New Security Challenges Within the International System:Changing Policy Among Major States

By Douglas Bandow

Former Special Assistant to President Reagan and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute

Never has the world been richer or nor the opportunities available to its residents been greater.New understandings and technologies beckon to a future that is healthier as well as wealthier and in which the bounty of humanity’s creativity is much more widely shared.However, taking advantage of this promise requires nations to adjust to a dramatically changing international environment.That includes adapting to significant shifts in economic and military power, as well as softer forms of global influence.

I.Development of Traditional International Order

The modern world has a Eurocentric foundation.The ancient order featured a succession of kingdoms and empires, which typically dominated for a time and then disappeared, losing out to newer powers.Rome remained dominant for an unusually long period, but its influence always was bounded.It had little impact much beyond the periphery of Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.Imperial Rome had no contact with the Eastern hemisphere.

Once the western half of the Roman Empire fell, few would have bet on Europe’s future dominance.The Chinese empire seemed a more likely candidate for global rule.The dynasties changed, but the imperium lived on.However, in the 15thcentury China’s Ming dynasty chose isolation.It was a hugely consequential decision for the Chinese nation.Then, stasis, weakness, and submission ended up transforming their future.

In contrast, Europe went in a very different direction.Despite periodic crises—the so-called Black Death and Mongol invasion,for instance—the continent learned to look outward.Even during the Middle Ages, starting around the 10thcentury, Europe began a period of sustained economic growth.The 14thcentury featured the Renaissance.The 15thcentury began what became a torrent of international exploration and trade.The industrial revolution transformed the continent starting in the 18thcentury.

Wealth and technology enhanced military power.Well into the 20thcentury European nations reached across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.Although Great Britain was the greatest of the global states, its direct power remained surprisingly limited: Britannia ruled the waves but fielded only a modest army.London relied on local troops and allied armies to advance its policies.Other than the loss of its American colonies, it was almost always victorious through World War II.One of Britain’s victims was China, which was forced to detach Hong Kong to London and grant“concessions” of Macau and related areas assorted to Portugal and other Western powers.Through World War I European governments would consult with each other on how to divide the geopolitical spoils, sometimes cooperating to enforce their will, as in China during the so-called Boxer Rebellion.

II.Destruction of Traditional International Order

Although the European states survived many limited conflicts among them with their reputations and influence intact, World War I proved different.All the colonial powers save Germany emerged from the conflict with their possessions, but their reputations had been ravaged.Countries which spent years slaughtering each other appeared less formidable to smaller states and dependent peoples.Peace brought only further instability to Europe, with the creation of a multitude of vulnerable smaller states.And revolutions of various sorts swept Germany, Russia, Italy, and the conglomerate Austro-Hungary.Although Britain and France remained atop the international order, their hold was tenuous and their confidence was shattered.

Moreover, powers both east and west of Europe were rising.Until 1917 the United States had been largely disengaged from the world politically and militarily.Joining the so-called Entente, the United States gave the latter a decisive edge against the German-led Central Powers.In 1919 the Versailles Treaty was an embarrassing repudiation of the moralistic claims underlying Washington’s entry into WWI—was rejected the U.S.Congress and popular disillusionment set in.Voters elected a new president who pulled America back from a leading international role.However, the U.S.no longer stood aloof from world affairs.

Transformed by the Meiji Revolution,Japan became the dominant Asian state.Having joined the Entente Tokyo benefited from the spoils of victory.However, Japan learned that the European club remained closed when the 1919 peace conference rejected a proposal by Japanese delegates regarding the “equality of nations” that would have banned discrimination based on “race or nationality.” Still, Japan was the one Asian state which European powers were forced to treat as an international equal.

Finally, in 1911 China’s Qing dynasty was overthrown in a revolution led by Sun Yat-sen.Although the new republic remained divided and weak, it foreshadowed great changes to come.The Chinese people had finally broken free of the stultifying imperial order and set in motion a process of great change.The new China joined Japan in undermining Asia’s position as a dominion of the West.

