关于坚持一个中国原则的共识

■ 尚君奇

关于坚持一个中国原则的共识

■ 尚君奇

海峡两岸关系协会成立后，根据国务院台湾事务办公室的授权，坚持以一个中国原则作为“两会”交往和事务性商谈的基础，从1992年3月至1993年4月，与台湾海峡交流基金会主要就“海峡两岸公证书使用”、“开办海峡两岸挂号函件遗失查询及补偿业务”两项议题进行商谈。中国公证员协会和中国通信学会邮政专业委员会分别参加了这两项商谈。

商谈初始，如何表述坚持一个中国原则，成为“两会”商谈中的一个突出问题。海协主张，一个中国原则是“两会”交往、事务性商谈的基础，两岸交往中产生的具体问题是一个国家内部的特殊事务，应本着一个中国原则，通过协商加以妥善解决。但海基会一方面按照台湾大陆事务主管部门的要求，表示“没有受权谈一个中国问题”，另一方面又在商谈中提出一些明显违反一个中国原则的主张。例如，在解决两岸公证书使用问题中，海基会提出比照国家间驻外使领馆认证的做法来处理祖国大陆公证书在台湾的使用；在开办两岸挂号函件业务问题中，援引国家间通邮的做法。台湾当局回避讨论表述坚持一个中国原则的问题，又企图用商谈达到政治目的，制造“两个对等政治实体”的做法，使两项本来单纯的事务性议题复杂化。

事实表明，要进行两岸商谈，首先要确立坚持一个中国原则的共识，没有这样一个共识作为基础，两岸事务性商谈无法进行。因此，在“两会”1992年3月第一次工作性商谈结束后，针对台湾当局的曲解，并考虑到部分台湾民众的疑虑，海协常务副会长唐树备就两岸事务性商谈中坚持一个中国原则的态度问题，作了进一步阐述。唐树备指出，首先，商谈要反映现实，一个中国是客观事实。只有坚持一个中国原则，并考虑到两岸存在不同制度的现实，才能实事求是、合情合理地处理海峡两岸交往中的各种具体问题，真正维护两岸同胞的正当权益。第二，本来双方对坚持一个中国的原则没有分歧，这见之于两岸双方领导人的谈话，见之于台湾当局公布的有关文件。明明双方都认为是“一个中国”，偏偏台湾当局某些主管大陆事务的官员，不同意双方“提一个中国”，不同意双方本着一个中国原则处理两岸交往中的问题。第三，我们提出在事务性商谈中坚持一个中国原则，只是要双方表明坚持一个中国原则的态度，并不是要与海基会讨论一个中国的涵义。至于表明坚持一个中国原则态度的方式，双方可以协商。此后，海协将在两岸事务性商谈中坚持一个中国原则的态度概括为：海峡两岸交往中的具体问题是中国的内部事务，应本着一个中国原则协商解决；在事务性商谈中，只要表明坚持一个中国原则的态度，可以不涉及一个中国的政治涵义，表述的方式可以充分讨论，并愿意听取海基会和台湾各界人士的意见。

海协上述合理的主张在台湾同胞中引起反响，也使台湾当局无法回避这个问题。台湾当局内部出现了是否在事务性商谈中应表明一个中国原则态度的争论。从4月起，经过长达3个多月的讨论，1992年8月1日，台湾“国统会”做出关于一个中国涵义的结论。该结论称：“海峡两岸均坚持一个中国之原则，但双方所赋予的涵义有所不同”；“1949年以后，中国处于暂时分裂的状态，由两个政治实体分治海峡两岸”；“台湾固为中国之一部分，但大陆亦为中国之一部分”。这份结论表明，台湾当局一方面鼓吹“两岸分裂分治”，谋求与祖国大陆“对等政治实体”的地位，另一方面不得不表示“坚持一个中国之原则”的立场和承认台湾是中国领土一部分的事实。

