Bertrand Russell
Any serious educational theory must consist of two parts: a conception of the ends of life, and a science of psychological dynamics, i.e. of the laws of mental change. Two men who differ as to the ends of life cannot hope to agree about education. The educational machine, throughout Western civilization, is dominated by two ethical theories: that of Christianity, and that of nationalism. These two, when taken seriously, are incompatible, as is becoming evident in Germany. For my part, I hold that, where they differ, Christianity is preferable, but where they agree, both are mistaken. The conception which I should substitute as the purpose of education is civilization, a term which, as I mean it, has a definition which is partly individual, partly social. It consists, in the individual, of both intellectual and moral qualities: intellectually, a certain minimum of general knowledge, technical skill in ones own profession, and a habit of forming opinions on evidence; morally, of impartiality, kindliness, and a modicum of self-control. I should add a quality which is neither moral nor intellectual, but perhaps physiological: zest and joy of life. In communities, civilization demands respect for law, justice as between man and man, purposes not involving permanent injury to any section of the human race, and intelligent adaptation of means to ends.
If these are to be the purpose of education, it is a question for the science of psychology to consider what can be done towards realizing them, and, in particular, what degree of freedom is likely to prove most effective.
On the question of freedom in education there are at present three main schools of thought, deriving partly from differences as to ends and partly from differences in psychological theory. There are those who say that children should be completely free, however bad they may be; there are those who say they should be completely subject to authority, however good they may be; and there are those who say they should be free, but in spite of freedom they should be always good. This last party is larger than it has any logical right to be; children, like adults, will not all be virtuous if they are all free. The belief that liberty will ensure moral perfection is a relic of Rousseauism, and would not survive a study of animals and babies. Those who hold this belief think that education should have no positive purpose, but should merely offer an environment suitable for spontaneous development. I cannot agree with this school, which seems to me too individualistic, and unduly indifferent to the importance of knowledge. We live in communities which require cooperation, and it would be utopian to expect all the necessary cooperation to result from spontaneous impulse. The existence of a large population on a limited area is only possible owing to science and technique; education must, therefore, hand on the necessary minimum of these. The educators who allow most freedom are men whose success depends upon a degree of benevolence, self-control, and trained intelligence which can hardly be generated where every impulse is left unchecked; their merits, therefore, are not likely to be perpetuated if their methods are undiluted. Education, viewed from a social standpoint, must be something more positive than a mere opportunity for growth. It must, of course, provide this, but it must also provide a mental and moral equipment which children cannot acquire entirely for themselves.
The arguments in favour of a great degree of freedom in education are derived not from mans natural goodness, but from the effects of authority, both on those who suffer it and on those who exercise it. Those who are subject to authority become either submissive or rebellious, and each attitude has its drawbacks.
The submissive lose initiative, both in thought and action; moreover, the anger generated by the feeling of being thwarted tends to find an outlet in bullying those who are weaker. That is why tyrannical institutions are self-perpetuating: what a man has suffered from his father he inflicts upon his son, and the humiliations which he remembers having endured at his public school he passes on to “natives" when he becomes an empire-builder. Thus an unduly authoritative education turns the pupils into timid tyrants, incapable of either claiming or tolerating originality in word or deed. The effect upon the educators is even worse: they tend to become sadistic disciplinarians, glad to inspire terror, and content to inspire nothing else. As these men represent knowledge, the pupils acquire a horror of knowledge, which, among the English upper-class, is supposed to be part of human nature, but is really part of the well-grounded hatred of the authoritarian pedagogue.
Rebels, on the other hand, though they may be necessary, can hardly be just to what exists. Moreover, there are many ways of rebelling, and only a small minority of these are wise. Galileo was a rebel and was wise; believers in the flat-earth theory are equally rebels, but are foolish. There is a great danger in the tendency to suppose that opposition to authority is essentially meritorious and that unconventional opinions are bound to be correct: no useful purpose is served by smashing lamp-posts or maintaining Shakespeare to be no poet. Yet this excessive rebelliousness is often the effect that too much authority has on spirited pupils. And when rebels become educators, they sometimes encourage defiance in their pupils, for whom at the same time they are trying to produce a perfect environment, although these two aims are scarcely compatible.
