论南海地区国家航空行为的研判与合法性标准

李亚凝

LI Yaning*

论南海地区国家航空行为的研判与合法性标准

李亚凝*

南海地区上空是中国管理和开发其东沙群岛、中沙群岛、西沙群岛、南沙群岛及其附近海域的重要支撑体的一部分，中国对南海上空享有的权利包括维持中国大陆领土与其密不可分的群岛水域之间的主权联系，以及群岛自身发展所必需的既有的以及将来应当具有的一切权利。其他国家的“航行及飞越自由”不能干扰到此种权利的实现。学术界与实务界对航空器与航空行为的混淆使用，以及国家航空行为的概念研究缺失，使得国家航空行为以及国家航空行为国际运行的研判标准不明。本文通过对既有概念与定义的梳理，厘清了“航空器”与“航空行为”的区别，并在此基础上，通过分析国家航空器的目的属性与行为属性，界定了国家航空行为的概念。本文最后还对判定国家航空国行为国际运行的合法性标准进行了整理。

民用航空行为 国家航空行为 国际法 民用航空公约

一、问题的提出

目前，南海作为一个具有战略通道功能和能源基地功能的特殊区域，对于作为陆海复合型国家的中国具有特别重要的战略意义。①杜德斌、范斐、马亚华：《南海主权争端的战略态势及中国的应对方略》，载于《世界地理研究》2012年第2期，第1页。特别是目前对南海地区的“U形线”存在着不同认知，主要存在“历史性水域说”、“历史性权利说”、“海上疆域说”和“岛屿归属线说”等4种学说。根据“岛屿归属线说”，中国对东沙群岛、中沙群岛、西沙群岛、南沙群岛及其附近海域拥有无可争辩的主权。②李金明：《南海断续线的法律地位：历史性水域、疆域线、抑或岛屿归属线?》，载于《南洋问题研究》2010年第4期，第22～29页；李金明：《南海断续线：产生背景及其法律地位》，载于《现代国际关系》2012年第9期，第7～14页。国家海洋局海洋发展战略研究所所长高之国认为，中国地图上的“U形线”与其说是传统的海上疆域线，不如说是岛屿归属线。他写道：“仔细研究中国文件可以看出，中国从未对南海整个海域提出过声称，而仅是对断续线内的群岛及其周围海域”。这就意味着南海诸岛是中国不可分割的一部分，而国家航空器在南海地区的运行，特别是外国国家航空器的运行将会成为各国关注的焦点。

一方面，根据《芝加哥公约》第三条的规定，“一缔约国的国家航空器，未经特别协定或其他方式的许可并遵照其中的规定，不得在另一缔约国领土上空飞行或在此领土上降落”。另一方面，我国与多国签订了双边航空协定，允许民用航空飞机进入我国领空。

近期，某些国家频频以所谓的“航行自由”为借口，妄图将南海问题国际化，而“航行自由”与“飞越自由”主要是针对公海的，而U形线所表明的是岛屿归属及资源管辖线。③金永明：《中国南海断续线的性质及线内水域的法律地位》，载于《中国法学》2012年第6期，第36～48页。中国对U形线内水域享有特殊权利，因此有必要对航空行为进行探讨。

随着科技的发展，法学传统概念的内涵与外延不可避免将要发生相应的变化，特别是对于航空活动而言。因此，与之相关的基础概念的探究就显得尤为重要。

首先，无论是我国的《民用航空法》，还是相关的国际公约，都混淆使用了“航空器”和“航空行为”这两个概念。例如在《芝加哥公约》第三条“民用航空器和国家航空器”中，将国家航空器定义为“用于军事、海关和警察部门的航空器”。④我国《民用航空法》第五条也采用了同样的表述方法，表述为“本法所称民用航空器，是指除用于执行军事、海关、警察飞行任务外的航空器。”实际上，“用于军事、海关和警察部门……”讨论的内涵是“航空行为”，但是却采用“航空器”进行概念化处理，使得“物”与“行为”发生了错位。因此在实践中，民用航空器执行国家任务，或者国家航空器执行民用任务时，非常容易发生研判错误。例如，美国联邦航空局认为任何击落无人机的行为都视同犯罪，⑤FAA Says Shooting Down Drones Is a Federal Crime, at http://www.engadget. com/2016/04/18/faa-says-shooting-down-drones-is-a-federal-crime/, 22 November 2016.其依据的规范是《美国法典》第18部第32节。⑥18 USC 32: (a) Whoever willfully - (1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce; ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. 这一表述中显然也是采用了“aircraft”，并没有区分航空行为。这一做法显然混淆了“物”与“行为”。

其次，虽然学术界与实务界较多关注民用航空行为的研究，而对于何为国家航空行为，以及对于国家航空行为的研判并没有进行深入的探讨，这就可能会出现概念边界不清的问题。作为与民用航空行为最邻近的概念，国家航空行为概念的厘清不仅会使得民用航空行为的范围更加明晰，而且对于航空活动的基础概念体系发展具有重要意义。

最后，自有记录到目前所发生的疑似武装击落民用航空器的8起案例之中，大部分都是因为将民用航空行为误认为国家航空行为，究其本质乃是将民用航空行为与国家航空行为相混淆所造成的悲剧，一旦具备国家航空行为属性的航空器进入他国领空，则有可能触发自卫权，这也成为国家航空行为迫切需要研究的重要原因。

笔者将从分析航空器性质与航空活动性质入手，通过讨论现有的侵略行为定义，来确定国家航空器的目的属性与行为属性，并籍此界定国家航空行为。

二、基于海洋权益对南海上空法律地位的分析

对于民用航空活动而言，确定空域的属性无疑是非常重要的。国际民航组织标准中把空域分为A、B、C、D、E、F、G等7类，⑦1）A类只允许IFR飞行，所有航空器之间配备间隔，提供ATC服务，要求实现地空双向通信，进入空域要进行ATC许可；2）B类允许IFR和VFR飞行，其它同A类；3）C类只要求IFR飞行之间、IFR和VFR飞行之间配备间隔，对IFR飞行之间、IFR和VFR飞行之间提供ATC服务，其它同B；4）D类只要求IFR飞行之间配备间隔，对IFR飞行之间提供ATC服务，对VFR飞行提供飞行情报服务，其它同C；5）E类只需要IFR飞行实现地空双向通信，VFR飞行进入空域不需要ATC许可，其他同D；6）F类空域对IFR飞行提供交通资讯和情报服务，VFR飞行提供飞行情报服务，所有航空器进入空域都不需要ATC许可，其它同E；7) G类空域不需要提供间隔服务，对飞行提供飞行情报服务，只要求IFR飞行实现地空双向通信，进入空域不需要ATC许可，其它同F。但是这种技术上的空域划分是以空域的基础属性为前提的。因此要确定南海上空的法律地位，就需要从南海岛礁及其附近水域的地位出发。

（一）南海U形线内区域的法律地位

西沙群岛是中国的领土，1996年中国政府还公布了西沙群岛的领海基线，依据直线型领海基线向外延伸12海里的海域为中国领海。这进而引发了如何界定U形线内其他区域的地位的问题。1982年《联合国海洋法公约》（以下简称“《海洋法公约》”）第四部分建立了一套独特的群岛制度，但是并没有明确非群岛国家是否可以使用群岛制度。

根据相关法律文件以及实践，笔者认为，首先，中国对东沙群岛、中沙群岛、西沙群岛、南沙群岛及其附近海域拥有无可争辩的主权。

其次，群岛制度不适用于南海特殊权利领域。非群岛国家的洋中群岛问题成为《海洋法公约》中的一个缺失。⑧傅崐成、郑凡：《群岛的整体性与航行自由——关于中国在南海适用群岛制度的思考》，载于《上海交通大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2015年第6期，第5～13页。中国的领土大部分为大陆，因此与《海洋法公约》第四部分所定义的“全部由一个或多个群岛构成的国家，并可包括其他岛屿”的一般群岛国家存在着本质区别。更为重要的是，中国作为一个以大陆为基础进行行政管理、促进经济和文化发展的国家，其陆地领土需求与其群岛领土存在紧密的联系，并且这种需求符合国家整体利益，也方便进行行政管理，这些权利需求使得南海成为了一个“特殊权利领域”。因此，U形线内并未确定领海基线的区域乃是为了方便大陆领土与其密不可分的群岛水域之间的主权联系而需要享有特殊权利的领域。

再次，南海特殊权利领域是保持中国南海岛屿健康发展的必需区域。作为以大陆为基础开展社会经济活动的国家，中国也需要有效地管理其群岛，这也与普通的以群岛为基础的国家不同。中国南海的岛屿较之大陆地区，仍处于初级开发的状态，需要与其大陆地区存在紧密的联系。如果把中国在南海的群岛看做是“婴儿”的话，南海U形线内的区域则是起到孕育作用的“摇篮”。因此，中国对于南海特殊领域内的权利不同于毗连区、专属经济区和大陆架权利，其应当包括为了保证大陆领土与其密不可分的群岛水域之间的主权联系，以及群岛自身发展所必需的既有的以及将来应当具有的一切权利。

又次，中国在南海U形线内的区域所享有的权利为国际法法理与国家实践所认可。这些权利以充分的历史事实为依据，即中国人最早发现、命名、开发使用和长期有效管理这些岛屿，此外，这些权利也得到了战后国际法体系的认可，包括1943年的《开罗宣言》、1945年的《波茨坦公告》和1951年的《旧金山和约》。这就说明了中国对南海诸岛的权利不同于其他以大陆为主体的国家对于其群岛的权利。

最后，中国对于南海的权利并不排斥中国与相关国家“搁置争议，共同开发”。实际上，中国人民在南海的活动已有两千多年历史。在上世纪60年代末南海地区发现丰富的油气资源之前，南海诸岛属于中国是国际社会的普遍共识，各国外交实践、权威地图和出版物均确认南海诸岛属于中国。而那之后，菲律宾等国陆续非法侵占和蚕食中国南沙岛礁多达40多个。对此，中国保持了极大的忍耐和克制，提出了“搁置争议，共同开发”的倡议，不仅与菲律宾历任政府达成通过谈判解决南海有关争议的双边协议，还与东盟各国共同发表了《南海各方行为宣言》，积极磋商制定“南海行为准则”，以实际行动维护南海的和平稳定。

（二）南海上空的法律地位

诚如前述，中国对于南海U形线内所拥有的权利包括为了保证大陆领土与其密不可分的群岛水域之间的主权联系，以及群岛自身发展所必需的既有的以及将来应当具有的一切权利。之所以言称“未来的一切权利”，是因为中国对于南海U形线内区域的权利并不是静止的，我们应当以发展的眼光来看待这些权利。过去对岛屿的行政管理和经济开发，主要通过船舶为载体进行，随着新技术的发展，将逐步增加航空器、网络通讯设备等载体。

2016年1月6日，中国政府征用的2架民航客机先后从海口美兰机场起飞，经过近2小时的飞行分别于10时21分、10时46分平稳降落南沙永暑礁新建机场并于当日下午返回海口，试飞成功。同年7月13日8时30分、8时40分，中国政府征用的南方航空公司、海南航空公司两架民航客机先后从海口美兰国际机场起飞，经过近2个小时的飞行，分别于10时29分、10时28分在美济礁新建机场和渚碧礁新建机场平稳着陆并于当日下午返回海口，试飞成功。这次试飞成功证明这两个新建机场具备了保障民航大型客机安全运行的能力，将为岛礁物资运输、人员往来、医疗救护提供便捷的交通方式，同时将为南海地区的跨洋飞行提供新的备降机场选择和更为经济灵活的航线选择。这也充分证明了中国已经采用新的载体来管理和开发南海诸岛。

与南海海域权利一样，中国对于南海上空的权利也应当包括为保证大陆领土与其密不可分的群岛水域之间的主权联系，以及群岛自身发展所必需的既有的以及将来应当具有的一切权利。《南海各方行为宣言》第三条规定，“各方重申尊重并承诺，包括1982年《联合国海洋法公约》在内的公认的国际法原则所规定的在南海的航行及飞越自由”，但是值得注意的是，这种“航行及飞越自由”并不能损害到中国所享有的前述一切权利。

因此，中国对于南海上空的权利具有优先性，这种优先性是与国家主权原则密不可分的。《联合国宪章》特别强调对于国家主权的保障。南海地区作为中国管理和开发其东沙群岛、中沙群岛、西沙群岛、南沙群岛及其附近海域的重要支撑体，体现了主权联系的特征。另外，这种主权联系具有一惯性与连续性，即中国以此种方式管理和开发南海诸岛是为当代国际法所认可的惯常方式。所以，各国“在南海的航行及飞越自由”不得影响到此种权利的实现。

三、国家航空行为与民用航空行为的差别

（一）国家航空行为的特征分析

根据《海洋法公约》第38条、第53条、第58条、第87条的规定，船舶与航空器在用于国际航行的海峡、群岛国的群岛水域、专属经济区以及公海都享有不同程度的航行自由与飞越自由。一般而言，沿海国在用于国际航行的海峡采取过境通行制，但在例外情况下，也有可能采取无害通过制度。1963年《关于在航空器内的犯罪和其他某些行为的公约》第4条规定，沿海国在特殊情形下可以对公海上空“飞行中的航空器”行使特定的刑事管辖权。就国际习惯而言，沿海国在公海上对海盗、贩奴、劫机等国际犯罪具有普遍管辖权。

但是，笔者认为航空器在南海上空的运行，应当受到中国对南海上空所具有的为保证中国大陆领土与其密不可分的群岛水域之间的主权联系，以及群岛自身发展所必需的既有的以及将来应当具有的一切权利的限制，所以并不能适用既有的制度。应当从发展国际法、利用国际法的角度，制定一套专门的制度进行调整。

这就需要我们对进入南海上空的航空器进行分类识别，无论是《芝加哥公约》还是中国《民用航空法》都区分了“国家航空器”与“民用航空器”，但是并没有对“国家航空行为”与“民用航空行为”加以区分。

航空行为作为一项速度快、跨越地域广的交通运输活动，非常容易牵连到主权问题，因此无论是民用航空行为还是国家航空行为，都需要对可能让对方误解为侵略行为的行为给予足够的关切，以避免发生误击事件。

1.空气空间的地位争议

空气空间的地位从1912年在布鲁塞尔召开的国际法学会年会中开始争论，分别出现了“空气空间自由论”与“空气空间主权论”两种不同意见。

“空气空间自由论”认为各国拥有在空气空间自由飞越的权利，⑨例如，《国际航班过境协定》第一条第一节规定，“每一缔约国给予其他缔约国以下列关于定期国际航班的空中自由：（一）不降停而飞越其领土的权利；（二）非运输业务性降停的权利。本节所规定的权利不适用于对定期国际航班禁止使用的军用机场。在战争或军事占领地区及战时通往此项地区的补给路线上，此项权利的行使须经军事主管当局的核准”。另外，《国际航空运输协定》第一条第一节规定，“每一缔约国给予其他缔约国以下述关于定期国际航班的空中自由：（一）不降停而飞越其领土的权利；（二）非运输业务性降停的权利；（三）卸下来自航空器所属国领土的客、货、邮的权利；（四）装载前往航空器所属国领土的客、货、邮的权利；（五）装卸前往或来自任何其他缔约国领土客、货、邮的权利。关于本节（三）、（四）、（五）各项所规定的权利，每一缔约国所承允的，仅限于构成来自或前往该航空器所属国本土的合理的直接航线上的直达航班。本节所规定的权利不适用于对定期国际航班禁止使用的军用机场。在战争或军事占领地区及战时通往此等地区的补给线上，此项权利的行使须经军事主管当局核准”。以《国际航班过境协定》和《国际航空运输协定》为代表。实际上这种飞越自由与国家领土主权原则是相背离的，领空作为国家行使主权的一部分，是不可分割的。特别是从领空的自然属性上而言，其覆盖领土与领海，如果允许他国航空器自由飞越，将可能会给所在国带来不可估计的风险。