鉴于台湾当局已做出“海峡两岸均坚持一个中国原则”的表态，8月27日，海协负责人发表谈话指出，确认“海峡两岸均坚持一个中国之原则”，对海峡两岸事务性商谈具有十分重要的意义，“它表明，在事务性商谈中应坚持一个中国原则已成为海峡两岸的共识”。同年9月，“两会”秘书长在厦门会面，就坚持一个中国原则的表述问题非正式交换意见。海协代表向海基会代表表示，“台湾方面关于一个中国原则的结论，说明双方事务性商谈中坚持一个中国原则已有共识。但我们不同意台湾有关方面对一个中国内涵的解释，也不可能与海基会讨论关于一个中国的内涵”，建议海基会认真考虑直接引用“海峡两岸均坚持一个中国原则”的表述。

1992年10月27日至29日，海协与海基会在香港进行工作性商谈。商谈中，海协代表提出5种有关表述坚持一个中国原则的方案，海基会代表也先后拿出8种表述方案(5种书面表述方案、3种口头表述方案)与海协代表进行讨论。其中第八种(口头)表述方案是：“在海峡两岸谋求国家统一的过程中，双方虽均坚持一个中国之原则，但对一个中国的涵义，认知各有不同。”海基会代表称此案为台湾方面的底案，并建议“以口头声明方式各自表述”。香港商谈结束后，11月1日，海基会代表发表书面声明表示，有关事务性商谈中一个中国原则的表述，“建议在彼此可以接受的范围内，各自以口头方式说明立场”。海协研究了海基会的第八个表述方案，认为这个方案表明了台湾方面谋求统一、坚持一个中国原则的态度；虽然海基会提出“对一个中国的涵义，认知各有不同”，但没有具体论述台湾方面的看法，而海协历来主张在事务性商谈中只要表明坚持一个中国原则的态度，不讨论一个中国的政治涵义；鉴于海基会表示了坚持一个中国原则、谋求国家统一的态度，因此，海协可以考虑与海基会各自以口头方式表达坚持一个中国原则的态度，提出希望海基会能够确认这是台湾方面的正式意见。11月3日，海基会发布新闻稿并致函海协，表示已征得台湾有关方面的同意，“以口头声明方式各自表达”。在上述工作的基础上，同日，海协副秘书长就此事与海基会秘书长陈荣杰通电话时表示，这次“两会”工作性商谈，“在海峡两岸事务性商谈中表述一个中国原则的问题上取得了进展”，“贵会建议采用贵我两会各自以口头声明的方式表述一个中国原则。我们经研究后，尊重并接受贵会的建议。口头表述的具体内容，另行协商”。11月16日，海协致函海基会，指出海基会在香港商谈中就表述坚持一个中国原则的态度“提出了具体表述内容，其中明确了海峡两岸均坚持一个中国的原则”；重申了同意以各自口头表述的方式表明“海峡两岸均坚持一个中国之原则”的态度，并提出海协口头表述的要点：“海峡两岸都坚持一个中国的原则，努力谋求国家统一。但在海峡两岸事务性商谈中，不涉及一个中国的含义。”并以附件的方式，将海基会在香港提出的第八个表述方案附在这封函中，作为双方彼此接受的共识内容。12月3日，海基会回函对此未表示任何异议。海基会也从未否定海协11月16日在函中附去的海基会在香港商谈中提出的第八种表述方案。

此后，“两会”都认为经过协商达成了共识。构成1992年“两会”共识的就是上述两段经过协商、相互认可的具体内容。共识中，“两会”都表明了“努力谋求国家统一”、“海峡两岸均坚持一个中国原则”的基本态度。对于一个中国的政治含义，海基会表示“认知各有不同”，海协表示“在事务性商谈中不涉及”，做了求同存异的处理。

“九二共识”虽然是各自以口头方式表述的共识，但其过程和内容均有明确的文件和文字记录，是任何人、任何政治势力都否定不了的。当时台湾媒体的报道与海基会的文件中对达成“九二共识”的情况都有明确的记载。1993年8月12日，海基会出版的《汪辜会谈纪要》也明载“双方同意一个中国原则由两会各自采用口头方式表述后，本会始积极考虑此项会谈。”

达成“九二共识”的过程说明，各自以口头方式是表述共识的方法，双方表述的内容是相互认可、约定的上述两段文字，而不是不加约束的、单方面的随意性的各说各话；“九二共识”的核心是“海峡两岸均坚持一个中国原则”。