The inter-war years saw the revival of deadly European rivalry as well as Japan’s invasion of China.When war finally came to Europe the two theaters merged into a global conflagration.The defeat of Germany and Japan yielded a completely new international order.Among the Europeans only the UK still stood militarily strong, but it was financially exhausted.Although London formally retained its empire, Britain’s hold was barely a short-term lease.Germany was defeated and divided.France had to deal with the consequences of occupation by and sometime collusion with Germany.Much of the rest of the continent was in ruins and chaos.

In Asia the collapse of the international system was almost complete.Japan was defeated and occupied.Onetime colonies, such as Korea, Vietnam, and the Dutch West Indies,were adrift, neither ruled nor freed.Most important, China, liberated from Japanese occupation, descended into full-scale civil war.

Thus, huge geopolitical vacuums existed both east and west.They were filled by the United States and Soviet Union as the Cold War developed.In the succeeding four decades the rest of the globe gradually welcomed both older revived and newly emerged powers.Europe recovered, as did Japan.Colonies won independence.India became a diplomatic and later economic force.Most importantly, the People’s Republic of China was born and eventually overcame internal challenges to dramatically enter the international marketplace.Still, until the U.S.S.R.collapsed the world remained largely bipolar, its relationships distorted by the sometimes violent and always dangerous competition between Washington and Moscow.

III.The Unipolar Moment

The Soviet break-up left an American-dominated order.It was called many things, including the Unipolar Moment, an apt description.For a brief time there was one hyperpower.That is, among world powers there was America and no one else.Washington was in a strong position to win international assent or at least acquiescence to U.S.economic and geopolitical initiatives.And Washington could act largely irrespective of the desires of others—expanding NATO up to Russia’s borders, for instance.Any real political or military battle would end in an American victory.

However, this world also turned out to be brief, just a “moment,” indeed, barely that considering the sweep of history.Other empires lasted centuries or decades.China even longer.Washington enjoyed something akin to imperial power for 20 or 30 years.The Trump administration is acting as if the unipolar moment remains, with America in charge, but the results have been disappointing—for President Donald Trump, at least.

Russia is no longer a global hegemonic competitor but remains a powerful regional power with international reach.And Moscow is sharply at odds with the United States and Europe over NATO expansion and especially the status of Ukraine and Georgia.However,allied sanctions have proved to be a dead-end and several European nations are pressing to change policy.Moscow also has consciously impeded American objectives in Venezuela,Syria, and Iran.In Afghanistan and North Korea the Putin government has proved less willing to back U.S.aims.

Washington’s relations with long-time friends, including Canada, Mexico, and Europe,have grown more truculent.Economic and immigration issues top the list of disputes, but security questions also loom large with Europe.America’s determination to use its predominant economic position to enforce its foreign policy directives has created special discontent across the continent regarding Cuba and Iran.

Europe’s economic influence has grown,despite the challenge posed by adoption of the Euro alongside radically different fiscal strategies by member governments.The continent matches America’s economic strength and exceeds that of China, though the Europeans continue to find it difficult to address on a common basis international issues.The European Union has stalled well short of a United States of Europe.Whether the continent is ever able to create a more consolidated government capable of managing Europe’s fiscal affairs, creating a serious trans-national military, and implementing an independent foreign policy remains to be seen.Until then,Brussels’ influence will dramatically diminish further from Europe.Although the continent’s economic ties with Asia, and especially China,are significant, its political and military clout in Asia is nonexistent.

The U.S.found limits to its influence even in its geographic neighborhood.The Trump administration tightened sanctions on both Cuba and Venezuela, but so far without result.Moreover, the political left remains vibrant and competitive in the region: Mexico has a president at sharp odds with America and the Peronistas could return to power in Argentina in the October elections.

