The Trend of Indo-Pacific Strategy and its Impact on the U.S.-Japan Alliance-- Creating and evolving of dual ambiguity, dual assurance and dual check strategies

The Trend of Indo-Pacific Strategy and its Impact on the U.S.-Japan Alliance-- Creating and evolving of dual ambiguity, dual assurance and dual check strategies

By Professor Gao Lan, the Center for Japanese Studies, Fudan University

Since the year 2018, the United States has launched a series of specific measures for the Indo-Pacific strategy, as well as discussions on the Indo-Pacific and Indo-Pacific strategy moved from the conceptual definition to strategy design. There are various signs that Asia ushers in an Indo-Pacific era.

The Indo-Pacific countries are very concerned about an Indo-Pacific strategy. The Indo-Pacific strategy has evolved versions such as a Japanese version, an U.S. version, an Australian version, an Indian version and an ASEAN version, among which the launch of the Japanese-U.S. version of the Indo-Pacific strategy, especially based on the Japanese version has had a major impact on the economic and security situation in the Indo-Pacific region, and also a profound new impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance itself.

The creating and evolving of Indo-Pacific strategy -- Japanese and U.S. version Indo-Pacific -- is originally a geographical concept spanning the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. One relatively objective conclusion is that the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical concept, Gurpreet S. Khurana, an Indian Ocean strategist in the year 2007 published a paper in the journal Strategic Analysis entitled "Maritime Lanes Security: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation.1

The Indo-Pacific strategy used by U.S. President Trump advocates the United States with Japan, India, Australia and other countries to form a community of national interests linking the United States with the Indo-Pacific region. On November 6, 2017 Trump made the joint offer with Japanese side during a visit to the country on "free and open Indo-Pacific strategy", marking the formal formation of Japan-America version of Indo-Pacific strategy.

The formation of the American version of the Indo-Pacific strategy.

For a long time, the United States has attached great importance to the strategic interests of the Indo-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific region extends from the west coast of India to the west coast of the United States, covering five of the seven treaty allies including Australia, Japan and South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand. In addition, of the16 sea lanes around the world, the Indian Ocean region has important channels including the strait of Hormuz, the strait of Mandel, the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Makassar. For the United States, control of the Indian Ocean is of vital importance to its execution of global strategy.

America's attention on the Indo-Pacific region dates back to the 1960s. In the year 1966 Britain reached an agreement with the United States to allow the U.S. Department of Defense to lease the British island of Diego Garcia for 50 years for military purposes, and also allowing for an extension of 20 years. The following year Britain gradually completed its withdrawal of its troops from Eastern area to the Suez Canal, the United States established its position in the Indian Ocean, the hegemony of the Indian Ocean shifted from the United Kingdom to the United States. The United States ushered in the age of maintaining hegemony in both the Pacific and Indian oceans.

In the process of forming the Indo-Pacific strategy of the American edition, there was a shift from concept defining to strategic positioning.

At the first stage, the Indo-Pacific concept was proposed. Back in 2007, the George w. Bush Administration stated its Maritime Cooperative Strategy for its 21st Century that the U.S. strategic center of gravity will shift from the Atlantic and Pacific oceans to the Pacific and Indian oceans. Since the year 2010, the Obama Administration had emphasized that it should view and handle its Asia-Pacific policy from the perspective of the Indo-Pacific strategic framework, expecting participation of Japan in the western Pacific as well as India’s participation.

The United States Department of Defense issued the Quadrennial Defense Review report in 2010, which proposes that India has become a Net Security Provider in the Indian Ocean and beyond.2Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on July 20, 2011 said during a visit to India that the United States is not just encouraging India to Look East, but also to do something in the East."3In November 2011, think tanks from the United States, Australia and India issued a joint paper entitled Shared Goals, Converging Interests: A plan for America-Australia-India Cooperation in Indo-Pacific, through which the United States has formally adopted the "Indo-Pacific" as a new geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic concept.