“九二共识”是在双方表明坚持一个中国原则态度的基础上，照顾各方利益，搁置对一个中国政治含义的争议，以灵活的方式求同存异而达成的，体现了两岸中国人的政治智慧，对于建构商谈基础、建立互信具有多层次的丰富含义。首先，共识的核心和灵魂是双方共同表明了坚持一个中国原则的态度。没有承认一个中国原则的基础，共识是不会达成的。第二，有了“海峡两岸均坚持一个中国原则”的态度，就可以平等协商的精神和求同存异的务实态度搁置某些政治争议，包括对一个中国政治含义的不同看法。否则，共识也是难以达成的。第三，表述共识的方式可以是灵活的，可以采取各自口头表述的方式。在“九二共识”中，正是在双方表明坚持一个中国原则态度的基础上，暂不讨论一个中国的政治含义，从而面向未来两岸关系的发展，进行务实的对话与谈判。可以说，“九二共识”就是在一个中国原则基础上暂时搁置某些政治争议的典范。祖国大陆十分珍视这样的历史经验和来之不易的成果，两岸同胞应共同维护“两会”商谈的政治基础。

海协成立之初，即于1992年1月8日致函海基会，邀请海基会董事长、副董事长或秘书长率员访问祖国大陆，就双方联系与合作事宜交换意见。海基会在复函中表示，愿意“于双方便利之时机专程拜访”。8月4日，海协会长汪道涵再次致函海基会董事长辜振甫，邀请他于当年择日择地，“就当前经济发展及双方会务诸问题，交流意见、洽商方案”，进行“两会”负责人会谈。8月22日，辜振甫复函表示接受邀请，并提议在新加坡进行会谈。海协在9月30日的复函中对辜振甫接受邀请表示欢迎，并建议双方有关人士在北京或祖国大陆其他地点进行预备性磋商。

11月，“两会”达成各自以口头方式表述“海峡两岸均坚持一个中国原则”的“九二共识”，确立了“两会”商谈的政治基础，为实现汪辜会谈创造了必要条件。

为保证“两会”领导人会谈成功，海协又多次致函海基会，邀请海基会负责人到北京就汪辜会谈进行预备性磋商。199 3年3月2 5日至27日，“两会”举行第三次工作性商谈，为汪辜会谈预备性磋商进行准备，并就“两岸公证书使用查证”、“两岸挂号函件查询、补偿事宜”两项协议草案达成一致意见。4月8日至11日，“两会”负责人在北京进行汪辜会谈预备性磋商，就会谈的时间、地点、人员、议题及有关问题达成8项共识，其中确定汪辜会谈的性质是“民间性的、经济性的、事务性的、功能性的会谈”，定于4月27日至28日举行。对于会谈地点，海协考虑到辜振甫受台湾当局有关规定限制不能来祖国大陆的情况，尊重辜振甫的提议，同意在新加坡举行。预备性磋商期间，“两会”负责人还草签了《两岸公证书使用查证协议》、《两岸挂号函件查询、补偿事宜协议》。汪辜会谈自此拉开序幕。

1993年4月2 7日上午10时，举世瞩目的汪辜会谈在新加坡海皇大厦正式举行。会谈中，海协积极主张进行两岸经济合作，提出现阶段应把两岸经济交流与合作放在两岸关系的首要位置，政治上的歧异不应当妨碍经济合作；两岸直接“三通”应当摆上议事日程；提出劳务、浦东与三峡建设、能源与资源开发、科技等方面的合作和共同筹备召开民间性经济交流会议等具体建议。会谈气氛良好，进展基本顺利，取得了积极成果。在两岸经济交流问题上，达成“双方均认为应加强两岸经济交流，互补互利”的重要共识，并确定择时择地继续商谈台商在祖国大陆投资权益保护与相关问题、两岸工商界人士互访等问题，磋商加强能源、资源的开发与交流的问题。在两岸科技交流问题上，商定促进科技人员互访，交换科技研究出版物、探讨科技名词统一与产品规格标准化，共同促进电脑及其他产业科技交流。在文教交流方面，进一步商定青少年、新闻界交流的具体项目。“两会”还商定建立联系与会谈制度，包括双方相互给予经商定的“两会”会务人员适当人出境往来与查验通关便利等。