Washington increasingly has militarized relations with Africa, in 2007 creating Africa Command or AFRICOM.Counter-terrorism tops its missions, but many operations are directed more at aiding local governments than protecting America.However, U.S.officials fear being left behind as the long-term international competition increasingly leans economic and political.Washington and Moscow used aid, investment, and trade as well as soldiers to compete for influence during the Cold War.Now America’s most important competition comes from the PRC, which has supplemented its steadily expanding trade relationships with projects under the Belt and Road Initiative.Although Beijing’s involvement has not been without controversies and setbacks, Chinese influence is growing throughout Africa.

Consuming most of Washington’s attention has been the Middle East.The United States demonstrated what should already have been obvious: America is capable of defeating any small to mid-size power, but lacks the mindset,patience, and skills necessary to remake other societies.Because Washington is unable to set meaningful priorities in where and what it does,it has squandered immeasurable resources in pursuit of secondary and even peripheral objectives.

For instance, three successive U.S.administrations spent lives, materiel, and attention in nation-building exercises in Afghanistan and Iraq; in Libya and Syria the Obama administration concentrated on destroying the existing governing structures without much concern about what followed.The United States got enmeshed in the Saudi/Emirati war against Yemen and currently is teetering on the brink of war with Iran.In the cases of Iraq and Iran Washington found itself acting without many of its traditional allies.Most important, the United States found itself far better at creating chaos which, like quicksand, made escape virtually impossible.Even as America’s energy reliance on the Mideast falls, Washington is being ever more tied to the region militarily.Yet every military action increases the number of enemies and potential terrorists, who then become the justification for additional military interventions, and on and on.

In Asia the United States remains the dominant security player but is losing its strong ground economically.Washington has directly confronted North Korea but found itself forced to try diplomacy after briefly threatening “fire and fury” in fall 2017.The talks are currently deadlocked and most observers recognize that the Trump administration will have to make concessions if it hopes to achieve denuclearization.

More significant is Washington’s attempt at the containment of China.Although American officials deny such an intention, there is no other explanation for U.S.policy.Trump administration policymakers assume aggressive intentions by Beijing and have pushed an assertive response regarding territorial claims in East Asian waters.Washington also has increased its military presence in the region,affirmed its alliance relationships with Japan and the Philippines, and sought to expand security ties with India.Finally, the current administration has highlighted its long relationship with Taiwan.Such initiatives have likely increased PRC determination to enhance its military strength.

However, East Asia is moving beyond bilateral rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Other countries are taking independent steps and often confronting China directly.Japan’s Abe government has been adopting a more aggressive political and military policy.India has been taking a more active role,building relations with Japan and Vietnam, in particular.South Korea and the PRC steadily improved their relations until Seoul’s deployment of the THAAD missile defense system, followed by Beijing’s imposition of sanctions; the bilateral relations have rebounded but remain tinged with suspicion.Australia, with deep security ties to America,has hosted a bitter internal debate over China’s growing influence domestically.

The economic competition for America is even stiffer.China’s commercial cooperation with its neighbors has surpassed their economic relations with America.Even South Korea,dependent for security on Washington, trades more with the PRC than with the United States and Japan combined.The Trump administration’s disdain for free trade, and especially rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was negotiated by the previous administration, opened the region to bilateral and multilateral trade pacts with Beijing.Most significantly, the United States and China currently are in the midst of a trade war.

Overall there has been talk of a potential cold war between Washington and Beijing.Relations have deteriorated, but thankfully have not reached that level.There is no global clash highlighted by military confrontation and existential threats.Despite the contentious trade talks, the two countries retain large-scale and beneficial economic cooperation.There are far more personal, academic, tourist, and other exchanges than that during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.And most of the world retains strong relations with both the United States and China, deeply embedding both in the same international order.

IV.Development of a New International Order

The Unipolar Moment obviously is over.Despite the illusions of many American policymakers, the problem is not lack of“leadership,” the constant mantra tossed about in U.S.foreign policy debates.Washington increasingly will lack the capability and determination to dominate every region of the globe.The U.S.president and Congress continue to act wildly with no concern for the future.America long has benefited from the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency.The Euro’s acceptance has been slowed by the travails of Greece and other European states.The Renminbi’s role has been limited by concern over China’s lack of financial transparency.

