrowing power” in the study of Pacific Island Countries’ international discursive power， see Xu Xiujun and Tian Xu， “The Logic of Constructing International Discursive Power of Small States in the Era of Global Governance： The Case of Pacific Island States，” Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies， No.2， 2019， pp.122-124.

6 Joanne Wallis， Pacific Power？ Australia’s Strategy in the Pacific Islands， Melbourne University Publishing Limited， 2017， p.3； Herman Mückler， “Australia – A Hegemonic Power in the Pacific Region，”The Journal of Pacific Studies， Vol.36， No.2， 2016， p.138； Liu Qing， “Australia’s Strengthened South Pacific Diplomacy： Measures， Motives and Constraints，” China International Studies， Issue 5， 2019， p.50.

7 Wang Shiming， “Open Regionalism and China-Australia Cooperation in the South Pacific Islands Region，” China International Studies， Issue 2， 2019， pp.84-108.

8 Chen Xiaochen， “New Developments in South Pacific Regionalism： Regional Mechanisms and Impacts，” Journal of International Relations， No.3， 2019， pp.79-106； Yue Xiaoying， “The South Pacific and the Building of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road： Challenges and Responses，” International Forum， No.2， 2020， pp.141-154.

9 The Fossil of the Day awards were presented by the Climate Action Network （CAN）， a worldwide network of over 1300 non-governmental organizations working to address climate change， to those countries“judged to have done their ‘best’ to block progress in the negotiations or in the implementation of the Paris Agreement.”

10 Aaron Atteridge and Nella Canales， “Climate Finance in the Pacific： An Overview of Flows to the Region’s Small Island Developing States，” Stockholm Environment Institute working paper， March 2017， https：//mediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/Climate/SEI-WP-2017-04-Pacific-climate-financeflows.pdf.

11 Greg Fry， Framing the Islands： Power and Diplomatic Agency in Pacific Regionalism， ANU Press， 2019， pp.282-283.

12 Agenda-setting is the political process of putting specific issues within the purview of decision-makers. See Jutta Joachim and Natalia Dalmer， “The United Nations and Agenda Setting，” in Nikolaos Zahariadis， ed.， Handbook of Public Policy Agenda Setting， Edward Elgar Publishing， 2016， p.369.

13 Chen Xiaochen， “Global Governance and the Development of Pacific Islands Regionalism，”International Forum， No.6， 2020， pp.119-136.

14 Dong Liang and Zhang Haibin， “How IPCC Influences the International Climate Negotiation： An Analysis Based on the Theory of Epistemic Communities，” World Economics and Politics， No.8， 2014， pp.64-83.

15 Terrence Wesley-Smith， “Pacific Uncertainties： Changing Geopolitics and Regional Cooperation in Oceania，” in Yu Changsen， ed.， Regionalism in South Pacific， Social Sciences Academic Press （China）， 2018， p.24.

16 Stephanie Lawson， Australia in the Pacific World， Submission to Australian Government Foreign Policy White Paper， February 2017， p.3.

17 Embassy of France in Canberra， “Declaration of the Fourth France-Oceania Summit，” November 26， 2015， https：//au.ambafrance.org/Declaration-of-the-Fourth-France-Oceania-Summit.

18 Zhu Songli and Gao Xiang， From Copenhagen to Paris： Evolution and Development of International Climate Regime， Tsinghua University Press， 2017， pp.252-253.

19 European Commission， “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council： A Renewed Partnership with the Countries of Africa， the Caribbean and the Pacific，” Strasbourg， JOIN （2016） 52 final， 2016， pp.21-23.

20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， “The 7th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting （PALM7），” May 23， 2015， https：//www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/page23e_000427.html.

21 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat， “Forty-ninth Pacific Islands Forum， Yaren， Nauru， 3-6 September， 2018： Forum Communiqué，” PIFS （18）10， Yaren， Nauru， 2018.

