Abstract

3 Zero Trust Strategy and Modernization of U.S. Cybersecurity

LIU Guozhu

[Abstract] Zero Trust is a cybersecurity paradigm based on the premise that trust is never implicitly granted but must be continuously validated. This security paradigm that focuses on resource protection has emerged with the expansion of digital applications such as the Internet, Internet of Things, big data and cloud computing.The core principles of Zero Trust architecture include universal identity verification,access segmentation, least trust authorization, pervasive encryption, continuous monitoring, and adaptation. Identity, devices, networks, applications and workloads,as well as data constitute the pillars of Zero Trust architecture. The U.S. government is accelerating the implementation of distinct Zero Trust capabilities and activities,driven by the need to modernize its traditional cybersecurity systems, adapt to evolving cybersecurity concepts and technologies, and compete as a major player in the digital age. Zero Trust architecture is also crucial for the modernization and informatization of the U.S. defense digital strategy. The U.S. government has strengthened its top-level cybersecurity layout, outlined key initiatives for implementing its Zero Trust strategy, and highlighted basic principles in advancing its Zero Trust security system at the federal government level. As a result, key infrastructure projects, national security systems and defense systems are regarded as core areas for the implementation of Zero Trust architecture, which has contributed much to the establishment of a “whole-of-government” framework with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency as the pivot. Giving more attention to data security than cybersecurity, Zero Trust is not only a technology issue, but also a matter of culture concerning the shift in cybersecurity design approaches. At the same time, Zero Trust is both a cybersecurity defensive strategy and an offensive one, allowing organizations to secure themselves and launch attacks against their adversaries without hesitation. The United States is greatly enhancing its offensive capabilities in the field of cybersecurity, which will put greater pressure on other countries. Against this backdrop, collaborative efforts are called for from Chinese government agencies, enterprises, and cybersecurity professionals to build a modern, autonomous, and secure cybersecurity system in China.

[Keywords] Zero Trust, key infrastructure, cybersecurity, data strategy

[Author] LIU Guozhu, Professor, Institute of World History and Research Center for Non-Traditional Security and Peace Development, Zhejiang University(Hangzhou, 310058).

29 Between Autonomy and Dependence: The Evolution of Japan-U.S.Defence Technology Cooperation

WANG Guangtao and YU Jiaru

[Abstract] Defence technology cooperation serves as an important manifestation of the deepening Japan-U.S. alliance and constitutes a key component of security cooperation and alliance management. The development of Japan-U.S. defence technology cooperation is influenced by both the level of institutionalization of their bilateral defence technology cooperation and the degree of Japan’s autonomy within the alliance. Before the 1980s, due to the constraints of Japan’s domestic arms export regulations and its limited technological capacities, the Japan-U.S. bilateral cooperation on defence technology was mainly based on the direct and unilateral assistance from the United States. Since the 1980s, Japan has made substantial technological breakthroughs and started to seek a balance between cooperation with the U.S. and its own autonomous development of weapons and equipment. However,the low level of institutionalization of defence technology cooperation to some extent hindered their bilateral cooperation. Since the 2010s, Japan has further strengthened its technological research and development capacities, making it possible to deepen its defence technology cooperation with the U.S. and diversify its technology cooperation after lifting the ban on weapons exports. The enhanced cooperation with the United States regarding research and development of jet fighters shows that Japan seems to become more autonomous but still remains entangled in the dilemma of reducing its dependence on U.S. defense technology.The depth of defence technology cooperation between Japan and the U.S. and the breadth of Japan’s defence cooperation will be an important indicator of the future development of Japan’s defence industry.

[Keywords] Japan-U.S. alliance, defence technology cooperation, defence industry,Japanese Arms Exports Ban

[Authors] WANG Guangtao, Associate Professor, Center for Japanese Studies,Fudan University; YU Jiaru, M.A. Student, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University (Shanghai, 200433).

51 An Exploration of Security Dilemma, Strategic Autonomy and Risk Preference Inertia

QIN Lizhi

[Abstract] Why does a major power shift from a “risk-averse” preference to a “risktaking” preference? The risk-averse or risk-taking strategic preferences of major powers do not always match power comparisons or strategic environments in that they sometimes opt for a strategy of restraint when the gains from the status quo are diminishing or the relative power advantage is being maximized, while showing a preference for a strategy of aggressiveness when the gains from the status quo are increasing or the power disadvantage still persists. To explain this uncertainty feature of risk preferences, unintended systemic effect outcomes can be explored through a correlational examination of national strategic autonomy, strategic motivation, security dilemma, and risk preference inertia by adopting an integrative explanatory path that combines both systemic and unitary variables. Through the structural and processual examination of the multi-polar system of modern Europe and the bipolar system of the Cold War, this paper aims to verify the importance of the ends-means dynamic equilibrium evolved from Liddell Hart to Paul Kennedy for major powers to cope with strategic risks, and intends to innovate strategic theories concerning the studies of strategic autonomy and risk preference inertia.

