Wittgenstein: A Wonderful Life维特根斯坦美好的一生

蒂姆·马迪根

Tim Madigan on logic， language and mysticism in the life of one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century.蒂姆·馬迪根谈20世纪最有影响的一大哲学家人生中的逻辑、语言和神秘主义。

One of the foremost philosophers of the Twentieth Century and the scion of one of the wealthiest families in Austria， Ludwig Wittgenstein （1889–1951） went to Cambridge in 1911 specifically to study with Bertrand Russell， the best-known logician of the time. At first a protégé of Russell’s， he later broke with him over the claim that mathematics can be firmly grounded in logic. The two for a time shared an interest in mysticism， but Russell seemed to ignore the underlying mystical nature of Wittgenstein’s first book， and the only one published in Wittgenstein’s lifetime， the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus （1921）， for which Russell wrote an introduction. Russell was not the only one so blinkered. The Vienna Circle movement likewise interpreted Wittgenstein’s work to be saying that all of nature could be reduced to propositions. “A proposition，” Wittgenstein wrote， “is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we think it to be.” The Vienna Circle interpreted this to mean that all metaphysical statements were strictly nonsense， since to them they were non-propositional—and if any claim could not be expressed in terms that were verifiable， then such a claim is meaningless and should be ignored. Followers of this view became known as Logical Positivists， and credited their origin to Wittgenstein’s writings. A. J. Ayer， one of the Circle’s most prominent members， used this verification argument to show that all claims about God were meaningless， and could also thus be ignored. After all， Wittgenstein himself had written： “The limits of my language means the limits of my world.”

Wittgenstein disappeared shortly after publishing the Tractatus. He felt he had solved all the problems of philosophy in this short work， and could move on to other pursuits， such as teaching elementary school， designing buildings， and working as a gardener for a monastery. But he was horrified to learn that his book was being used to justify a materialistic， even atheistic， philosophical movement. His thinking was that just because you could not express a concept did not mean the concept itself was nonsensical： it could simply be ineffable. He therefore left his worldly pursuits to return to philosophy， teaching for a time at Cambridge （becoming a professor in 1939）， and subsequently repudiating much of what he had earlier written.

Russell was to say of Wittgenstein that he resembled Blaise Pascal， who had likewise abandoned mathematics for piety. There was a distinctive mystical air around Wittgenstein， and many of his students treated him like a guru. After his return to Cambrige he spent the remainder of his life pursuing the question of the role which language plays in human affairs and the limitations it places on expressing ideas. These observations were published posthumously as the Philosophical Investigations （1953）. Later， several of his students’ notebooks and other dispersed and miscellaneous writings were published as well. This would have infuriated a man so careful with his views that he agonized over every word.

The question of Wittgenstein’s own religious beliefs， like so much else about him， remains a mystery. His paternal grandfather， the founder of the vast Wittgenstein fortune， was a convert from Judaism to Protestantism. This did not protect the Wittgenstein family in Vienna when the Nazis came to power. Wittgenstein’s brother Paul paid a huge sum of money to the Hitler regime to arrange for the safe escape of his sisters from Austria. Wittgenstein’s mother was Roman Catholic， and he himself was baptized in that faith. He manifested a strong ascetic streak throughout his life， as well as a proneness for depression. Three of his brothers committed suicide， and when Ludwig several times expressed the desire to end his life， his family took this desire seriously. Once， upon seeing Wittgenstein pacing the room in apparent agony， Russell jocularly asked him， “Are you thinking about logic or your sins？” to which Wittgenstein replied “Both.” While Wittgenstein seemed to have no conventional religious views， and was considered to be an atheist by some， he often expressed great sympathy for religious figures， particularly those of a contemplative nature. Although he was always loath to admit any influence upon him from previous philosophers， he did admit a fondness for certain aspects of Saint Augustine’s writings. It is also clear that he was familiar with Arthur Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation， and seemed to agree with that atheist’s claim that human beings are metaphysical by nature.