Since then, the United States has strengthened the interpretation and usage of its Indo-Pacific concept. For example, on April 9, 2013, Admiral Samuel Locklear, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, raised why is the Indo-Pacific Asia so Important?,4and first proposed an idea of Indo-Pacific Asia. Released in January 2015, the United States and India issued the U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean.

After expanding from the concept of Asia-Pacific to the concept of Indo-Pacific, the United States began strengthening its strategic deployment in the Indo-Pacific region, strengthening its ally relations with Japan, upgrading India as an emerging partner, improving relations with Burma and stationing troops in Australia.

The second stage is to establish the Indo-Pacific strategy. Since 2017, the Trump Administration's Indo-Pacific strategy is taking shape. After taking office, Trump stressed the importance of the Indo-Pacific region in maintaining U.S. national security, having expanded the strategic deployment in the Asia-Pacific region to the entire Indo-Pacific region, so the previous two-ocean strategy (the Pacific and the Atlantic) expanded into the Indo-Pacific and the Atlantic strategy.

On October 18, 2017, then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made a speech titled "Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century,5for the first time used the concept of "free and open Indo-Pacific", having read a preview of President Trump's basic conception of Indo-Pacific strategy, which basically include 3 aspects: firstly, developing comparative advantage of the U.S. and Indian economy and promoting connectivity and economic growth of the Indo-Pacific region, especially of South Asia region; Secondly, the United States and India join hands to promote realization of security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region; thirdly, constructing the Indo-Pacific rebalance alliance structure, integrating Japan and Australia into this system.

From 5 to14 November 2017, Trump during a visit to Asia formally promoted the new concept of "free and open Indo-Pacific strategy", thus Indo-Pacific is formally established as a strategic positioning. In Japan in his a speech at the Yokota-Air base in Tokyo, Trump noted that the prosperity of many countries in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean regions have benefited from those sacrifices of our military service and our Allies.6Later, in attendance at the APEC summit in Vietnam on Nov 10, President Trump emphasized that the United States will strengthen ties and cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific region, so as to build our new trade relationship.

Since then, U.S. officials have made specific presentations about its strategic vision on Indo-Pacific. For example, on June 1, 2018, at the 17thShangri-la dialogue, then Secretary of Defense James Mattis7briefed the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States, pointing out the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy based on "principled realism" with the aim of building a tranquil, secure, prosperous and free Indo-Pacific region. There are three basic principles as follows: strengthening alliances and partnerships as a priority; the centrality of ASEAN iscritically important; welcoming cooperation with China where possible, and exploring new and meaningful opportunities for multilateral cooperation. The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy has four means of implementation: helping partner countries upgrade their navies capacity and maritime law enforcement capabilities, and monitoring and protecting the maritime commons height seas; providing Allies with advanced defense equipments and enhancing security cooperation, and strengthening ability to operate equipments inside partner countries when necessary; strengthening the rule of law and civil society and transparent governance; economic development led by the private sectors.

As noted above, the U.S. version of the Indo-Pacific strategy is still at the top designing stage, its connotation, goal, vision and other specific contents are still in constant improvement.

The formation and development of the Japanese Indo-Pacific strategy.

Similar with the United States, Japan attaches great importance to the geostrategic role of the Indian Ocean. Japan's concern for the Indian Ocean is, above all, to protect maritime transport lanes security, and then attach importance to the Indian Ocean strategic value.

Since 2007, Japan has been introducing the concept of Indo-Pacific, and advancing the Indo-Pacific strategy. For example, on August 22, 2007, Prime Minister Abe proposed the idea of "two oceans convergence" during his visit to India, and claimed Pacific and Indian oceans are bringing a dynamic combination as seas of freedom and prosperity... Through the association of Japan and India, 'the expanded' Asia would include the United States and Australia, so as to develop a broad network covering the Pacific Ocean.8Abe stressed that Japan's current foreign policy pursues establishment of an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” and the Indo-Japan strategic partnership is one of the most important part. Besides, the Japan Institute of International Affairs published in 2013 Security Order for Asia (especially the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean),9having comprehensively carried out study on the Indo-Pacific issues from geography, strategy, economy, order and political diplomacy and other perspectives.