However, Washington’s deficit will near $1 trillion this year and only increase in the future.The federal government budget will be under increasing strain as more Americans retire,reducing tax revenues while increasing outlays on pensions and health care.The U.S.desire to project power at will costs far more than deterring outside intervention.The American public is likely to have a declining willingness to underwrite the expense of what appears to be foreign adventurism for little benefit.These will force Washington to rethink its foreign policy.

What is future security policy of leading nations likely to look like? The system must evolve, perhaps broadly along the lines suggested below.For a time the U.S.will continue to pursue primacy.Washington will browbeat its allies to follow its lead, and mix military threats with economic sanctions to force others to accept its ends.The results will become increasingly indifferent.Friendly nations will resist contributing to military campaigns and work to further shield the international financial system from American control.For instance, Europe has been working to protect transactions with Iran to preserve the nuclear agreement.Potential adversaries will back similar efforts while assisting each other to resist Washington.Moscow recently offered to similarly aid Iran and both China and Russia provided other forms of assistance to Venezuela.States that feel threatened by the U.S.will use proceeds from their growing economies to bolster their militaries, emphasizing such weapons as missiles and submarines to deny or at least hinder America access to their waters,lands, and airspace.

Under extraordinary fiscal pressure, the United States will begin cutting back affecting its influence in the Asia-Pacific, and other nations can most easily take over security responsibilities.For instance, Americans are likely to tire of defending Europe, a continent facing few genuine security threats and possessing the means to protect itself.Moscow has little incentive to attack its neighbors, for the costs would vastly outrange the benefits.Moreover, as a whole Europe possesses a much larger population and economy than Russia.Of all the U.S.commitments, the one to Europe may be most antiquated.In some fashion Europe will take on increasing security responsibilities, including confronting Moscow,if need be, as well as limiting refugee/migrant flows from North Africa and the Middle East and thwarting terrorist attacks originating in the same regions.The mechanism could be NATO with a reduced U.S.role.Or it could be a new Euro-defense agency emanating from the European Union.Still, Europe will have difficulty projecting military power much beyond its own environs.The political differences among EU members and reluctance to invest in the military are likely to remain too great.In coming years Washington also is likely to draw back from the Middle East, since the results of past interventions have ranged between disappointing and disastrous.Moreover, America no longer has much at stake in a region in which instability seems endemic.For instance, the United States has become a major energy producer and is not reliant on Middle Eastern oil.New oil and natural gas fields have been discovered elsewhere and will ease European and Asian dependence on the Middle East as well.Moreover, Israel, a traditional American concern, is a regional superpower, able to defeat any of its neighbors brave enough to challenge it.As for terrorism,Washington’s constant war-making in the region and support for Israel and its oppressive rule over the Palestinians have been major grievances driving attacks on the U.S.Disengaging would make America safer.

The result is likely to be development of a new regional balance of power.The Gulf states might more openly ally with Israel, and Turkey might informally join with Syria, Iraq, and Iran.All would find it in their interest to battle jihadist insurgents and terrorists, such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.Some states, such as Yemen, seem destined for long-term crisis.Others, such as Egypt, look stable but might face upheaval sooner than expected.Iran is unlikely to yield to the Trump administration’s extreme demands but might make a more balanced deal with a different U.S.administration and Europe.Moreover,industrialized states east and west will face pressure regarding security of oil shipments through Persian Gulf waters.Normally no Mideast state has an incentive to interrupt transit, but outside factors, such as U.S.economic sanctions or ongoing conflict, could change that calculus.If Washington finally demurred from taking on the responsibility, it would fall most obviously on the Chinese,European, Indian, and Japanese navies.