22 Chen Dezheng， ed.， Pacific Islands Studies， Vol.1， Social Sciences Academic Press， 2017， p.6.

23 Kate Lyons， “Fiji PM Accuses Scott Morrison of ‘Insulting’ and Alienating Pacific Leaders，” The Guardian， August 16， 2019， https：//www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/16/fiji-pm-frank-bainimaramainsulting-scott-morrison-rift-pacific-countries.

24 Ministry of External Affairs of India， “Inauguration of India-Pacific Islands Sustainable Development Conference，” May 25， 2017， https：//www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm？ dtl/28488/Inauguration_of_ IndiaPacific_Islands_Sustainable_Development_Conference.

25 M. Syaprin Zahidi and Musfiroh， “The Melanesian Spearhead Group in terms of Indonesia’s Interest，”Przegl？d Politologiczny， Vol.23， No.2， 2018， pp.165-172.

26 Nic Maclellan， “The Region in Review： International Issues and Events， 2015，” The Contemporary Pacific， Vol.28， No.2， 2016， pp.438-439.

27 Jonathan Schultz， “Theorising Australia-Pacific Island Relations，” Australian Journal of International Affairs， Vol.68， No.5， 2014， pp.562-563. Instead of using the term “middle power complexity” in Schultz’s article， the author considers “middle power dilemma” a better description of Australia’s difficult choice between international morality and unilateral actions.

28 Kate Lyons， “Australia Removes Climate ‘Crisis’ from Pacific Islands Draft Declaration，” The Guardian， August 14， 2019， https：//www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/15/australia-removes-coal-andclimate-crisis-references-from-pacific-islands-declaration； Chloé Farand， “Australia Seeks to Water down Climate Declaration at Pacific Summit，” August 13， 2019， https：//www.climatechangenews.com/2019/08/13/ australia-seeks-water-climate-declaration-pacific-summit.

29 Greg Fry， Framing the Islands： Power and Diplomatic Agency in Pacific Regionalism， ANU Press， 2019， pp.316-322.

30 Pacific Community （SPC）， Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme （SPREP）， Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat （PIFS）， United Nations Development Programme （UNDP）， United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction （UNISDR） and University of the South Pacific （USP）， Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific： An Integrated Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management （FRDP） 2017 - 2030， Suva， Fiji， 2016， pp.12-25.

31 European Commission， “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council： A Renewed Partnership with the Countries of Africa， the Caribbean and the Pacific，” pp.21-23.

32 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat， “Forty-eighth Pacific Islands Forum， Apia， Samoa， September 5-8， 2017： Forum Communiqué，” PIFS （17）10， Apia， Samoa， 2017， pp.1-2. With multiple meanings， the Blue Pacific is not only a regional governance concept， but also represents a new regional identity and narrative， as well as a new expression of achieving security through sustainable development， management and conservation.

33 Pacific Islands Forum， “Boe Declaration on Regional Security，” September 2018， https：//www. forumsec.org/2018/09/05/boe-declaration-on-regional-security.

34 Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane， “Contested Multilateralism，” Review of International Organizations， Vol.9， No.4， 2014， pp.385-386.

35 Ashlie Denée Denton， “Voices for Environmental Action？ Analyzing Narrative in Environmental Governance Networks in the Pacific Islands，” Global Environmental Change， Vol.43， 2017， pp.62-71.

36 “The Blue Pacific at the United Nations Ocean Conference，” June 2017， https：//www.forumsec.org/ blue-pacific-united-nations-ocean-conference.

37 Sandra Tarte， “The Changing Paradigm of Pacific Regional Politics，” The Round Table， Vol.106， No.2， 2017， pp.1-9.

38 Lyu Guixia， “Globalization， Regionalization and the Pacific Islands Development Forum，” History Research and Teaching， No.4， 2018， pp.105-111； Chen Xiaochen， “Pacific Islands Development Forum under Global Governance： Origins， Process and Influence，” Area Studies and Global Development， No.4， 2019， pp.5-22.