“空气空间主权论”的代表国际公约为《芝加哥公约》，其第一条开宗明义认为“缔约各国承认每一国家对其领土之上的空气空间具有完全的和排他的主权”。

2.国家航空行为的特殊性

由于民用航空的属性，以及历史上所出现的误击民航飞机事件，逐渐引起国际社会对避免针对民用航空行为使用武力问题的关注。但是由于《芝加哥公约》出现的时候尚未预见到此类事件的发生，因此人们经常引用的是《联合国宪章》第二条第四款，“各会员国在其国际关系上不得使用威胁或武力，或以与联合国宗旨不符之任何其他方法，侵害任何会员国或国家之领土完整或政治独立”。在1983年“大韩航空007号班机空难事件”后，国际民航组织经调查后，于1984年3月6日通过决议，认为无论造成该机偏离其飞行计划航路的原因为何，武力的使用都是违反国际法的，但是并未具体指出是违反哪条国际法规范。随即在同年5月，增设《芝加哥公约》第三分条，要求不对民用航空器使用武力。

但是国家航空行为不同于民用航空行为，具体体现在下述方面：

首先，主体方面，国家航空行为的主体是国家，民用航空行为的主体是人或其他组织。需要注意的是，此处所言的“国家”概念是国家权力层面上的，其表现为非民事主体性。因此需要将国有航空公司的运营与国家运营区分，国有航空公司中的“国家”是民事主体意义上的，即作为民事主体的国家所进行的民事行为，因此国有航空公司的运营属于民用航空行为。

其次，属性方面，国家航空行为具有国家任务的属性，是一种国家管理权的体现，因此如果存在与其他国家主权冲突的状况，则将较民用航空活动复杂得多。主权这一概念意指对内的最高权、对外的独立权和防止侵略的自卫权的集合。因此国家航空行为实际上体现的是主权的全部或者部分，是一种“权力”的体现，不能侵犯到其他平等主权国的主权。相反，民用航空行为则是平等主体间的民事行为，是“权利”的体现。

最后，既有规范方面，主要国际航空公约对于其是否适用于国家航空行为也进行了相应的规定，大致区分了在不同领域的适用情况。相比较而言，国际规范中有关民用航空行为的规定较为细致，但却几乎没有针对国家航空行为的规定。

李理公行，可人经通国行办时地权、器他进入治的。家运用国于客空其家加统输况国载适约对》旅航或国或任运情个局不缔约送以家于准委空留一当，视公运业国对批地、航保但事时，沙器企于》际的。军用为华空输用约在护国国留国包行《航运适公国保的约保该所空了以空约沙约、理缔办于公华何为局航缔地续有航任机当用延所于有飞该民本《，“民接赖上于用用。，“了定殖直有得的为于明规其本用适适不记或用定说中、规所为基适样的书登局适定国当》》据约同为中”，定家土行议国领空议该该书约依公约行款输加其他航其家定公。本公空一运附于何国本在经议拉则，“本航第的在用任于对明量，“，牙哈规规输民二办约不辖适定。用条理》适下用声运海载拉用款运于第所公款管否定府规政部，《达适瓜的第国其在件华一际对其下沙一力是全此。条的了约条，《第权约》条国六和的因为《为的行十共条或机一酬明公的是二权公该”。行空定空第报表该定。二民主沙但第第人且约航，公家规航行用》取是条》兰李的国进民约收”，，规用约宗华输的一输本权适公、，《书波行改于题与公而此定知及修用问为沙物运意第运明主议通因物书适门行华货免得人航留在”。费注在空声其牙时海随、议情货定况专空于航《以员本知《或的值法的保或利对家国于为留知留用用行保通保适适空国用国用国况否航约适约适约情是家缔况缔况缔知视情视情视通民于为用行适空用用用否航适适适是用称名约公》约公沙华《定议牙》海书《哈拉》达约瓜公《拉

，空和地。确损。预）已航于器和关但织航牙危为于李系受二免；（所行于航行有的由空关海。组该海在行体海、器空且在，《空、事航，年此航的或范况机）飞用留事军空用物五因家目亡规情业三将适扣军供航民货五》，伤的列营供于的际和九”。国于约身偿下括；（即不性。、包器器定防为于用型类国李一输用公人赔一不空空规预行用适知行的的平运适，“，用该本统航他。适不则客公、，《项况但航航条一空其确通员时该情定机备关、不，于明时人用于知规旅立些中建规运的有二，《家条邮须是。此国约为公行用行适进可运所随输包用通适留某输上输运础。三括必留求因用本空其国局局不保运空基为第包其扣要分，“航用，此一当当》国空航则行》，及非的”。适定民看对来未，“事该约约航际原空约器则航空器所性为公缔际国偿航公空器除生留部，产扣，规于定并》定军为条用规约规国或沙视国在赔用三适条公条该局华，一对性民规的航空中防行航十约一马三为当的为统，复于些作的航途预空正行《益恢用某府飞货航人工行的程的用第公十罗十器事修空民》该。二《二空军城航是利在适称的，仅的政上、关有用约此动第的第航该拉用名者失约器行线客有所适公因活》订》的由损公空执航运或的分利约签书记是马民式费的该航粹规载题器部权”。空航公日定登量地于正消物，用留纯正酬问空》器器际马7议国运危适的输货的扣）通报务航约空空国《罗月拉该载在》约运输目性一防：（共收的失则航航债去公公空年书交取的的10马用部运定认的的年年地在全一定尔航利际者制预留公始起为规承用际使目危明的九七议一扣在开引行些察拉特国或其，据统性实备所法某国察警19331952《声器一马《防确准程非的蒙保失根《警和从是留用军警际军警际否保适是国况供和国供和国确约情于关的动用于关的动明缔知用海的活适、目空适分用海的活适、目空不用视通不事察航部不事察航尚适用用用适用用适适分适适部拉马》地书危定《议尔利》特约蒙公《防空规预航些》一留某约统扣的公《性器则认利承权》际器约国空公《航》约公马罗《

航际、关的国事海用的军、察的供事警目于军或察用供关警适于海和用、关不，适事海器不军、空，供事航为于军用行用供民空适于于航不用用用约适适民公不约于本，公用，“为该，适定空行约规航定。公款用规器的空该。，动四民款航定活第于一家规空条用第国条的条航五际第一适》其四的第国约此第目》的公因。约察约的京”，动公警公目东器活该和京察空据关北警《空航根海《和军警际军警际军警际供和国于关的动供和国供和国用海的活于关的动于关的动适、目空用海的活适、目空用海的活适、目空不事察航不事察航不事察航用用用适适适》约公京东《止航非公制用的的于民全为》关害安行约《危空法》定约议公京》京北书北《《和

以上的区别说明，尤其需要研究国家航空行为的国际运行。实际上，此类航空行为会引发权力与权力的冲突，或者说主权冲突，这就涉及到如何判定侵略行为的问题。在目前全球严峻的反恐形势下，对于侵略的研判不仅仅是传统意义上的，更需要增加反恐的因素。

（二）侵略行为定义的渊源

1.《联合国宪章》第51条

《联合国宪章》第51条规定，

联合国任何会员国受武力攻击时，在安全理事会采取必要办法，以维持国际和平及安全以前，本宪章不得认为禁止行使单独或集体自卫之自然权利。会员国因行使此项自卫权而采取之办法，应立向安全理事会报告，此项办法于任何方面不得影响该会按照本宪章随时采取其所认为必要行动之权责，以维持或恢复国际和平及安全。

该条所赋予国家在遭受武力攻击时进行自卫的权利来自于国家主权原则。一国的主权表现为一个国家独立自主处理自己内外事务，管理自己国家的最高权利。

此条中的“武力攻击”是核心概念，其是触发自卫权的条件。⑩Tarcisio Gazzimi, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 132.但是对于“武力攻击”的构成条件，各国存在不同的主张。

2.卡罗琳规则

1837年，作为英国殖民地的加拿大发生叛乱。支持此次叛乱的一部分人驻扎于尼亚加拉河靠近加拿大一侧的海军岛上，其中大多是美国人，他们租借美国私人船舶“卡罗琳号”为叛乱分子运送武器与人员。12月29日，英国军队越界对停泊于美国境内斯洛塞港的“卡罗琳号”发动袭击，并推入尼亚加拉瀑布，造成一名美国人死亡。对此美国表示抗议，而英国则辩称是基于自卫与自保的需要。①James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Temporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2006, pp. 433～435.此案形成了卡罗琳规则，即自卫“必须在危急迫切，不能选择手段，也无暇考虑的限度以内，方为合法”。②R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and Mcleod Cases, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Issue 1, 1938, pp. 91～92.

但是由于判例法的传统，卡罗琳号案的事实对结论的解释产生了趋势化影响，使得这一案件中“预先自卫”的因素变得尤为突出。

3.《芝加哥公约》第九条与联合国安理会“禁飞区”

《芝加哥公约》第九条规定，

禁区

一、缔约各国由于军事需要或公共安全的理由，可以一律限制或禁止其他国家的航空器在其领土内的某些地区上空飞行，但对该领土所属国从事定期国际航班飞行的航空器和其他缔约国从事同样飞行的航空器，在这一点上不得有所区别。此种禁区的范围和位置应当合理，以免空中航行受到不必要的阻碍。一缔约国领土内此种禁区的说明及其随后的任何变更，应尽速通知其他各缔约国及国际民用航空组织。

二、在非常情况下，或在紧急时期内，或为了公共安全，缔约各国也保留暂时限制或禁止航空器在其全部或部分领土上空飞行的权利并立即生效，但此种限制或禁止应不分国籍适用于所有其他国家的航空器。

三、缔约各国可以依照其制定的规章，令进入上述第一款或第二款所指地区的任何航空器尽速在其领土内一指定的机场降落。

1967年，西班牙援引《芝加哥公约》第九条规定，在阿尔赫西拉斯海峡周边地区设立禁区，禁止所有航班飞行。英国提出反对，将此问题提交国际民航组织理事会，但是由于问题被政治化，该项争议被无限期搁置。

值得注意的是，由于《芝加哥公约》并不适用于国家航空行为，如果援引《芝加哥公约》第九条，在效力上并不及于国家航空行为。

联合国安理会出于对人道主义干预的要求，对一个国家领土上空的空间进行限制，例如2011年在利比亚上空设立的禁飞区。其效力影响到国家航空行为。

（三）“武力攻击”条件的辨析

无论是卡罗琳规则还是《联合国宪章》第51条，都将武力攻击作为行使自卫权的触发条件，但是究竟何为“武力攻击”，却是语焉不详。

1.限制解释论

传统意义的限制解释论认为，《联合国宪章》第51条中“联合国任何会员国受武力攻击时”的规定应该严格进行解释。这就极大地限制了主权国家进行自卫的权利，即只有在遭受武力攻击的时候，才可以进行自卫。这一时间点并不延伸到武力攻击之前的准备阶段。③周鲠生著：《国际法》，北京：商务印书馆1981年版，第199页。进而有学者明确认为，武力攻击必须是实际发生且处于继续状态。④许光建主编：《联合国宪章诠释》，太原：山西教育出版社1999年版，第353～360页。

此外，还出现了限制解释论的修正见解。有学者认为如果相邻国家中的一方发射火箭足以威胁到邻国的安全，那么即可以触发《联合国宪章》第51条的自卫权。⑤Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 367.还有学者认为，除以上条件外，还应当满足攻击发动的“不可逆性”。⑥Singh M. Narendra, The Right of Self-Defence in Relation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons, Indian Yearbook of International Af f airs, 1956, Vol. 5, pp. 25～26.

2.扩大解释论

限制解释论与以陆战为主的时代密不可分，然而随着军事科技的发展，军用飞机、巡航导弹等速度高、杀伤力巨大的武器逐步成为战争的主流，这对判定“武力攻击”的传统做法提出了挑战。例如，某国精确制导导弹部署后，在其打击范围内，相应的邻国就可能随时会遭到毁灭性的打击。

由此形成了对新形势下“武力攻击”的扩大解释论，由于在高科技武器打击的背景下，被攻击国家可能无法针对攻击做出有效的反应，从而实际上将被攻击国置于被动境地，因此正如学者所指出的一样，如果一个国家必须等到导弹越过边界才能行使自卫权，那有效的自卫概念将无意义。⑦Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, pp. 366～369.

3.侵略行为中反恐因素的加入

911事件中，美国战斗机曾试图截击被恐怖分子劫持的第4架飞机，但它却在采取行动之前在宾夕法尼亚上空坠毁。911事件过后，总统布什、国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德与参谋长联席会议就制订出了遇到类似紧急情况时新的行动准则，此前国防部没有得到采取武力行动对付被劫飞机的正式准许。⑧《美国空军举行击落被劫民航客机的实战演习》，下载于http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/20 03-10-05/153963.html，2016年11月24日。

2006年《俄罗斯反恐怖主义法》第7条明确规定了“制止空中恐怖主义行为”，具体为：

1.依据俄联邦规范性法律文件，俄联邦武装力量可以使用武器和军事装备，以便消除空中恐怖主义行为威胁或者制止类似的恐怖主义行为。2.如果航空器不理睬地面指挥的无线电指令，违反俄罗斯联邦航空规则，或者对俄罗斯联邦武装部队拦截飞机的无线电和视觉信号没有反应，或者拒绝服从，或者没有任何解释，俄罗斯联邦武装力量可以使用武器和军事装备迫降以制止其飞行。如果航空器不服从迫降并发生航空器内人员死亡的现实危险，或者发生环境灾难，可以采用武器和军事装备摧毁航空器以制止其飞行。3.若获取了利用航空器实施恐怖主义行为或者劫持航空器的可靠信息，已采取了所有的迫降措施并且出现人员死亡的现实危险或者面临环境灾难，俄联邦武装力量可以运用武器和军事装备摧毁航空器以制止其飞行。⑨许桂敏：《俄罗斯反恐立法特点评介》，载于《环球法律评论》2013年第1期，第57页。

斯洛伐克政府2005年2月16日通过一项法令，授权斯国防部长在必要情况下可下令击落侵犯其领空的飞机。根据该法令，对于非法进入斯领空的飞机，斯空军有权对飞机采取干预行动。在特别的情况下，即有明确迹象表明进入其领空的飞机是恐怖分子发动袭击的工具，可能对人们的生命财产造成严重危害时，斯国防部长可以下令将其击落，不论它是民用飞机还是军用飞机。⑩《防“9·11”重演欧洲各国立法允许击落遭劫持飞机》，下载于http://news.tom.com/100 3/3295/2005114-1761852.html，2016年11月24日。

在当前国际反恐形势下，传统认为国际恐怖主义具有武力攻击特点的理论遭遇到巨大冲击。①Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 51 of the UN Charter, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2002, pp. 45～46.这在当代就成为了教条的观点，②Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, San Diego International Law Journal, Vol. 4, 2003, pp. 16～17.因此存在革新的必要。特别是联合国安理会1368号决议并没有将自卫权的行使与国家武力攻击相联系，而是明确提出了“恐怖主义攻击”。此外，联合国安理会1373号决议，以及国际法院在“石油平台案”中也没有将武力攻击与国家行为相联系。

