Zhang Yuyan & Xu Xiujun
Ever since the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the United States, putting an end to the long period of isolation between the two countries, the bilateral relations have progressed from early limited engagement to a comprehensive interdependence with an increasingly high degree of mutual interests. As one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world, the overall China-US relationship has remained stable, providing an important guarantee for the world’s peaceful development, prosperity and stability. However, in recent years, the benign interactions between the two countries have been disrupted, exhibiting a tendency of antagonism in some areas.
With the change of administrations in the United States, the bilateral relationship stands at a new crossroads. Regarding the future course of China-US relations, Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed in his congratulatory message to US President-elect Joe Biden the hope that “the two sides will uphold the spirit of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation, focus on cooperation, manage differences, advance the healthy and stable development of China-US ties, and join hands with other countries and the international community to promote the noble cause of world peace and development.”1 China’s position not only serves the fundamental interests of the two peoples, but also meets the common expectations of the international community, pointing to building a new type of China-US relations. Facing the future, China and the United States must work together for a “mutually assured interdependence” against the risk of “decoupling” in order to lay a solid foundation for the healthy and stable development of China-US relations.
The Logic for Interdependence and Peaceful Coexistence
Generally speaking, economic globalization refers to a process of increasing economic interdependence of human beings. As economic globalization deepens, people across countries live in a world of contradictions. “On the one hand, as material wealth accumulates constantly, and science and technology progresses with each passing day, human civilization has developed to the highest level in history. On the other hand, the world is faced with rising uncertainties as a result of frequent regional conflicts, terrorism, refugee flows and other global challenges, as well as poverty, unemployment and increasing income gaps.”2 It demonstrates that the increasing global interdependence in the process of economic globalization does not necessarily bring about common prosperity, peace and stability for all countries. Especially in recent years, the great change in the China-US power balance has intensified concerns about the prospects of world peace. In the debate over whether the world’s two largest economies can coexist peacefully in the process of globalization, the arguments that China and the United States are headed toward confrontation have gained some popularity. Graham T. Allison compared the China-US relationship to that between Athens and Sparta, concluding that the two countries might fall into the so-called “Thucydides trap.”3 This argument should serve as a warning signal to us to take measures in order to avoid such a scenario in China-US relations. Meanwhile, it underestimates the objective requirements of international economic connectivity and interaction for the world economic development and the reality of high global interdependence.
With the rapid development of economic globalization over the past half century, the world has been able to maintain overall peace without largescale wars among major powers. Especially since the end of the Cold War, military confrontation between the East and West camps no longer exists. Instead, the global market is rapidly growing, and global interdependence is advancing at an unprecedented pace. As this “double-edged sword” effect of global interdependence becomes prominent, people are increasingly uncertain whether a high degree of interdependence among major powers is a stabilizer of peaceful coexistence or a catalyst of conflicts. Systematic study of the relationship between interdependence and peaceful coexistence began as early as in the 1960s. Richard N. Cooper was among the first to establish a relationship between political and economic factors in international relations from the perspective of international economic interdependence, and analyzed the effects of economic interdependence on domestic and foreign policies and the response to the effects by domestic and foreign policies, laying the foundation for the systematic study of interdependence.4 As this study deepens, researchers have tended to take one of the two following views: one arguing that the interdependence may help peaceful coexistence; the other that it will increase the possibility of conflicts.
In the liberal theories of international relations, mutual dependence between two states is based on close trade relations that bring benefits to both parties, and the interruption of trade by conflict will invariably leads to the loss of any “gains from trade.” This thesis has its deepest foundation in classical political economics. In the view of classical political economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the prosperity and development of any nation originates from market expansion, which carries policy implications with regard to the promotion free trade and to participation in the international division of labor. When two countries have close trade ties, both parties will improve their welfare. Based on the historical experience and the study of interdependence in the 1980s, Richard Rosencrance pointed out that a true interdependent relationship has emerged, which has greatly increased the benefits of peace; and peaceful development through inter-state trade has become an important factor in achieving prosperity and even world leadership.5 The policy implication of Rosencrance’s research for the United States is that it must re-position itself, shifting from the old style of military competition and devoting more efforts to the world economy and to trade, so as to avoid nuclear war and ensure prosperity. Since the 21st century, the development of information technology has further surmounted restrictions on trade both in time and space, and spawned new types of trade as well as new trade rules, making the world more “flat.”6 The expansion of inter-state economic exchanges has increasingly consolidated the economic foundation for peaceful coexistence between states.