In Asia an American withdrawal is likely to be slower and more measured.There is no friendly multilateral alliance in place.Washington’s partners have a history of mutual antagonism, particularly toward Japan.And China, of greatest concern to U.S.governments past and present, dwarfs its much smaller neighbors.Nevertheless, America is likely to eventually move into a role more akin to that of an off-shore balancer.New powers, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, are likely to play increasingly important regional roles.An improved relationship between South and North Korea will reduce the argument for U.S.ground forces stationed in the Republic of Korea.With Japan steadily enhancing its military capabilities Washington might bring home the Marine Expeditionary Force stationed on Okinawa, as long demanded by many local residents.The United States is likely to encourage greater regional military cooperation,including with Vietnam and India.Along the way Washington might shift its defense commitment from contested territories to national independence of allied states, which has never been threatened by the PRC.

How China’s neighbors perceive its ambitions and plans will likely determine these and other developments.In recent years regional concern has increased that Beijing has abandoned its commitment to “peaceful rise”and is more willing to use military force to achieve its ends.That has encouraged neighboring states to move closer to America,change their opinion of Japanese rearmament,cooperate more with one another, and invite India to effectively connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans.Recent Chinese policy toward Taiwan and Hong Kong has reinforced these negative opinions.If Beijing’s strategy continues in this direction, any American withdrawal is likely to be more limited and reluctant, and to be met by vigorous regional moves to fill the resulting vacuum.On the other hand, if the PRC and its neighbors successfully address pressing controversies — for instance,some interim agreements regarding regional territorial claims allowing shared development while postponing sovereignty decisions—Washington might be readier to leave and there might be little effort to replace U.S.deployments and commitments.

Africa has extraordinary room to grow,depending on the policies adopted by individual governments.Africa has been enjoying a modest renaissance of democracy and economic growth.Greater reform-oriented stability has encouraged more investment and trade, creating a virtuous cycle to the benefit once desperately poor populations.If countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa can surmount significant political challenges, they will emerge with global importance.Although the continent’s security challenges are real, they have little to do with outside powers.Most involve home-grown or neighboring insurgents and terrorists, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria.Thus, international geopolitical competition no longer need hinder Africa’s development.Rather, any China-U.S.economic competition should redound to the continent’s benefit.

Similar is the situation with Latin America.Despite having only a modest presence internationally, the region has three potentially important international participants: Argentina,Brazil, and Mexico.All face primarily self-inflicted wounds, and could make reforms and succeed largely irrespective of U.S.and their international policies.

Of course, America is nearby and naturally dominates its neighbors.Those long outside its sway, most notably Cuba and Venezuela, matter little strategically.Contrary to the Trump administration’s near hysterical reaction to the Maduro government, this regime can do little to harm anyone other than its own people,whether America or Caracas’ neighbors.With the recent resolution of Colombia’s long-running armed insurgency, there are few significant security issues in the region other than the drug trade.For the latter America long has been the primary problem, providing the demand driving production and imposing legal prohibition, making the trade more lucrative.In any case, given America’s proximity,Washington is unlikely to substantially change its intrusive policies toward Latin America.They cost the U.S.relatively little while the region matters much to Washington.

Overall, there is no reason the foregoing world, or something similar, could not deliver general stability and peace, indeed do so better than the present international order.Although at least some smaller conflicts are inevitable, the major powers could remain at peace, especially if they work to establish firebreaks to war.Combat of any sort seems least likely in Europe,outside of the Balkans, anyway.There is little in either South America or Africa to draw in one let alone multiple ones.Asia may be most vulnerable to conflict, which highlights the importance of its peoples and governments working to resolve disputes which could lead to violence.

V.Threats to Stability and Peace

Despite the tragedy of violence which seemingly surrounds us, the world has been getting more peaceful.There are fewer large,destructive wars.Those that occur, such as the Syrian civil war and Saudi/Emirati invasion of Yemen, are awful.However, they pale compared to many in the past, considering the Sino-Japanese conflict of the 1930s, as well as World Wars I and II.