随着国际反恐行动的不断深化与地区间冲突摩擦的日益频繁，民用航空器飞越冲突地区上空时的安全保障就成为需要关注的问题。国际民航组织在2014年成立了“冲突地区民航风险工作队”，并连续召开4次会议，研究冲突地区民航面临的安全和安保危机。③笔者参与了2015年7月13日至15日国际民航组织在加拿大蒙特利尔召开的第四次特别小组会议，审查了《国际民用航空公约》及其他民航条约中有关冲突区规定的适用问题。特别小组会议共有来自中国、美国、俄罗斯、乌克兰等15个国家的代表参加，最终讨论通过了“特别小组关于审查国际民航条约中有关冲突区规定的适用问题的报告”，并准备向理事会提交。

在国际反恐怖主义的背景下，各国在判断航空侵略行为的时候更加侧重于航空行为本身，而对于国家行为的研判意愿下降，这就使得相应的国际法准则在反恐的背景下淡化了。

四、从国家航空器到国家航空行为——对于既有理论的整理

诚如上述，我们需要采用“国家航空行为”来替代“国家航空器”的意义，从而设定相应的制度，笔者试图从既有的理论作为研究的起点。

（一）国际民航组织

虽然国际民航组织建立的目的④国际民航组织的宗旨和目的在于：确保全世界国际民用航空安全地和有秩序地发展；鼓励为和平用途的航空器的设计和操作技术；鼓励发展国际民用航空应用的航路、机场和航行设施；满足世界人民对安全、正常、有效和经济的航空运输的需要；防止因不合理的竞争而造成经济上的浪费；保证缔约各国的权利充分受到尊重，每一缔约国均有经营国际空运企业的公平的机会；避免缔约各国之间的差别待遇；促进国际航行的飞行安全；普遍促进国际民用航空在各方面的发展。在于促进民用航空的发展与合作，但是实现上述目的的前提在于辨别民用航空器和国家航空器，值得注意的是，国际民航组织并不具有界定国家航空器的权力。然而，对于二者的区别，国际民航组织进行过以下研究工作。

1.对于民用航空器和国家航空器区别的专门研究

国际民航组织曾就民用航空器与国家航空器问题进行专门研究，⑤Secretariat Study on “Civil/State Aircraft”, C-WP/9835 of 22/09/1993, presented by the Secretary General at the ICAO Council 140th Session.并最终形成工作报告。但报告实际上是对民用航空行为和国家航空行为进行了分析，最终认为除用于军事、海关、警察目的的航空器以外的航空器应当属于民用航空器，还同时强调在判断航空器性质的时候，也应当考虑到多重因素。

2.在航空器运行方面的附带提出

国际民航组织在2015年4月14日到15日召开了军民合作研讨会，在有关航空器运行的讨论中，⑥ICAO Global Provisions Regarding Aircraft Operations, ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium, Paris, France, 14-15 April 2015, at http://www.icao.int/RO_EURNAT/ Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20 Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20Symposium%20 2015/ICMCS%20PPT12.pdf, 24 November 2016.国际民航组织认为《芝加哥公约》仅对民用航空器有效，不对国家航空器有效，并且认为用于军事、海关、警察目的的航空器应当是国家航空器，但是这一定义采用“包含但并不限于”的结构，这就意味着国家航空器的目的是一个包含着军事、海关、警察目的的更大范围的目的集合。）方面的附带提出

缩小垂直间隔（RVSM）即将现代喷气式民航客机巡航阶段所用的飞行高度层FL290至FL410（含）之间的垂直间隔标准由2000英尺缩小到1000英尺，从而增加空域容量，提高航空公司的运行效益，减轻空中交通管制指挥的工作负荷。国际民航组织从20世纪70年代开始研究缩小垂直间隔标准的问题。

2002年1月，经有关国家民航当局和相关国际民航组织共同商讨，在共达13

3. 在缩小垂直间隔（RVSM次的工作会议后，决定从2002年2月21日起在南海地区实施RVSM运行。未获得RVSM运行批准的航空器将不得在RVSM空域内运行，而只能在飞行高度层FL 290以下飞行。

国际民航组织在审议RVSM问题的时候，⑦George Firican, State Aircraft in RVSM Airspace, ICAO Civil/Military Coordination Workshop, Kiev Ukraine, 28-31 October 2013, at http://www.icao.int/RO_EURNAT/ Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20 Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20Seminar%202013/ Kiev%20day%201%20George%20Firican%20State%20Aircraft%20in%20RVSM%20 airspace.pdf, 24 November 2016.附带提出将国家航空器定义为用于军事、海关、警察目的的航空器。

4.在外国航空运行者验证与监控程序方面的附带提出

在讨论外国航空运行者验证与监控程序时，⑧Foreign Air Operator Validation & Surveillance Course, p. 7, at http://www.icao.int/safety/ implementation/library/a_icao_convention_annexes_related_to_fao_2009_07_r1.pdf, 24 November 2016.国际民航组织附带对《芝加哥公约》第三条作出解释，认为《芝加哥公约》仅对民用航空器有效，并不对国家航空器有效，并且认为用于军事、海关、警察目的的航空器不是民用航空器，而应当是国家航空器。这种认知与国际民航组织在讨论航空器运行时附带提出的意见一致。

（二）国际航空运输协会

在2015年4月14日到15日召开的军民合作研讨会上，国际航空运输协会提出《芝加哥公约》仅对民用航空器有效，并不对国家航空器有效。⑨Dmitry Kosolapov, Improve Safety for Flight over the High Seas, ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium, Paris, France, 14-15 April 2015, p. 4, at http://www.icao.int/ RO_EURNAT/Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20 Symposium%202015/ICMCS%20PPT07.pdf, 24 November 2016.此意见与同时参会的国际民航组织的意见一致，反映出民航业中2个重要组织对于此问题的共同认知。

（三）欧洲航空安全组织

欧洲航空安全组织在其发布的《国家航空器在欧洲RVSM空域运行与标准指南》⑩EUROCONTROL, Guidance Material for the Certifcation and Operation of State Aircraft in European RVSM Airspace, at https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/article/ content/documents/official-documents/guidance/2012-cmac-rma-military-guidance.pdf, 24 November 2016.中认为，“只有”用于军事、海关、警察目的的航空器才是国家航空器，而无论是《芝加哥公约》还是国际民航组织都未用过“只有”一词来严格定义国家航空器。

（四）北大西洋公约组织

北大西洋公约组织在讨论其主导的任务与作业中的军/民航空器运行问题时，①NATO Policy for Civil/Military Aircraft Operating in Support of NATO or NATO-led Missions and Operations, at http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ pdf_2016_08/20160804_1608-NATO-Policy-civil-military-aircraft.pdf, 24 November 2016.认为用于军事、海关、警察目的的航空器不是民用航空器，而应当是国家航空器。这一观点与国际民航组织、国际航空运输协会一致。此外，北大西洋公约组织还强调任何缔约国再发布关于国家航空器的规范时，都应当给予民用航空器应有的安全注意。

（五）美国空军

在参与讨论国际民航组织CAR/SAM区域的RVSM问题时，美国空军专门讨论了国家航空器议题，认为用于军事、海关、警察目的的航空器不是民用航空器，而应当是国家航空器，并且国家具有定义国家航空器的自由，在定义时应当考虑航空器所有者、运行者、乘客、货物等因素。②U.S. Air Force: State Aircraft Issues, ICAO’s 1st RVSM Seminar for CAR/SAM Region, ICAO’s 2nd RVSM Seminar for CAR/SAM Region, at http://www.icao.int/RO_SAM/ Documents/2003/RVSMII/P-Storm-State%20Aircraft-E.pdf#search=State%20Aircraft%20 %20%20us%20AIr%20force, 17 December 2016.

（六）我国有关民用航空器和国家航空器区别问题的讨论

1.学术界

我国学术界对此问题的讨论，文献较少且着眼于国家航空器的判定，③黄力华：《国家航空器法律问题研究》，载于《现代法学》2000年第6期，第146～149页；李文莉：《国家航空器在国际法上的地位——从“南海撞机事件”谈起》，载于《安徽职业警官学院学报》2003年第3期，第26～27页。但是实际上仍是讨论国家航空行为。

2.实务界

我国实务界方面，1993年中国民用航空局令第31号《民用航空器维修许可审定的规定》中曾经规定，“国家航空器指军队、海关和警察使用的航空器”，但是本部规章被2001年《民用航空器维修单位合格审定规则》废止。而在《中国民用航空空中交通管理规则》、④中国民用航空总局令第86号《中国民用航空空中交通管理规则》1999年7月5日发布，2000年1月5日实施。《民用航空飞行签派员执照管理规则》、⑤中国民用航空总局令第136号《民用航空飞行签派员执照管理规则》2004年12月16日发布，2005年1月15日实施。《中国民用航空总局关于奥运会（残奥会）期间外国飞机临时飞行计划申请、审批的通知》⑥中国民用航空总局明传电报《中国民用航空总局关于奥运会（残奥会）期间外国飞机临时飞行计划申请、审批的通知》2008年2月发布，2008年7月1日实施。以及《民用航空器驾驶员和地面教员合格审定规则》⑦中国民用航空局令第224号《民用航空器驾驶员和地面教员合格审定规则》2014年7月10日发布，2014年9月1日实施。中，“国家航空器”仅仅作为一个概念在使用，并没有确切的文本含义。《中国民用航空局关于救灾物资中危险品运输有关事宜的通知》采用了单项行为定性的方式，规定“对包机运输含有危险品的救灾物资，可视为国家航空器运行，不受CCAR-276部规章的限制，但对货物的安全处理仍需满足第二条第（二）款的要求”。

从上述规定来看，当前在实务界，“国家航空器”并未具有完全的定义疆域，而仅有“局部”化的描述。

（七）阶段性结论——有关航空器与航空器行为的区分

笔者认为，对于民用航空器和国家航空器区别的既有探讨混淆了航空器性质与航空行为性质，因此有必要厘清这2个概念。

当前，各国以及国际组织大多采用涵盖航空行为的“航空器”概念，这就可能导致在判别航空器实际行为时产生误差。例如，在全球民用航空的发展史上，就发生了多次因误判民用航空器的行为而产生的事故。

为对为对确为对质行敌为行敌为明行敌为性航为航为航为民判行民判行不民判行将误将误尚将误重降上生死全一军人，109死果严迫机人人人难括将95亡降上人结-4，面，9被后，58遇包国的死迫机2亡DC伤海人，10亡上部上法机名内机成中机击到19还在飞造人两，的军高输接音航击。，能波民其境定未的员运飞后落起击降人了中飞军美行用在1611和为将边规枚型军射亚，，军致空告利亚警加行断役导-135其令兰的一C-54退射RC发员向组弹利过保在直进不现命芬织，国发后挥逃航导加经在。仍一的法外保在挥去为近指图名意因飞面意民空际空，指飞峙擦司一弹对摩公（员地，国枚。告事中斯从界空报机行而示年导听边照两空意腊军空拉察飞，指2011遵射侦军胁军愿希的的格未发领员判防利飞研而的湾近道亚行出和-135苏威苏方加事台附国现亚。试似步不动时与岛美落保当致测RC）。认从并-15确遵作苏入亚，陆南自表利击所行大加的相一班的此，海源进利架保火进军其进航机。束间结期DC-4线加落航保起向起在美极示的飞落上正架为表请空截降。刚。的离据下落机枚其外所航拦备班刚行落偏。放起于一别，挥韩军准航争进击。机截机起由，判计指大苏示战在被判飞拦客收是称视设面称为指902鲜直泰误，行座又故声目款地声认军伤朝一国起时进星即事时。员一同是方面按枚段航-15一格L-049随称访落向面则苏击，也引行年抗但。易告采击报视被张容，飞源，苏国已，于于军方经一军第米架思方电班1954对紧，航-4落事度机在架那意官受航苏707装。韩其中涂落而且击泰DC空击疑导落客战迫件击航遭机国击空联伤事国司遭列班客本射航苏击国公机件件色以402事航件航被试件韩被机事英空客事落法似弹事大机斗降7 7 9 4间年195423日年195527日年196811日年197820日时月月月月

为对为对行敌行敌确航为为航为为击明民判行民判行误不将误将误尚全269人人难亡遇人生遇298使死290难上部78丧上为人机数致机全上部客人并1993一是式苏形5机于年击”在标，在飞也）进员后就模入对1987误被射正的1812器后起，向航驶了录查治航航偏驾“，发落记调拉导磁班机的导弹时空”号击行立克的前的上斯弹飞独安驶G（航斗之射湾森导的的在班自将L007联驾HD号战此发斯文空班轮动苏在军波“防航一，。空舰号新航为年克经洋L007过式KA上模致，号做加多拉S-200经007式行导意打伊机弹途巡枚KA织AL模开被客导一有航，K向准这的。的组）飞是大争舰航级战卫民加射拥民现航标），长生机发伊护朗罗发认际发承国组G（执系航难磁行统班的两弹伊德，导，康。时习开。小HD没有航张号日3提落演公国查紧克用并导国击号空在斯韩调势塔月性007致7美弹军罗给。使长局斯接乌湾军年习空直机（是惯AL导的导，归报俄还告一后式。K直认海海，演对后其终，飞模因断是国峡舰承体将落起S原判景美。1988海府。解年最击在IN的误背，没的日沉政确出被机为空错苏1992提到客改领的联事11些尔SM兹-2MR木兰。明克班不年直说更联势007难此月险霍准乌航尚客击弹斯事航坠空空航军导罗机航机民美兰俄客亚17西韩班件朗被件事克落航来MH件事大号事伊机落乌击民件马空毁9晨7 7年清10年4年日2014171983日日年日19883 1月月月2001月

目前，某些国家对中国在南海地区享有的权利存在不合理的看法，因此南海上空极容易出现误判航空器行为的事件，因为单纯地从航空器的属性并不能确定航空器行为的性质。这就需要我们对航空器与航空行为进行区分与研究，特别是国家航空行为。

1.航空器性质

航空器性质主要根据其初始制造目的来确定，但这种初始目的并不影响其后被用作其他目的，并且现实中存在航空器性质发生变化的情况。⑧《波音创造民航飞机改军用历史》，载于《北京日报》2007年5月22日。例如，波音737-100式飞机的设计目的是一种只有65到80个座位的小容量短途载客用机，因此波音737-100式飞机的航空器性质是民用航空器。但是从波音公司的产品发展来看，波音大型喷气客机形成了707、737、747、757、767、777系列，787也在研制试生产中。波音公司也应军需，将它们同时改装为军用飞机，如707-320B被改装为空军预警机，于1972年首飞；2006年11月，韩国向波音订购了4架E-737预警机，使韩国能监视整个朝鲜半岛及周边国家部分空域；747在1977年被改装后，就用作航天飞机的载机至今；767增加KC-767加油机，可以直接为远程重型战略轰炸机B-52H空中加油；1993年日本又成为767预警机的发起用户，并已装备了4架。也就是说，航空器的性质实际上是客观性质，并且此种性质是可变更的。所以，单纯从航空器的性质来界定航空器的行为是不科学的，比如，若一架民用航空器执行的是国家任务，仅仅从航空器性质进行界定就有可能得出相反的结论。

2.航空行为

随着无人机的兴起，固执地坚守航空器的性质已经毫无意义，因为航空器实际上从属于其行为目的。例如，无人机可以用来运送快递，也可以用来执行军事任务。如果不加以区分统一以“无人机”作为关键概念进行处理，将会产生行为混淆的问题。正是由于航空器性质界定的缺陷，笔者认为航空活动的性质更加容易判断，其需要采用实际目的来进行判断，例如某民航飞机波音737-100式飞机被国家征用，进行抢险救灾，此时该飞机所进行的活动则为国家活动。航空活动体现了航空器的主观性质。

