The Prospects of Russia-US Relations and its Implications

Liu Fenghua

Amid intensifying China-US competition and a global power shift accelerated by the novel coronavirus pandemic， combined with major ongoing transformations in the international landscape， the trajectory of the relationship between Russia and the United States has become critically significant， not only to China， but also to global strategic stability and the prospects for reform of the international order. What policy will the US under the Biden administration adopt toward Russia and how will the latter respond？ Will Russia-US relations further deteriorate or witness a rebound？ These questions and their potential influence on international politics demand our close attention.

Structural Contradictions in Russia-US Relations

Over the nearly three decades since the Cold Wars conclusion， RussiaUS relations have been affected by the overall international situation and both sides domestic and foreign policies. The three periods of bilateral rapprochement， from 1991 to 1993， from 2001 to 2003， and most recently from 2009 to 2011， all ended with further estrangement and dissatisfaction. Looking back on the evolution of Russia-US relations， the US has played the active part， setting the rules and the agendas of their bilateral interactions. Russia has also contributed greatly to the dynamics and shaped the status of the bilateral relationship through its policy choices. There have been both competition and cooperation between the two global powers， but there is far from enough cooperation to serve as a solid and lasting foundation for an improvement of bilateral ties. Instead， structural contradictions have been the dominant feature of Russia-US relations， as reflected in three main aspects： competition over who controls Russias neighborhood， attempts by the US to change Russias political system， and the security dilemma between the two sides. These structural contradictions have prevented the needed progress in Russia-US relations during the two US administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump， and they will ostensibly continue to constrain efforts aimed at improving the bilateral relationship now that Biden has taken office. Any analysis of the prospects of Russia-US relations has to start from there.

Competition over control of Russias neighborhood

Since the end of the Cold War， the United States has been promoting the expansion of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization （NATO） and the European Union （EU） into the geostrategic space formerly belonging to the Soviet Union， to prevent an alleged Russian Empire from reemerging. In response， Russia has been ferociously resisting the intrusion of the USled Western system while trying to preserve its dominant position in its neighborhood. The incorporation of most Central and Eastern European countries into the Western system by the US and the EU has greatly weakened Russias traditional geopolitical clout in that region. Based on their gains in Central and Eastern Europe， the US and the EU even began to advance further eastward to compete with Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States （CIS）， which Russia considers its immediate sphere of influence and a long-cultivated strategic base for its revival. Therefore， Russia has been more resolutely opposing US and EU expansion in the area. The rivalry between the two sides led to armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008. It also triggered the 2014 Ukraine crisis， which terminated the restart of Russia-US relations and plunged their bilateral relationship into a state of long-term confrontation.

Following the Crimea incident， the US， together with the EU， launched economic sanctions against Russia， freezing the overseas accounts of several high-ranking Russian officials and denying them visas. Obama declared that the referendum in Crimea had violated Ukraines constitution and international law， and that it would never be recognized by the US and the international community.1 Russian President Vladimir Putin countered immediately that the Crimean referendum for independence was consistent with the provisions on national self-determination in the United Nations Charter， and that the Western countries supported the coup in Ukraine in order to prevent the countrys re-integration with Russia. According to Putin， Russia could not have backed down in the face of NATOs pressing eastward expansion， as the presence of a NATO fleet in Crimea would be simply intolerable and threaten the entire southern flank of Russia.2 In response to American sanctions on Russian senior officials， the Putin government also imposed sanctions on several key political figures in the US. After the outbreak of armed conflicts in eastern Ukraine in April 2014， the US and the EU implemented sanctions against major banks as well as energy and militaryindustrial enterprises in Russia， to deal a heavy blow to Russias main economic sectors and cut off its access to Western capital and technology. Russia retaliated by imposing bans on a series of food and agricultural products from the US and the EU.

The tit-for-tat exchange of sanctions between Russia and the US has seriously undermined bilateral economic cooperation. Trade volume between the two countries declined from US$38 billion in 2013 to $29.2 billion in 2014.3 Coupled with the plummeting international oil price， the US-EU sanctions have led to a slowdown and even recession in the Russian economy. The US sanctions continued seamlessly during the Trump administration. The Countering Americas Adversaries Through Sanctions Act （CAATSA）， passed by the US Congress in July 2017， not only reined in the presidential policy-making power on Russia， but also consolidated and perpetuated US sanctions against Russia in the form of legislation. With both sides unwilling to compromise， the“sanctions war” between Russia and the US has dragged on to this day.

At the same time， the political and military containment of Russia by the US and NATO at the Eastern European frontier has resulted in further serious tensions. The Ukraine crisis triggered a new round of Russophobia in Eastern European countries and reactivated NATOs collective security functions. The US and NATO increasingly apply military pressure on Russia to prevent its alleged “invasion” of Eastern European countries and more parts of Ukraine. While deploying additional troops to Poland and the three Baltic countries， they have frequently conducted army drills on the territories of their Eastern European allies and Ukraine， and held naval exercises in the Baltic and Black Seas， to exert a deterrent effect on Russia. In 2018， the US began supplying lethal weapons， including Javelin anti-tank missiles， to Ukraine in order to strengthen the latters defense against the Russian military. To counter NATOs military pressure， Russia has been building up defense capabilities and armament in its western region and the Black Sea while strengthening military training. Given its disadvantageous position compared to NATO in terms of conventional forces， Russia has conducted multiple test launches of its Topol and Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles and accelerated building up its Strategic Rocket Forces.

To divert the USs and the EUs focus from the Ukraine crisis， Russia sent its air force to Syria and turned the Middle Eastern country into a new battlefield of US-Russia rivalry. Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war in September 2015 turned the tide in Bashar al-Assads favor and preserved Russias own political and economic interests in Syria. However， Putin has thus far failed to bring the US and the EU back to the negotiating table to discuss the Ukraine crisis and normalize relations between the two sides. As their competition in Syria intensified， conflicts between Russia and the US in Ukraine were also prone to escalation.