Perhaps what most marked Wittgenstein’s character was his often-professed desire to be perfect. This high—indeed impossible—standard had a major impact upon all who came to know him. His tormented nature， his unceasing search for truth， his inability to suffer fools gladly， and his apparent lack of humor all attest to a modern-day mystic. He died of cancer in 1951. Surprisingly enough， given how unsatisfied he seemed with the mundane world around him， according to his friend Norman Malcolm his last words were： “Tell them I’ve had a wonderful life！”

20世纪最重要的哲学家之一、奥地利最富有家族之一的子弟路德维希·维特根斯坦（1889—1951）于1911年来到剑桥专门跟随当时最著名的逻辑学家罗素学习。一开始他是罗素的得意门生，后来因为反驳罗素关于数学可以牢固建立在逻辑基础之上的主张而与罗素分道扬镳。这两人一度对神秘主义很感兴趣，但罗素似乎忽视了维特根斯坦第一本书《逻辑哲学论》（1921）潜在的神秘性质，这是维特根斯坦在有生之年出版的唯一一本书，罗素为这本书写了导言。罗素并不是唯一一个如此被蒙蔽的人。维也纳学派运动同样把维特根斯坦的著作理解为所有的自然都可以归结为命题。“一个命题，”维特根斯坦说，“是实在的一幅图像。一个命题是我们所认为的一个实在的模型。”维也纳学派把这一点理解为所有形而上学的陈述严格来说都是无意义，因为对他们来说，它们都是非命题——以及，如果任何主张不能用可以证实的术语来表述，那么这样的主张是没有意义的，应该忽略。这一观点的追随者被称为逻辑实证主义者，并把他们的根源归功于维特根斯坦的著作。这个学派最杰出的成员之一，A. J.艾耶尔用这个证实论点来表明所有关于上帝的主张都是没有意义的，因此也可以忽视。毕竟，维特根斯坦自己说过：“我的语言界限就是我的世界的界限。”

维特根斯坦出版《逻辑哲学论》后不久就消失了。他认为他已经在这本简短的书中解决了所有的哲学问题，可以继续其他的追求，比如在小学教书、设计房子，以及在一所修道院做园艺工。但他惊恐地发现他的书被用来为一场唯物论、甚至无神论的哲学运动作辩护。他的看法是，仅仅因为你不能表达一个概念，并不就意味着概念本身是无意义的：它可能仅仅是难以表达出来。因此他放弃了世俗追求而回归哲学，在剑桥教过一段时间书（1939年被聘为教授），后来否认他之前写过的许多东西。

罗素在谈到维特根斯坦时说，他很像布莱士·帕斯卡尔（1623—1662，法国数学家、物理学家和哲學家，译者注），帕斯卡尔也为了虔诚的信仰而放弃了数学。维特根斯坦浑身散发着一丝神秘，被众多门徒视若权威。他回到剑桥后终其余生都在研究语言在人类事务中的作用，及其在表达思想中的限制。这些观察结果在他辞世后作为《哲学研究》（1953）出版。后来他学生的一些笔记和其他散碎的文章也出版了。这原本会让一个对自己的观点如此谨慎以致为每一个字伤脑筋的人感到愤怒。

维特根斯坦本身的宗教信仰问题，就像其他很多关于他的事情一样，仍然是个谜。他的祖父，维特根斯坦家族巨大财富的创始人从犹太教皈依到新教。但纳粹占领维也纳时，这并没有使维特根斯坦家族得到保护。维特根斯坦的哥哥保罗付给希特勒政权一大笔钱安排他姐姐从奥地利安全出逃。维特根斯坦的母亲是天主教徒，他也曾受洗为天主教徒。在他的一生中，他表现出强烈的禁欲主义倾向，同时也有抑郁倾向。他的三个哥哥都自杀了，当路德维希几次表达想要结束生命的愿望时，他的家人都觉得这个愿望是认真的。有一次，看到维特根斯坦在房间里痛苦地踱来踱去，罗素打趣地问他：“你是在思考逻辑呢，还是你的罪行？”对此维特根斯坦回答说：“两者都有。”虽然维特根斯坦似乎没有传统的宗教观点，被一些人认为是无神论者，但他经常对宗教人物表示极大的同情，尤其是那些沉思的人。尽管他一直不愿意承认以前哲学家对他的任何影响，但他确实承认对圣奥古斯丁作品某些方面的喜爱。同样明显的是，他也熟悉叔本华的《作为意志和表象的世界》，似乎同意这个无神论者关于人本质上是形而上学的说法。

也许维特根斯坦最显著的性格是他经常声称自己的愿望是成为完人。这一高度的——实际上是不可能的——标准对所有认识他的人都有很大影响。他备受折磨的天性、对真理的不懈追求、无法甘心忍受愚蠢之人、显然缺乏幽默感，所有这些都证明了他是一个现代的神秘主义者。他于1951年死于癌症。不过奇怪的是，考虑到他对周围的世俗世界是多么地不满，据他的朋友诺曼·马尔科姆说，他的遗言是：“告诉他们我度过了美好的一生！”