3.从航空器到航空行为

由此，我们可以发现，航空器性质与航空活动的性质并无直接联系。如果仅仅以航空器的性质分类，则会忽视掉航空器实际上的目的。实际目的正是区分民用航空行为与国家航空行为的依据，而并非是航空器最初的设计目的。目前有关航空器的定义均采用了航空活动这一主观标准来界定，因此在语言表述上，我们完全可以把国家航空器的定义看做是国家航空行为的定义。

五、国家航空行为的目的形态

诚如上述，对于航空器性质的研判无助于解决现实中面临的问题，民用航空器由于其行为被认定为国家航空器而被击落即为一例。国际社会对于民用航空行为的界定已经相对清晰，因此，如何判定国家航空行为才是我们需要解决的真正问题。

（一）国家航空行为的定义权

首先，《联合国宪章》序言规定“大小各国平等权利之信念”；第一条确定“发展国际间以尊重人民平等权利及自决原则为根据之友好关系”的宗旨；特别在第二条第一项规定“本组织系基于各会员国主权平等之原则”，第七项声明“不得认为授权联合国干涉在本质上属于任何国家国内管辖之事件”。第七十八条再次肯定“联合国会员国之间关系，应基于尊重主权平等之原则”，并把它列为各项原则之首，作为联合国的一项基本组织原则。

其次，《芝加哥公约》第三条第四款规定，“缔约各国承允在发布关于其国家航空器的规章时，对民用航空器的航行安全予以应有的注意”，这表明《芝加哥公约》延续了《联合国宪章》对于各国主权尊重的规定，承认各国具有规定何为本国国家航空器（国家航空行为）的自由。

因此，无论是《联合国宪章》关于国家主权原则的规定，还是《芝加哥公约》对于国家自行界定国家航空器（国家航空行为）的规定，均表明了规定国家航空行为和国家航空器的定义与范围是一国主权范围的事项。特别是，因为南海地区是维持中国大陆领土与其密不可分的群岛水域之间的主权联系，以及群岛自身发展所必需的既有的以及将来应当具有的一切权利的承载体，因此需要由中国对国家航空行为进行定义。

（二）民用航空行为与国家航空行为的区分

《芝加哥公约》第三条规定，

民用航空器和国家航空器

一、本公约仅适用于民用航空器，不适用于国家航空器。

二、用于军事、海关和警察部门的航空器，应认为是国家航空器。

三、一缔约国的国家航空器，未经特别协定或其他方式的许可并遵照其中的规定，不得在另一缔约国领土上空飞行或在此领土上降落。

四、缔约各国承允在发布关于其国家航空器的规章时，对民用航空器的航行安全予以应有的注意。

各国和各国际组织认为该条款对民用航空器与国家航空器进行了区分。

首先，《芝加哥公约》序言中开宗明义规定，“使国际民用航空得按照安全和有秩序的方式发展，并使国际航空运输业务得建立在机会均等的基础上，健康地和经济地经营；为此目的缔结本公约”，且第三条重申“本公约仅适用于民用航空器，不适用于国家航空器”。由此我们可以发现，该公约的目的表明了其并不协调与规范国家航空行为的定义与范畴，因此，该公约规定的国家航空器定义仅在民用航空行为的范畴内具有意义，也就是说，《芝加哥公约》对于民用航空行为与国家航空行为的区分，是以《芝加哥公约》的目的为语境的，这种区分并不适用于所有语境。

其次，从语义上分析，《芝加哥公约》第三条“用于军事、海关和警察部门的航空器，应认为是国家航空器”中采用“用于（目的）……应认为是（性质）”的表述模式，因此对于国家航空器的界定实际上是从航空行为的性质来定义航空器的性质。

再次，《芝加哥公约》第三条“用于军事、海关和警察部门的航空器”，采用的是列举式的表述，如果仅仅认为此三种类型的航空器包含了全部的国家航空器，或者国家航空行为目的，则是对《联合国宪章》中规定的国家主权原则的侵犯。由于各国具有平等主权，而国家航空行为目的又是国家主权的一个方面，因此不应当受《芝加哥公约》第三条定义的限制。

最后，《芝加哥公约》第三条第四款规定，“缔约各国承允在发布关于其国家航空器的规章时，对民用航空器的航行安全予以应有的注意”，这体现了《芝加哥公约》对各国主权的尊重，即各国具有规定何为本国国家航空器（国家航空行为）的自由。

（三）中国《民用航空法》对于民用航空行为的界定

我国现行的《民用航空法》并不含有直接界定国家航空器的条文，而仅是在第五条中规定，“本法所称民用航空器，是指除用于执行军事、海关、警察飞行任务外的航空器”，但是《民用航空法》的目的仅仅是“为了维护国家的领空主权和民用航空权利，保障民用航空行为安全和有秩序地进行，保护民用航空行为当事人各方的合法权益，促进民用航空事业的发展”，因此第五条这种列举式的条文并不能看做是对民用航空行为和国家航空活动的区分，只能说第五条是作为界定民用航空器或者民用航空行为的一个组成部分，而要充分界定何为民用航空行为，还需要参考《民用航空法》的整个篇章结构以及其他法律规范。

此外，我们还可以发现，从某种程度上说，1995年10月30日公布的中国《民用航空法》第五条，实际上是对《芝加哥公约》第三条“用于军事、海关和警察部门的航空器，应认为是国家航空器”的重复。所以该条并不具有区分国家航空行为与民用航空行为的充分权威性。

（四）中国《宪法》与《物权法》对于国家航空行为的界定

有关国家航空行为的定义还可以从我国《宪法》与《物权法》中寻找。我国《宪法》第十三条对公民的私有财产作了规定：“国家为了公共利益的需要，可以依照法律规定对公民的私有财产实行征收或者征用并给予补偿”，并且《物权法》第四十四条规定：“因抢险、救灾等紧急需要，依照法律规定的权限和程序可以征用单位、个人的不动产或者动产。被征用的不动产或者动产使用后，应当返还被征用人。单位、个人的不动产或者动产被征用或者征用后毁损、灭失的，应当给予补偿。”

因此，出于“公共利益的需要”或“因抢险、救灾等紧急需要”的原因，国家可以征用与征收私有财产。同理，国家出于“公共利益的需要”或“因抢险、救灾等紧急需要”的原因，可以对原本用于民用目的的航空器进行征用与征收，从而将民用航空行为转化为国家航空行为。

（五）联合判定

基于上述的分析可知，规定国家航空行为的定义是一国主权范围之内的事项，主权国家对此拥有无可争辩的权力。如果运用“国家航空行为、民用航空行为”的二分法来界定航空活动，国家航空行为的目的至少由以下三部分组成：

首先，《民用航空法》第五条规定“本法所称民用航空器，是指除用于执行军事、海关、警察飞行任务外的航空器”，采用排除规定的方式界定了民用航空器，同时也划定了非民用航空目的。从国家航空行为和民用航空行为二分的视野出发，这部分非民用航空目的就构成了国家航空行为目的的一部分。因此在实定法意义层面上，“执行军事、海关、警察飞行任务”成为国家航空行为的目的之一。

其次，根据我国《宪法》与《物权法》，出于“公共利益的需要”或“因抢险、救灾等紧急需要”，国家按照法律规定可以征用或者征收私有财产。在现实生活中，由于突发灾害，国家会征用民用航空执行相应的救灾任务，此时民用航空器的行为具有了国家航空行为的属性。换句话说，依据我国《宪法》与《物权法》，执行国家任务也应成为国家航空行为的目的之一。

最后，基于《联合国宪章》关于国家主权原则的规定，以及《芝加哥公约》对于国家自行规定国家航空器（国家航空行为）的规定，国家具有补充国家航空行为定义的自由。

总而言之，国家航空行为的目的包括“执行军事、海关、警察飞行任务”、“公共利益的需要”与“抢险、救灾等紧急需要”，此外，国家还具有补充国家航空行为定义的自由。

（六）国家航空行为与民用航空行为混合情况下的性质研判

在国家航空行为与民用航空行为出现混合的情况下，如何界定该活动的性质呢？例如，基于双边司法协定，甲国执法人员接受乙国执法机关移交的外逃犯罪嫌疑人，搭乘民航航班由乙国回国的行为，即出现了国家活动（押解犯罪嫌疑人）与民用活动（普通的旅客乘坐）的混合，此时如何判定该航空器的活动性质呢？笔者认为，需要采用以下几个标准进行判断。

首先，需要审视该航空器活动的主要目的是用于民用活动还是国家活动。上例中，如果该航班的主要目的为搭载旅客，押解行为本身并未对航空器功能产生实质影响，则应当认定为民用航空行为；反之，如果由于押解工作的要求，该民航飞机采用特别航班时刻等方式进行保障，则应当认定为国家航空行为。值得注意的是，对于飞入一国领空的航空器，应当依据该国法律对其航空行为的性质进行研判，这是对一国主权的尊重。这就意味着，甲国的国家航空器在甲国以及公海上空运行的时候，应当遵守甲国的国内法以及国际法准则，而甲国的航空器在飞入乙国的领空后，需要受乙国国内法的管控。

其次，需要审视该航空器的实际控制权掌握在谁手中，即主要看航空器处于何种主体的实际控制之下。国家航空行为不仅表现在目的上，还具备外在行为。一方面存在通过外在行为将民用航空行为误解为国家航空行为，从历次民用航空器被武装击落的原因来分析，我们可以发现大多数是由于对外在行为发生误解而导致的；另一方面存在通过外在行为将国家航空行为误解为民用航空行为。⑨例如，1981年6月7日以色列空军实施“巴比伦计划”，出动14架飞机偷袭了伊拉克首都巴格达东南约20公里处的核反应堆，以色列对突击飞机全部采用约旦空军涂装，沙特雷达曾发现并令其通报身份，以色列飞行员即以流利的阿拉伯语回答道：“是约旦空军，例行训练。”对方信以为真。当约旦雷达发现时，由于机群编队密集，在雷达屏幕上显示的图像只是一个模糊的亮点，很像一架大型运输机，以飞行员即用国际通用美语回答是“民航机”，再次蒙混过关。

最后，再利用飞机外表标注进行研判。民用航空器标志即飞机号、机尾号、注册号，是识别飞机的重要标志，无此独一无二编号的民用航空器是不允许进行任何飞行的。国际民用航空组织理事会于1949年2月8日通过了《芝加哥公约》附件七《航空器国籍标志和登记标志》。1981年7月30日通过了附件七的第4次修改，各缔约国的规定如与附件7的规定有差异时，应通知国际民航组织备案认可，并在该附件7的附录中加以说明。这种标准实际上是从国家认定以及国际认定的角度对民用航空行为进行了规定。因此在国际上我们可以通过相关标识来进行研判，其中包括国籍标志、⑩国籍标志选定规则：国籍标志须从国际电联分配给登记国的无线电呼叫信号中的国籍代号系列中选择，须将国籍标志通知国际民航组织。共用标志①国际民航组织理事会于1969年1月23日通过了附件七第3次修改，并于同年5月23日生效，引进了“共用标志”、“共用标志登记当局”、“国际经营机构”等词。按《国际民用航空公约》第77条规定，预期不以国家形式登记航空器的，可以采用共用标志。共用标志须从国际电联分配给国际民航组织的无线电呼叫信号的代号系列中选定。由国际民航组织给共用标志登记当局指定共用标志。例如，1983年国际民航组织理事会会议决定，阿拉伯航空货运公司（约旦和伊拉克联营）联合登记的航空器具有共用标志4YB，由约旦保存并登记，约旦和伊拉克共同承担国际民航组织规定的责任。以及登记标志。②一般规定，登记标志须是字母、数字或者两者的组合，列在国籍标志之后，第一位是字母的，则国籍标志与登记标志之间应有一短划。临时登记标志主要针对尚未取得国籍登记证的航空器。我国《民用航空器国籍登记规定》规定，当用于试验和表演飞行，为支付出口的调机飞行（在国外交付时）以及民航总局认为必要的情况下，可申请临时登记标志。具有临时登记标志的航空器不得从事客货运输及其他经营活动。

六、结 论

1976年的《东南亚友好合作条约》和1982年《海洋法公约》建立了和平解决东南亚地区争端的初步机制，但是并没有为南海问题提供实质上的帮助。于是2002年11月，中国与东盟各国签署了《南海各方行为宣言》，该宣言是第一个专门解决南海问题的政治文件。

如上文所述，在国际反恐的新形势下，侵略行为的概念出现了扩大的趋势。这就对国家航空行为的判定提出了新的要求，而此问题的实质就是国家航空行为国际运行的合法性问题。

（一）整体上遵循和平共处五项原则

和平共处五项原则作为一个开放包容的国际法原则，集中体现了主权、正义、民主、法治的价值观。③《习近平在和平共处五项原则发表60周年纪念大会上的讲话》，下载于http://www. gov.cn/xinwen/2014-06/29/content_2709613.htm，2016年11月24日。1970年25届联大通过的《关于各国依联合国宪章建立友好关系及合作的国际法原则宣言》和1974年第6届特别联大《关于建立新的国际经济秩序宣言》，都明确把和平共处五项原则包括在内。对待国家间存在的分歧和争端，要坚持通过对话协商以和平方式解决，以对话增互信，以对话解纷争，以对话促安全，不能动辄诉诸武力或以武力相威胁。热衷于使用武力，不是强大的表现，而是道义贫乏、理念苍白的表现。只有基于道义、理念的安全，才是基础牢固、真正持久的安全。因此，和平共处五项原则应当作为一个概括性标准来处理国家航空行为的国际运行问题。

南海地区上空是中国管理和开发其东沙群岛、中沙群岛、西沙群岛、南沙群岛及其附近海域的重要支撑体的一部分，中国对南海上空享有的权利包括维持中国大陆领土与其密不可分的群岛水域之间的主权联系，以及群岛自身发展所必需的既有的以及将来应当具有的一切权利。其他国家的“航行及飞越自由”不能干扰到此种权利的实现。

总而言之，南海上空的利用首先应当尊重中国的上述权利，并且本着和平发展与共赢的目的进行利用。

（二）国家航空行为的双重判定标准

如前所述，各国具有定义国家航空行为的权力，此外国际公约中又缺少有关国家航空行为的规定，所以，在当前国际社会中，“国家航空行为”并未形成一个共信共行的协同概念，这就使得该概念的外延具有可扩充性。因此，在判定某一行为是否属于国家航空行为时，即排除适用民用航空公约的时候，应当结合所在国国内法与国际法进行判定。

一方面，对国家航空行为的判定是一项主权内容，特别是对于飞临本国领空的外国航空器，主权国家拥有不容置疑的研判权力；另一方面，应当在符合既有国际法准则的情况下，结合相关国家规定和实践进行判定。

（三）国家航空行为的无害判定标准

国家航空行为的国际运行有可能会导致主权冲突的情况。但是如果国家航空行为并没有侵犯到另一国主权，则不应当被认为是有害行为。例如，若国家航空行为的国际运行是为了救助目的，则不应当认为是有害行为。这点也是为国际法所认可的，危难情形下可以解除国际不法行为的不法性是早已确立的国际习惯法规则。联合国国际法委员会2001年在其第53届会议上通过了《关于国家对国际不法行为的责任的条款草案》，该草案第24条第1款就指出：“就一国不遵守该国国际义务的行为而言，如有关行为人在遭遇危难的情况下为了挽救其生命或受其监护的其他人的生命，除此行为之外，别无其他合理方法，该行为的不法性即告解除。”