The CIS region has also witnessed the aggravation of Russia-US tension. While Russia advances the integration of member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union （EEU） and the Collective Security Treaty Organization（CSTO）， the US has been developing military and political ties between NATO and former Soviet states such as Ukraine and Georgia. By promoting cooperation between CIS countries and the EU， the US intends to weaken Russias integration efforts with these states. Despite the overwhelming urgency for countries around the world to take joint actions to address the COVID-19 pandemic， the US is still intent on the “democratic transformation” of CIS countries. It interfered in the parliamentary election of Kyrgyzstan and the presidential election of Belarus， where it is sparing no effort to overthrow the pro-Russian Lukashenko government. To thwart the process of “democratic transformation，” the Putin government has been enhancing military， political， economic as well as anti-pandemic cooperation with CIS countries to retain Russias traditional influence.

US attempts to change Russias political system

Instead of blindly following the Western political system promoted by the US， Russia has insisted on keeping a system that best suits its own national conditions and historical traditions. This has fostered the deeprooted antagonism between the two countries. The widely held view in Washington circles is as follows： “Transition to democracy was and still is widely assumed to be the only way for Russia to become stable， a reliable steward of its nuclear arsenal， and an ally of the United States.”4 Therefore， a central aspect of the Russia policy of successive US administrations has been to promote such political and economic reforms in Russia that would make it adopt the Western political system and market economy. To this end， the US has been vocally supporting Russias “democratic” politicians and political parties， interfering in Russian elections and even personnel appointments，and running a pressure campaign against Russia with the help of Westerndominated international organizations. The “democratic transformation”of Russia that was once pushed forward with great fanfare ultimately failed in the late 1990s. As Russias economy recovered and shed its dependence on debt to Western countries， it attached more importance to political sovereignty and proposed the vision of “sovereign democracy.” By rejecting the Western liberal democratic model， Russia has confidently embarked on a unique development path consistent with its traditions， and has successfully countered the “color revolutions” instigated by the US and the EU on Russian territory and in the CIS region. The rift between Russia and the US in terms of political systems has thus continued to widen.

The latest severe rupture in Russia-US relations was apparently triggered by the Ukraine crisis， but was rooted in political conflicts between the two sides. In 2012， Putin switched roles with Dmitry Medvedev and took the Russian presidency again， which prompted the US and Europe to criticize Russias brand of democracy and cast a shadow upon the bilateral relations in the Putin-Obama era. In response to the Obama administrations support for mass protests lead by the Russian opposition， Russia denounced the United States interference in its domestic affairs and adopted new amendments to the Federal Law on Non-Profit Organizations， which effectively put an end to the operations of the US Agency for International Development （USAID） in Russia and narrowed the channels for the US and the EU to conduct political penetration in the country. Soon after the US passed the Magnitsky Act5 in December 2012， Russia retaliated by adopting the Dima Yakovlev Law，6 thus reaching a new level of escalation in their conflict over interference into Russian domestic affairs. The Russian law， as a tit-for-tat response to US actions， undermined the United States ability to influence Russian public opinion through non-governmental organizations （NGOs）. The US human rights diplomacy encountered another major setback in 2013， when Russia took advantage of Edward Snowdens leak of extensive internet and phone surveillance by American intelligence to level serious charges against the United States. Shortly afterwards， the United States cancelled the summit meeting between US and Russian presidents originally scheduled in September of the same year， and vowed to make revisions to the bilateral relations， which have been further sliding downhill ever since.

Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis， the US has stepped up its“democratic transformation” efforts in Russia， thus deepening contradictions between the two countries. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov revealed， the US State Department was ordered to spend US$20 million a year on “promoting democracy in Russia” under the 2015 Ukraine Support Act. According to Lavrov， a significant part of the funds went to finance Russian NGOs that advocate “promoting democracy in Russia，” and American officials have repeatedly been seen at protests organized by the Russian opposition， where slogans about regime change were pronounced.7 In addition， for the first time in October 2016， the US Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a joint statement that publicly accused Russia of authorizing cyberattacks on the US and attempting to influence the US presidential election by stealing and exposing confidential information. Russia firmly denied the accusations， but that did not stop the US from imposing additional sanctions on Russia and limiting the broadcasting capabilities of Russian media in the US on this ground. In November 2017， the US forced the local subsidiary of the Russian news outlet Russia Today（RT） to register as a “foreign agent.”8 In response， Russia listed the local branches of several US news services， including Voice of America （VOA） and Radio Liberty， as “foreign mass media performing the functions of a foreign agent” in accordance with its own foreign agents law.9 The two countriespolitical disputes on democracy had now spilled over to the area of media and information， with its ramifications now felt not only by the elite but also by the general public.

The US has been committed to subverting the political foundation of the Putin regime and creating favorable social conditions for a “color revolution”in Russia. In January 2018， the US Treasury published the so-called “Kremlin list，” which targeted 114 senior political figures and 96 oligarchs close to Putin with the threat of sanctions. Dmitry Peskov， Press Secretary for the President of Russia， said before the release of the list that Moscow was convinced the“Kremlin report” was an attempt by the US to pressure the Russian elite and meddle in the upcoming Russian presidential election.10 After Putin won his reelection in 2018， the US continued to support activities of Russian opposition groups and NGOs. In August of the same year， a group of US senators introduced the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act. Not only did they threaten to sanction the oligarchs and Putins entourage on the “Kremlin list，” but they also spelled out the need to draft a report on the Russian presidents personal assets and property， to create a narrative directed at eroding the legitimacy of the Russian political system.11