What is wanted is neither submissiveness nor rebellion, but good nature, and general friendliness both to people and to new ideas. These qualities are due in part to physical causes, to which old-fashioned educators paid too little attention; but they are due still more to freedom from the feeling of baffled impotence which arises when vital impulses are thwarted. If the young are to grow into friendly adults, it is necessary, in most cases, that they should feel their environment friendly. This requires that there should be a certain sympathy with the childs important desires, and not merely an attempt to use him for some abstract end such as the glory of God or the greatness of ones country. And, in teaching, every attempt should be made to cause the pupil to feel that it is worth his while to know what is being taught—at least when this is true. When the pupil cooperates willingly, he learns twice as fast and with half the fatigue. All these are valid reasons for a very great degree of freedom.
It is easy, however, to carry the argument too far. It is not desirable that children, in avoiding the vices of the slave, should acquire those of the aristocrat. Consideration for others, not only in great matters, but also in little everyday things, is an essential element in civilization, without which social life would be intolerable. I am not thinking of mere forms of politeness, such as saying “please”and “thank you” : formal manners are most fully developed among barbarians, and diminish with every advance in culture. I am thinking rather of willingness to take a fair share of necessary work, to be obliging in small ways that save trouble on the balance. Sanity itself is a form of politeness and it is not desirable to give a child a sense of omnipotence, or a belief that adults exist only to minister to the pleasures of the young. And those who disapprove of the existence of the idle rich are hardly consistent if they bring up their children without any sense that work is necessary, and without the habits that make continuous application possible.
There is another consideration to which some advocates of freedom attach too little importance. In a community of children which is left without adult interference there is a tyranny of the stronger, which is likely to be far more brutal than most adult tyranny. If two children of two or three years old are left to play together, they will, after a few fights, discover which is bound to be the victor, and the other will then become a slave. Where the number of children is larger, one or two acquire complete mastery, and the others have far less liberty than they would have if the adults interfered to protect the weaker and less pugnacious. Consideration for others does not, with most children, arise spontaneously, but has to be taught, and can hardly be taught except by the exercise of authority. This is perhaps the most important argument against the abdication of the adults.
I do not think that educators have yet solved the problem of combining the desirable forms of freedom with the necessary minimum of moral training. The right solution, it must be admitted, is often made impossible by parents before the child is brought to an enlightened school. Just as psychoanalysts, from their clinical experience, conclude that we are all mad, so the authorities in modern schools, from their contact with pupils whose parents have made them unmanageable, are disposed to conclude that all children are “difficult”and all parents utterly foolish. Children who have been driven wild by parental tyranny (which often takes the form of solicitous affection) may require a longer or shorter period of complete liberty before they can view any adult without suspicion. But children who have been sensibly handled at home can bear to be checked in minor ways, so long as they feel that they are being helped in the ways that they themselves regard as important. Adults who like children, and are not reduced to a condition of nervous exhaustion by their company, can achieve a great deal in the way of discipline without ceasing to be regarded with friendly feelings by their pupils.
I think modern educational theorists are inclined to attach too much importance to the negative virtue of not interfering with children, and too little to the positive merit of enjoying their company. If you have the sort of liking for children that many people have for horses or dogs, they will be apt to respond to your suggestions, and to accept prohibitions, perhaps with some good-humoured grumbling, but without resentment. It is no use to have the sort of liking that consists in regarding them as a field for valuable social endeavour, or—what amounts to the same thing—as an outlet for power-impulses. No child will be grateful for an interest in him that springs from the thought that he will have a vote to be secured for your party or a body to be sacrificed to king and country. The desirable sort of interest is that which consists in spontaneous pleasure in the presence of children, without any ulterior purpose. Teachers who have this quality will seldom need to interfere with childrens freedom, but will be able to do so, when necessary, without causing psychological damage.