[Keywords] strategic autonomy, risk preference, strategic inertia, security dilemma,strategic stability

[Author] QIN Lizhi, Associate Professor, School of International Affairs and Public Administration, Ocean University of China (Qingdao, 266000).

79 Civilizational Foundations, Theoretical Logic and Practical Paths of Global Security Initiative

PENG Bo and XUE Li

[Abstract] Global Security Initiative is deeply rooted in the prominent features of Chinese civilization identified by President Xi, namely its continuity, innovative nature, unity, inclusiveness and peaceful nature, thus exhibiting the theoretical logic characterized by cooperative security, open security, common security, and multilateral security. The United States, motivated to maintain its global hegemony, has imposed on the Asia-Pacific region a traditional security paradigm featuring competitive security, closed security, divisible security, and unilateral security. This has given rise to an increasingly intensified strategic game among major countries in the region,an accelerated formation of security camps, a spiral of security dilemmas, and a heating up of non-traditional security competition, which has seriously undermined regional peace and stability. Global Security Initiative provides a new security paradigm, which is to cope with competitive security through cooperative security,overcome closed security with open security, replace divisible security with common security, and surpass unilateral security with multilateral security. In response to the U.S. implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China, Global Security Initiative blazes practical paths for achieving universal security and lasting peace in the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, it will play an increasingly important role in promoting positive interactions among major countries in the region, improving ASEAN-centered regional security mechanisms, shaping mutual trust among regional countries, and strengthening regional non-traditional security cooperation.

[Keywords] Global Security Initiative, features of Chinese civilization, Asia-Pacific security governance, new security paradigm

[Authors] PENG Bo, Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; XUE Li, Senior Fellow, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing, 100732).

102 How Can Security Institutions Divide a Rival Alliance?

WEI Bing

[Abstract] Dividing a rival alliance is an important way to change the balance of power between states. Around the concept of “wedge strategy,” the existing studies have systematically discussed the ways and mechanisms of dividing a rival alliance,and specifically proposed two main types of “wedge strategy”: “reward-based wedge strategy” (splitting the adversaries with carrots) and “coercive wedge strategy”(splitting the adversaries through heavy pressure), both of which emphasize the use of material forces to divide a rival alliance and hence can be collectively referred to as “material wedge strategy.” Apart from this, given that competitive security concepts constitute the kernel of alliances and some states may prefer cooperative security policies in certain periods of time to avoid conflicts and reduce costs, the dividing state can use differentiated cooperation concepts as the breakthrough point to realize the conceptual differentiation of the rival alliance, which can be summarized as “concept-based wedge strategy.” The “concept-based wedge strategy” aims to weaken the target state’s perception of the value and efficacy of the alliance by influencing and changing its security concepts, thereby indirectly inducing alienation from the alliance. When the dividing state does not pose a serious threat to the target state,and has a strong voice in the security issues concerned by the target state that holds similar policy positions with some third-party states on these security issues, the dividing state may adopt the “concept-based wedge strategy” to weaken and dissolve the rival alliance. Security institutions serve as a main platform for the implementation of the “concept-based wedge strategy” and can be used by the dividing state to propose cooperative security initiatives or cooperative solutions to the security issues that the target state attaches importance to, so as to provide alternative security means for the target state, thus weakening the strategic value of the alliance state and lowering the cooperation level within the rival alliance. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) put forward by the Soviet Union during the Cold War is a concrete practice of “concept-based wedge strategy”.

[Keywords] alliance, wedge strategy, material wedge strategy, concept-based wedge strategy, CSCE

[Author] WEI Bing, Ph.D. Student, Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University (Beijing, 100084).

126 Technological Authority and International Technological Competition in the Digital Era: A Case Study of Mobile Communication Technology

SHEN Yi and GONG Yunmu

[Abstract] In the research studies of international technological competition, the perspective of power competition has failed to provide a comprehensive analytical framework that takes into consideration the unique characteristics of technological development. The introduction of the concept of authority into the technology domain aims to create a framework where technological authority is not built upon relationships of interest exchange or maintained through coercive means. Instead, it is achieved by defining the trajectory of technological development and by establishing governance rules to win the voluntary following of other countries, thus creating an asymmetric relationship of compliance. Technological authority can be classified into four types:knowledge-based technological authority, regulation-based technological authority,institution-based technological authority, and leverage-based technological authority.These four types can be interconverted through technological leaps and market expansion.The abundance of technological resources and the initial market size are used as independent variables to analyze different types of technological authority and the path selection tool of countries in international technological competition. In the field of mobile communication technology, countries with different types of technological authority participate in international technological competition through physical paths,market paths, institutional paths, and alliance paths. They leverage the lock-in effect in the technological field to consolidate their dominant positions in international technological competition until the emergence of disruptive technological breakthroughs.[Keywords] international technological competition, technological authority, path selection, mobile communication technology

[Authors] SHEN Yi, Professor, School of International Relations and Public Affairs,Fudan University; GONG Yunmu, Ph.D. Student, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University (Shanghai, 200433).