4月29日上午，汪道涵与辜振甫签署《汪辜会谈共同协议》、《两会联系与会谈制度协议》、《两岸公证书使用查证协议》、《两岸挂号函件查询、补偿事宜协议》等四项协议。

汪辜会谈引起台湾社会和国际舆论的广泛关注，采访会谈的记者达300多人，其中台湾记者有100 多人，美、日、德、法、英等主要通讯社都做了大量的报道。

汪辜会谈是1949年以来，两岸高层人士以民间名义公开进行的最高层次的会谈，它的影响力远远超过会谈成果本身。江泽民指出，“汪辜会谈是成功的，是有成果的，它标志着海峡两岸关系迈出了历史性的重要一步”；“汪辜会谈所以取得成功，主要是因为反映了两岸同胞及港澳同胞、海外广大华人要求两岸接触商谈、共同合作、发展经济、振兴中华的愿望”。台湾方面认为这次会谈“跨出了两岸接触的第一步”，是“两岸民间交流迈向制度化的里程碑”，“是近半个世纪以来两岸关系从对峙走向和平统一的一个重大发展关键”。

汪辜会谈对于两岸接触与谈判，乃至两岸关系的发展，具有深远的历史性意义。

首先，汪辜会谈建立了一个中国原则基础上两岸制度化协商的机制，冲击了台湾当局“不接触、不妥协、不谈判”的“三不政策”，使谈判成为台湾同胞能够普遍接受的事实与观念。坚持一个中国原则，两岸间就可以进行平等谈判；通过两岸谈判，两岸关系就能稳定和发展。

其次，汪辜会谈为海峡两岸在一个中国原则基础上平等协商树立了典范。汪辜会谈体现了海协与海基会相互尊重、实事求是、平等协商、求同存异的精神，从实践上说明了在一个中国原则基础上的协商，是一种务实、平等的协商，并不会像台湾当局所说的“矮化”台湾；说明了只要在一个中国原则的基础上谈起来，可以暂时搁置某些政治争议，可以在此基础上求同存异地解决两岸关系中的一些问题，可以增强互信、累积共识；也说明了海峡两岸的中国人完全可以在一个中国原则的基础上，找到双方平等谈判的适当方式。

第三，汪辜会谈及其成果，有力地推动了两岸经贸往来和民间交流的发展，凝聚了两岸同胞同是中国人的民族认同。汪辜会谈是在蓬勃发展的两岸经贸往来和民间交流下催生的，集中体现了两岸同胞要接触、要交流、要合作的强烈的民族情感与民族意愿。祖国大陆方面在汪辜会谈中倡导的加强两岸经济合作、发展民族共同利益的精神和内容，不仅为20年来两岸经济交流与合作的发展提供了丰富的养分，而且对于今天两岸关系的改善和发展仍具有现实意义。

Following its establishment, between March 1992 and April 1993, on the authority of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Of fi ce and on the basis of adhering to the one-China principle during exchanges and routine discussions, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)carried out talks with the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF)on the topics of “the adoption of cross-Strait notarized documents” and “setting up a cross-Strait registered mail inquiry and compensation service.” The China Notaries Association and the Professional Committee of the China Institute of Communications participated in each of the respective discussions.

During the initial talks between the two sides, the one-China principle became a prominent issue. The ARATS suggested that the one-China principle should be the basis on which the two sides carry out exchanges and discussions,and that speci fi c issues arising in the course of cross-Strait exchanges were China’s internal affairs and should therefore be properly solved through consultation on the basis of the one-China principle. However, in accordance with a requirement of the Mainland Affairs Council, the SEF stated that it did not have the authority to discuss the one-China principle. During the talks the SEF also expressed several opinions that clearly violated the one-China principle. For example, when addressing the issue of adopting cross-Strait notarized documents, the SEF proposed that the two countries’ embassies and consulates should handle the adoption of the mainland’s notarized documents in Taiwan. While discussing the issue of setting up a cross-Strait registered postal service, the SEF also talked about“postal links between the two countries.” The Taiwan authorities’ avoidance of discussing or mentioning the one-China principle was an attempt to use the talks to achieve political aims and a way of creating two political entities on equal footing, and it complicated two originally simple and routine issues.