Unfortunately, it is utterly impossible for over-worked teachers to preserve an instinctive liking for children; they are bound to come to feel towards them as the proverbial confectioners apprentice does towards macaroons. I do not think that education ought to be anyones whole profession: it should be undertaken for at most two hours a day by people whose remaining hours are spent away from children. The society of the young is fatiguing, especially when strict discipline is avoided. Fatigue, in the end, produces irritation, which is likely to express itself somehow, whatever theories the harassed teacher may have taught himself or herself to believe. The necessary friendliness cannot be preserved by self-control alone. But where it exists, it should be unnecessary to have rules in advance as to how “naughty” children are to be treated, since impulse is likely to lead to the right decision, and almost any decision will be right if the child feels that you like him. No rules, however wise, are a substitute for affection and tact.
1. Explain the contextual meaning of the following words and expressions(highlighted in blue)in English.
(1) conception, dynamics, incompatible, modicum (Para. 1)
(2) derive, relic, unduly, hand on, perpetuate (Para. 3)
(3) initiative, thwart, inflict (Para. 5)
(4) meritorious, defiance (Para. 6)
(5) fatigue (Para. 7)
(6) vice, obliging (Para. 8)
(7) abdication (Para. 9)
(8) disposed, reduced (Para. 10)
(9) apt (Para. 11)
2. Look up the underlined words in your dictionary, examining their multiple meanings. (Note down the meaning of each word in the context, and another meaning that the word often expresses.)
(1) Education and Discipline (title)
(2) Any serious educational theory… (Para. 1)
(3) … be completely subject to authority… (Para. 3)
(4) … would not survive a study of… (Para. 3)
(5) … can hardly be just to… (Para. 6)
(6) … maintaining Shakespeare to be no poet. (Para. 6)
(7) … due in part to physical causes… (Para. 7)
(8) … more to freedom from the feeling of… (Para. 7)