On August 27, 2016, Prime Minister Abe, in his delivered-speech at the 6th Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development formally put forward the "free and open Indo-Pacific" strategic thinking, namely Japan has a responsibility for maintaining freedom and the rule of law between the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, between Asia and Africa, and fostering a market economy.10The statement released after Abe's talks with Modi in September 2016 for the first time used the wording of the Indo-Pacific strategy for freedom and openness. Japan and India during Abe's visit to India in September 2017 issued the Joint Statement on Dedication to Freedom, Openness and Prosperity for the Indo-Pacific, and the two sides also proposed to vigorously build the Asia-African growth corridor and expand economic influence in East African countries such as Kenya.

Based on Abe's vision for Japan's version of the Indo-Pacific strategy,11the four countries of Japan and the United States as well as India and Australia should make concerted efforts and work together with other Asian countries to carry out regional cooperation, the key of which is to share and support liberalism, democracy and market economy, etc. and defend the "universal values" of fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Based on this assumption, Japan has strengthened the regional security guarantee relationship of Asia from the Western Pacific to Southeast Asia and from the Indian Ocean straightforward to Africa. The specific implementation means its Indo-Pacific strategy12calling for building a "sea of Asia" through participating in exercises and visiting ports of various countries by the Japan’s SDF,13strengthening the capacity of partner countries by carrying out various support services, emphasizing freedom of navigation and peaceful settlement of disputes, etc.

The formation and development of Indo-Pacific strategy of Japan-U.S. version

Since the beginning of the 21st century, there are views emphasizing the Indo-Pacific region from the past Asia-Pacific region.14Similar to the United States, on the one hand, Abe praises India's "Look East" policy; on the other hand, Japan states needs to strengthen cooperation with India.

But since the year 2010, the Obama Administration proposed the Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy, which still focuses on the strategic push for the Asia-Pacific region. Japan expects the United States to play a leading role and guide its advocacy of the Indo-Pacific concept incorporated into the Indo-Pacific strategy so as to promote the regional impact of the Indo-Pacific strategy. To this end, on September 25, 2013, Abe, during his visit to the United States, proposed to "build an Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean century, Japan and the United States should work together."15But the Obama Administration remains committed to the Asia-Pacific strategy. Coordination with the United States Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy, Japan in December 2013 in its first National Security Strategy still uses the wording Asia-Pacific in many places instead of using the Indo-Pacific concept.

Since January 2017, the newly formed Trump Administration has spiked several times this Obama's previous policies, and urgently need to come up with a policy propositions, policy proposal different with that of Obama's, but find it difficult to determine the appropriate formulation. In November 2017, |Trump decided to visit Asia. The Japanese Government proposed to Trump using the visit as an opportunity to launch its Asian policies, formally launch Indo-Pacific strategy. To that end, Japan worked hard for persuasion.

Influenced by the Japanese Government's proposal, in mid-October before President Trump visited Japan,Secretary of State Rex Tillerson delivered a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, gave up the traditional Asia-Pacific concept, repeatedly used the wording Indo-Pacific, and emphasized its importance. On November 6, 2017, Prime Minister Abe and President Trump finally reached an agreement, proposing a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy that is led and jointly promoted by Japan and the United States.16Trump points out, the United States will work with Japan to build a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Abe said at a joint press conference after the summit that they agree to strengthen cooperation so as to achieve a free and open Indo-Pacific Oceans. Based on the above initiatives, the Japan-American version of the Indo-Pacific strategy followed.