39 Joanna Siekiera， “Pacific Islands Development Forum： Emergence of the New Participant in the Pacific Regionalism，” Studia Iuridica Lublinensia， Vol.28， No.3， 2019， pp.77-87.

40 Pacific Islands Development Forum， “Suva Declaration on Climate Change，” in Suva， Fiji， September 2-4， 2015.

41 “Pacific Islands Forum Leader Warns Australia on Climate Stance，” The Straits Times， September 8， 2015， https：//www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/pacific-islands-forum-leader-warns-australia-on-climatestance.

42 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat， “Forty-sixth Pacific Islands Forum， Port Moresby， Papua New Guinea， 8-10 September， 2015： Forum Communiqué，” PIFS （15）7， in Port Moresby， Papua New Guinea， p.7.

43 Michael Slezak， “Pacific Islands Nations Consider World’s First Treaty to Ban Fossil Fuels，” The Guardian， July 14， 2016， https：//www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/14/pacific-islands-nations-considerworlds-first-treaty-to-ban-fossil-fuels.

44 Margaretha Wewerinke， “Thinking Globally， Acting Regionally： The Case for a Pacific Climate Treaty，” 2016， http：//pacificidf.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Pacific-Climate-Treaty.pdf.

45 Kate Lyons， “Revealed： ‘Fierce’ Pacific Forum Meeting almost Collapsed over Climate Crisis，” The Guardian， August 16， 2019， https：//www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/aug/16/revealed-fiercepacific-forum-meeting-almost-collapsed-over-climate-crisis； Kate Lyons， “Fiji PM Accuses Scott Morrison of ‘Insulting’ and Alienating Pacific Leaders，” The Guardian， August 16， 2019， https：//www.theguardian. com/world/2019/aug/16/fiji-pm-frank-bainimarama-insulting-scott-morrison-rift-pacific-countries.

46 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat， “Fiftieth Pacific Islands Forum， Funafuti， Tuvalu， 13-16 August， 2019： Forum Communiqué，” PIFS （19）14， in Funafuti， Tuvalu， pp.11-13.

47 Chloé Farand， “Australia Seeks to Water down Climate Declaration at Pacific Summit.”

48 Nic Maclellan， “Forum Marathon Reveals Tensions over Climate Policy，” Islands Business， August 16， 2019， https：//islandsbusiness.com/news-break/forum-marathon-reveals-tensions-over-climate-policy.

49 Meg Taylor， “Pacific Leaders Set New Bar by Collectively Declaring Climate Crisis，” September 28， 2019， https：//www.climatechangenews.com/2019/08/28/pacific-leaders-set-new-bar-collectively-declaringclimate-crisis.

50 Joanne Wallis and Henrietta McNeill， “The Implications of COVID-19 for Security in the Pacific Islands，” Round Table， Vol.110， No.2， 2021， pp.203-216.

51 Peter Hannam， “‘Utter Nonsense’： CSIRO Blasted for Dropping Chinese Climate Partner，” The Sydney Morning Herald， June 17， 2021， https：//www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/utter-nonsensecsiro-blasted-for-dropping-chinese-climate-partner-20210616-p581ix.html.

52 Steven McGann， “How the US Can Build Cooperation in the Pacific，” October 27， 2020， https：//www. aspistrategist.org.au/how-the-us-can-build-cooperation-in-the-pacific； Eerishika Pankaj， “Australia’s Pacific Step-up and the Quad，” January 19， 2021， https：//www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-s-pacificstep-and-quad.

53 Anne-Marie Schleich， “End of Pacific Regionalism？” March 1， 2021， https：//www.rsis.edu.sg/rsispublication/rsis/end-of-pacific-regionalism/#.YIQWtL5SGUk.

54 “Pacific Resilience Facility Prospectus， Logo Launch a ‘Necessary Stepping Stone’ towards Global Pledging Event， Says SG Taylor，” May 12， 2021， https：//www.forumsec.org/2021/05/12/pacific-resiliencefacility-prospectus-logo-launch-a-necessary-stepping-stone-towards-global-pledging-event-says-sg-taylor.