但是，在南海上空进行的国家航空行为，不能以危害中国大陆领土与其南海诸岛的主权联系，以及南海U形线内水域对此种关系的支撑为代价。这就要求在南海地区进行的国家航空行为应当以此为最高准则，这是由现代国际法上的国家主权原则衍生出来的。任何国家在利用他国赖以为生的区域时，都不应当使得作为该国“生命”的主权受到侵害。

（四）“排除合理怀疑”标准

排除合理怀疑实际上是刑事诉讼法对有罪无罪的研判标准，对于国家航空行为的国际运行是否有害，需要采用此标准进行研判，即相关国家只有在排除合理怀疑的基础上才能在程序上认定国家航空行为的国际运行是否有害。

根据前论，甲国的国家航空器在甲国或公海上空运行的时候，应当遵守甲国的国内法以及国际法准则，而甲国的航空器在飞入乙国领空后，则需要由乙国的国内法进行研判与调整。因此极有可能出现两国对于航空行为研判规定不一致，甚至是相冲突的情况。在目前的情况下，期许统一的国际法标准对其进行调整是不现实的。这就需要对研判标准进行梳理，特别是对“无害”的把握。

作为在南海上空具有优先权利的国家，中国应当具有程序法上的谨慎义务与注意义务。南海作为交通要冲，中国深知南海地区对于各国具有重要意义，因此积极倡导通过《南海各方行为宣言》来规范秩序，以增加南海地区的国际公益性。

（五）不优先使用武力原则

虽然国家在遭遇侵略或者遭遇外来恐怖袭击的时候，具有自卫权，但前提是国家航空行为的国际运行属于侵略行为，否则不能使用武力。在侵略行为的研判方面，应当以限制解释论为原则，辅之以反恐背景下必要的扩大解释。并且《南海各方行为宣言》中强调，“有关各方承诺根据公认的国际法原则，包括1982年《联合国海洋法公约》，由直接有关的主权国家通过友好磋商和谈判，以和平方式解决它们的领土和管辖权争议，而不诉诸武力或以武力相威胁”。

因此，在南海上空如果发生他国的国家航空行为侵扰到中国大陆领土与其南海诸岛的主权联系，应当首先以谈判协商的方式解决。

LI Yaning*

I. Research Questions

Serving as a strategic passage and energy base, the South China Sea (SCS) holds special strategic significance to China, a hybrid country that borders with both land and sea.①Du Debin, Fan Fei and Ma Yahua, Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea and China’s Strategies, World Regional Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2012, p. 1. (in Chinese)Particularly, the current views and opinions about the U-shaped line in the SCS are not consistent. There are mainly four different postulations regarding the legal status of this line, namely, the “historic waters line”, the“historic title line”, “maritime boundary line”, and the “islands ownership line”. In accordance with the postulation of “islands ownership line”, China has indisputable sovereignty over the Dongsha, Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as their surrounding waters.②Li Jinming, The Legal Status of the U-shaped Line in the South China Sea: Historic Waters, Maritime Boundary or a Line of Islands Ownership?, Southeast Asian Af f airs, No. 4, 2010, pp. 22～29 (in Chinese); Li Jinming, Background and Legal Status of the U-shaped Line in the South China Sea, Contemporary International Relations, No. 9, 2012, pp. 7～14 (in Chinese). Gao Zhiguo, the Director of China Institute for Marine Af f airs, SOA, argues that the U-shaped line on the Chinese map is merely a line that delineates ownership of islands rather than a maritime boundary in the conventional sense. He wrote in an article, “[a] careful study of Chinese documents reveals that China never has claimed the entire water column of the South China Sea, but only the islands and their surrounding waters within the line.”It implies that the SCS islands form an indispensable part of China, and the operation of state aircraft, especially those of foreign States, would become the focus of worldwide attention.

On the one hand, according to Article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (hereinafter “Chicago Convention”), “[n]o state aircraft of a contracting State shall fy over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.” On the other hand, China has concluded many bilateral aeronautical agreements with other States, allowing the entry of their civil aircrafts to China’s airspace.

Recently, under the pretext of the so-called “freedom of navigation”, many attempts have been made to internationalize the SCS issue. However, “freedom of navigation” and “freedom of overflight”, primarily, refer to the rights on the high seas. In contrast, the U-shaped line is an islands ownership line and resourcejurisdiction line.③Jin Yongming, The Nature of China’s U-shaped Line in the South China Sea and the Legal Status of Waters Enclosed by the Line, China Legal Science, No. 6, 2012, pp. 36～48. (in Chinese)China has special entitlement to the waters enclosed by the U-shaped line. Therefore, it is necessary to embark on a discussion on aviation behaviors.

The connotations and denotations of conventional legal concepts, unavoidably, will change accordingly with the development of science and technology, especially those relating to aviation activities. In this case, a study on the basic concepts pertinent to aviation activities is particularly important.

First, both the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China and the relevant international conventions, confuse the two concepts of “aircraft”and “aviation behavior” and use them interchangeably. For example, Chicago Convention, Article 3, entitled “Civil and state aircraft”, defines state aircraft as“aircraft used in military, customs and police services”.④Article 5 of the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China also adopts the same expression, namely, “Civil aircraft mentioned in this law refer to aircraft other than those used for fying mission of military, customs and police operations.”The expression “aircraft used in military, customs and police services”, virtually, is employed to describe“aviation behavior”, which however is conceptualized by using the word “aircraft”. This is a misuse of “behavior” for “object”. For this reason, when civil aircraft carry out state missions, or state aircraft perform civil tasks, misjudgment often occurs in practice. For instance, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) says shooting down a drone is a federal crime⑤FAA Says Shooting Down Drones Is a Federal Crime, at http://www.engadget. com/2016/04/18/faa-says-shooting-down-drones-is-a-federal-crime/, 22 November 2016.based on Title 18, Section 32 of the United States Code.⑥18 USC 32: (a) Whoever willfully - (1) sets fre to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce; … shall be fned under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Obviously, this provision used the word “aircraft”, without distinguishing aviation behaviors.This act, obviously, mixes up “object” with “behavior”.

Second, although much attention has been given to the study of civil aviation behavior by scholars and practitioners, few in-depth discussions have been made with respect to the defnition of state aviation behavior and the criteria to identify state aviation behaviors. Lack of such discussions will result in unclear or vague concepts. The elucidation of state aviation behavior, a concept most linked to civil aviation behavior, would make the scope of the latter clearer, and also contribute signifcantly to the development of the basic concept system concerning aviationactivities.

Finally, the majority of the recorded eight incidents, where civil aircraft were suspected to be shot down by armed forces, are tragedies caused by misjudging civil aviation behaviors as state ones. These tragedies, in nature, are resulted from the confusing of civil with state aviation behaviors. When a State’s aircraft, which have characteristics of state aviation behavior, enter into the airspace of another State, the right of self-defence may be triggered. That is one important reason why state aviation behavior urgently needs a careful study.

Embarking on the nature of aircraft and aviation activities, the author attempts, through examining the existing definitions for “act of aggression”, to outline the purpose and behavioral attributes of state aircraft, and further to define state aviation behavior.

II. The Legal Status of the SCS Airspace: A Perspective from Maritime Rights and Interests

Indisputably, the determination of the nature of airspace is fairly important for civil aviation activities. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) classified airspace into seven classes: Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E, Class F and Class G⑦1) Class A: IFR flights only are permitted, all flights are separated from each other and provided with air traffic control (ATC) service; continuous two-way radio communication is mandatory, and all fights are required to follow ATC clearances. 2) Class B: IFR and VFR fights are permitted; other requirements are identical with those of Class A. 3) Class C: IFR flights are separated from other IFR flights; VFR flights are separated from IFR fights; all these fights are provided with ATC service, and other requirements are identical with those of Class B. 4) Class D: IFR fights are separated from other IFR fights and are provided with ATC service; VFR fights receive traffic information in respect of all other fights; and other requirements are identical with those of Class C. 5) Class E: continuous two-way radio communication is mandatory for IFR fights; VFR fights are not required to follow ATC clearances; and other requirements are identical with those of Class D. 6) Class F: IFR flights receive air traffic advisory and information service and VFR flights receive fight information service; all fights are not required to follow ATC clearances; and other requirements are identical with those of Class E. 7) Class G: fights are not required to separated from each other, and all fights are provided with fight information service; continuous two-way radio communication is mandatory for IFR flights; flights are not required to follow ATC clearances; and other requirements are identical with those of Class F.Nonetheless, such technical classifcation of airspace is preconditioned on the principal attributes of airspace. In this connection, the legal status of the SCS airspace should be decided after first taking into account thestatus of SCS islands and their adjacent waters.

A. The Legal Status of the Area Enclosed by the U-shaped Line in the SCS

The Xisha Islands constitutes an integral part of China’s territory. And the Chinese government announced the baseline of the territorial sea of Xisha Islands in 1996, and the waters extending up to 12 nautical miles from the straight baseline is the territorial sea of China. Then there comes the question: How to defne other parts of the area enclosed by the U-shaped line? Part IV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) established a unique“archipelagic regime”, however, it failed to provide explicitly whether this regime is applicable to non-archipelagic State.

In light of the relevant legal documents and practice, the author is of the opinion: First, China has indisputable sovereignty over the Dongsha, Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands, as well as their adjacent waters.

Second, the archipelagic regime cannot be applied to the SCS area where China has special entitlement. The UNCLOS failed to deal with the issues associated with the mid-ocean archipelagos of non-archipelagic States, which is an unfortunate omission of the convention.⑧Kuen-chen Fu and Zheng Fan, Unity of Archipelago and Freedom of Navigation: Some Suggestions on Applying Archipelagic Regime in the South China Sea, Journal of SJTU (Philosophy and Social Sciences), Vol. 23, No. 6, 2015, pp. 5～13. (in Chinese)Chinese territory is mainly made of its mainland, which is essentially distinct from the general archipelagic States under Part IV of UNCLOS, which defnes archipelagic State as “a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands”. More importantly, China is a country which carries out pubic administration and promotes economic and cultural development primarily on its mainland. Its demands for land territory are closely related to the territory of its islands, which is consistent with the country’s overall interests and would facilitate public administration. Such demands turn the SCS into an “area where China should have special entitlement”. Therefore, the part of the area enclosed by the U-shaped line without fxed baseline of territorial sea, should be the area where China should have special entitlement, in view of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters.

Third, the SCS area where China should have special entitlement is an indispensable zone for China to sustain the healthy development of its SCS islands. As a country which carries out social and economic activities primarily on its mainland, China also needs to ef f ectively manage its islands. This is another aspect that dif f erentiates China from archipelagic States conducting such activities principally on archipelagoes. Compared to its mainland, China’s islands in the SCS are still in the primary stage of development, which should be closely connected to its mainland. If China’s islands in the SCS are compared to an “infant”, then the area enclosed by the U-shaped line can be recognized as a “cradle” nurturing the infant. Therefore, being dif f erent from its entitlement to the contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, China’s entitlement to the special SCS area should include, all the existing and future rights necessary for the development of these SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters.

Fourth, China’s entitlement to the area enclosed by the U-shaped line in the SCS is recognized by the jurisprudence of international law and state practice. The Chinese people frst discovered, named, developed and utilized the SCS, and have ef f ectively managed them for a long term. These historical facts substantiate China’s entitlement above. Additionally, China’s entitlement is acknowledged by the post-World War II international legal system, including the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the 1945 Potsdam Declaration and the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. These facts indicate that China’s entitlement to the SCS islands is distinct from the entitlement of other mainland-based States to their islands.

Lastly, China’s rights over the SCS do not prevent China from “shelving disputes and seeking joint development” with other States concerned. In fact, the Chinese people have engaged in all kinds of activities in the SCS for over 2,000 years. Before the late 1960s, when abundant hydrocarbon resources were found in the SCS area, the fact that the SCS islands belong to China was widely recognized by the international community, and confirmed by diplomatic practice, along with authoritative maps and publications of other States. However, after the late 1960s, the Philippines and other States, one after another, illegally occupied and encroached upon more than 40 islands or features of Nansha Islands. China not only showed great tolerance and exercised much restraint towards such acts, but also put forward the initiative to “shelve dispute and seek joint development”. Apart from concluding bilateral agreements with each administration of the Philippines tosettle their disputes over the SCS through negotiations, China also issued, together with the ASEAN countries, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and actively negotiate with the States concerned to formulate the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, with an aim to maintain the peace and stability of the SCS region by taking practical actions.

B. The Legal Status of the Airspace over the SCS

As stated above, the rights China enjoys over the area enclosed by the U-shaped line in the SCS should include, all the existing and future rights necessary for the development of the SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters. “All future rights” is used here because China’s rights over the area enclosed by the U-shaped line would not remain unchanged, and we should see these rights with foresight. Previously, the administration and economic development of islands were chiefly carried out through ships, but with the development of new technology, such jobs can also be performed through aircraft, network and communication equipment, and etc.

On 6 January 2016, two civilian airplanes requisitioned by Chinese government took of f from Haikou Meilan International Airport, and successfully landed at 10:21 a.m. and 10:46 a.m., respectively, on the airfeld newly built on the Fiery Cross Reef after nearly 2 hours’ flight. These two planes returned to Haikou, China, in the afternoon of the same day, signifying that the test fight is successful. In addition, on 13 July of the same year, a flight took off from Haikou Meilan International Airport at 8:30 a.m. and landed on the newly built airfeld on the Meiji Reef two hours later, while another took of f from Haikou at 8:40 a.m. and landed on the airfeld on the Zhubi Reef at 10:28 a.m.. The two civilian planes, one chartered by China Southern Airlines and the other by Hainan Airlines, both returned to Haikou after a short stay on the reefs. This successful test flight demonstrates that both airfelds have the capability to ensure the safe operation of large civilian aircraft, which, in turn, would provide a convenient means of transportation for the provision of daily supplies to the SCS islands, as well as the relevant passenger traffic and medical aid. Furthermore, these airfelds may serve as alternate airports in the SCS for cross-ocean fights, and are also in the position to of f er cheaper and more fexible air routes options. Such fights fully refect that China has employed a new vehicle to manage and develop the SCS islands.

Similar to China’s rights over the relevant sea areas of SCS, its rights to the SCS airspace should include all the existing and future rights necessary for the development of the SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters. According to Article 3 of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, “[t]he Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overfight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Notably, such freedom of navigation and overfight should not be with prejudice to all the existing and future rights of China as described above.

Therefore, the rights China enjoys over the SCS airspace have the priority over the freedom of navigation or overfight, which is closely related to the principle of state sovereignty. The Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter “UN Charter”) laid particular stress on state sovereignty. The SCS region, which serves as the important base supporting China’s management and development of the Dongsha, Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as their adjacent waters, has sovereign relations with China’s mainland. Moreover, such sovereign relations have been exhibited in a continuous and consistent way. That is to say, the method that China adopted to manage and develop these SCS islands is a customary way recognized by the modern international law. Consequently, “the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea” should not affect the exercise of China’s rights abovementioned.

III. The Dif f erences between State and Civil Aviation Behaviors

A. The Features of State Aviation Behavior

In accordance with UNCLOS Articles 38, 53, 58 and 87, ships have, to varying extent, freedom of navigation in the straits used for international navigation, archipelagic waters of archipelagic States, EEZs and the high seas, while aircraft have varying degree of freedom of overfight over such sea areas. Coastal States generally adopt the transit passage regime for vessels going through the straits used for international navigation, but also the innocent passage regime in exceptional cases. Article 4 of the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other ActsCommitted on Board Aircraft stipulates that a coastal State could interfere with an aircraft in fight over the high seas in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over an offence committed on board in exceptional cases. According to international customs and usage, coastal States have universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed on the high seas, such as piracy, slave trafficking and hijack.