Thus, while it is important to work against conflict anywhere by any state and group, it is most important to develop a security structure that most effectively discourages big wars by big powers.Among the most dangerous presently are mid-level rivalries,such as India and Pakistan, nuclear powers both.Saudi Arabia and Iran are another combustible pair.North and South Korea too.These nations,major powers, and international organizations should work to such assorted military tinderboxes.Indeed, President Donald Trump’s willingness to meet with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un addresses one of the most worst confrontations, offering hope of creating a stable, peaceful peninsula.

Far more dangerous are existential disputes among the major powers of which, thankfully,there are few.While the U.S.has a variety of claims and complaints against both China and Russia, and they are against America, none involve vital interests of any party.Against each other the three contend for influence, not territory, population, or existence.There simply is no traditional excuse for war among them.

Regarding other states or groups, the greatest threat to America comes from terrorists,for which traditional war is no answer; rather,invading and occupying other nations is likely to increase such attacks.China and Russia have more direct confrontations with others, lesser powers—both over territorial claims of sorts.China with India, Japan, Philippines, and Vietnam; Russia with Georgia and Ukraine.

Washington’s tendency to promiscuously issue security guarantees has turned all into potential transmission belts of great power conflict.Washington keeps supporting the expansion of NATO and even has pushed to bring Georgia and Ukraine into the transatlantic alliance.The Trump administration also has reaffirmed its defense commitments in Asia over contested territories, such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.In the Middle East Washington has acted as general guarantor of Israel and bodyguard for the Saudi and Emirati royals.All these commitments could lead to limited conflicts.Although a U.S.defense promise helps deter foreign action, it also encourages reckless behavior by recipients and ensures American involvement if deterrence fails.Thus, Washington must attempt to restrain its allies while essentially promising to back them with nuclear weapons if anything goes wrong.

The best way to avoid major power conflict in such cases is to seek peaceful resolution of disputes involving America’s defense dependents.For example, with Russia Washington could offer to halt further NATO expansion, and especially discussion of possible NATO membership for Georgia and Russia.In return Moscow could drop support for Ukrainian separatists and hold an internationally monitored referendum in Crimea.

In Asia the U.S.could disengage from territorial controversies where the parties have found peaceful means to defuse potential confrontations.In some cases Washington might be able to help solve the conflict—agreeing to verifiable arms control and economic cooperation on the Korean peninsula, for instance.Finally, resolving ancillary but tension-building disputes, such as over trade, would help build additional firebreaks to conflict.

In the Middle East Washington might backstop the survival of its allies but not promise to intervene when lesser interests were at stake.Moreover, the U.S.could relinquish responsibility for maintaining Mideast stability.It is a thankless, frankly fruitless task, and is not necessary for the peace and security of America or other important powers.Such steps would not guarantee the absence of conflict,however, such a course would make war much less likely.

VI.Conclusion

People living today live far better than their ancestors.Even those with modest incomes have conveniences and luxuries far beyond the imagination of the wealthiest and most powerful figures in the past.Amazing medical care, the miracle of travel, the wonders of the internet, and so much more.It is a good time to be alive.However, the threat of conflict and war remains very real around the globe.Worst would be eruption of conflict between major powers, which could kill and destroy on a mass scale, even threatening the existence of entire nations.We have tragically suffered through such events in the past.World War II ended just 74 years ago.The Korean War concluded 66 years ago, but no peace treaty was ever signed, and the Vietnam War ended 44 years ago, etc..The risk of new great power wars has since eased, at least slightly although there have been other horrendous conflicts since then, but none that involved a major power or threatened to draw in major powers.

With the collapse of the Unipolar Moment,peoples and governments around the world must look for alternative security structures to provide for a stable and peaceful future.Such a world is not foreordained but will require hard work.As we embark upon this task, we should insist, as has often been said elsewhere, that failure is not an option.We simply must succeed, lest this seeming world of plenty turn into one of disaster.

Footnotes:

1.He is the author ofTripwire: Korea and U.S.Foreign Policy in a Changed WorldandForeign Follies:America’s New Global Empire.