However, political realists have criticized and questioned the theory of economic interdependence as a safeguard for peace. They maintain that national survival and security is the foremost objective of state policy as compared with national prosperity, which is based on trade. Therefore, political considerations prevail over economic ones, and survival and security over economic prosperity. This is also one of the fundamental reasons why states have been willing to sacrifice the economic benefits of trade, by imposing sanctions and suspending trading activities. As far as economic benefits are concerned, trading states may also experience frictions and tensions over the relative nature of the benefits and their distribution. Meanwhile, since interdependence is often asymmetrical, the less dependent player often sees interdependence as a source of its power over its more dependent counterpart.7 Neo-realist political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz argued that close interdependence means close interaction, thus increasing chances of accidental conflicts. If interdependent relations are not well managed, conflicts and occasional violence between states will occur; and if the interdependence develops too quickly and gets out of control, it could lead to war.8 Empirical studies even show that there seems to be a curved type of relationship between interdependence and conflict. Low- and medium-level interdependence reduces the chances of antagonistic disputes, while extensive economic interdependence rather increases the possibility of disputes between states, even leading to military conflict. A large degree of interdependence in particular, whether symmetric or asymmetric, could increase conflicts.9 Other studies have pointed out that in view of possible “weaponization” in the relationship, global interdependence will lead to more serious inter-state rivalry, or to a more strident division of power in some fields, making it difficult or even impossible for late-comer competitors to catch up. Therefore, in that view, the conflicts between states with vested interests and those that are just emerging in the global economic system are irreconcilable and unavoidable.10
Divided on the question of interdependence, neither argument denies the impact that localized issues may have on high-level politics, as both follow a common logic. First, trade helps to enhance well-being. Interdependence brings economic benefits to both parties, otherwise states would not be motivated to strengthen economic ties with one another, but it does not necessarily benefit a nation’s priority security and military objectives. Second, a greater degree of interdependence increases the cost of conflict. Some states may provoke disputes and conflicts regardless of the cost, but for a state with a rational view, the losses from “decoupling” as a result of conflicts cannot be excluded from their cost-and-benefit calculations. Third, interdependence is an instrument for leveraging national policies and international relations. Although the interdependence in low-politics areas such as economics may have opposite effects on the relationship between states in high-politics areas such as military and security, the increasingly close relationship between low-politics and high-politics issues tends to provide greater dynamics to the interdependence, allowing more space for countries to avoid conflicts or at least serving to reduce their intensity. Therefore, many of the problems which have disrupted China-US peaceful coexistence cannot be attributed to their intensified interdependence, but rather lie in the degree and structure of their interdependence in the various fields.
Real Challenges of China-US Interdependence
In June 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping and then US President Barack Obama met each other and reached a consensus on building a new type of major-country relationship between China and the United States. The two sides believed that in the face of the rapid economic globalization and increased connectivity between nations, China and the United States could avoid the traditional path of confrontation between major countries and embark on a new path. The two sides agreed to work together to build a new type of major-country relationship with mutual respect and in the spirit of win-win cooperation to benefit the people of the two countries and the people of the world at large.11 However, since Donald Trump came to power, China-US relations have been facing the most severe challenges since the establishment of diplomatic relations. According to the scores of China’s foreign relations published by the Institute of International Relations of Tsinghua University, China-US relations in October 2020 scored -8.2, the lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations of the two countries, and since the beginning of the Korean War truce negotiations in July 1951. In contrast to the deterioration of China-US relations during the Korean War, the recent sharp decline in bilateral relations occurred despite the high degree of interdependence achieved. China-US interdependence failed to assure positive interactions between the two states, but rather turned into an excuse for the Trump administration to pressure China and to cause dramatic fluctuations in the bilateral relations, arousing doubts about the positive nature of that interdependence.