In view of formation and development process of the Indo-Pacific strategy, there are two stages as follows. The first stage of strategic conception, led by Japan and followed by the United States. The so-called Indo-Pacific strategy was initiated by Japan not by the United States.17As previously stated, since 2007 on the basis of continuing the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity strategy, Prime Minister Abe had advocated an Indo-Pacific strategy and repeatedly had policy communication with the United States, but stalled for a variety of reasons. Until November 6, 2017, Trump and Abe launched the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. Japan has played a major leading role in this process, which brings the United States since the Obama administration from conceptual policy discussions on the Indo-Pacific region to gradually moving to a strategic level, and is implemented during the Trump Administration. Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy is based on a conception of an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity. Prime Minister Abe launched its Arc of Freedom and Prosperity conception during his first term in 2007, something similar to the Indo-Pacific strategy, with the vision of democracy, freedom, market economy and so on as the slogan, advocated an arc belt composed of three countries from Northern Europe to the Baltic, Central Asia, India and Southeast Asia. The Indo-Pacific strategy and the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity strategy have the Cold war thinking in common.18The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity was intended to encircle China and Russia while the Indo-Pacific strategy is intended to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative. In essence, the idea of Arc of Freedom and Prosperity is more focused on Japan's requirements. While the Indo-Pacific strategy is desalinating the response to Russia and to Central Asia, but closer to the requirements of the U.S. rebalancing strategy .

The second stage of strategy implementation , led by the United States and followed by Japan. Since Trump officially announced the Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States has led the top-level design of Indo-Pacific strategy and comprehensively structured from economy, security, mechanism and order perspectives, and spared no effort to create the Indo-Pacific strategy. Japan fully coordinates with this U.S. strategy, reflecting the traditional strategic pattern of the leader and the led between the United States and Japan .

After that, the United States and Japan together promote the Indo-Pacific strategy, which strengthens the strategic synergies of the U.S.-Japan alliance, while also leaving an important impact on the economy and security, etc. of the countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

The connotation of the Japan-U.S. version of the Indo-Pacific strategy

As noted above, since October 2017, Trump and his team cooperate with Japan, thus Japan-U.S. version of the Indo-Pacific strategy takes shape.

The Indo-pacific strategy, according to relevant policy documents from the Trump Administration , includes the following specific respects.

The Indo-Pacific security policy.

As we all know, the Indo-Pacific region is the most heavily militarized region in the world, where 7 of 10 largest standing armies have deployments there, including that of China, India, the DPRK, the ROK, Russia, Vietnam, and the United States. Besides, the world’s largest and most advanced navies are also concentrated in the region, i.e. that of China, India, Russia, and the United States. For this reason, the United States believes that the Indo-Pacific’s regional security is crucial and hopes to work with Japan and other countries to build an Indo-Pacific strategic alliance.

The Trump Administration has released three key strategic documents: the National Security Strategy report, National Defense Strategy report and Nuclear Posture Review report, which from three perspectives of overall national security, national defense and nuclear security, respectively elaborate the American strategy and the policies, and provides guidance on Indo-Pacific strategy. The National Security Strategy of the United States launched in December 201719specifically expounds the concept of Indo-Pacific, so the Indo-pacific strategy gradually enriches the basic connotation, puts forward attaching importance to the Indo-Pacific region, the emphasis on competition with China and a negative response to the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue,20establishes the basic framework for the U.S. Indo-Pacific regional security policy.

Firstly, clearly identifying the Indo-Pacific security objectives. The National Security Strategy stresses that the vision for Indo-Pacific is not aimed at any country. The United States will strengthen its commitment to maritime freedom and peaceful solution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law. The United States will work with Allies and partners together to achieve complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and maintain nuclear non-proliferation in Northeast Asia.