(9) … it is worth his while… (Para. 7)
(10) … only to minister to… (Para. 8)
(11) … can bear to be checked… (Para. 10)
3. Answer the following questions briefly.
(1) How do you understand “[t]wo men who differ as to the ends of life cannot hope to agree about education”?
(2) Why does the author raise the issue of freedom in Paragraph 3?
(3) What are the features of the aristocrat mentioned in Paragraph 8?
*本期學习任务的答案将刊登在《英语学习》2020年3月刊,敬请关注。
教育与规纪
伯特兰·罗素
任何严肃的教育理论必定由两个部分组成: 一是指向生活目标的概念,二是关于人的心理如何运作,即心理变化的规律。如果人们拥有截然不同的生活目标,就无须妄想他们能对教育问题的看法达成一致。在西方文明的历史长河中,教育机制一直深受基督教和民族主义这两种价值观影响。如果认真剖析这两种思想,就会发现它们本质互不相容,正如当前德国明显表现出来的那样。我认为,两者如有分歧之处,那么基督教的价值观相对更加可取;两者如有达成一致之处,那么双方的观点都是谬误。在此我想要将“教育的目的”这一概念替换成“文明”,而“文明” 的定义包含个体层面和社会层面。在个体层面,“文明”指的是智力和品德:智力包括对必要常识的了解、对职业专业技能的掌握以及凡事都依照证据的思考方式。从社会层面,“文明”包括公正、仁善和基本的自控力。恐怕在这里我还需要加上“文明”的第三个层面,它无关智力和道德,而是属于生理层面,即生活中的乐趣和激情。在集体层面,文明要求人们尊重法律,追求人与人之间的公正,避免对任何人带来持久伤害,具备随机调整以达成目的的素质。
假如以上就是教育的目标,那么亟待解决的问题就在于:如何实现这些目标?教育过程允许拥有何种程度的自由才能达到最佳效果?为了解决这些问题,我们需要运用心理学。
在有关教育应当允许何等程度自由的问题上,目前主要有三种思想流派。之所以会产生分歧,部分原因是人们对人生目标有不同的理解,以及人们所运用的心理学理论不同。有些人认为,无论孩子们多么顽劣,他们都应当被给予绝对的自由;有些人则认为,无论孩子们多么听话,他们都应该完全服从管教;还有些人认为,孩子们应该被给予自由,而即使对这个自由不加约束,他们也依旧能成为好孩子。持最后一种观点的人很多,但这个观点根本不符合逻辑;就像成年人一样,拥有绝对自由的孩子们不会是尽善尽美的。相信自由能够带来道德完善是卢梭主义思想的后遗症,这种思想会被有关动物和婴儿的研究轻易推翻。持有这一观点的人认为,教育不应有任何特殊目的,教育只是为了给受教育者提供适合他们自由发展的环境。我不赞同这种观点。在我看来,这种观点过分地强调个体性,漠视知识的重要性。我们生活在需要合作的集体社会中,指望单凭人们自发的意愿就能带来所有必要的合作是不切实际的幻想。如果不是因为发达的科学技术,一大群人是无法在有限区域里共同生存的,因此教育必须考虑到这一现实问题。那些允许最大程度自由的教育者们,他们获得成功的前提是受教育者拥有一定程度的仁慈、自制力及智力训练,但这些品质几乎不可能在自由放任的环境中养成。因此,如果这些人所支持的教育方式不加以调整,他们所具备的优点就无法传承下去。从社会的立场看,教育不仅仅是单纯为了给人们提供自由成长的机会。当然,提供成长的机会是必要的,但教育还需要培养儿童的心理和道德素质,这些素质不可能完全由孩子自行养成。
支持教育过程中应保有极大程度自由的思想的出发点并非是人们的善良天性,而是权威压迫的作用。这种权威对施压者和受压迫者都产生影响。那些被权威压迫的人,要么变得驯服,要么变得反叛,而这两种态度都是存在一定问题的。
驯服者在思想和行动方面都会丧失创造力;而且,他们因受压迫而引起的愤怒常会通过欺凌更弱者的方式得到发泄。这就是暴政机制得以维系的原因:一个人会将受父辈压迫的痛苦同样地施加给自己的儿女;一个在中学时受过欺辱的人,长大成为帝国元首后会将同样的欺辱施加给他的“国民”。这样一来,过分强调权威的教育会将孩子们变成怯懦的暴君,在言行上既不能进行自主原创,又不能容忍别人的创新。教育者们所受到的影响甚至更坏:他们往往会变成施虐狂式的规训者,乐于散布恐惧,除此之外别无所求。而由于教育者们往往代表了知识权威,学生们也越发会对知识产生恐惧。英国上层社会认为这种恐惧是人性的一部分,但这实际上揭示了人们对权威教育的普遍仇视。