Russias constitutional amendment in 2020 annulled previous restrictions on the length of presidential office terms， thus allowing Putin to potentially extend his rule until 2036. This prompted the US to voice a new round of criticisms of Russias political system. Immediately after the amendment had been adopted on July 2， 2020 following a nationwide vote， the US Department of State expressed concerns about reports of alleged Russian government efforts to manipulate the result of the vote， and particularly about the legal revision that would permit Putin to remain in power until 2036.12 Leonid Slutsky， Chairman of the Russian State Dumas Committee on International Affairs， called the US concerns a direct interference in the internal affairs of Russia.13 According to Andrei Klimov， head of the Interim Committee of the Federation Council for the Protection of State Sovereignty and Prevention of Interference in the Internal Affairs of Russia， the US continued to allocate funds for their efforts to“democratize” Russia， despite having the highest number of COVID-19 cases and deaths domestically. The Bureau of Democracy， Human Rights and Labor of the US State Department announced a special grant of more than US$5 million for “independent monitoring” of the vote. The US also channeled funds to protest groups against the constitutional amendment inside Russia through Ukraine and other neighboring countries.14

Security dilemma between Russia and the US

As the worlds two leading military superpowers， the US and Russia are not immune to any security dilemma. Although the long US-Soviet Cold War history has come to an end， the Cold War mentality has lingered on and amplified military competition， contributing to the reality of their confrontation in Europe. In essence， the Russia-US relationship is mainly based on military and security interactions instead of economic interdependence.15 This has led to a propensity of evaluating all aspects of their bilateral relations in terms of their security implications and whether a balance of power can be maintained. Military cooperation， if any， cannot bring the two countries closer， let alone dispel the mutual mistrust.

After the Ukraine crisis erupted， Russia and the US accelerated their development and deployment of strategic weapons not limited by bilateral arms control treaties on the Eastern European frontier， while also upholding their confrontation of conventional forces. This has exacerbated their longstanding dispute over missile defense， which has been a grave concern for the strategic security on both sides. For the US， the main objective of building missile defense systems in Europe is to weaken Russias nuclear deterrent potential and gain a strategic and military advantage over Russia. Russia， on the other hand， is actively developing its penetration capabilities and anti-missile systems to maintain strategic balance with the US. In the wake of the Ukraine crisis， the US took advantage of the anti-Russian sentiment in Eastern European countries and stepped up the construction of missile defense systems in the region. In 2016， the first land-based missile interceptor was put into operation in Romania， while the construction of a second land-based interceptor site was started in Poland. The onshore missile defense system in Romania and the offshore system in Spain， both of which have taken shape with actual combat capabilities， have posed severe challenges to Russias nuclear deterrence. To counter the US-deployed missile defense systems in Europe， Russia has been building up its strategic nuclear forces， developing new types of missile and air defense systems， putting five regiments with advanced missile equipment on combat duty， and deploying Iskander nuclear-capable missiles to Kaliningrad. The escalating US-Russian competition over missile defense has triggered a strategic arms race between the two countries， accompanied by an increase in defense spending and the upgrading of weapons systems， all of which have only exacerbated the security dilemma.

The heightened military tensions and the geopolitical and ideological conflicts between Russia and the US further aggravate their mutual hostility and deepen their opposing military policies. The latest National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation， approved by Putin in December 2015， identified NATOs eastward expansion and the relocation of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders as a national security threat. The sighting of US missile defense installations and the deployment of strategic non-nuclear precision weapon systems in Europe， the Asia-Pacific region and the Near East were defined as negative security factors.16 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation， adopted in November 2016， declared that the containment policy of the US and its allies undermines regional and global stability， and that Russia reserved the right to take a tough stance in response to the unfriendly moves.17 The two major documents demonstrate Russias unyielding attitude toward American and NATO threats to its military security， and its resolute determination to maintain strategic stability with the US and safeguard national security. From the end of 2017 to February 2018， the US successively released its National Security Strategy， the summary of its National Defense Strategy， and the Nuclear Posture Review， in which the US again defined Russia as a strategic competitor and a primary military rival while reiterating its containment policy toward Russia.

The military antagonism between the two countries has further extended into the area of strategic stability， leading to the demise of the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces （INF） Treaty and the resumption of their arms race on land-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. While the US and Russia were embroiled in the dispute over missile defense， the US announced its intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty under the pretext that Russia had long been developing intermediate- and shorter-range missiles prohibited by the treaty. President Putin indicated that Russia would respond to the US withdrawal with the use of more advanced military technology and other measures deemed necessary. In August 2019， the US and Russia formally withdrew from the INF Treaty in close succession. Although both countries rushed to develop previously banned missiles following their exit from the treaty， Russia still expressed hope that both sides would not deploy land-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe.

The abandonment of the INF Treaty has negatively impacted the sustainability of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty （New START）. The Anti-Ballistic Missile （ABM） Treaty， the INF Treaty and the New START collectively constitute the current international treaty regime on arms control. With the successive demise of the former two treaties and the Trump administrations negative attitude toward the latter one， the renewal of New START had been put into question. As Russias nuclear arsenal is rapidly aging and would require enormous funding for maintenance and upgrading， a reciprocal reduction of nuclear weapons with the US serves its interests. Therefore， Russia has advocated New STARTs extension， which would maintain Russia-US strategic stability and safeguard Russias strategic security. However， the Trump administration refused to recognize equal positions of the US and Russia in the area of nuclear weapons and showed little interest in extending New START. Considering the potential termination of New START， the Putin and Trump administrations were both ready to upgrade their respective nuclear arsenals and other offensive strategic weapons should the treaty expire.