Secondly, developing an Indo-Pacific security cooperation approach. The United States will strengthen the longstanding military ties with Allies and partners, and encourage U.S. cooperation with Allies and partners to develop a strong defense network. For example, the United States will advance cooperation with Japan and South Korea on the missile defense, enhance cooperation with Southeast Asian partners in law enforcement, defense and intelligence, expand defense and security cooperation with India, and revitalize the ally relationship with the Philippines and Thailand and strengthen partnership with Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia. In line with the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 authorizes Defense Secretary Mattis to establish an Indo-Pacific stability initiative.

Thirdly, establishment of Indo-Pacific security governance control institution. On 30 May 2018, the U.S. Pacific Command is officially renamed Indian-Pacific Oceans Command, which will be directly involved in the U.S. Pacific regional diplomacy and building the military security structure in the Indo-Pacific region. Japanese Defense Minister Isunori Onodera said at the renaming ceremony that the U.S. move is likely to support a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy advanced by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's leadership. On June 21 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met with U.S. Indo-Pacific commander Davidson further proposed that Japan will work with the United States to advance the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy based on the rule of law.21Then, the United States, Japan and India had off Guam in the Western Pacific the first joint sea exercises"Malabar 2018". This large-scale military exercise is the milestone action carried out by the United States in cooperation with other countries for implementing the Indo- Pacific strategy .

Fourthly, building a material foundation for Indo- Pacific security. On 1 August 2018, the U.S. Senate passed the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2019, with the total defense budget at US$708 billion. Since the Cold War, the United States has lost its competitive edge over its competitors, asked for a five-year extension of the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, even renamed it the Indo-PacificMaritime Security Initiative, including Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as aid-receiving countries, and also India; requests the DoD to submit a five-year plan of the Indo-Pacific stability initiative; an additional sum of US$235 million is allocated to upgrade the U.S. military combat capability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Currently, the U.S. military deployment in the Indo-Pacific region is basically in place. After the establishment of the Indo-Pacific command, whose presence is listed from the South Pole to the North Pole, from the Western Pacific coast of the United States to the Indian Ocean. The United States is expected to continue increasing its presence in the Indo-Pacific region and focuses on expanding multilateral defense and security cooperation with Japan, India and other countries.

The Indo-Pacific economic strategy.

The Indian Ocean witnesses the busiest sea trade routes in the world, of which its oil sea lanes are the "strategic lifeline" for many developed countries and developing countries to rely on and more than half of the world's oil shipped on sea is via the Indian Ocean. To this end, the United States began refining the Indo-Pacific economic strategy.

Firstly, establishing the Indo-Pacific economic development principle. The National Security Strategy report22notes that the United States will encourage regional cooperation, maintain free and open shipping lanes and transparent infrastructure financing, unimpeded commercial activities and the peaceful settlement of disputes, continue to push forward bilateral trade agreements and strengthen quality infrastructure cooperation with U.S. Allies. The United States will work with Australia and New Zealand, support vulnerable island partner countries in the Pacific region so as to reduce their impact on economic volatility.23

Secondly, putting forward the Indo-Pacific economic cooperation approach. On 30 July 2018, U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross announced a program to increase U.S. commercial cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region,24the following three point-measures are proposed. One is to develop global market (DGM), with emphasis on introducing opportunities for U.S. exporters in Asia. Two is to strengthen business exchanges and cooperation with India and other neighboring countries. Three is to aim to increase trade and investment in Indo-Pacific region by bringing back U.S. exporters to Asia.

Thirdly, setting areas for Indo-Pacific economic cooperation. On 31 July 2018, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum presented the Indo-Pacific regional economic vision,25i.e., the United States, through a new $113 million program, will support foundational areas for the future -- digital economy, energy, and infrastructure. The U.S. strategy is to inspire American businesses to play their best part for greater support to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Fourthly, advancing the Indo-Pacific economic cooperation program. The United States is going to promote five economic cooperation programs in the Indo-Pacific region. (1) A partnership program on big data communications and cyber security. Improving the partner countries data connectivity, expanding U.S. technology exports. (2) The Asian EDGE Program, i.e. development and economic growth through energy. Through the EDGE plans, the United States would invest nearly US$50 million in 2018 to help partners to import, produce, transport, store and plan their energy resources in the Indo-Pacific region. (3) An infrastructure program. The United States will launch an infrastructure trading and mutual aid network so as to facilitate proper infrastructure development, and establish new cross-institutional agency with nearly US$30 million as seed capital. (4) The United States will establish an Indo-Pacific trading advisory fund, providing legal and financial consultant services. Besides, according to the House Construction Bill, the U.S. Government's development financing ability will be doubled, up to more than to $60 billion.