The current situation is not the result of being unduly interdependent, but rather is a result of the inadequate governance and management of that interdependence. Therefore, there is a need to better understand China-US interdependence in the context of economic globalization. To understand economic globalization, one should consider it in three dimensions: in terms of its materials, its institutions and its ideas. In the dimension of materials, as the division of labor deepens and the market expands, goods and services, capital, labor, technology and other factors of production flow across national borders at far greater velocities and scales than previously envisioned; and in the dimension of institutions, the rules that have previously been utilized on a limited scale have been increasingly regarded as universal and adapted more broadly, at a time when the world operates in a way that is highly sensitive to and dependent upon what are essentially nonneutral international rules; and in the dimension of ideas, with the help of communication, and the revolution in information technology in particular, the values and ideologies of different peoples, ethnic groups and nations both converge and diverge in their encounters.12 Thus, the real challenges of China-US interdependence unfold in all the three dimensions.
At a physical level, a negative impact has been felt in bilateral economic and trade exchanges. Since 2017, the US government has launched a series of investigations under Sections 232 and 301 against Chinese products exported to the United States, continuously escalating economic and trade tensions and seriously disrupting economic and trading activities. Donald Trump and some other American politicians claimed that the United States was disadvantaged in the bilateral economic and trade exchanges, and that China had infringed on the interests of US companies and workers. Indeed, a good number of studies have shown that China-US trade in general has had a positive impact on the employment and a rising income in the United States, both in the past and at present;13 and has benefited the manufacturing sector, industrial workers and even ordinary consumers in the United States.14 However, the benefits are unevenly distributed between different sectors, industries, and fields as well as among different social groups. It happens that negative impact is felt more strongly by less competitive sectors, industries, and groups. A similar negative effect is also found in China as China-US economic and trade relations develop. However, the real problem does not lie in the economic and trade exchanges themselves, but in the capability and efficiency of domestic governance in the United States. Similarly, recognizing the loss on the US side caused by the China-US trade frictions as being uneven, the Trump administration frequently adjusted the scope, intensity and pace of trade frictions with China.
At an institutional level, synergizing different rules reveals the divergence of interests. Economic globalization is largely characterized by increased universal applicability of international rules, which more than ever has become a major or decisive factor in economic globalization. A multilateral trading system and regional trade arrangements have been the two wheels driving economic globalization. China and the United States being the two largest economies in the world, synergizing and integrating their economic and trading rules would conform to the development trend of the times and serve the interests of all nations. However, the United States, which established the system of international rules, has long benefited from the nonneutral rules. Despite the rise of emerging countries and new participants in the international rules-based system, the US has been trying its best to monopolize the international rules, and to maintain its rights and privileges in the existing system of international rules which are increasingly incompatible with its power, responsibilities and obligations. Consequently, China’s legitimate appeal to enhance its voice in the international system is regarded as a challenge to US interests, while some American politicians accused China of having violated the multilateral trading rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a matter of fact, US approval of China’s accession to the WTO and its granting of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status to China are not the root causes of unemployment and other related problems in the United States, but rather have brought real benefits to most Americans.15 Meanwhile, China has been performing impressively and equally well as other WTO members such as the United States and European Union countries in complying with WTO rules and observing trade dispute arbitration.16
At the conceptual level, the “China threat” perception undermines mutual trust. After Trump took office, the United States underwent major adjustments of its strategy towards China built on the false perception of“China threat.” The US National Security Strategy published in December 2017 stated that “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”17 The summary of the US National Defense Strategy, released by the Defense Department in January 2018, defined China as a “strategic competitor”and “revisionist power.”18 The US Strategic Approach to China, released in May 2020, further articulated the view that the United States would protect American interests and advance American influence “through a whole-ofgovernment approach and guided by a return to principled realism” in order to comply with its economic values and meet the security challenges of China.19 In the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean region, the US advanced its Indo-Pacific strategy, which brought on board Japan, India, and Australia, to help safeguard and consolidate US hegemony through combined political, diplomatic, and military means, block China’s strategic space, and undermine China’s international influence. In addition, the US continually interferes in China’s internal affairs on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet, and challenges China’s maritime sovereign rights and interests. These strategic measures and actions by the US have seriously damaged the mutual trust, and significantly undermined the political foundation of the benign interactions between the two countries.