Facts show that to carry out cross-Strait talks, there must fi rst be consensus on the one-China principle. Without a consensus on this, there can be no routine cross-Strait discussions. As a result, at the end of the fi rst working-level talks between the ARATS and the SEF in March 1992, to counter the Taiwan authorities’ misinterpretation and taking into account the doubts of some of the Taiwan people, the ARATS’s executive vice-chairman Tang Shubei elaborated on the issue of adhering to the one-China principle during routine talks. Tang Shubei pointed out, fi rst of all, that the talks should reflect reality, and that the existence of one China was an objective fact. He said that only by adhering to the one-China principle and taking into account the reality that each side has its own system, will they be able to seek truth from facts, amicably and reasonably deal with various speci fi c issues in cross-Strait exchanges, and truly safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Second, he pointed out that neither side had originally disputed the one-China principle,which could be seen from conversations between the leaders of both sides and relevant documents released by the Taiwan authorities. Therefore, both sides obviously believed in one China, and only a few of fi cials in charge of mainland affairs from the Taiwan authorities objected to expressing that there is only one China and disagreed that both sides should deal with issues in cross-Strait exchanges on the basis of the one-China principle. Third, Tang Shubei pointed out that adhering to the one-China principle during the routine discussions had been proposed simply so that both sides could make clear their attitude of adhering to the one-China principle, and not so that the ARATS could discuss with the SEF the connotations of the one-China principle. He even went so far as to suggest that both sides could negotiate how to adhere to the one-China principle. Afterwards, Tang Shubie summarized that during cross-Strait routine talks the following points related to the one-China principle should be adhered to: speci fi c issues in cross-Strait exchanges are the internal affairs of China and they should be discussed and resolved on the basis of the one-China principle; during routine discussions, both sides need only acknowledge that they adhere to the one-China principle and need not discuss the political connotations of the one-China principle, and the manner in which this should be acknowledged could be fully discussed and the ARATS was willing to listen to the views of the SEF and Taiwanese people from all sectors of society.

The ARATS’s reasonable stance provoked a reaction from compatriots in Taiwan, which meant the Taiwan authorities could not avoid the issue. Subsequently, a debate raged within the Taiwan authorities as to whether they should make clear their position on the one-China principle during routine talks. Following three months of discussion,on August 1, 1992, Taiwan’s National Uni fi cation Council issued its conclusion on the meaning of one China: “Both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one-China principle,but the two sides differ over the meaning ascribed to it.…Since 1949, China has been temporarily divided, with two political entities controlling the two sides of the Strait….Taiwan is a part of China, but the mainland is also part of China.” This conclusion clearly states that the Taiwan authorities, on the one hand, advocate “two political entities controlling the two sides of the Strait” and seeks the status of an “equal political entity.” On the other hand, it expresses adherence to the one-China principle and recognizes the fact that Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory. Seeing as the Taiwan authorities stated that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one-China policy,” on August 27, the head of the ARATS issued a statement confirming that both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhering to the one-China policy was of great significance for cross-Strait routine talks as “it shows that adhering to the one-China principle during routine talks has already become the consensus on both sides of the Strait.” In September of the same year, the secretary-generals of the ARATS and the SEF met in Macao to formally exchange views on issues relating to expressing adherence to the one-China principle. The representative from the ARATS said to the representative from the SEF that, “The Taiwan sides’ conclusion on the one-China principle explained that both sides are in consensus that they should adhere to the one-China principle during routine talks. But we do not agree with the relevant Taiwan authorities’ explanation of the connotations of there being one China, nor are we able to discuss with the SEF the connotations of there being one China.” The ARATS’s representative also recommended that the SEF seriously consider directly stating that “both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle.”