Meanwhile, Japan is also boosting its economic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, supporting economic cooperation with ASEAN and promoting economic relations with the Indian Ocean countries (including India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, etc.), and expects to establish strategic economic cooperation with Australia, India, ASEAN countries. Thus, Japan’s economic policies on the Indo-Pacific strategy are more detailed and wide-ranging.

The Indo-pacific regional order.

The core content of the Japan-U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is emphasizing the maintenance of a "rules-based order", which refers to freedom and openness.

The U.S. National Security Strategy report26emphasizes that there is geopolitical competition between liberal and authoritarian views of the world order in Indo-Pacific region, the so-called "free and open" Indo-Pacific regional order has three meanings.27

Firstly, concerning freedom. The first and foremost is from international perspective. The United States hopes to see that countries of the Indo-Pacific region are not subject to coercion and they can exercise sovereignty in the way they pursue the path of their independent choice.

Secondly from the perspective of countries, the United States wants Indo-Pacific societies to enjoy freedom, including good government and basic rights, transparency and fighting corruption. The Indo-Pacific region's open sea and air passages become increasingly important to the world.

Thirdly, needing more open logistics infrastructure. Regional infrastructure is difficult in the Indo-Pacific . The United States wants to help the region to properly build infrastructure.

For decades, the United States has supported more open investment environment, and a more transparent regulatory structure, and therefore the Indo-Pacific region should not only be more open to foreign investment, such as from the United States and others, but also investment environment to drive economic growth across the region.

The Indo-Pacific strategic mechanism building.

The Japan-U.S. Indo-Pacific strategic conception has the United States, Japan, Australia and India security dialogue (QUAD) as the main framework of the Indo-Pacific strategy. In addition, it will strengthen ties with Southeast Asian countries.

According to the National Security Strategy report,28the United States believes it should maintain the strong leadership role of its key ally – Japan, and seek to expand cooperation with Japan, Australia and India. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Thailand remain important U.S. Allies and markets. Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are gradually becoming security and economic partners of the United States. ASEAN and APEC remain the core of the Asia-Pacific regional framework and a regional platform for development of freedom and order.

On18 January 2018, the United States, Japan, India and Australia in India attended the regional defense forum -- "Resina Dialogue", which is seen as a sign of further strengthening the four-nation alliance made up of the United States, Australia, Japan and India.

Abe, in the year 2007 on the basis of strategic requirement of the values diplomacy and the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity also call for -- the United States, Japan, Australia, India – the four countries alliance dialogue, then received support from U.S. Vice President Cheny, Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard, and the Prime Minister of India Mohan, who attended the dialogue. In March 2007, Japan and Australia signed a joint declaration, upgrading Japan-Australia relations as "quasi-ally" relations, which is the first time for Japan to have signed a joint declaration in the area of security with a country other than the United States. Thereafter, the forming of the Rudd Administration in Australia brings the 4-counry relations to a standstill, and Australia's policy mirrors the ambivalence caused by the rising tension in China-U.S. relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Later, Jerald rose to power in Australia, and Australia return to dialogue, the U.S. marines is based near the Timor sea and in Darwin close to Lombok strait.