However, the author contends, the operation of aircraft in the SCS airspace, should be subject to all the existing and future rights enjoyable by China, as necessary for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters, and for the development of its SCS islands. Therefore, the existing regimes cannot apply to the SCS airspace. That is to say, a regime should be specially designed for the SCS airspace, by utilizing and developing international law.

The creation of such a regime requires us to classify and identify the aircraft over the SCS. Both the Chicago Convention and the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China have dif f erentiated state aircraft from civil aircraft, but failed to distinguish state from civil aviation behaviors.

Having the feature of quick movement and covering extensive areas, aviation behaviors are quite likely to get involved in sovereignty disputes. In that case, aviation behaviors, civil or state, should show enough concerns over any act that may be mistaken as any act of aggression, in order to avoid aircraft being shot down by mistake.

1. The Debate over the Status of Airspace

The debate over the status of airspace started from the 1912 Annual Conference of the International Law Association held in Brussels. Two opposing opinions appeared in this conference: one holds that every State enjoys the freedom to fy in the airspace of other States, and the other asserts that every State has sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.

The frst assertion that every State enjoys the freedom to fy in the airspace ofother States,⑨Article 1(1) of the International Air Services Transit Agreement provides that: “Each contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled international air services: 1. The privilege to fy across its territory without landing; 2. The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes. The privileges of this section shall not be applicable with respect to airports utilized for military purposes to the exclusion of any scheduled international air services. In areas of active hostilities or of military occupation, and in time of war along the supply routes leading to such areas, the exercise of such privileges shall be subject to the approval of the competent military authorities.” Additionally, Article 1(1) of the International Air Transport Agreement stipulates that: “Each contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled international air services: 1. The privilege to fly across its territory without landing; 2. The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes; 3. The privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo taken on in the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses; 4. The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses; 5. The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of any other contracting State and the privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo coming from any such territory. With respect to the privileges specifed under paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this section, the undertaking of each contracting State relates only to through services on a route constituting a reasonably direct line out from and back to the homeland of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses. The privileges of this section shall not be applicable with respect to airports utilized for military purposes to the exclusion of any scheduled international air services. In areas of active hostilities or of military occupation, and in time of war along the supply routes leading to such areas, the exercise of such privileges shall be subject to the approval of the competent military authorities.”is represented by the International Air Services Transit Agreement and the International Air Transport Agreement. In practice, such freedom of overfight contradicts with the principle of state territorial sovereignty, since state sovereignty also extends to the territorial airspace. In particular, in terms of its natural attribute, territorial airspace covers territory and territorial sea; therefore, if foreign aircraft are allowed to fy freely in the airspace of a State, that State would be exposed to risks beyond calculation.

The Chicago Convention, a representative international treaty holding every State has sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, provides explicitly in its Article 1 that “[t]he contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”

2. The Particularity of State Aviation Behavior

Considering the attributes of civil aviation, and the illegal downing of civil aircraft appeared in history, to avoid using force against civil aviation behaviors has gradually become a global concern. However, such incidents had not been anticipated at the time when the Chicago Convention was prepared. Therefore, people often quoted Article 2(4) of UN Charter, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrityor political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” After the crash of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983, the ICAO adopted a resolution on 6 March, 1984, based on its investigation, saying that any use of weapon against civil aircraft was incompatible with the rules of international law, no matter what reasons caused the airplane to deviate from its scheduled route. However, the resolution failed to specify which rule of international law was violated. In May of the same year, Article 3 bis was added to the Chicago Convention, which provided that every State must refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft in fight.

However, State aviation behavior is dif f erent from civil one in the following aspects:

First, the subject of state aviation behavior is State, while the subject of civil aviation behavior is individuals or any other entities. Notably, the concept of“State” here mainly refers to state power, which is not a civil subject. In that case, the operation of state-owned airlines should be dif f erentiated from state operation. The “state” in the expression of “state-owned airlines” is used in the sense of civil subject. That is to say, state, as a civil subject, conducts civil act. It follows that the operation of state-owned airlines is civil aviation behavior.

Second, state aviation behavior is of the nature of state mission, which refects the administrative power of a State. Hence, in case of conficts with the sovereignty of other States, state aviation behavior is much more complex than civil aviation activities. Sovereignty means the supreme power internally, the right to independence externally, and the right of self-defence to prevent foreign invasion. Therefore, state aviation behavior refects sovereignty in whole or in part, which shows a kind of power. It should refrain from jeopardizing the sovereignty of other sovereign States. In contrast, civil aviation behavior is a kind of civil acts by civil subjects with equal status, which manifests the “rights” of such subjects.

Third, all the principal international aviation conventions contain provisions defning whether they are applicable to state aviation behaviors, and also roughly distinguish their application in different areas. Comparatively, international regulations contain detailed provisions on civil aviation behaviors, but almost without any provisions on state aviation behaviors.

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The differences listed above show that state aircraft behaviors performed in foreign and international airspace need to be carefully studied. In practice, such behaviors have led to conficts of powers, or sovereignty conficts, which give rise to the question on how to determine an act of aggression. Given that the global antiterrorism situation is still severe at present, the study on aggression should not only made from a conventional angle, but also take anti-terrorism factors into account.

B. The Source of the Def i nition for Act of Aggression

1. Article 51 of the UN Charter

Article 51 of the UN Charter provides,

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

A State’s right to self-defence when suffering an armed attack, which is granted to the State by this Article 51, originates from the principle of state sovereignty. The sovereignty of a State means that a State can independently deal with its domestic and foreign af f airs, and has the supreme authority to administrate itself.

“Armed attack”, the core concept in this article, is a factor that triggers the exercise of the right to self-defence.⑩Tarcisio Gazzimi, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 132.However, the opinions of different States vary with respect to the requirements of “armed attack”.

2. The Caroline Rule

In 1837, the United Kingdom was facing a rebellion in Canada, which at that time was still under British control. A number of the rebel forces acting insupport of the Canadian rebellion (the majority of which being U.S. nationals) were stationed on Navy Island on the Canadian side of the Niagara River. They were supplied in munitions and personnel by the Caroline, which was an American steamer hired for that purpose. On December 29, while the Caroline was docked at Schlosser, in U.S. territory, it was attacked by British forces that set fre to the steamer and towed it over Niagara Falls. In the process, a U.S. citizen was killed. The U.S. protested against the British act. However, the U.K. alleged that its act was necessary for self-defense and self-preservation.①James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Temporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2006, pp. 433～435.And the Caroline Rule was established in this case, which says that self-defence may be justifed only in cases where the “necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”.②R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and Mcleod Cases, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Issue 1, 1938, pp. 91～92.

However, due to the traditions of case law, the facts of the Caroline case had overwhelming infuence on the interpretation of conclusions, which highlighted the element of “preemptive self-defense” in the case.

3. Article 9 of Chicago Convention and the “No-Fly Zones”Imposed by the UN Security Council

Article 9 of Chicago Convention states,

Prohibited areas

a) Each contracting State may, for reasons of military necessity or public safety, restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of other States from flying over certain areas of its territory, provided that no distinction in this respect is made between the aircraft of the State whose territory is involved, engaged in international scheduled airline services, and the aircraft of the other contracting States likewise engaged. Such prohibited areas shall be of reasonable extent and location so as not to interfere unnecessarily with air navigation. Descriptions of such prohibited areas in the territory of a contracting State, as well as any subsequent alterations therein, shall be communicated as soon as possible to the other contracting States and to the International Civil Aviation Organization.

b) Each contracting State reserves also the right, in exceptional circums-tances or during a period of emergency, or in the interest of public safety, and with immediate ef f ect, temporarily to restrict or prohibit fl ying over the whole or any part of its territory, on condition that such restriction or prohibition shall be applicable without distinction of nationality to aircraft of all other States.

c) Each contracting State, under such regulations as it may prescribe, may require any aircraft entering the areas contemplated in subparagraphs a) or b) above to ef f ect a landing as soon as practicable thereafter at some designated airport within its territory.

In conformity with Article 9 of the Chicago Convention, the Spanish Government, in 1967, declared the Spanish airspace surrounding Algeciras Bay a zone prohibited to aerial navigation. The U.K. protested against this declaration and forwarded its concerns over the issue to the ICAO Council. Nevertheless, since this issue was politicized, the deliberation of this issue was postponed indefnitely.

It should be noted, since the Chicago Convention does not apply to state aviation behaviors, it has little ef f ect on state aviation behaviors if its Article 9 is invoked.

UN Security Council, by invoking the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, imposes limits on the airspace over the territory of a State. For example, UN Security Council imposed a “No-Fly Zone” over Libya in 2011, which has ef f ect on state aviation behaviors.

C. The Requirements of an Armed Attack

Both the Caroline Rule and Article 51 of the UN Charter consider “armed attack” as a condition that triggers the exercise of right to self-defence. However, neither of them articulate what types of actions constitute an “armed attack”.

1. Restrictive Interpretation

According to restrictive interpretation in the conventional sense, “if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” under UN Charter Article 51 should be strictly, narrowly and precisely construed. Such an restrictive interpretation greatly limits a sovereign State’s right to defend itself, since a State can defend itself only when it suf f ers an armed attack. And this time frame does notinclude the preparatory phase prior to an armed attack.③Zhou Gengsheng, International Law, Beijing: The Commercial Press, p. 199. (in Chinese)Moreover, some scholars even hold that an armed attack should actually take place and continue for a period of time.④Xu Guangjian ed., Commentary on the Charter of United Nations, Taiyuan: Shanxi Education Press, 1999, pp. 353～360. (in Chinese)

In addition, the restrictive interpretation of armed attack was also modifed to some extent. It is asserted that if one of two neighboring States launches a rocket threatening the safety of its neighbor, then the right to self-defence can be invoked under Article 51 of the UN Charter.⑤Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 367.It is also proposed that, apart from the conditions above, such an attack should also be “irreversible”.⑥Singh M. Narendra, The Right of Self-Defence in Relation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons, Indian Yearbook of International Af f airs, 1956, Vol. 5, pp. 25～26.

2. Extensive Interpretation

Restrictive interpretation is closely associated with the time dominated by land battles. However, with the development of military technology, warcraft, cruise missiles and other weapons of mass destruction become the main weapons used in wars, which poses challenges to the conventional way to determine an “armed attack”. For example, when a State has deployed its precision guided missiles, its neighboring States, if within the attack range of the missiles, would suffer devastating blows at any time.

In this new context, the extensive interpretation of an “armed attack” was formed. When attacked by high-tech weapons, the State attacked may not be able to ef f ectively react to the attack, which would actually put the State in a passive position. Therefore, as one scholar proposed, if a State may only exercise the right to self-defence when a missile crosses its border, then the concept of ef f ective selfdefence would be meaningless.⑦Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, pp. 366～369.

3. The Anti-Terrorism Factors in an Act of Aggression

During the 9/11 attacks, an American fighter attempted to intercept the fourth airplane seized by the terrorists. Unfortunately, this fighter crashed in the air over Pennsylvania before the interception. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. President George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Henry Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staf f formulated a new code of conduct in case of similaremergencies. Before the new code, the U.S. Department of Defense had not been officially approved to use force against any hijacked airplane.⑧U.S. Air Force Conducted Live-Fire Drills with Respect to Hijacked Airliners, at http://mil. news.sina.com.cn/2003-10-05/153963.html, 24 November 2016. (in Chinese)

Article 7 (Suppressing Terrorist Acts in the Air) of the Russian Federal Law No. 35-FZ on Counteraction of Terrorism (2006) specifes,

1. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation shall use their weapons and military equipment in the procedure established by normative legal acts of the Russian Federation for the purpose of removing the threat of a terrorist act in the air or for the purpose of suppressing such terrorist act. 2. If an aircraft does not react to radio commands of ground control centers to stop violating the rules of using the airspace of the Russian Federation and (or) to radio commands and visual signals of the aircrafts of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation sent to intercept it, or refuses to follow radio commands or visual signals not explaining the reasons for it, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation shall use their weapons and military equipment for preventing the flight of the said aircraft by way of forcing it to land. If the aircraft does not obey the demand to land and there is a real danger of the loss of life or the onset of an ecological catastrophe, the weapons and military equipment shall be used for preventing the fl ight of the said aircraft by way of destroying it. 3. Where there is reliable information about the probable use of an aircraft for committing an act of terrorism or about the occupation of an aircraft and, with that, all measures required under the circumstances for its landing have been taken and there is a real danger of the loss of life or the onset of an ecological catastrophe, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation shall use their weapons and military equipment for preventing the fl ight of the said aircraft by way of destroying it.⑨Xu Guimin, A Review on the Features of Russian Legislation against Terrorism, Global Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2013, p. 57. (in Chinese)

The government of Slovakia adopted a decree on 16 February 2005, authorizing its Defence Minister to order the downing of any aircraft violating its airspace, if necessary. In accordance with this decree, Slovakian air force is empowered to intercept any aircraft entering its airspace. In exceptional cases, where there are clear evidences indicating that the aircraft entering its airspace isemployed by terrorists to launch attacks, which may cause severe damages to life or property, the Slovakian Defence Minister has the right to order the downing of such aircraft, be it civil or military.⑩European States Pass Laws Authorizing Shooting Down of Hijacked Aircraft in Order to Avoid the Replaying of 9/11 Tragedy, at http://news.tom.com/1003/3295/2005114-1761852.html, 24 November 2016. (in Chinese)

In the current situation of global anti-terrorism, prior assertions that terrorist acts constituted an “armed attack” have met great challenges.①Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 51 of the UN Charter, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2002, pp. 45～46.Such assertions are regarded as a strange formalism in modern day,②Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, San Diego International Law Journal, Vol. 4, 2003, pp. 16～17.which therefore need to be evolved. Particularly, the UN Security Council, in its Resolution 1368, did not connect the exercise of the right to self-defence with armed attacks launched by States, but expressly pointed out the notion of “terrorist attacks”. Additionally, neither UN Security Council in its Resolution 1373, nor the International Court of Justice in Oil Platforms (Iran v. USA), correlated armed attacks with state behaviors.

Due to the increasing of global anti-terrorist actions and regional conflicts and confrontations, the security of civil aircraft, when flying over the conflict areas, became a global concern. In 2014, ICAO set up the Task Force on Risks to Civil Aviation Arising from Conflict Zones, which convened four meetings consecutively. The meetings studied the safety and security crises facing civil aviation arising from confict zones.③The author attended the fourth meeting of the special group held by the ICAO from 13 to 15 July 2015, in Montreal, Canada. The meeting reviewed the application of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other civil aviation treaties relating to confict zones. Delegates from 15 States, including China, the United States, Russia and Ukraine, attended the meeting. After discussion, the meeting ultimately adopted the Report on the Outcome of the Meeting of the Special Group to Review the Application of ICAO Treaties Relating to Confict Zones, which would be forwarded to the ICAO Council.

Against the backdrop of international anti-terrorism, States are inclined to, when assessing whether a particular action can constitute an act of aviation aggression, focus on the aviation behavior per se, instead of judging whether it is performed by a State or not. That is to say, the corresponding rules of international law have been less invoked against the background of anti-terrorism.

IV. From State Aircraft to State Aviation Behaviors: An Review of Existing Theories

As previously mentioned, we need to create a regime of state aviation behavior, which corresponds to the existing regime of state aircraft. The author attempts to start the discussion from the existing theories associated with state aircraft.