Requirements for Building a New Type of China-US Relations
Historically, the development of China-US relations has had a solid political foundation. The Shanghai Communiqué, the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, and the August 17 Communiquéhave established the one-China principle and laid out the norms for a relationship of mutual respect, equal treatment and seeking common ground while reserving differences. During the Obama administration, China and the United States continuously made new breakthroughs in building a new type of major-country relationship through strengthening strategic communication, expanding practical cooperation, and properly managing differences, which enhanced the common interests of the two peoples and the people around the world. As a fundamental inspiration for bilateral relations in this period, “the two sides need to stay committed to the principles of non-confrontation, non-conflict, mutual respect and winwin cooperation, and work steadily toward a new model of major-country relations.”20 Today, as the world is undergoing momentous changes unseen in a century, both the external environment and the internal foundation for the development of China-US relations are experiencing new significant changes. In the face of worsening bilateral relations, the construction of a new type of China-US relations is the solution to breaking the traditional law of conflict and confrontation between major powers, and creating a new model for the development of their relations. To be specific, the new type of China-US relationship can be achieved by surmounting the following four aspects.
First, to surmount mutually assured destruction. During the Cold War, the military confrontation between the US-led and Sovietled camps did not lead to large-scale military conflicts and all-out wars, instead maintaining peace over a long period of time between the two superpowers. However, it was a balance of nuclear deterrence under the strategy of “mutually assured destruction,” which continually threatened to bring the world to the brink of war. Since the development of nuclear weapons, nuclear states have had to face the question of how big their nuclear weaponry had to be in order to assure their national security. In the 1960s, then US Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara set the standards for mutually assured destruction, arguing that the US must have a reliable capability of “assured destruction” if it was to prevent nuclear attacks on the US or its allies.21 Thus, mutually assured destruction became the core of the US-Soviet deterrence strategy. Apart from a balanced nuclear deterrence, the policies and conditions of the long peace between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War also included long-standing ideological opposition, respect for each other’s sphere of influence, differentiation of opponents, tolerance of strategic non-transparency, and a fairly high but not complete economic distancing from each other, etc.22 There is no doubt that such policies based on mutually assured destruction are incompatible with the current environment and cannot bring about real world peace.
Second, to surmount the Cold War mentality. The Cold War mentality mainly refers to the manner of thinking of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, in handling inter-state relations and resolving international disputes during the Cold War era. Essentially it is hegemonic thinking and exhibits the logic of mighty power in pursuing one’s self-interests. In the past one hundred years, the international order has been evolving in conjunction with the formation and expansion of American hegemony. In the latter part of the Second World War, the United States, with the help of its relative national strength, began to seek an institutional dominance by promoting and establishing international trading rules and multilateral international institutions which could safeguard and expand its hegemonic interests. At the same time, the US actively implemented the strategy of alignment for a US-led Western alliance to strengthen its hegemony and achieve a “Pax Americana.” However, due to the huge impact on its economy after the global financial crisis in 2008 and the sharp rise of government debt, it has become more difficult for the US to maintain the enormous spending needed to sustain the hegemonic system. Despite this, the Trump administration still pressed ahead with the “America First” foreign policy, requesting trading partners to cut their trade surplus in the name of so-called“fair trade,” while threatening to withdraw from the multilateral institutions in an attempt to maintain US hegemony by containment and blackmailing. At a time when the fate of all nations is so closely connected and intertwined, the US Cold War mentality of advocating confrontation and power politics has not only met with widespread opposition around the world, but also gained little support from the American people themselves. In the US presidential election in 2020, American voters gave their evaluation of Trump’s policies by denying him a second term.