The characteristics of the Indo-Pacific strategy and its impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance

In fact, the Abe administration's Indo-Pacific strategy has dual strategic objectives: first of all stabilizing the U.S.-Japan alliance; Secondly, taking the opportunity to seek diversified alliance system to ensure strategic balance and strategic control, enlarge Japan's independent role, and give play to Japan's limited guidance role. To this end, Japan cooperated with the United States to actively create a Japan-U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, hoping to maintain a strong U.S.-Japan alliance and get a qualitative leapfrog in the Trump era.

However, due to the structural problems of the U.S.-Japan alliance itself, and the differences between the United States and Japan on the strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific strategy, which, in the process of the joint promotion of the two countries, shows the following three characteristics: i.e. dual ambiguity, dual assurance and. dual check, and had a major impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance.

First, the U.S. version of the Indo-Pacific strategy is implicit, and not yet completely clear. Trump, for example, in November 2017 at the APEC summit in Vietnam, mentioned the wording Indo-Pacific 12 times without giving it a clear "strategic" meaning. In addition, the new U.S. National Security Strategy report only uses the wording Indo-Pacific region and does not explain the Indo-Pacific strategy. For the United States, the Indo-pacific is still largely a concept, President Trump Just borrowed what Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been advocating a "free and open Indo-Pacific" in order to set out his policy on Asia so as to distinguish it from the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy in the Obama era, which reflects the views of the American establishment, especially the U.S. military.29

Until Trump's visit to Asia in 2017, Japan still had been worried that President Trump does not understand the implications and intentions of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Even Trump co-launched Indo-Pacific strategy with Japanese counterpart during his visit to Japan, President Trump still hardly understands what the strategy means.30President Trump, despite his remarks in Vietnam that he is happy to share a free and open Indo-Pacific development vision, then, has repeatedly emphasized American centrism and negated the international coordination approaches, but the Indo-Pacific strategy is exactly a kind of international coordination approach, hence the ambiguity and contradiction of Trump's Indo-Pacific strategic propositions emerge.

Secondly, there is ambiguity between the America's Indo-Pacific strategy emphasized by Trump and the Obama-launched the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy. From the above specific connotation of the Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States hopes building a framework for strategic cooperation between the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean regions, to realize the interactions between the two oceans in the economic, political and military fields, whose intention is similar to Obama's "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy effect. In the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, the Pacific and Indian oceans is considered as a whole concept, the U.S. republican security experts have long supported the U.S. concept of an " Indo-Pacific" region. The Obama Administration did not upgrade the "Indo-Pacific" regional concept to a strategic design, but the Trump Administration is pursuing an Indo-Pacific strategy in a big and detailed way.

Thirdly, there is also ambiguity in Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy. At the beginning, Japan hoped to held up China's development with the Indo-Pacific strategy. Abe's Indo-Pacific launched in August 2016 focused on keeping counterbalance with China's Belt And Road Initiative through promoting this regional strategy.31However, since the mid-2017, China-Japan relations continue to warm up, the Abe Administration has raised the possibility to dock the Indo-Pacific strategy with the Belt and Road Initiative. Currently, concerning the Belt and Road Initiative concept,China and Japan have set up an Official-Civil Association to explore specific projects for the cooperation between the China and Japan and the third parties. There are signs that, on the Indo-Pacific strategy, Prime Minister Abe shows non-confrontational awareness toward China regarding the Belt and Road Initiative so as to achieve the goal of strategic balance and economic development.

Japan's strategic community has long been concerned about U.S. entrapment over Japan.32Japan is very much worried about the U.S. vague commitment to the defense of the Diaoyu islands, and its vague commitment to the defense of Taiwan, particularly over whether President Trump will abandon the Allies, and sacrificed the interests of allies. Japan hopes to maintain a strategic balance and takes a moderate approach in balancing China, thus carrying out limited cooperation with China to avoid excessive checks and balances risks, and prevent the deterioration of the security dilemma.

Dual assurance.

From the U.S. side, the United States of America hopes the Indo-Pacific strategy can ensure the consolidation of alliances with Asia and especially the alliance with Japan, while maximizing the national interests of the United States.