From October 27 to 29, 1992, the ARATS and the SEF carried out working-level talks in Hong Kong. During the talks, the ARATS’s representative proposed fi ve points related to expressing adherence to the one-China principle.The SEF’s representative proposed eight such points (five written and three verbal) to be discussed with the ARATS’s representative. The eighth (verbal) point was, “In the process of both sides of the Taiwan Strait seeking national reunification, though both sides adhere to the one-China principle, they have different understandings of the meaning of one China.” The SEF’s representative called this the Taiwan sides’ sine qua non, and suggested that each side should “state orally their stance.” On November 1, after the talks in Hong Kong had concluded, the SEF’s representative issued a written statement on acceptance of the one-China principle during routine talks, which recommended that both sides should, within mutually acceptable limits, state verbally their stance on the matter. The ARATS studied the SEF’s eighth point and felt that it showed that the Taiwan side was seeking reunification and adherence to the one-China principle. Although the SEF had suggested both sides “have a different understanding of the meaning of one China,” it had not specifically set forth the Taiwan side’s views, and the ARATS had always advocated only adhering to the one-China principle and not discussing the meaning of “one China.” In view of the SEF’s attitude of adhering to the one-China principle and seeking national reuni fi cation,the ARATS was also willing to consider, together with the SEF, verbally expressing their adherence to the one-China principle, and it expressed its hope that the SEF could con fi rm that this was the formal view of the Taiwan side. On January 3, the SEF issued a press release and wrote a letter to the ARATS stating that it had received permission from relevant parties in Taiwan for each side to make a verbal statement. On the basis of the above work, that same day,the ARATS deputy secretary-general phoned the secretarygeneral of the SEF, Chen Rong-jye, regarding this matter and stated that the recent working-level talks between the ARATS and SEF had “achieved progress on the issue of mentioning the one-China principle during routine talks,”and that, following their research, the ARATS respected and accepted the SEF’s suggestion that both parties should make verbal statements expressing their adherence to the one-China principle, and that the specific content of the verbal statements would require separate consultations. On November 16, the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF pointing out that at the talks in Hong Kong the SEF had “proposed specific content, which explicitly stated that both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle,” and reiterated their agreement to stating verbally that “both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle” and proposed the main points for the verbal statements: “Both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle and are striving for national reuni fi cation. But the meaning of “one China” shall not be covered in cross-Strait routine talks.” The ARATS also attached the SEF’s eighth Hong Kong proposal as content on which the two sides had reached consensus. On December 3, the SEF wrote back stating that they had no objection to this. The SEF has never denied that the ARATS attached the SEF’s eighth Hong Kong proposal to its letter dated November 16.

Afterwards, the ARATS and the SEF both believed they had reached a consensus through their consultations.The content of the above two paragraphs constitute the consensus reached through consultations and mutual recognition by the ARATS and the SEF in 1992. The consensus consisted of both the ARATS and the SEF clarifying their basic attitude of “striving for national reunification” and that “both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle.” With regard to the political implications of “one China,” the SEF stated that the two sides had “different understandings,” and ARATS stated that this “was not the concern of routine talks,” and that both sides were seeking common ground while reserving differences.

Although the 1992 Consensus was expressed verbally,there are clear documents and written records of it, and it is undeniable by any person or political force. There are also clear records of the situation leading to the 1992 Consensus in the form of Taiwan media reports and SEF fi les from that time. On August 12, 1993, the minutes from the “Wang-Koo talks” (between Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu) were published by the SEF, which clearly showed that both the ARATS and the SEF verbally agreed on the one-China principle and to begin to actively consider it at the talks.

The process that led to the 1992 Consensus proves that it was expressed verbally by each side, that the content expressed by both sides was mutually agreed upon, rather than being unfettered and unilateral statements, and that the core of the 1992 Consensus was that both sides adhered to the one-China principle.