Third, to surmount the zero-sum game. It is undeniable that disputes or even conflicts of interests may occur between states, especially between big powers, but it does not mean that the result of exchange between states is a zero-sum game. On the contrary, all parties can achieve non-zero-sum benefits as long as those disputes and conflicts are well handled. According to Thomas C. Schelling, negotiations are non-zero-sum in nature. This is because both sides stand to lose if any negotiation fails to resolve a conflict; and agreement through negotiation is better for both sides than no consensus at all.23 Therefore, despite the severity of conflicts, there exists common ground for cooperation on both sides, i.e. the willingness of both sides to avoid the damage resulting from failed negotiations and achieve a winwin situation. This provides a theoretical basis for states to overcome the zero-sum game and resolve disputes in a peaceful fashion. Over the past 40 years of bilateral exchanges, the areas of cooperation between China and the United States have been expanded, the foundation of cooperation consolidated, and their common interests multiplied; and a pattern of mutually integrated interests is taking shape between the two sides in many respects. The history and reality of the bilateral relations have shown that both countries benefit from cooperation and lose from confrontation.
Fourth, to surmount differences in social systems. In the process of historical development, China and the United States have chosen different systems and different development paths. This is an important prerequisite and foundation for stable development of the bilateral relations since the normalization of the two countries’ diplomatic ties. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, China has been unswervingly following the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Consequently, it has made remarkable achievements and great contributions to world peace and development. However, growing unease about China’s rapid development has led some American politicians to play up the “China threat” rhetoric, attributing their accumulated domestic problems and tensions to external challenges, even claiming that the US engagement policy has failed to change China, and exaggerating ideological antagonism and competition between the two countries’ systems. Such opinions and propositions do not at all help to solve the current US problems and tensions, but rather endanger the confidence in its own system. Both being important institutional achievements of human civilization, the social systems of China and the United States have their respective characteristics, and each has room for improvement. China and the US can fully respect and learn from each other for peaceful coexistence and common development of the two systems. In view of the twists and turns in current China-US relations, the two countries should resume dialogues, restart cooperation, and restore trust. By adopting an objective and rational attitude, and seeking greater mutual understanding and broader convergence of interests, the two sides will surely find a path of peaceful coexistence in this world between countries of different social systems and cultural backgrounds.24
Mutually Assured Interdependence and the Future of China-US Relations
The general trend of historical development tells us that despite all the current difficulties in China-US relations, the two states will eventually return to the correct track of building a new type of major-country relations. As President Xi Jinping emphasized, “The building of a new model of major-country relationship between China and the United States is an unprecedented and innovative endeavor. There is no ready experience or model to follow and it is natural that some difficulties and even setbacks may occur. When faced with problems, what is crucial is that we work together to resolve them instead of simply finding the problem fearsome or letting it take over.”25 The two countries have now come to a critical moment in laying a new foundation for future stable development of the bilateral relations. Undoubtedly, it must not be a foundation on which the two countries go back to mutual isolation or be trapped in a “weaponized interdependence,” but rather must be a foundation that would assure interdependence in important areas.