The above three structural contradictions have shaped the character and the pathway of Russia-US relations for a long time. Whether it is the“sanctions war” during the Putin-Obama period， or the “hybrid war”18 in the Putin-Trump era， the specifics of their bilateral relationship in a particular period have been only the inevitable outcome of those overarching structural contradictions. Neither the “sanctions war” nor the “hybrid war” succeeded in forcing Russia to yield to the US and its allies. On the contrary， they have further deepened the alienation between Russia and the US. Despite remaining forms of cooperation between the two countries on nuclear arms control， trade and counter-terrorism， the downward spiral continues. At this point in time， Russia-US relations are at their lowest level since the end of the Cold War， with low expectations of an early normalization.

The Biden Administrations Policy Adjustments towards Russia

Given the severity of the COVID-19 epidemic， the resulting economic recession and the intensifying racial conflict in the United States， the Biden administration has concentrated on addressing domestic problems early after taking office， particularly on combatting the coronavirus and achieving economic recovery， instead of dealing with foreign policy issues. Moreover， the Biden administrations top diplomatic priority is to repair the ties between the US and its European and Asian-Pacific allies， followed by managing the trade war with China and other urgent issues of their bilateral relations. The imminent renewal of the New START treaty and a review of US-Russia relations has only been a secondary concern for the new government.

President Biden and his core foreign policy staff all hold a negative perception of Russia and US-Russia relations. They advocate the strict containment of Russia and allow cooperation only in areas where the two sidesinterests converge. In Bidens opinion， Russia is just a secondary power in deep decline and unable to compete with the West. In his view， Russia is trying to weaken the West from within， undermine the unity of NATO， the EU and the liberal world order as a whole， confront the US beyond the former Soviet borders and increasingly move closer to China.19 During his campaign， Biden called Russia the main threat to American security and alliances.20 In his foreign policy address at the State Department on February 4， 2021， Biden indicated his willingness to engage adversaries and competitors diplomatically， where it is in the US interest， and agreed to extend the New START treaty with Russia for five years. As for alleged Russian interference in US elections， Biden vowed to impose higher costs on Russia and defend vital American interests， while working in coalition and coordination with other like-minded partners to more effectively deal with Russia.21 In his remarks at the 2021 virtual Munich Security Conference on February 19， Biden accused Russia of deliberately undermining US-European cooperation and urged US partners in Europe to remain united within the EU and NATO to jointly tackle the threat posed by Russia. Biden also claimed that the biggest current challenge for the American government is to demonstrate that Western democracy works， and to revitalize the alliance of democratic forces and their values.22 The key members of Bidens diplomatic and security policy team， including Secretary of State Antony Blinken， National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin， all hold similar opinions on US-Russia relations and support the use of sanctions and containment measures against Russia.

On the one hand， anti-Russian sentiment is prevailing in the White House， in Congress and in the Democratic and Republican parties. On the other hand， President Biden and his team have rich foreign policy experience and professional diplomatic skills. Considering these factors， Biden is expected to adopt a tougher position toward Russia compared to his predecessor， but at the same time be more professional and pragmatic on specific issues such as nuclear disarmament. Therefore， the Biden administration will continue and even intensify the containment policy and sanctions against Russia， while simultaneously uphold necessary cooperation.

Continuing sanctions and encirclement

First， sanctions against Russia will continue. The policy originated in the Obama era， during which Biden， as Vice President， got involved in policy formulation and implementation. The Biden administration will maintain the sanctions on Russias energy， financial and military industrial sectors to damage the Russian economy and achieve Americas political goals. The US will also continue to prevent Russia from implementing the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline project. Given the call by many Americans for retaliation against Russias alleged cyberattacks， Bidens government is likely to step up economic sanctions against Russia， the intensity of which depends partly on the effectiveness of the US to successfully respond to its own economic recession. At the same time， Biden will probably tighten sanctions on Russian individuals， particularly officials and oligarchs， to divide the Russian elite.

Second， the US will sustain its military and political pressure on Russia in Eastern Europe. As a policy inherited from the Obama-era， it will not simply be abandoned by the Biden administration. From the perspective of the US and its European allies， a Russian “invasion” can only be deterred and prevented by a strong military presence there. Trumps policy toward NATO and the EU during his four-year term of office has caused an alienation of European countries from the US and has to some extent undermined the ability to coordinate between NATO members in containing Russia. Bidens government will refocus on multilateral diplomacy and consolidate the USEurope alliance. The US will coordinate activities with its European allies and bring into play their roles in containing Russia， while empowering NATO forces and enhancing military cooperation under its framework， to maintain military pressure on the Eastern European flank.

Strengthening containment while cooperating in limited areas

First， the US actively seeks to weaken Russias military strength and thus gain a strategic advantage over Russia through an arms race in strategic weapons and arms control treaties. As the second largest military power in the world， Russia is perceived as a security threat to the US， which undermines US interests in international affairs through its military might. For the US， the only way of reducing that threat is by eroding Russias military capabilities， especially its strategic weapons. Since the Biden administration has agreed to extend New START， it will strive to bring tactical nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles， where Russia enjoys advantages， under the category of limited weapons in its negotiations with Russia on a new strategic arms reduction treaty. Meanwhile，the Biden government will not rejoin the ABM and INF treaties， but is likely to consolidate or increase advantages over Russia in missile defense， intermediaterange missiles and other non-nuclear strategic weapons.

Second， the US will suppress Russias traditionally large influence in Eurasia. The Biden administration will increase support for anti-Russian countries in the region， for example by providing military aid to Ukraine， expanding the US and NATOs political and military cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia， and promoting the countries economic integration with the EU. The US will continue to advance the “democratization” of Eurasian countries， by supporting those pro-Western opposition forces， which are expected to seize power through elections or street protests and supplant the old generation of pro-Russian leaders. The US is also likely to reactivate some “frozen conflicts”in Eurasia to stir up trouble in Russias neighborhood， forcing Russia to get involved in struggles which consume its national power and diplomatic resources. Bidens government will support independence movement in proRussian regional states and promote their economic cooperation with nonEurasian Economic Union countries， especially Western countries.

Third， the US will further promote the “democratization” of Russia. Given Bidens assessment that Russia will not maintain its status quo and that another presidential candidacy by Putin in 2024 will have profound implications， the US government will step up exerting influence on Russias internal affairs.23 Bidens government will fund the Russian opposition， indoctrinate the pro-Western population in Russia with ideological beliefs， and launch an information war against Russia， to destabilize its political system.24 In January 2021， the US embassy in Russia published the times and routes of demonstrations in Russias major cities in advance on its website， and encouraged mass protests in support of the opposition leader Alexei Navalny. In his State Department speech in February， Biden demanded that Navalny， who was targeted for exposing corruption and jailed on politically motivated grounds， should be released immediately and without conditions.25 Taking advantage of the issues of democracy and human rights and given the opportunity of the 2021 State Duma election， the Biden administration will continue to promote anti-Putin activities in Russia， so that even a US-instigated“color revolution” in Russia cannot be completely ruled out.

While tightening the containment of Russia， Biden is also likely to cooperate on nuclear disarmament and in a limited number of other areas， where Russia has the need and willingness to collaborate. This selective but pragmatic cooperation despite otherwise confrontational bilateral relations can be conducted in the following two fields.

First， the two countries can cooperate on strategic weapons reduction. Maintaining nuclear disarmament cooperation with Russia serves US interests and is consistent with Bidens arms control vision. In their phone conversation on January 26， 2021， US and Russian leaders agreed to extend New START for five years， which is a beneficial step towards global strategic stability that has helped create the necessary conditions for negotiating the next phase of strategic arms reduction. However， a new treaty is hard to come by within Bidens term of office， due to the two countries antagonistic positions and the predominant anti-Russian sentiment in the US. While Russia is linking any nuclear arms control talks to the US abandoning its deployment of missile defense systems and offensive strategic weapons in Europe， the US demands that Russia reduces its tactical nuclear weapons and non-nuclear strategic weapons such as its hypersonic missiles. According to Andrey Kortunov， Director-General of the Russian International Affairs Council （RIAC）， it is highly unlikely that any new arms control agreement between the two countries would be passed in the US Senate. Under these circumstances， the Biden administration would have to sign an agreement that is not subject to Senate approval. The two sides may agree to suspend the deployment of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe，as long as Russia concedes to US concerns and suspends its deployment of 9M729 missiles.26 Despite potential complications and setbacks， the resumption of strategic arms control dialogue and cooperation between the two countries is a positive sign for bilateral relations.

Second， the two countries will restart dialogue and cooperation under multilateral mechanisms， such as the “5+1” talks on the Iran nuclear issue， and the Paris Agreement on climate change. Shortly after taking office， Biden signed the executive order to rejoin the Paris Agreement and expressed his intent to restore the Iran nuclear deal， which will involve the US， Russia and other concerned nations. Having said that， the prospects for bilateral cooperation on these international issues still depends to some extent on Bidens attitude toward Putins government and Russias overall policy. Wherever cooperation materializes， the Biden administration will adopt a case-by-case approach and refrain from simply overturning its overall containment policy.

Russias Judgement and Response

Russias longstanding position towards the United States has been to conduct dialogue and cooperation based on the three principles of equality， respect for each others national interests， and non-interference into internal affairs， while resisting all threats to its security and interests emanating from the US and NATO. The following prerequisites are implied in Russias three principles in dealing with the US： recognizing Russias status as a world power and building an equal Russia-US partnership； maintaining strategic stability between the two countries； recognizing the CIS region as Russias sphere of influence and granting Russia some policy-making power in European security affairs； respecting the right of Russia to pursue an independent domestic and foreign policy， and not intervening in its internal affairs. However， as demonstrated by the above-mentioned three structural contradictions in their bilateral relations， the US has not only turned a blind eye to Russias demands， but has also been active in containing and “transforming” Russia， so that current tensions are moving further toward outright confrontation.

Russian officials generally hold a pessimistic view about RussianAmerican relations in the Biden era. Putin waited until December 15， 2020 to congratulate Biden on his election victory， making him one of the few foreign leaders to send his congratulatory message at such a late date. Although Putin in his telegram expressed willingness to cooperate and engage with Biden， such a late recognition of Bidens election victory indicated that he is bracing himself for a rivalry with the new US government.27 Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated in an interview on December 29 that Russia does not expect the dysfunctional relationship with the US to improve in the near future， and that the anti-Russia hysteria in the US would leave no opportunity for a rapid return to normality.28 The following are Russias potential responses to Bidens Russia policy：

First， Russia will continue to develop third-party economic cooperation to circumvent US sanctions， while striving for détente with the US. The Putin government will extend its counter-sanctions measures in time and continue the ban on agricultural， raw material and food imports from the US and Europe. In accordance with the Federal Law on Countermeasures to Unfriendly Actions of the United States of America and Other Foreign States， Russia will keep its restrictions on American imports in place， ban or limit the export of products and raw materials from the Russian territory by sanctioned American enterprises， prohibit US companies from participating in Russias state procurement and privatization of state property， and deny those sanctioned American officials and citizens entry into Russia.29 The Putin government will resist US pressure to abandon the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and instead lobby Germany to jointly complete the project as soon as possible. It will further enhance economic and trade cooperation with countries in the Asia-Pacific region to make up for its losses in Western markets， while expanding trade settlement in local currencies with China to reduce dependence on the US dollar. To improve the efficiency of countermeasures against US and EU sanctions， Russia will concentrate its efforts on the following aspects： strengthening coordination among government agencies， formulating legislation on liabilities for violating Russian regulations， enriching the toolkit of financial sanctions， revision of visa restrictions， expanding cooperation with allies and partners， and improving technical supervision.30

Second， Russia will resolutely counteract any political and military pressure by the US and NATO. The Putin government will undoubtedly spare no effort to safeguard Russias number one priority， its national security， especially in the western regions where the vast majority of security related resources have been invested. As Russias Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has observed in December 2020， NATO views Russia as its main threat and has conducted simultaneous exercises at Russias western， southern and eastern borders； the US began redeploying combat units from Germany to Poland and the Baltic countries； and the intensity of reconnaissance and demonstration activities by American aircraft and navy vessels near the Russian border has significantly increased.31 It is a generally held opinion among Russian officials and think tank experts that the Biden government and NATO will sustain the military and political containment of Russia， to enhance the presence of American military units in Europe and revitalize NATO. In response， Russia will accelerate the military buildup of all armed services types in its western region， including Crimea， expand its arsenal， and hold onshore and offshore exercises when necessary to counter the US and NATO containment. Meanwhile， the Putin government will also be committed to resuming dialogue under the NATO-Russia Council framework， to moderate military confrontation and avoid armed conflicts.

Third， parallel to strategic arms control cooperation with the US， Russia will develop its missile defense system， intermediate-range missiles and other strategic weapons to maintain asymmetric deterrence vis-à-vis the US. In June 2020， Putin signed a presidential decree on the fundamentals of Russias state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence. Being the first official document in Russia of its kind， it elucidates Russias nuclear deterrence principles and conditions for using nuclear weapons， highlighting their functions in safeguarding national security.32 In his remarks at an expanded meeting of the Collegium of the Defense Ministry in December of the same year， Putin pointed out that the share of modern weapons and equipment in Russian troops had already surpassed 70 percent for conventional forces and 86 percent for nuclear forces. He added that the Russian defense forces， in particular the nuclear triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles， submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers， had reached a level that could guarantee national security， but that the arsenal of the Russian military was in constant need of upgrading. Putin pledged that the modernization level of Russias nuclear forces would reach 88.3 percent in 2021， and that of conventional forces 75.9 percent by 2024.33 Following Bidens nod to the renewal of the New START treaty， Russias State Duma and the Federal Council successively ratified the extension. Putin subsequently signed the bill and thus completed the legal procedures for the extension on the Russian side. With a focus on national security interests， the Putin government will initiate negotiations with the US on the next phase of strategic arms reduction. Despite the complex and long-term nature of such negotiations， Russia will aim at settling some of the more urgent strategic security and stability issues with the Biden administration， including an agreement not to equip nuclear warheads on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and not to deploy such missiles on land in Europe. Putin will also further promote a nuclear security meeting among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council， to create a favorable multilateral platform to discuss nuclear weapons reduction and strategic arms control.

Fourth， Russia will continue to compete with the US and the EU in Eurasia to maintain its dominant position in regional affairs. As reflected in the 2020 presidential election in Belarus， the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan and the parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan， competition between the US/EU and Russia in the Eurasian region has entered a new phase. While accelerating economic， military and political integration with anti-Russian countries such as Ukraine and Georgia， the US and the EU have also been intent on overthrowing pro-Russian regimes in the CIS region by instigating“color revolutions” and reactivating “frozen conflicts.” Russia and its Eurasian partner countries have responded by jointly resisting any Western attempts of“color revolutions”， and by further advancing the Russian-led process of multilevel integration， with a priority on economic integration under the EEU mechanism and security integration under the CSTO framework. Russia will strengthen bilateral ties with Eurasian states in the fields of economic， energy， security and anti-pandemic cooperation， thus keeping these countries under predominantly Russian influence by providing economic incentives and getting involved in regional conflict resolution.

Fifth， Russia will improve its governance capacity through appropriate political reforms. In his over two decades of leadership， Putin has successfully safeguarded Russias territorial integrity， achieved political stability and economic progress， and rebuilt a strong Russian army.34 The constitutional amendment and government reshuffle in 2020 suggests that Putin has set out to tackle the issue of the 2024 transfer of power. Due to Western sanctions， a domestic economic downturn and the COVID-19 pandemic， potential instability has been on the rise in Russias state governance and society， which may be exploited by Western powers， as the Navalny issue makes clear. Given this，Russian scholars have suggested that Putin should address these problems before the enemy takes advantage of these weaknesses and attacks Russia. According to their advice， the ruling elite should be renewed under the principles of meritocracy and accountability， domestic policies revised in favor of greater social solidarity， and new approaches to foreign policy should be based on a broad consensus on national interests.35

In summary， the Putin government is prepared to endure a prolonged confrontation with the United States while also seeking opportunities to cooperate for more balanced bilateral relations. Russia is fully aware that in the current confrontational atmosphere it would be difficult to launch any meaningful cooperation， and that its scope would certainly be limited. As Andrey Kortunov pointed out， Russia should not count on the Biden administration to restart the bilateral relations. Even in a best case scenario， Biden could achieve very limited improvement that would reduce bilateral tensions and the cost of mutual competition.36 Correspondingly， as long as the US demonstrates the willingness to cooperate， as reflected in Bidens policy on nuclear arms control， the Putin government would enter into cooperation that is consistent with Russias interests.

Implications for the International and Regional Situation

If Russia-US relations continue to be characterized by overall confrontation combined with limited cooperation， it will have lasting implications for the international and regional situation.

First， it will accelerate the reconfiguration of great-power interactions. Given the long-term nature of Russia-US confrontation， the Biden government will be prompted to repair ties with the EU and strengthen transatlantic coordination to the detriment of Russia， which will experience more difficulties to obtain Western capital and technology. Russia will also encounter greater pressure when handling its relations with NATO， managing CIS regional affairs， and even during the implementation of domestic policies. While the US-EU alliance will be consolidated because of their common position on Russia， it will still be no easy task to bridge their differences on trade， tariffs and a range of other global issues. The tensions between the US and Russia will have a direct negative impact on Russia-EU relations， making it highly likely that the EUs economic sanctions against Russia will remain in place. However， the traditionally close cooperation between the two sides in the energy and trade sector is expected to continue， and such economic interdependence would act as an effective buffer to prevent stronger Russia-EU antagonism. Moreover， as the prolonged US and EU sanctions and containment against Russia are pushing the latter to step up strategic coordination with China， the ChinaRussia comprehensive strategic partnership is expected to enter a new era of sustainable and in-depth joint development. The continuous rise of China and the combined resistance of China and Russia against American containment will tilt the China-US-Russia triangular relationship in favor of China and Russia， leading to a more multi-polar balance of power.

Second， it will complicate global strategic stability. The continuation of Russia-US cooperation on nuclear arms reduction helps prevent a nuclear arms race， maintain the bilateral nuclear balance， and ensure global strategic stability. The two countries cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation will also lead the international community to make genuine progress on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons （NPT）. On the other hand， while the two countries have agreed on a limitation of strategic nuclear warheads， they have been fiercely competing over other strategic armaments， including missile defense systems， intermediate- and shorter-range missiles， tactical nuclear weapons， hypersonic missiles， laser weapons， space weapons and cyber weapons. Should no limit be placed on an arms race of this kind， the balance of power between Russia and the US is bound to be wrecked， which will endanger bilateral strategic nuclear arms control and international stability.

Third， it will undermine European security. The protracted military and political polarization between Russia and the US/NATO in Eastern Europe is putting the strategic stability of Europe at risk. While the US is expanding its network of missile defense systems in Europe， Russia in turn is developing and deploying its own anti-missile systems that can penetrate American missile defense. As it stands now， the Biden administration is not expected to deploy land-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe， but if it happens， Russia is set to follow suit， raising the specter of another missile crisis and the risk of nuclear conflicts like the one in the 1980s.

Fourth， it may give rise to turbulences in the Eurasian region. Judging from the statements by President Biden， Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin， the US will offer additional economic and military aid to Ukraine to enhance its defense capacity against Russia. US-Russian competition may reignite armed conflicts in Ukraines eastern region and steer the currently improving Russian-Ukrainian relations back towards confrontation. Moreover， the opposing views of the US and the EU on the one side and Russia on the other regarding the presidential election and political reform in Belarus may send the country in the direction of a second Ukraine. The fragility of the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Russian-American competition in regional conflict resolution may bring about a new round of armed conflicts. The US support for “color revolutions” in the Eurasian region and the cooperation between Eurasian countries and NATO/EU will leave Russia with no other option but to use all its strength to prevent any tendency of a split-off. The intensifying competition between Russia and the US/EU in Eurasia is likely to trigger instability in countries beyond Ukraine and even in the entire region.

Fifth， it will increase difficulties to find solutions for hotspot issues. The Biden governments deployment of additional troops to Syria to offset the growing Russian influence has aggravated the two sides competition in the country. Cooperation on the Iran nuclear issue is quite conceivable， given that Biden has agreed to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action（JCPOA） and Russia has been supporting the deal from the beginning. A window of opportunity for the US and Russia also exists with the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue， as Biden will partly return to the Obama-era policy of “strategic patience” and adopt a dual approach of sanctions and dialogue.If and to what extent the two countries will cooperate in both cases not only depends on the convergence of interests on relevant issues， but also hinges on their overall relationship， their policies toward relevant regions， and the response from Iran or North Korea.

Conclusion

The current phase of tensions between Russia and the US has lasted seven years with no end in sight. The three main structural contradictions between the two countries and their disagreement in areas such as missile defense are deep-rooted and difficult to resolve， while new problems are constantly emerging with regard to intermediate-range missiles， mutual interference in domestic elections， and cyberattacks. The already strained bilateral relations are on a downward trajectory and are expected to remain confrontational during Bidens term in office. Serious deterioration of relations due to acute incidents is also likely， but will stop short of direct armed conflict. With Biden in power， opportunities are rare and challenges manifold when it comes to improving US-Russia ties. The Russian government will respond with a dual approach of countermeasures and cooperation， to avoid military conflicts with the US while rejecting unconditional reconciliation. Russian-American relations as such will be characterized by overall confrontation combined with limited cooperation.

In todays global arena of politics， Russia-US relations are no longer the most important. Apart from handling their mutual relations， each country will increasingly consider their respective relationship with China. Despite growing worries about the declining status of its relationship with the US in international politics， Russia is also aware of the potential opportunities brought by strategic competition between the US and China. Taking this factor and other unforeseeable strategic opportunities into consideration， the possibility of a Russia-US rapprochement after a long period of discord cannot be completely ruled out. This is emblematic of the uncertainty we are experiencing amidst the once-in-a-century profound changes in the international landscape， and it is a severe test for the strategic insight and political wisdom of global leaders.

1 Обама сообщил Путину， что США готовы к дополнительным мерам в отношении России. 17 марта 2014， http：//zn.ua/POLITICS/ssha-i-evropa-gotovy-prinyat-dopolnitelnye-mery-v-otnoshenii-rf-zanarushenie-suvereniteta-ukrainy-141258_.html.

2 Обращение Президента Российской Федерации. 18 марта 2014， http：//www.kremlin.ru/news/20603.

3 Давыдов А. Проблемы и ограничения российско-американских экономических отношений. // США и Канада. №2. 2015 г.

4 Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky， “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy toward Russia： Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken？” June 20， 2019， https：//carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/20/thirty-years-of-u.s.-policytoward-russia-can-vicious-circle-be-broken-pub-79323.

5 The Magnitsky Act bans Russian officials responsible for the death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in 2009 from entering the United States， and freezes their assets in the US.

6 The Dima Yakovlev Law bans US citizens who have committed crimes against Russian citizens， violated the freedoms of Russian citizens， or conducted unfair trials of Russian citizens from entering Russia， freezes their assets in Russia， and bans US citizens from adopting children from Russia.

7 Андрей Васильев Лавров： Госдепу приказано продвигать демократию в России. // Российская Газета. 28 октября 2018， https：//rg.ru/2018/10/28/lavrov-gosdepu-prikazano-prodvigat-demokratiiu-vrossii.html.

8 According to relevant US laws， a foreign agent carries out political activities in the United States at the order， request， or under direction or control of a foreign principal. It must periodically disclose to the US authorities its relationship with the foreign principal and its activities and financial arrangements in the US.

9 Under the Russian law， those foreign media outlets designated by the Russian government as “foreign agents” must mention the designation when distributing information to the Russian public. They must register themselves to the Russian government and periodically report their funding sources， expenditure， objectives and management structure. The Russian law enforcement can conduct inspections of these“foreign agents” to ensure their compliance with the law.

10 “Russia Calls U.S. "Kremlin Report" Attempt to Influence Presidential Election，” Xinhua， January 30， 2018， http：//www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/30/c_136934501.htm.

11 Ivan Timofeev， “DASKAA and the New Anti-Russia Sanctions： Does the US Want Self-Isolation？”Russian International Affairs Council， August 22， 2018， https：//russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-andcomments/analytics/daskaa-and-the-new-anti-russia-sanctions-does-the-us-want-self-isolation.

12 “On Russias Constitutional Plebiscite，” US Mission to the OSCE， July 2， 2020， https：//osce.usmission. gov/on-russias-constitutional-plebiscite.

13 Татьяна Замахина В Госдуме оценили обеспокоенность США на тему поправок в Конституцию. // Российская Газета. 2 июля 2020， https：//rg.ru/2020/07/02/v-gosdume-ocenili-obespokoennost-ssha-natemu-popravok-v-konstituciiu.html.

14 Галина Мисливская Сенатор： США не жалели денег на ‘демократизацию России во время пандемии. // Российская Газета. 25 июня 2020， https：//rg.ru/2020/06/25/senator-ssha-ne-zhaleli-denegna-demokratizaciiu-rossii-vo-vremia-pandemii.html.

15 Liu Fenghua， “The U.S.-Russia Relationship during President Putins Third Term and Prospects for the Bilateral Relationship during His Fourth Term，” Russian Studies， No.2， 2018.

16 Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации. Утверждена Указом Президента Российской Федерации от 31 декабря 2015 г. №683， http：//www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1/133.html#.

17 Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации. Утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации В. В. Путиным 30 ноября 2016 г.， http：//www.kremlin.ru/acts/news/53384.

18 “Hybrid war” is the term used by international media and academic community to describe the current comprehensive conflict between Russia and the United States， in contrast to the “Cold War” between the Soviet Union and the US. See Дмитрий Тренин От гибридной войны к взаимному отстранению. Как изменятся отношения России и США за 20 лет. 8 ноября 2019， https：//carnegie.ru/commentary/80293.

19 Дмитрий Тренин Какое место займет Россия во внешней политике Байдена. 25 ноября 2020， https：//carnegie.ru/commentary/83303.

20 Байден назвал Россию главным врагом США. 26 октября 2020， https：//lenta.ru/news/2020/10/26/ biden_russia.

21 “Remarks by President Biden on Americas Place in the World，” The White House， February 4， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-onamericas-place-in-the-world.

22 “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference，” The White House， February 19， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-bypresident-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference.

23 Дмитрий Тренин Как повлияют на Россию отношения Байдена с Европой и Китаем. 3 декабря 2020， https：//carnegie.ru/commentary/83372.

24 Иван Тимофеев Стратегическое соперничество： перспективы российско-американских отношений в новом политическом цикле в США. 22 декабря 2020， https：//russiancouncil.ru/analyticsand-comments/analytics/strategicheskoe-sopernichestvo-perspektivy-rossiysko-amerikanskikh-otnosheniyv-novom-politicheskom/.

25 “Remarks by President Biden on Americas Place in the World，” The White House， February 4， 2021.

26 Андрей Кортунов Администрация Джо Байдена и Россия. 22 декабря 2020， https：//russiancouncil. ru/activity/workingpapers/administratsiya-dzho-baydena-i-rossiya/.

27 Поздравление Джозефу Байдену с победой на выборах Президента США. 15 декабря 2020， http：// www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64660.

28 Интервью Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации С. В. Лаврова международному информационному агентству Россия сегодня . 29 декабря 2020， https：//www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/ news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4514920.

29 Федеральный закон от 4 июня 2018 г. N 127-ФЗ “О мерах воздействия （противодействия） на недружественные действия Соединенных Штатов Америки и иных иностранных государств”. // Российская Газета. 6 июня 2018 г.， https：//rg.ru/2018/06/06/kontrsankcii-dok.html.

30 Иван Тимофеев О санкционных итогах года. 28 декабря 2020 г.， https：//www.kommersant.ru/ doc/4628194.

31 Расширенное заседание коллегии Минобороны. 21 декабря 2020 г.， http：//www.kremlin.ru/events/ president/news/64684.

32 Указ Об Основах государственной политики Российской Федерации в области ядерного сдерживания . 2 июня 2020 г.， http：//www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/45562.

33 Расширенное заседание коллегии Минобороны. 21 декабря 2020 г.

34 Реформы Путина： другая страна 20 лет спустя. // РИА Новости. 27 декабря 2019， https：//ria. ru/20191227/1562947600.html.

35 Дмитрий Тренин Как повлияют на Россию отношения Байдена с Европой и Китаем. 3 декабря 2020.

36 Андрей Кортунов Администрация Джо Байдена и Россия. 22 декабря 2020.