On the basis of expressing both sides’ adherence to the one-China policy, the 1992 Consensus took account of the interests of both sides, set aside the dispute over the political meaning of “one China,” used flexible means to seek common ground while reserving differences, re fl ected the political wisdom of Chinese people on both sides of the Strait, and was highly signi fi cant in establishing a basis for discussions and mutual trust. First of all, the heart and soul of the consensus was that both sides expressed their adherence to the one-China principle. Indeed, consensus could not have been reached without recognizing the one-China principle. Second, with both sides adhering to the one-China principle, they were able to set aside certain political differences, such as their differing views on the political meaning of “one China,” in the spirit of equal consultation and with a pragmatic attitude of seeking common ground while reserving differences. Had it not been for this, it would have been very difficult to reach a consensus. Third, the method of expressing consensus was flexible, with each side able to express it verbally. In the 1992 Consensus, it was on the basis of both sides adhering to the one-China principle that they temporarily agreed not to discuss the political implications of “one China” and were able to hold pragmatic talks and negotiations aimed at developing cross-Strait relations in the future. It could be said that the 1992 Consensus serves as a model for temporarily putting aside political differences on the basis of the one-China principle. The mainland valued this historical experience and hard-won achievement, and compatriots on both sides of the Strait should safeguard the political foundation established by the talks between the ARATS and the SEF.

On January 8, 1992, shortly after it was established,the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF’s chairman, vicechairman and secretary general inviting them to visit the mainland to exchange views on matters relating to contact and cooperation between the two sides. In its reply, the SEF expressed its willingness to arrange the “special visit for a mutually convenient time.” On August 4, ARATS’s president, Wang Daohan, sent another letter to the SEF’s chairman, Koo Chen-fu, inviting him to choose a date and time that year “to exchange views and negotiate plans on the issues of current economic development and both committees’ affairs,” and for the people in charge of the committees to talk. On August 22, Koo Chen-fu replied accepting the invitation and proposed the talks be held in Singapore. In its reply on September 30, the ARATS welcomed the invitation and suggested relevant personnel from both sides hold preparatory discussions in Beijing or another location on the mainland.

In November, the 1992 Consensus, which was reached after the ARATS and the SEF verbally agreed that both sides would adhere to the one-China principle, established the political basis for discussions between the two sides and created the necessary conditions for the Wang-Koo talks.

In order to ensure the success of talks between the leaders of the two committees, the ARATS sent numerous letters to the SEF, inviting the responsible members of the SEF to Beijing to carry out preparatory discussions on the Wang-Koo talks. Between March 25 and 27, 1993, the two committees held their third set of working-level talks to prepare for the preparatory discussions on the Wang-Koo talks, and to reach consensus on draft agreements regarding verifying cross-Strait notarized documents and a cross-Strait registered mail service. From April 8 to April 11,leaders of the two committees met in Beijing to carry out preparatory discussions for the Wang-Koo talks on issues such as time, location, personnel, topics and other issues.During the preparatory discussions, the Wang-Koo talks were designated as a summit on civil, economic, functional and routine affairs, and scheduled for April 27-28. With regard to the location, the ARATS took into account the fact that Koo Chen-fu was prohibited by relevant regulations of the Taiwan authorities from traveling to the mainland and agreed to his request that the talks be held in Singapore.During the preparatory discussions, leaders from both committees initialed the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Notarized Documents” and the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Registered Mail Inquiries and Compensation.” Afterwards,the Wang-Koo talks began.

On April 27, 1993, at 10am, the Wang-Koo talks,which had attracted worldwide attention, formally began at the Neptune Orient Line Building in Singapore. During the talks, the ARATS actively advocated cross-Strait economic cooperation and suggested that cross-Strait economic exchanges and cooperation should be given greatest prominence in cross-Strait relations in the current stage, and that political differences should not impede economic cooperation; proposed that establishing direct mail, transport and trade links (the Three Links) between the two sides should be placed at the top of the agenda; and put forward specific recommendations for cooperation in the areas of labor services, the development of Pudong and the Three Gorges, energy and resource development, and science and technology, as well as for joint preparations for convening non-governmental economic exchange meetings.The atmosphere at the talks was good and progress was smooth, with some positive results achieved. An important consensus was reached on the issue of cross-Strait economic exchanges which stated that, “Both sides believe they should strengthen cross-Strait economic exchanges for complimentary and mutual bene fi t,” and decided to select a time and place to continue talks about protecting the rights and interests of Taiwan businesspeople who invest on the mainland, cross-Strait industrial and commercial personnel visits and other issues, and to discuss strengthening energy and resource development and exchanges. On the issue of cross-Strait science and technology exchanges, both sides agreed to promote visits by scientific and technological personnel, exchange scientific and technological research publications, look into unifying scienti fi c and technological terminology and standardizing product specifications, and jointly promote exchanges in computing and other industrial science and technology. In terms of cultural and educational exchanges, both sides further agreed on specific projects for youth and news media exchanges. The ARATS and SEF also agreed to establish a system of contacts and talks,including both sides giving special clearance for appropriate personnel from the two committees to travel between Taiwan and the mainland.