First, to assure interdependence in global industrial and value chains. China has the world’s most comprehensive manufacturing industrial chain and the world’s largest manufacturing sector, and it is also the only country in the world that possesses all the industrial sectors. 220 out of the world’s over 500 major industrial goods are produced in China in the largest quantities. Some of the Chinese industries have gradually established their leading positions globally, but in general its manufacturing sector is still at the middle and low end of the global value chain, with some industries still highly dependent on foreign imports. According to statistics, China has substantial gaps with the world’s leading economies in 10 industrial sectors, and huge gaps in another 5, accounting for 57.7 percent across all 26 sectors; and China is highly dependent on foreign economies in 2 sectors and extremely dependent in another 8, accounting for 38.5 percent of all sectors.26 At present, many of China’s critical technologies come from the United States, especially middleand high-end chips on which the US maliciously cracked down on China. China must import 80 percent of its middle- and high-end chips and all these imported chips involve US technology. However, it should also be noted that China is an important importer and consumer market for US tech products. In terms of trade, the United States is China’s major export market and source of foreign exchange earnings, while China is an important destination for US agricultural products. Assuring China-US interdependence in global industrial and value chains corresponds to the common interests of both countries and will help prevent a complete decoupling from one another. In the face of the current US decoupling policy, China must consolidate the domestic foundation of its industries to assure the interdependence of China-US industrial and value chains; promote technological innovation and overcome technological bottlenecks; enhance the advantages of Chinese industries, products and industrial chains; and pursue a more symmetrical and balanced interdependence in China-US relations. Equally important, China must take precautions against the “paradox of decoupling,” namely, reinforcing the risk of decoupling by taking measures intended to avoid it.27
Second, to assure interdependence in the global system of rules. Rapid trade growth goes hand-in-hand with the improvement of international trading rules. Today, the development of international free trade has entered the phase of “rules-based trade,” by which the developed countries strive to protect their own interests by rewriting rules or establishing new ones in addition to“containing” any serious competition arising from emerging economies.28 This also reflects the importance of institutions and rules in international economic cooperation and competition. In recent years, the Trump administration withdrew from international organizations and arrangements one after another, not in order to give up its leadership in international rules-making, but rather in order to revamp the existing rules and orientate the reform of the international system for its own benefit. In his speech at the High-level Meeting to Commemorate the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations, President Xi Jinping said, “Relations among countries and coordination of their interests must only be based on rules and institutions; they must not be lorded over by those who wave a strong fist at others.”29 This is the basic principle to resolve the disputes and differences between states in an effective way, and also China’s fundamental policy of promoting institutional openness in the formulation of rules. Institutional openness refers to aligning policies and practices with international rules for the continuous promotion of a rulesbased and open world economy. The inevitable choice is to adapt to the new stage of economic globalization and use it as a necessary instrument for coordinating China-US relations. The United States is using so-called new “high-standard” international rules to raise the threshold and cost for China to comply with those rules, and thereby block China’s accession to the international market. In this context, China must continue to consolidate the domestic foundation to adapt to new international rules, and integrate itself into the international system of rules led by the United States, while transforming its strength into an institutional discourse that facilitates the formulation of new international rules.
Finally, to assure interdependence in the practice of global governance. In an era when nations are unprecedentedly dependent on each other, no country can prosper in isolation, particularly in the present complex situation of world politics and with an economy facing global problems; nor can it realize its own interests at the expense of others. Fairness must be introduced to the consideration of responsibilities and obligations, following the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” All members of the international community must contribute to the solution of global problems, they should be allowed to do so in differentiated fashions, that is, to shoulder responsibilities of different sizes, in different fields, by different means, and for different durations in accordance with their capabilities, characteristics and the prevailing principles of international law. As two major countries in the world, China and the United States must give full play to their respective advantages in meeting global challenges in order to promote global governance for practical results. In global governance, the US has strong economic, financial, scientific, technological and military strengths, supported by its global system of alliances; while China has the institutional advantage of being capable of mobilizing resources to address major global governance issues, and has accumulated rich experience in this respect. The pressing global issues facing mankind call for China and the United States, the two largest economies in the world and the biggest stakeholders in human affairs, to shoulder the responsibility together. They must work hand-in-hand to make the pie of shared interests bigger, and strive to make economic globalization more open, inclusive, and balanced and mutually beneficial.
Conclusion
The development of economic globalization requires new content in China-US relations that accords with the spirit of the times. While their common interests continue to expand, the divergence of their interests is also increasingly prominent, bringing with it new risks and challenges to the bilateral relations, particularly when the unfair and unreasonable old international economic order remains fundamentally unchanged. To avoid the “Thucydides trap” in major-power relations, China and the United States must abandon the mentalities of mutually assured destruction based on the notion of deterrence, Cold War thinking, zero-sum game and competition of systems. More importantly, they must secure the relationship from such risks through a policy of mutually assured interdependence.
In the new historical era, it is an inevitable trend of historical development to build a new type of China-US relations, which also represents the hope of people around the world. The current twists and turns in the China-US relationship are not a result of over-interdependence, but rather reflect the need for a more comprehensive, closer and well-balanced mutually assured interdependence. On this basis, the two countries must overcome the danger of weaponized interdependence and consolidate a solid foundation for the healthy and stable development of bilateral relations, therefore setting the tone of coordination, cooperation, and stability in the construction of a new type of China-US relations.