A. ICAO

The ICAO was established with an aim④The aims and objectives of ICAO include: to ensure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world; to encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes; to encourage the development of airways, airports and air navigation facilities for international civil aviation; to meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport; to prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition; to ensure that the rights of Contracting States are fully respected and that every Contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines; to avoid discrimination between Contracting States; to promote safety of flight in international air navigation; and to promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics.to promote the development of civil aeronautics and cooperation in this regard. However, the attainment of this aim is conditioned on differentiating civil from state aircraft. Notably, ICAO is unauthorized to defne state aircraft. Nevertheless, the organization has made some researches on the dif f erentiation between civil and state aircraft.

1. A Special Study on the Distinction Between Civil and State Aircraft

ICAO completed a study dedicated to the issue of civil/state aircraft,⑤Secretariat Study on “Civil/State Aircraft”, C-WP/9835 of 22/09/1993, presented by the Secretary General at the ICAO Council 140th Session.and prepared a working report for it. This report, in fact, analyzed civil and state aviation behaviors. It asserted that aircraft other than those used in military, customs and police services should be regarded as civil aircraft. However, it also stressed that multiple factors should be taken into account, when examining the nature of an aircraft.In the ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium held on April 14 and 15,2015, when discussing about aircraft operation,⑥ICAO Global Provisions Regarding Aircraft Operations, ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium, Paris, France, 14-15 April 2015, at http://www.icao.int/RO_EURNAT/ Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20 Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20Symposium%20 2015/ICMCS%20PPT12.pdf, 24 November 2016.ICAO believed that the Chicago Convention should be applicable only to civil aircraft, and should not be applicable to state aircraft. Also, the ICAO contended that aircraft used in military, customs and police services should be state aircraft. In other words, state aircraft should include but not limited to aircraft used in military, customs and police services, meaning that state aircraft can be used for more purposes than military, customs and police services.

2. Incidentally Mentioned in the Discussion of Aircraft Operation

3. Incidentally Mentioned in the Discussion of Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM)

RVSM is implemented to reduce the vertical separation between fight level (FL) 290 and FL 410 from 2000-ft minimum to 1000-ft minimum, during the cruise phase of modern civil jet aircraft. It increases airspace capacity and operation profits of airlines, and decreases the workload in air traffic control. And ICAO started to study the RVSM standard in the 1970s.

In January 2002, upon negotiations between the aviation authorities of the States concerned and the relevant international civil aviation organizations, and after 13 working meetings, it is agreed that RVSM would be implemented in the airspace over the SCS since 21 February 2002. Aircraft without RVSM approval should not fy over RVSM airspace, and must fy below FL 290.

When deliberating the issue of RVSM,⑦George Firican, State Aircraft in RVSM Airspace, ICAO Civil/Military Coordination Workshop, Kiev Ukraine, 28-31 October 2013, at http://www.icao.int/RO_EURNAT/ Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20 Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20Seminar%202013/ Kiev%20day%201%20George%20Firican%20State%20Aircraft%20in%20RVSM%20 airspace.pdf, 24 November 2016.ICAO mentioned incidentally to defne state aircraft as aircraft used in military, customs and police services.

4. Incidentally Mentioned in the Discussion of Foreign Air Operator Validation and Surveillance

When reviewing issues relating to foreign air operator validation and surveillance,⑧Foreign Air Operator Validation & Surveillance Course, p. 7, at http://www.icao.int/safety/ implementation/library/a_icao_convention_annexes_related_to_fao_2009_07_r1.pdf, 24 November 2016.ICAO also explained Article 3 of Chicago Convention. The organizationargued that this convention should be applicable only to civil aircraft, but not applicable to state aircraft, and aircraft used in military, customs and police services should be deemed as state aircraft, rather than civil aircraft. This argument is consistent with the one raised by the ICAO when discussing aircraft operation.

B. International Air Transport Association (IATA)

IATA put forward, in the ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium held on 14-15 April 2015, that Chicago Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.⑨Dmitry Kosolapov, Improve Safety for Flight over the High Seas, ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium, Paris, France, 14-15 April 2015, p. 4, at http://www.icao.int/ RO_EURNAT/Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20 Symposium%202015/ICMCS%20PPT07.pdf, 24 November 2016.The view of the IATA was identical with that of ICAO, which also attended the symposium, reflecting the common view shared by these two important organizations in this regard.

C. European Aviation Safety Agency

European Aviation Safety Agency, in its Guidance Material for the Certifcation and Operation of State Aircraft in European RVSM Airspace,⑩EUROCONTROL, Guidance Material for the Certifcation and Operation of State Aircraft in European RVSM Airspace, at https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/article/ content/documents/official-documents/guidance/2012-cmac-rma-military-guidance.pdf, 24 November 2016.said that “only”aircraft used in the military, customs and police services would qualify as State aircraft. Comparatively, neither Chicago Convention nor ICAO has used “only” to strictly defne the concept of state aircraft.

D. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

When discussing issues related to civil/military aircraft operating in support of NATO-led missions and operations①NATO Policy for Civil/Military Aircraft Operating in Support of NATO or NATO-led Missions and Operations, at http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ pdf_2016_08/20160804_1608-NATO-Policy-civil-military-aircraft.pdf, 24 November 2016.NATO argued that aircraft used in the military, customs and police services should be state aircraft, rather than civilaircraft. NATO is consistent with both ICAO and IATA in this aspect. Furthermore, NATO also emphasized that when any contracting States issues other guidelines for state aircraft, due regard should be paid to the safety of civil aircraft.

E. U.S. Air Force

In the ICAO’s RVSM Seminars for CAR/SAM Region, U.S. Air Force specifcally talked about state aircraft issues. And it proposed that aircraft used in the military, customs and police services should be state aircraft, rather than civil aircraft. In addition, States have the freedom to define state aircraft, and should take into account the owner, operator, passengers, cargos and other factors when defning②U.S. Air Force: State Aircraft Issues, ICAO’s 1st RVSM Seminar for CAR/SAM Region, ICAO’s 2nd RVSM Seminar for CAR/SAM Region, at http://www.icao.int/RO_SAM/ Documents/2003/RVSMII/P-Storm-State%20Aircraft-E.pdf#search=State%20Aircraft%20 %20%20us%20AIr%20force, 17 December 2016.

F. Discussions over the Distinction between Civil and State Aircraft in China

1. Academic Circles

In China, only a few academic papers have explored the distinction between civil and state aircraft. And these papers focus on the study and identifcation of state aircraft,③Huang Lihua, Legal Problems about the State Aircrafts, Modern Law Science, No. 6, 2000, pp. 146～149 (in Chinese); Li Wenli, Position of State Aircraft in International Law, Journal of Anhui Vocational College of Police Officers, No. 3, 2003, pp. 26～27. (in Chinese)which virtually discuss state aviation behaviors.

2. Practitioner Circles

In Chinese practitioner circles, the Civil Aircraft Maintenance Certification Regulations (CAAC Decree No. 31) of 1993, provided that “state aircraft refer to the aircraft used in the military, customs and police services”. However, this decree was abolished and replaced by the 2001 Civil Aircraft Maintenance Organization Certifcation Regulations. Additionally, “state aircraft” was used solely as a notion without any precise textual meaning in the following rules or regulations: Rules on Air Traffic Control of China’s Civil Aviation,④Rules on Air Traffic Control of China’s Civil Aviation (CAAC Order No. 86) was promulgated on 5 July 1999 and came into force on 5 January 2000.Civil Aviation Flight DispatcherLicense Management Rules,⑤Civil Aviation Flight Dispatcher License Management Rules (CAAC Order No. 136) was promulgated on 16 December 2004 and came into force on 15 January 2005.A Guide to Flight Plan Application and Its Approval for Foreign Aircraft Interim Flight Operations during Olympic/Paralympic Games issued by CAAC,⑥A Guide to Flight Plan Application and Its Approval for Foreign Aircraft Interim Flight Operations during Olympic/Paralympic Games, a telegraph issued by CAAC, was promulgated in February 2008 and came into force on 1 July 2008.and Rules of Certifcation of Civil Aviation Aircraft Pilot and Ground Instructor.⑦Rules of Certifcation of Civil Aviation Aircraft Pilot and Ground Instructor (CAAC Order No. 224) was promulgated on 10 July 2014 and came into force on 1 September 2014.The CAAC Notice Concerning Issues Relating to the Carriage of Dangerous Goods Contained in Relief Supplies determined the nature of a single behavior, saying that “the carriage of relief supplies containing dangerous goods by chartering may be considered as carriage by state aircraft, and therefore not subject to Regulations CCAR-276. Nevertheless, the safe disposal of cargo shall be carried out pursuant to the requirements laid out in Article 2(2).”

The preceding provisions show that the complete scope of state aircraft has not been defned by the practitioners. Currently, it is only partially described.

G. Periodic Conclusion with Respect to the Dif f erentiation between Aircraft and Aviation Behavior

In the view of the author, the existing discussions on the distinction between civil and state aircraft have confused the nature of aircraft with that of aviation behavior. Therefore, the two concepts need to be clarifed.

Presently, most States and international organizations tend to include “aviation behaviors” into the concept of aircraft, which, however, may cause misjudgment of the actual behaviors of aircraft. For example, many incidents, happened in the history of global civil aviation, were caused by misjudging the behaviors of civil aircraft.

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Currently, some States have unreasonable views towards China’s entitlement to the SCS region. Against this backdrop, it is likely that the aircraft behaviors in the SCS airspace would be misjudged, because solely judging from the nature of aircraft cannot determine the behavior of an aircraft. Therefore, we need to study aircraft and aviation behaviors, and dif f erentiate one from another, especially state aviation behaviors.

1. The Nature of Aircraft

The nature of an aircraft is primarily determined on the basis of its original intended usage, but this usage does not prevent it from being used for other purposes in the future. And changes of aircraft nature really exist.⑧Boeing Makes the History of Converting Civil Aircraft into Military Aircraft, Beijing Daily, 22 May 2007 (in Chinese). For example, Boeing 737-100 was originally developed as a short-range airliner with a capacity of 65～80 passengers. That is to say, Boeing 737-100 was civil aircraft in nature. However, the development history of Boeing products tells, Boeing has developed large jet airliners including series 707, 737, 747, 757, 767 and 777, and series 787 is also developed and under trial production. In order to meet military needs, Boeing also converted its airliners into military aircraft. For instance, Boeing 707-320B was later converted into an early warning aircraft, which made its maiden fight in 1972; in November 2006, South Korea ordered four Boeing E-737 early warning aircraft, enabling South Korea to surveil the whole Korean Peninsula and some airspace of its neighboring States; in 1977, Boeing 747 was modifed to ferry space shuttles, which has been used as shuttle carrier aircraft until now; Boeing KC-767 is an aerial refuelling tanker developed from Boeing 767, which can refuel a Boeing B-52H (a along-range, heavy strategic bomber) up in the air; in 1993, Japan became the primary user of Boeing 767 early warning aircraft, and four such aircraft have been put into service by now.In other words, the nature of aircraft is objective and may be changed. In that case, it is unscientifc to decide aircraft behaviors solely from the nature of aircraft. For example, with respect to a civil aircraft performing certain state mission, the conclusion regarding the nature of its behavior would be contrary to the truth, if merely judging from the nature of the aircraft.

2. Aviation Behaviors

With the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), stubbornly insisting on treating the nature of aircraft as a criterion has become meaningless, because the nature of aircraft, in fact, depends on its behavioral purposes. For instance, UAV can be used for express delivery, and also for the performance of military missions. The behaviors of UAV would be confused with each other, if UAV is treated in a uniform way as a key concept. The author argues, precisely because of the defects lying in the definition of the nature of aircraft, the nature of aviation activities becomes easier to be decided, which, specifcally, should be decided by the actualpurpose of such activities. For example, a civil plane, Boeing 737-100, which was chartered by a State to do rescue and relief work, should be considered as carrying out state activities. It follows that aviation activities refect the subjective nature of aircraft.

3. From Aircraft to Aviation Behaviors

The statements above show, the nature of aircraft is not directly related to the nature of aviation activities. If aviation behaviors are classified merely based on the nature of aircraft, the actual purposes of aircraft would be ignored. However, such actual purposes, instead of the original intended usage of aircraft, should be the critical element distinguishing civil from state aviation behaviors. Currently, aircraft is defined in terms of the subjective criteria of aviation behaviors. In that case, the defnition of state aircraft could be mutatis mutandis applied to the defnition of state aviation behaviors.

V. The Purposes of State Aviation Behaviors

As described above, the determination of the nature of aircraft cannot contribute to the settlement of problems happened in real life. Due to their behaviors, many civil aircraft were shot down as state aircraft. Such tragedies can serve as a perfect example in this case. Given that the defnition made by the international community for civil aviation behavior is relatively precise and clear, the real problem that we have to tackle is how to determine or judge state aviation behaviors.

A. The Right to Def i ne State Aviation Behaviors

First, the UN Charter stipulates, in its Preamble, the determination “to reaffirm faith … in the equal rights … of nations large and small,” and in Article 1 the purpose “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” Particularly, the Charter provides: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members” (Article 2, Paragraph 1); “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State” (Article 2, Paragraph 7); and “relationship among [Members of the United Nations] shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality” (Article 78). The principle of sovereignequality, a fundamental organization principle of the United Nations, is listed as the most important one.

Second, according to Article 3(d) of the Chicago Convention, “[t]he contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.” It shows, following the UN Charter, the Chicago Convention also provides for the respect to the sovereignty of all States, and acknowledges that a State has the freedom to defne its state aircraft or state aviation behavior.

Hence, both the principle of state sovereignty provided for in the UN Charter, and the freedom of States to define state aircraft or state aviation behavior contemplated in the Chicago Convention tell that, to provide for the definition and scope of state aircraft and state aviation behavior is a matter within a State’s sovereignty. Particularly, China should define state aviation behaviors, since the SCS region is the base supporting all the existing and future rights necessary for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters, and for the development of the SCS islands.

B. The Dif f erentiation Between Civil and State Aviation Behaviors

Article 3 of the Chicago Convention provides,

Civil and state aircraft

a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.

b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft.

c) No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.

d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.

This article is considered as the one that has differentiated civil from state aircraft.

First, the Preamble of Chicago Convention expressively provides, “… in orderthat international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically. Have accordingly conclude this Convention to that end.” And Article 3 reaffirms, “This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.” These provisions indicate that the definition and scope of state aviation behavior are not covered in the Chicago Convention. Therefore, the defnition of state aircraft contained in this convention is meaningful and applicable only in cases of civil aviation behaviors. In other words, the distinction between civil and state aviation behaviors as envisioned in the Chicago Convention is made in relation to the purpose of this convention, which hence is not applicable in all cases.

Second, semantically, the provision “[a]ircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft” (Chicago Convention, Article 3) uses the sentence pattern of “… used in (purposes), should be (nature).” In that case, defning state aircraft is, actually, a process of depicting the nature of aircraft based on the nature of aviation behaviors.

Third, Chicago Convention, Article 3, “aircraft used in military, customs and police services”, sets out its provision by enumerating all possible kinds of state aircraft. However, if we say the three kinds of aircraft listed above cover all state aircraft or all purposes of state aviation behaviors, the principle of state sovereignty under the UN Charter would be violated. Since all States enjoy equal sovereignty, and the purposes of state aviation behaviors are covered in state sovereignty, such purposes should not be subject to the defnition contained in Article 3 of the Chicago Convention.

Lastly, Chicago Convention, Article 3(d) states, “The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.” This article shows this convention respects state sovereignty, and all States have the freedom to prescribe what state aircraft or state aviation behaviors are in their own States.