In the afternoon of April 29, Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu signed the “Wang-Koo talks Joint Agreement,”“Cross-Strait Agreement on a System of Contacts and Talks,” “Cross-Strait Agreement on Notarized Documents”and the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Registered Mail Inquiries and Compensation.”

The Wang-Koo talks attracted widespread attention from Taiwan society as well as the international media, and more than 300 journalists covered the talks, including 100 journalists from Taiwan and the mainland. The major news agencies from the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK also covered the talks in-depth.

The Wang-Koo talks were the highest level nongovernmental cross-Strait talks held by high level individuals since 1949, and their influence far exceeded their results. Jiang Zemin pointed out that, “The Wang-Koo talks were successful and achieved results, and it marks a historic step forward in cross-Strait relations.” He also stated that, “The reason the Wang-Koo talks was successful is because it reflected the wish of compatriots on both sides of the Strait, compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao and the vast number of overseas Chinese for cross-Strait contact and discussions, cooperation, economic development and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The Taiwan side felt that the summit “was the fi rst step in establishing cross-Strait contact” and “a milestone in institutionalizing cross-Strait civilian exchanges,” as well as “a major key to developing cross-Strait relations from confrontation to peaceful reuni fi cation over the past half century.”

The Wang-Koo talks had far-reaching historical significance for cross-Strait contact and negotiations, and even for the development of cross-Strait relations.

First of all, the Wang-Koo talks established an institutionalized cross-Strait negotiation mechanism on the basis of the one-China principle; had a large impact on the Taiwan authorities’ “three noes policy” of no contact, no compromise and no negotiations; and made negotiations a fact and idea generally accepted by Taiwan compatriots.By adhering to the one-China principle, both sides could carry out negotiations on an equal footing, and through cross-Strait negotiations, cross-Strait relations stabilized and developed.

Second, the Wang-Koo talks established a model for cross-Strait consultations on an equal footing on the basis of the one-China principle. The Wang-Koo talks embodied the ARATS and the SEF’s spirit of mutual respect, seeking truth from facts, carrying out negotiations on an equal footing and seeking common ground while reserving differences. The talks proved that pragmatic and equal negotiations based on adherence to the one-China principle do not, as the Taiwan authorities put it, “dwarf” Taiwan. They proved that on the basis of the one-China principle, political differences can be temporarily put aside, issues relating to cross-Strait relations can be resolved by seeking common ground while reserving differences, and mutual trust can be enhanced and consensuses reached. They also proved that, on the basis of the one-China principle, Chinese people on both sides of the Strait are entirely capable of finding a suitable way to conduct bilateral negotiations on an equal footing.

Third, the Wang-Koo talks and their outcome provided a strong impetus for the development of cross-Strait economic, trade and civilian exchanges, and they strengthened the Chinese national identity of compatriots on both sides of the Strait. The Wang-Koo talks were the result of the fl ourishing development of economic, trade and civilian exchanges, and were the concentrated expression of intense national sentiment and desire for contact, exchanges and cooperation on the part of compatriots on both sides of the Strait. During the Wang-Koo talks, the spirit and content advocated by the mainland side of strengthening economic cooperation and developing common national interests has not only provided strong impetus to developing economic exchanges and cooperation over the past twenty years, but still has practical signi fi cance for improving and developing cross-Straits relations today.

MAINTAINING CONSENSUS ON THE ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE

■ Shang Junqi