另一方面,尽管反叛可能是必要的,但公正的反叛者们却很少。而且反叛的方式有很多,其中只有极少数是明智的。伽利略反叛且明智;相信地球是个平面的人也反叛,但却是愚蠢的。认为反抗权威本质上是优点、反传统的观念必定是正确的思想观念是十分危险的。诸如砸毁路灯、否认莎士比亚诗人地位之类的反叛行为并不能带来任何实际益处。这种过分叛逆往往是对富有创造力的学生施加过多压迫的恶果。而一旦这些反叛者今后成为教育者,他们有时也会鼓励学生藐视权威,但与此同时他们又想要为学生创造良好的教育环境,但这两个目的通常难以两全。
我们需要的既不是驯服,也不是反叛,而是优秀的品质,以及对人和新思想的开放心态。这种素质一方面来自于常被传统教育家所忽视的身体层面的原因,但更多来源于因为生命的基本冲动受到压抑而产生无能挫败感后对自由的渴望。在多数情形下,为了使孩子成长为友善的人,教育者必须让孩子觉得自己生活的环境是友善的;这就要求教育者要理解孩子们基本的愿望,而不仅仅是试图把孩子们作为实现某种抽象目标的工具,比如获得上帝的荣耀,或者为国家争光。而且在教育过程中,至少在这些知识确实值得学习时,教育者应当尽其所能让孩子们意识到他们正在学的知识是有价值的。如果孩子积极配合,学习效率就会加倍,疲倦也会减少。以上种种都有力支持了为何教育中应当留有足够自由。
然而,我們很容易矫枉过正。假如孩子们为了避免驯服的奴性,从而染上了贵族的恶习,就绝非是我们想要看到的。无论在大事还是日常小事上,为他人着想都是文明的基本要素。如果缺少这一素质,社会生活就会变得令人难以忍受。我指的不仅是说“请”与“谢谢”这种浮于表面的礼节。这种道貌岸然的礼节在野蛮社会中发展得最为充分,随着文化的逐渐进步反而变得越来越不必要。我指的是自愿参加一些必要的工作,并且在细枝末节处约束自己,以免招致不必要的麻烦。理智本身就是一种礼貌,让孩子觉得自己无所不能,或者让他们觉得成年人的存在仅仅是为了取悦他们是不对的。而那些认为好吃懒做也能够致富的人,他们培养出的孩子就会毫无工作是必要的的意识、没有不断进取的习惯,这样肯定会难以为继。
某些鼓吹教育自由的人还忽视了一点,那就是在一群没有大人看管的孩子中,强者会建立起霸权,这种霸权可能会比成人世界的霸权还要残酷。如果两个两、三岁的孩子被放在一起玩耍,在打了几架后,一个孩子总是能打赢,那另一个孩子就会成为奴隶。当孩子的数量增加时,其中的一两个孩子会获得绝对支配权,而其余孩子的自由将被大大减少。而如果有成年人介入来保护弱小的孩子,那么弱小的孩子们的自由会更多,并且孩子们也不会那么好斗。对于多数孩子而言,推己及人并不是与生俱来的美德,而是后天习得的,往往需要权威或者是榜样的作用。这也许是对成人不应介入管教孩子这一观点最好的批驳。
在我看来,教育家们还不知道怎样将适度的自由与必要的道德规训结合起来。我们必须承认,孩子们进入学校启蒙之前就已经受到父母的负面影响。正如精神分析学家从临床研究中得出的结论:人类通常都是疯子。现代学校的领导们和那些被家长惯坏的孩子们接触之后往往会得出这样的结论:所有孩子都是“老大难”,而父母们都是十足的蠢货。父母表面溺爱实则专制的教育方法把孩子们逼得桀骜叛逆,他们或多或少需要一段时间的绝对自由才能不再对成年人充满猜疑。但是,那些在家中受到悉心关怀的孩子们能够忍受一定程度上的约束,只要他们觉得这能让自己获益。成年人如果喜爱孩子,同时在陪伴孩子时能不被累得筋疲力尽,就能对孩子们进行卓有成效的约束并且依旧获得他们的好感。
我认为现代教育理论家倾向于过度重视“不干预孩子”的消极影响,却忽视了孩子们和成人相处也会带来好处。假如你像某些人爱自己的马或狗一样关爱孩子,他们就会乐于听取你的建议、接受你的约束。即使他们会有些并非恶意的抱怨,但绝不会心怀怨恨。把孩子们视为有价值的社会资源(换句话说,把他们当做当权者冲动时的牺牲品)绝对毫无益处。如果你只想把孩子培养成某一党派的附庸,或是预备为君主和国家牺牲的躯体,孩子们对你不会有任何感激之情。我们对待孩子应有的兴趣是:和他们在一起时会由衷地感到快乐,不带任何功利目的。具有这种品质的教师很少需要干涉孩子的自由,但必要时也能够实施干预,而这种干预并不会伤害孩子们的心理。
不幸的是,指望操劳过度的教师们能对孩子保持本能的喜爱是完全不现实的。教师们必定对孩子感到厌倦,就如同资深甜点师早就腻烦了甜点的味道。我认为教育不应该成为一个人的全职,人们每天从事教育的时间至多两小时,而在其余时间里他们应该远离孩子们。和一群孩子打交道会使人疲倦,尤其是在没有严肃的纪律约束孩子时。疲倦最终会导致恼怒,无论被烦扰的教师秉持多么完美的教育理论,这种情绪都无可避免。单靠教师的自制力是无法维持教育中必要的友善态度的。但只要教师保持友善,就无须事先为处理“淘气”的孩子们制定种种规则,因为天然的选择就能导向正确的决定,况且如果孩子们能感觉到你的喜爱,你做出的决定对他们而言都是正确的。无论多么明智的规定都无法替代教师的关爱与老练。