1 “Xi Congratulates Biden on Election as U.S. President,” Xinhua, November 25, 2020, http://www. xinhuanet.com/english/2020-11/25/c_139542676.htm.
2 Xi Jinping, “Shouldering Together the Responsibilities of Our Times to Promote Global Development,”in Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, Vol.2, Foreign Languages Press, 2017, p.476.
3 Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015; Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.
4 Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968; Richard N. Cooper, “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies,” World Politics, Vol.24, No.2, 1972, pp.159-181.
5 Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, New York: Basic Books, 1986.
6 Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.
7 Robert O. Keohan and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 4th edition, Boston: Pearson, 2012, p.9.
8 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979.
9 Katherine Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or A Source of inter-state Conflict?”Journal of Peace Research, Vol.33, No.1, 1996, pp.29-49.
10 Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security, Vol.44, No.1, 2019, pp.42-79.
11 “Xi Jinping and Barack Obama Meet the Press,” People’s Daily, June 9, 2013.
12 Zhang Yuyan et al., Globalization and Development of China, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2007, p.55.
13 Germán Gutiérrez and Thomas Philippon, “Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S.,”National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.23583, July 2017, https://www.nber.org/ papers/w23583; Christian Broda and John Romalis, “Inequality and Prices: Does China Benefit the Poor in America?” University of Chicago working paper, March 10, 2008, https://www.etsg.org/ETSG2008/Papers/ Romalis.pdf.
14 Zhi Wang et al., “Re-examining the Effects of Trading with China on Local Labor Markets: A Supply Chain Perspective,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.24886, August 2018, revised in October 2018, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24886/w24886. pdf.
15 Scott Lincicome, “Testing the ‘China Shock’: Was Normalizing Trade with China a Mistake?”Cato Institute, July 8, 2020, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/testing-china-shock-wasnormalizing-trade-china-mistake.
16 Weihuan Zhou, China’s Implementation of the Rulings of the World Trade Organization, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019; James Bacchus et al., “Disciplining China’s Trade Practices at the WTO: How WTO Complaints Can Help Make China More Market-Oriented,” Cato Institute, November 15, 2018, https://www. cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/disciplining-chinas-trade-practices-wtohow-wto-complaints-can-help.
17 The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” December 2017, p.2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
18 US Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” January 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
19 The White House, “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 20, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/united-states-strategic-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-ofchina.
20 “Making Unremitting Efforts for a New Model of Major-Country Relationship Between China and the United States: Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping at the Joint Opening Ceremony of the Eighth China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Seventh China-U.S. High-Level Consultation on People-toPeople Exchange,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, June 6, 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1370191.shtml.
21 John Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989.
22 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
23 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp.21-22.
24 Wang Yi, “Serving the Country and Contributing to the World: China’s Diplomacy in a Time of Unprecedented Global Changes and a Once-in-a-Century Pandemic,” Study Times, December 14, 2020.
25 “Work Hard to Build a New Model of Major-Country Relationship between China and the United States: Address by H.E. Xi Jinping at the Joint Opening Ceremony of the Sixth Round of the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Fifth Round of the China-US High-level Consultation on Peopleto-People Exchange,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, July 9, 2014, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1178864.shtml.
26 “Security Evaluation of China’s Industrial Chains: 60 Percent Secure and Under Control,” China Industrial and Economic Information Net, October 21, 2019, http://www.cinic.org.cn/xw/cjxw/641727.html.
27 Zhang Yuyan, “COVID-19 Pandemic and the World Outlook,” World Economics and Politics, No.4, 2020, p.6.
28 Zhang Yuyan and Niu He, “The Success and Limit of Donald Trump, A Discussion of China-US Economic and Trade Relations,” International Economic Review, No.2, 2017, p.14.
29 “Xi Jinping Delivers an Important Speech at the High-level Meeting to Commemorate the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, September 21, 2020, https:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1817250.shtml.
China International Studies2021年1期