C. Civil Aviation Behaviors Def i ned in the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China

The Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China fails to directly define the term “state aircraft”. It only stipulates in Article 5, “Civil aircraft as referred to in this Law means aircraft other than those used in fight missions ofmilitary, customs and police services”. However, the aim of this law is solely “to safeguard the national sovereignty of territorial airspace and the rights of civil aviation, to ensure the conduct of civil aviation activities in a safe and orderly manner, to protect the lawful rights and interests of the parties concerned in civil aviation activities, and to promote the development of civil aviation industry.”Therefore, Article 5, which is stated by enumeration, cannot be considered as a provision distinguishing civil aviation behavior from state aviation activities. This article may only be said to constitute a part of the defnition of civil aircraft or civil aviation behavior. And the term of “civil aviation behavior” should be adequately defned by referring to the whole text and structure of the Civil Aviation Law of China and other laws or regulations.

In addition, Article 5 of the Civil Aviation Law of China, which was promulgated on 30 October 1995, to some extent, repeats the wording of the Chicago Convention Article 3, “Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft”. Consequently, this Article 5 does not have the full authority to dif f erentiate state from civil aviation behaviors.

D. State Aviation Behaviors Def i ned in the Constitution and Property Law of the People’s Republic of China

The definition of state aviation behaviors should also be found in the Constitution and Property Law of the People’s Republic of China. Article 13 of the Constitution of China lays down some provisions about private property, saying:“The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with law, expropriate or requisition private property for its use and make compensation for the private property expropriated or requisitioned.” Furthermore, Article 44 of the Property Law of China prescribes, “In order to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue or providing disaster relief, the immovables or movables of any entities or individuals may be requisitioned within the limits of power and in compliance with the statutory procedures. After the emergent use, the requisitioned immovables or movables shall be returned to the owners. Where the immovables or movables of any entities or individuals are requisitioned, or if they are damaged or lost thereafter, compensations shall be made therefor.”

That is to say, “in the public interest” or “in order to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue or providing disaster relief”, the State may expropriate or requisition private property for its use. In a similar vein, “in the public interest”or “in order to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue or providing disaster relief”, the State may expropriate or requisition civil aircraft for its use, which in fact turns a civil aviation behavior into a state aviation behavior.

E. Joint Determination

The analysis above shows that making regulations on the definition of state aviation behavior is a matter within the sovereignty of a State, and a sovereign State has indisputable power in this regard. If dichotomy (state and civil aviation behaviors) is used to define aviation activities, the purposes of state aviation behaviors involve, at least, the following three aspects:

First, Article 5 of the Civil Aviation Law of China, “Civil aircraft as referred to in this Law means aircraft other than those used in fight missions of military, customs and police services”, defines civil aircraft by excluding all possible options, and at the meantime describes the purposes of non-civil aviation activities. Seen from the dichotomy of state and civil aviation behaviors, these purposes of non-civil aviation activities form a part of the purposes of state aviation behaviors. In the eye of positive law, to engage in “fight missions of military, customs and police services” is one of the purposes of state aviation behaviors.

Second, pursuant to the Constitution and the Property Law of China, “in the public interest” or “in order to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue or providing disaster relief”, the State may lawfully expropriate or requisition private property for its use. In real life, due to emergent disasters, the State would requisition civil aircraft to engage in some relief work, where civil aircraft activities have the nature of state aviation behaviors. In other words, according to the Constitution and the Property Law of China, performing state missions should become one of the purposes of state aviation behaviors.

Lastly, in accordance with the principle of state sovereignty under the UN Charter, and the provision that States may defne their own state aircraft or state aviation behaviors under the Chicago Convention, States have the freedom to supplement the defnition of state aviation behaviors.

To sum up, the purposes of state aviation behaviors include: to engage in “fight missions of military, customs and police services”, to meet “the public interest”and “to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue or providing disaster relief”. Additionally, States have the freedom to supplement the defnition of state aviation behaviors.F. Nature of Aviation Activities When State and

Civil Aviation Behaviors Are Combined

Where state and civil aviation behaviors are combined together, how to determine the nature of such aviation activities? For example, when law enforcement officers of a State, in accordance with a bilateral judicial agreement, take a fleeing criminal suspect handed over by the law-enforcement authority of another State, back to his home State by civil aviation flight, state activities (sending a criminal suspect under escort) and civil activities (ordinary passengers taking a plane) are combined together. In this case, how to defne the nature of the activity of this aircraft? The author holds that this question should be answered based on the following standards.

Firstly, in order to defne the nature of such aviation activities, we may look into whether the aircraft is primarily used for conducting civil or state activities. In the example mentioned above, if the fight is mainly used for carrying passengers, and the escorting of criminal suspect does not substantially af f ect the functions of the aircraft, then the aviation activity should be deemed as a civil aviation behavior; in contrast, if the civil aircraft, as required by the escorting mission, adopts special fight timetable and other means to ensure its navigation safety, then this aviation activity should be deemed as a state aviation behavior. Notably, with respect to an aircraft flying in the territorial air space of a State, the nature of its aviation behaviors should be decided in accordance with the laws of that State, which is a kind of respect to the sovereignty of the State concerned. Specifically, when the state aircraft of State A operate in the airspace of that State or the airspace over the high seas, they should comply with the domestic law of State A and the rules of international law; when the state aircraft of State A enter into the territorial air space of State B, they should be regulated by the domestic law of State B.

Secondly, we may examine who de facto controls the aircraft. State aviation behaviors are not only refected in their purposes, but also include some external behaviors. On the one hand, some civil aviation behaviors are mistaken as state ones due to certain external behaviors; most of the airliner shootdown incidents in history were caused by misunderstanding of external behaviors. On the other hand, there are cases where state aviation behaviors, because of external behaviors, aremistaken as civil ones.⑨For example, Israeli air force carried out the “Operation Babylon” on 7 June 1981. It deployed 14 airplanes, launching a surprise strike against a nuclear reactor about 20 km southeast of the Iraqi capital Baghdad. Israel painted its attack squadron resembling the aircraft of Jordanian air force. When Saudi radar detected the Israeli aircraft and the controllers required the Israeli pilots to report their identities, the Israeli pilots replied in fuent Arabic: “We are Jordanian air force conducting routine trainings.” The controllers believed it to be true. When Jordan radar detected these aircraft, due to the density of the squadron, the image displayed on the radar screen was just a blurring dot, like a large transport aircraft. When enquired, the pilots answered in American English: “It is a civil plane”. The Israeli aircraft muddled through again.

Lastly, we can also determine the nature of an aviation behavior through aircraft marks. Civil aircraft markings, referring to aircraft number, tail number and registration number, is a signifcant symbol used to identify aircraft. Without such unique numbers, civil aircraft are not allowed to engage in any fight. The ICAO Council frst adopted Annex 7 “Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks” to the Chicago Convention on 8 February 1949. And the fourth amendment to Annex 7 was adopted on 30 July 1981. Contracting States are required to notify the ICAO of any dif f erences between their national regulations and the standards contained in this Annex 7, and describe the dif f erences in the appendices to Annex 7. Such standards actually set out some regulations on the identifcation of civil aviation behaviors both on national and international levels. Hence, in the international arena, we may determine the nature of an aviation behavior through relevantmarkings, including nationality,⑩Selection rule of nationality mark: the nationality mark shall be selected from the series of nationality symbols included in the radio call signs allocated to the State of Registry by the International Telecommunication Union. The nationality mark shall be notifed to the International Civil Aviation Organization.common①The third amendment to Annex 7 was adopted by the ICAO on 23 January 1969, and entered into force on 23 May of the same year. The amendment introduced expressions such as “Common Mark”, “Common Mark Registering Authority” and “International Operating Agency”. In accordance with Article 77 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, aircraft not registered on a national basis can apply for common marks. The common mark shall be selected from the series of symbols included in the radio call signs allocated to the ICOA by the International Telecommunication Union. Assignment of the common mark to a common mark registering authority will be made by the International Civil Aviation Organization. For example, the ICAO Council decision of 1983 required: the aircraft jointly registered by the Arab Air Cargo (cooperative between Iraq & Jordan) must bear the common mark “4YB”; joint register shall be maintained by Jordan; and Jordan & Iraq shall be jointly & severally bound to assume the obligations & responsibilities which ICAO attaches.and registration marks.②Generally, “registration mark” shall be letters, numbers, or a combination of letters and numbers. The nationality mark shall precede the registration mark. When the frst character of the registration mark is a letter, it shall be preceded by a hyphen. According to the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Nationality Registration of Civil Aircraft, with respect to a civil aircraft having not obtained a civil aircraft nationality registration certifcate, a provisional registration mark may be applied, when the aircraft is used in test flights, performance flights, orientation flights for export delivery (to be delivered in a foreign State), or in other circumstances considered necessary by the CAAC. Aircraft with provisional registration marks should not engage in passenger and cargo transportation, as well as other business operations.

VI. Conclusions

The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the 1982 UNCLOS established the preliminary mechanism to peacefully settle the disputes in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, this mechanism has not substantially contributed to the resolution of SCS disputes. In this context, China and ASEAN countries signed in 2002 the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which is the frst political document specially designed to settle SCS disputes.

As mentioned previously, in the current situation of global anti-terrorism, the notion of “aggression act” tends to expand its meaning, and impose new requirements on the identifcation of state aviation behaviors. The identifcation of state aviation behaviors, essentially, concerns the legality of state aircraft behaviors carried out in foreign and international airspace.

A. Adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence on the Whole

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as open and inclusive principles of international law, embody the values of sovereignty, justice, democracy and rule of law.③Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to Build a Better World through Win-win Cooperation, Address by H.E. Mr. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, at Meeting Marking the 60th Anniversary of the Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/ t1170143.shtml, 24 November 2016.These principles were also incorporated in the relevant declarations, such as the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 25th session in 1970, and the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, adopted at the sixth special session of UN General Assembly in 1974. Disputes and differences between countries should be resolved through dialogue, consultation and peaceful means. We should increase mutual trust, and settle disputes and promote security through dialogue. Willful threat or use of force are discouraged. Flexing military muscles only reveals the lack of moral ground or vision rather than refecting one’s strength. Security can be solid and enduring only if it is based on moral high ground and vision. Therefore, these fve principles should be employed as a general standard to deal with state aircraft behaviors performed in foreign and international airspace.

The SCS airspace is a part of the important base supporting China’s management and development of Dongsha, Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as their adjacent waters. China’s entitlement to the SCS airspace should include, all the existing and future rights necessary for the development of these SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters. The freedom of navigation and overflight of other States should be without prejudice to China’s exercise of such rights.

Overall, in order to use SCS airspace, China’s rights mentioned above should frst be respected. In addition, the airspace should be used for peaceful development and win-win cooperation.

B. Double Standard to Def i ne State Aviation Behaviors

As stated above, given that States are authorized to define state aviation behavior, and international conventions are silent on the said behavior, currently, there is no concept of state aviation behavior widely acknowledged in the international community. This situation makes the concept extensible. In this connection, when assessing whether a behavior is a state aviation behavior or not, or excluding the application of civil aviation conventions, the domestic law of the State concerned and the international law should be considered together.

On the one hand, the right to evaluate and identify state aviation behaviors falls under the scope of sovereignty. In particular, with respect to foreign aircraft fying over the territorial airspace of a State, that sovereign State has indisputable power to assess their activities. On the other hand, when determining the nature of an aviation behavior, the existing rules of international law should be complied with frst, but the regulations and practice of the States concerned should also be taken into account.

C. The Standard to Determine the Innocence of State Aviation Behaviors

State aviation behaviors, if carried out in foreign and international airspace, may cause conficts of sovereignty. However, if a state aviation behavior does not jeopardize the sovereignty of another State, this behavior should not be deemed as a wrongful act. For example, where a state aviation behavior is performed in foreign and international airspace for relief work, it cannot be considered as wrongful. This point is recognized by the international law, since the wrongfulness of internationally wrongful acts is precluded in a situation of distress, which has long been established as a rule of customary international law. The International Law Commission, established by the United Nations General Assembly, adopted the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts at its ffty-third session in 2001. Article 24(1) of the Draft Articles provides that, “The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State is precluded if the author of the act in question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of distress, of saving the author’s life or the lives of other persons entrusted to the author’s care.”

State aviation behaviors carried out in the SCS airspace should not undermine the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its SCS islands, orthe support of f ered by the waters enclosed by the U-shaped line to such relations. That is to say, in the SCS region, state aviation behaviors should be performed according to this supreme principle, which derives from the principle of state sovereignty under modern international law. When any State utilizes a region that another State relies on for existence, it should not infringe the sovereignty of that State.

D. The Standard of Excluding Reasonable Doubts

The standard of excluding reasonable doubts is a standard applied in criminal procedure law to judge whether a suspect is guilty or innocent. This standard can also be applied to judge whether a state aviation behavior performed in foreign and international airspace is wrongful or not. That is to say, in procedure, a State cannot decide the wrongfulness of such a state aviation behavior before excluding all reasonable doubts.

As previously mentioned, when the state aircraft of State A operate in the airspace of that State or the airspace over the high seas, they should comply with the domestic law of State A and the rules of international law; when the state aircraft of State A enter into the territorial air space of State B, they should be regulated by the domestic law of State B. Therefore, it is highly possible that the two States would have different or even conflicting regulations about the identification of aviation behaviors. Currently, it is unrealistic to find a uniform standard from international law in this regard. In this context, we need to collate the existing standards, especially those concerning “innocence”.

China, a State with preferential rights to the SCS airspace, has duties of prudence and care under procedural law. SCS serves as a vital transportation hub. Being aware of the signifcance of SCS region to all States, China actively proposes to shape a normative order in the region through the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, with an aim to increase the public benefts derived from the SCS region.

E. The Principle of Not Resorting to Force First

States have the right to self-defence in cases of aggression or terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, force cannot be used, unless state aircraft behaviors performed in foreign and international airspace are determined as acts of aggression. Whendeciding whether an act constitutes an act of aggression or not, restrictive interpretation should be applied in principle, but extensive interpretation may also be used, if necessary, against the backdrop of anti-terrorism. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea emphasizes that “[t]he Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign States directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”

Therefore, if the state aviation behaviors of any other States performed in the SCS airspace prejudice the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its SCS islands, it should be settled frst through consultation and negotiations.

Translator: XIE Hongyue

Standards to Identify and Decide the Legality of State Aviation Behaviors Performed in the South China Sea Region

The South China Sea (SCS) airspace is a part of the important base supporting China’s management and development of Dongsha, Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as their adjacent waters. China’s entitlement to the SCS airspace should include, all the existing and future rights necessary for the development of these SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters. The freedom of navigation and overflight of other States should be without prejudice to China’s exercise of such rights. Currently, the two concepts,“aircraft” and “aviation behaviors”, are confused and used interchangeably both in the academic and practitioner circles. In addition, studies on the notion of state aviation behavior are few. Therefore, there is no clear standard to identify state aviation behaviors or state aviation behaviors performed in foreign or international airspace. This paper, by collating and examining the existing concepts and defnitions, clarifes the dif f erences between “aircraft” and “aviation behavior.” Further, it defines the notion of state aviation behavior after reviewing the purpose and behavioral attributes of state aircraft. Lastly, the author sorts out the standards which can be applied to decide the legality of state aviation behaviors performed in foreign and international airspace.

Civil aviation behavior; State aviation behavior; International law; Conventions on civil aviation

* 李亚凝，法学博士，中央财经大学法学院博士后研究人员。电子信箱：daneenlee@ hotmail.com。

© THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

* LI Yaning, SJD, a postdoctoral research fellow at Law School of the Central University of Finance and Economics. E-mail: daneenlee@hotmail.com.

© THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW