Hierarchical and Multilateral: Interest Absorption and Responsibility Exclusion in “Ask for Opinions” in Public Policy Making
Guolei Zhang & Zhili Cao
Motivation: In the bureaucratic system, both the upper and lower levels often “Ask for Opinions” on policy issues. What are the mechanisms for accepting opinions and processing feedback? If segmented departments “Ask for Opinions”, will that eliminate any subsequent resistance to policy implementation?
Methodology: Using an "interest-responsibility" framework and multi-dimensional analysis, this case study examined the value orientation and action logic of those different departments, in the southern Guangxi province city of Q, that “Ask for Opinions”.
Findings: From the perspective of interaction types: (1) the rigid binding force between vertical departments that produced the “Ask for Opinions” form can nudge lower departments to give feedback on time; (2) the flexible binding force between horizontal departments that produced the “Ask for Opinions” form expanded the space for the benefit of each department; and, (3) the asymmetric communications between interwoven departments that produced the “Ask for Opinions” form exacerbated the uncertainties of feedback. In terms of operational consequences, with each action subject to risk minimization principles, there were hierarchical differences. High-level policy was organized to control overall risk; middle managers implemented policies so as to both moderate and shift responsibility; and, grassroots cadres selectively excluded themselves from liability. Thus, self-interest, selectivity, and expedience shaped policy execution behaviors.
Contributions: This paper contributes to the limited research on the absorption of public opinions into public policy-making. It also reveals the internal mechanisms of different types of “Ask for Opinions” forms in the various departments in the policy-making process. Greater attention should be paid to internal consultations in order to avoid the "obstruction dilemma” in follow-up policy implementation.
KeyWordsPublic Policy; Policy Formulation; Ask for Opinions; Interest Absorption; Responsibility Exclusion
Does Social Assistance Increase the Life Opportunities of Persons with Disabilities in Rural China?A Study of the Intersections of Disability Stigma,Street-level Bureaucracy,and Anti-poverty Policy
Huiqing Liao, Xingjie Zhang & Kaiyun Zhang
Motivation: Disability stigma undermines the intended outcomes of anti-poverty policy. How does claims stigma interact with street-level bureaucracy and a one-dimensional anti-poverty policy and affect the life chances of persons with disabilities living in rural China?
Methodology: Through interviews, this case study of D province’s rural areas examined 57 households with disabilities and poverty and the 34 street-level bureaucrats charged with delivering social welfare. Grounded theory methodology was also applied.
Findings∶Disability stigma, interacting with a one-dimensional anti-poverty policy and street-level bureaucracy, eroded the life chances of persons with disabilities in rural areas. Instead, essential entitlements consisting of the right to make decisions, discourse power, and behavior capabilities determined whether and to what extent persons with disabilities moved out of poverty. Anti-poverty policy failed to work on the entitlements to anti-poverty in rural areas and was evolved into the process that constructed the disability stigma. Claims stigma had persistent labelling effects on persons with disabilities. They were imagined to be abnormal, incapable, and indolent, so they then relied too much on their families and street-level bureaucracies.
Contribution:This paper advances an individual entitlement set for persons with disabilities for anti-poverty policy based on the family power structure. It also enriches anti-poverty theory regarding persons with disabilities in rural areas.
KeyWordsRural China; Disability Stigma; Street-level Bureaucracy; Entitlement; Social Assistance
How Does the Commercial Forest Redemption Policy Leverage Social Participation and Economic Performance? A Mixed-Methods Research of Fujian Forestry Policy Innovation
Jingjing Cai & Deguo Li
Motivation: In some areas, natural forests have been gradually replaced by commercial forests, and forest ecological diversity has declined. At the same time, the contradiction between ecological protection and forest farmers’ interests has become increasingly acute. Can commercial forest redemption, the main strategy of forestry policy innovation in Fujian Province, achieve social and economic benefits? And, how is it implemented?
Methodology: Mixed research methods, such as field investigation, case analysis, and other methods were used to describe and analyze the network of implementation processes of local forestry policies as well as their formation and operations. Second, the structural equation model was applied to empirically test the relationship between policy network and local policy performance.
Findings: At the policy network level, sound information and a reasonable distribution of benefits can improve the effect of social mobilization and government control in forestry innovation. A diverse and subdivided forest tenure structure had an insignificant impact on government control, but it weakened social mobilization. Good social mobilization can improve both the social and economic performance of forestry policies. Conversely, tight government control will reduce economic performance, but it can still improve social performance.
Contribution: This article verifies the effect of a policy network on forestry policy performance through empirical research. Under the practical conditions of administrative control and social mobilization, the government leveraged social participation and economic performance through information mechanisms, benefit distribution mechanisms, and property rights mechanisms. Forestry policies need to lose the constraints of professionalism and actively respond to the diverse and complex needs of policy network actors from the broader perspective of public governance.
KeyWordsPolicy Network; Social Participation; Policy Implementation Performance; Commodity Forest Redemption
Research on the Public “Negative Response” Phenomenon in Funeral Reform: Based on the Tracking Analysis of the Mobilization Process
Changzheng Wang & Xiaobing Peng
Motivation: The public’s “negative response” to local government mobilization affects governance. Although the existing research seeks to explain the “authority system”, it does not discuss the mobilization of the micro-social public in governance. What explains the public’s “negative response” during “dialogue” between local government and the micro-social public?
Methodology: This research used the analytical perspective of frame alignment, examined the process of mobilization governance in funeral reforms in J City, collected data through field investigations and interviews, and then further explored the public’s “negative response” in follow-up analyses of local mobilization governance.
Findings: Local governments typically begin mobilization governance through policy mobilization, control mobilization, and rational mobilization actions. However, in the face of the public’s “negative response”, one local government turned to the promotion phase, a curvilinear type of mobilization, and the construction of a value community. Public value was not realized. The transformation and the mobilization of potential participants still elicited a “negative response”. Through flexible mobilization, local governments and the public can reach a temporary compromise. This does not mean mobilization governance failed, but rather the values of the participants and the local government were not synchronized. The essence of this “negative response” is a weak consensus between local governments and the public because of uncoordinated interests, unfair values, and political distrust.
Contribution: This paper emphasizes the integration of local governments and the micro-public into the same action framework. And, it points out the nature of the “negative response” phenomenon in mobilization governance. Therefore, local mobilization governance should construct consensus relationships between different subjects in order to provide a corresponding reference for governance practices that advocate self-initiated mobilization.
KeyWordsMobilization Governance; Frame Alignment; Consensus Mobilization; Funeral Reform
From Resource Utilization and Ecological Protection to Public Health Security: Focus Events and Social Construction in China’s Wildlife Policy
Han Wu & Guohua Wang
Motivation: How has China’s wildlife policy evolved? What is its logic of policy change? Focus events are often regarded as important drivers of change in policy analysis. The extant research on policy change tends to focus on the influence of power, resources, and relationship networks while ignoring the functions of the ideas, discourses, and constructive behaviors of policy entrepreneurs.
Methodology: Taking China’s wildlife policy as a case, this study collected the announcements of national and local forestry departments, quarantine departments, and health departments, as well as the proposals, writings and appeals of policy entrepreneurs. An analytical framework was then constructed to examine policy changes through social construction, which is well-suited to analyzing China’s policy process.
Findings: Influenced by focus events, wildlife policy shows discontinuous-equilibrium characteristics. The ideas of policy makers were the driving forces for change. Policy entrepreneurs relied on power distribution, discourse frameworks, and the integration effects of public opinion that were generated by the focus events that changed the policy makers’ cognition of concepts.
Contribution: This paper emphasizes the role of symbolic factors such as concept and social construction in the policy process, and thereby provides a new perspective for describing and understanding policy changes.
KeyWordsSocial Construction;Focus Events;Policy Change;Wildlife Protection
How Does the Public Perceive the Performance Differences between Public and Private Hospitals? A Comparative Study Based on a Survey Experiment
Jiannan Wu & Yao Liu
Motivation: How does the public recognize public and private hospital performance? Can the results of a survey experiment in a European context be replicated in China?
Methodology: Based on the principle of replication, Hvidman and Andersen (2016)’s survey experiment was replicated in the Chinese context. After dividing respondents into four groups based on public/private attributes and performance management, the study collected 141 valid questionnaires using stratified random sampling.
Findings∶The study’s results were consistent with the original experiment. (1) In China, the perceived red tape was significantly higher in public rather than private hospitals. (2) The differences in perceptions of effectiveness and benevolence as between public and private hospitals were not significant. The two differences in perceptions are: (1) in the original experiment, the efficiency of public hospitals was significantly lower compared to private hospitals, but it was not significant in this experiment. (2) This study also found the implementation of performance management had a significant, positive effect on the perceived efficiency of Chinese public hospitals; but, it was not significant in the original experiment.
Contribution: This paper provides a model for the design and implementation of replication experiments. It also suggests the replicability of theory and the applicability of policy recommendations must be discussed more cautiously.
KeyWordsExperimental Replication; Public-Private Attribute; Performance Management; Perceptions of Performance
From Race-to-the-bottom to Strategic Imitation: How does the Ecological Transformation of Government Performance Assessment affect the Competing Strategy of Environmental Governance across Chinese Local Governments
Zhenbo Zhang
Motivation: Competition among local officials for promotion in China is increasingly being affected by their region’s environmental indicators. The importance of ecological indicators was introduced into the assessment system and the promotion veto mechanism by the central authority. How have the competing strategies of environmental governance among local governments been impacted by this transformation of the promotion process? Would governing performance be different if the ecological indicators were not the same?
Methodology: Based on a dataset derived from 30 Chinese provinces from the period 2000-2016, this study used the spatial econometric approach (SAC model) by setting environmental regulation stringency and pollutants emission amounts as dependent variables, respectively.
Findings: Local government performance in reducing pollutant emissions was highly sensitive to the specific indicators set by the central authority to assess local officials. Spatial correlations appeared when a province implemented environmental regulations and was dedicated to reducing emissions. If two provinces were at a similar economic level, then the imitation effect between them regarding environmental governance was pronounced.
Contribution: Competition among localities in environmental governance has turned a race-to-the-bottom into strategic imitation. It has apparently been impacted by the ecological indicators set for promotion assessments. This study highlights the policy benefits of incentivizing local officials to coordinate environmental governance. This objective-targeted governance mechanism is both embedded in the environmental performance measurements for officials seeking promotion and guaranteed by regional cooperation and coordination mechanisms. It can also fundamentally overcome the policy-implementation-hindrance in environmental decentralization. Besides, it’s essential to construct a holistic environmental governance system by achieving high-quality development, promoting the transformation of growth patterns, and facilitating the diffusion of technological innovation.
KeyWordsEnvironmental Performance Assessment; Environmental Governance; Strategic Competition; Spatial Econometrics
How Does the Decay of the State Governance System Cause a Reverse-Wave Anti-corruption: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 14 Countries
Junying Shang & Zengke He
Motivation: Sustainable, clean politics is an important pursuit of state governance. Many countries have achieved periodic success in fighting corruption, but few have consolidated their achievements. As used in this paper, the phenomenon of corruption recurrence after periodic success in anti-corruption is called “reverse-wave anti-corruption”. The purpose of this study is to explore both why and how it occurs.
Methodology: Using data from 14 countries from the period 1995 to 2017, this study applied qualitative comparative analysis methods to explore the impact of a state’s governance system on the reverse wave of anti-corruption.
Findings: Reverse wave of anti-corruption is often triggered by major political changes. And, its underlying causes are the decay of state capacity, the rule of law or democracy, and the resulting disharmony. The three key cases are as follows: (1) liberalization-oriented democracy efforts in Liberia failed to strengthen the state’s capacity, and it was unable to implement leader’s anti-corruption policies; (2) rule-of-law reform in Italy suffered many setbacks because it was unable to restrain the nation’s entrenched, clientelist politics; (3) Turkey, under the rule of a political strongman, experienced democratic retrogression and the rule of law was immediately trampled upon.
Contribution: This paper puts forward and explains the concept of reverse-wave anti-corruption, provides a new perspective for the study of the success and failure of anti-corruption efforts, reveals the relationship between the decay of state governance system and reverse-wave anti-corruption, and provides a preliminary analytical tool for evaluating and predicting the current situation of and prospects for anti-corruption in a country.
KeyWordsReverse-Wave of Anti-corruption; State Governance System; Rule of Law; State Capacity; Democracy
How Does Evaluation and Recognition Promote Pollution Control? Empirical Evidence from the Evaluation of Civilized Cities
Huange Xu
Motivation: As an important promotional tool for urban environmental governance, evaluation and recognition has received less attention than the central government’s other tools such as command-and-control and market-based environmental policies. Then, what is the governance effectiveness of this new environmental policy tool and its spatial spillover effects? Can it break the difficult problem of urban environmental governance?
Methodology: Based on panel data from 285 cities from the period 2003-2016, this research takes the evaluation and recognition from civilized cities as a natural experiment. Using the multi-period difference-in-difference and spatial measurement methods, this study tested the environmental effects and spatial spillovers of the establishment of civilized cities.
Finding∶First, the civilized city rating has significantly reduced the intensity of industrial effluents and sulphur dioxide emissions in the region. Second, the emission intensity of the neighboring areas was also reduced and the spatial spillover demonstration effect was significant. The Civilized City Award contributes to improving environmental quality by strengthening environmental regulations, improving local infrastructure, and mobilizing and involving the public in environmental management.
Contribution: This paper furthers the consideration of combining 'goals’ and 'competition’ with awards and recognition in order to maximize the effectiveness of environmental policy instruments in countries with unique governance structures such as China. It also enriches the theoretical research on environmental policy instruments. At the same time, this paper provides a theoretical and empirical framework for evaluating the effectiveness of assessment and commendation tools such as the Civilized City Award.
KeyWordsAward and Recognition; Civilized Cities; Policy Tool; Environmental Pollution; Difference-in-Difference
How Does Inter-governmental Debt Competition Affect the Supply of People’s Livelihood Services? A Tracking Study of 222 Prefecture-level Cities
Huiping Li & Xu Zheng
Motivation: Under a federal system, as the theory of public choice contends, inter-governmental competition should reduce the supply of people’s livelihood services. But, local government debt competition in China does not directly lead to the reduction of people’s livelihood services. On the contrary, the higher the debt, the higher the per capita level of public services will be. Therefore, what are the internal mechanisms for local government debt competition and the supply of people’s livelihood services in China?
Methodology: Based on panel data from 222 prefecture-level cities for the period 2013-2017, this study applied different spatial weights and used the Durbin model to analyze the impact of inter-governmental debt competition on the supply and internal mechanisms of people’s livelihood services.
Findings: First, the spatial spillover effect exists in government debt competition with prefecture-level cities in the province. This will increase the supply of livelihood services for local residents. Second, competition with local government debt within the province can improve the supply of public services within the province. Third, from the perspective of service categories, competition with provincial and local government debt will promote the expenditure of public services for local people such as education and medical care but not social security.
Contribution: UCIBs can meet the capital demands of productive public goods for local governments and indirectly increase the capital supply of livelihood services in local governments’ budgets. Under the debt management mechanism of China’s administrative contract system, debt competition among governments will eventually promote the supply of public services similar to those in prefectural level cities. Research on this issue in the Chinese context enriches the traditional public choice theory.
KeyWordsInterjurisdictional Competition; Urban Construction Investment Bonds; People’s Livelihood Service
One Core and Multiple Actors: Interdepartmental Network Relations and Action Logic in the Government Purchase of Services
Xue Xiao & Kegao Yan
Motivation: Although a strategic function that can help change government operations, the mechanisms of purchasing services are rarely studied. How are the powers, responsibilities, and resources of purchasing services allocated among government departments and what relationships have been formed? What kind of action logic does it imply for the government to purchase services?
Methodology: Using the social network method, this study mapped an interdepartmental relationship network for the purchase of services, analyzed its structural characteristics, observed its trend evolution and regional differences, constructed a ‘strength-breadth’ two-dimensional analysis framework, and analyzed the location of the department network. This revealed the interactive relationships of the government’s internal institutions from the micro level and explained the logic of government purchasing behind the relationship networks.
Findings: A ‘star shaped network’ of ‘one core, multiple subjects, and bipolar distribution’ had formed among departments. Funds dominated the government’s purchasing actions. The government depended on the financial sector but had not formed a wide range of collaborative relationships. Over time, the interdepartmental relationship networks trended towards ‘expansion before contraction’, with the government’s enthusiasm for purchasing services gradually cooling down and returning to reason. Regionally, the interdepartmental relationship networks had unconventional differences, with institutional factors greatly affecting the governmental process of purchasing services.
Contribution: Taking interdepartmental relationships as its focus, this paper breaks with the previous research paradigms of ‘government-social relations’ and ‘cost-effectiveness’, and instead analyzes the government’s internal behaviors and operation mechanism in the study of services purchasing. Its findings provide a reference for further improving the internal institutional arrangements of government services and improving the efficiency of purchasing services
KeyWordsGovernment Purchasing Services; Interdepartmental Relations; Action Logic