By restarting the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India dialogue mechanism, the United States recognizes that its Allies and partners in the Asian region remain supportive of its hegemony. The United States is not the initiator of the Indo-Pacific strategy, but Japan, India and Australia have made strategic planning for many years already. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is the initiator for Indo-Pacific strategic concept, and then Australia has also written the Indo-Pacific strategy into its defense white paper, and India attaches greater importance to the Indo-Pacific strategy for upgrading India’s geostrategic position. For this end, on the basis of the common concerns of Japan, India, Australia and other countries, the United States, through leading the Indo-Pacific strategy, can ensure maximum national interests of "America First" and that these Asian Allies, especially Japan, are able to keep pace with the U.S. strategy.

From the Japanese side, Japan wants to take advantage of the Indo-Pacific strategy to ensure Japan's traditional important position in the U.S.-Japan alliance, strengthen the U.S.-Japan military alliance and prevent the United States from bypassing Japan again in diplomacy. Since the war, Japan has always insisted that Japan and the United States share basic values and strategic interests and the alliance is the foundation of Japan's diplomacy and security.33

But in January 2017, after taking office, Trump pushed for non-transparent foreign policy,34and in terms of its policy toward Japan, dealt several blows to Japan and several times had it caught off guard.

The Trump's first shock to Japan was the Trans Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP). Since 2009, the U.S. Obama Administration had urged Japan to join the TPP and expanded its potential market scale. When Trump took office in 2017, he immediately announced the U.S. quit from the TPP. Japan has tried repeatedly to persuade the Trump Administration to return to the TPP, but was rejected. Japan then joined Australia, Brunei, Canada and other countries to renegotiate and sign on March 8, 2018 the new version the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). After that, Trump instructs economic and trade advisers to study the possibility of rejoining the TPP. But on April 18, during the meeting with Prime Minister Abe, President Donald Trump said that the United States will not return to the TPP until it find good terms it cannot reject. For the changing Trump policy on the TPP, Japan is at a loss.

Trump's second shock to Japan is the U.S.-DPRK summit. In the year 2018, the situation in Northeast Asia changed dramatically, and the U.S.-DPRK summit was held. The U.S.-DPRK dialogue dealt a huge shock to Japan. On the one hand, Japan fears the Americans may again bypass Japanese to engage in a deal-diplomacy with the DPRK alone regardless of Japan's interests and concerns; on the other hand, there are obstacles in relations between Japan and South Korea, low mutual security trust between them, so Japan is unable to do it would like to .

Dual check

Under the framework of the Japan-American alliance, the United States and Japan pin down each other.

The United States, within the framework of the U.S.-led U.S.-Japan alliance, based on the America First principle, wishes to pin down Japan to prevent it from deviating from the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy aims, and bring it to a greater play to the alliance. The United States requests Japan to make more concessions and pay for the Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States calls on Japan to significantly cut down its trade deficits with the United States and requests Japan to buy high-end U.S. weapons and contribute to U.S. economic growth.

On the campaign trail, Trump complained the U.S.-Japan relationship is unfair, and harshly demanded Japan to do something about it, or America will leave it to its own course. After assuming the office, Trump imposed greater pressure on Japan over bilateral trade deals, and requested it to buy a large amount of American weapons. Japan has increased year by year purchase of American military equipments due to the pressure. Japan's Defense Ministry in 2017 decided to buy the U.S.-made land-based Aggies interceptors to defends itself against North Korea ballistic missile launch. Japan also pushes for the deployment of U.S. advanced weapons systems, such as the F-35 stealth fighter, and will deploy more than 80 of them at Misawa base alone by the year 2021, and the interceptor system costs about 80 billion yen per set, leaving Japan a enormous huge fiscal burden.

While, Japan, on the other hand, wants to conduct diplomacy independently to ensure the United States to continuously strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance; from the perspective of diversified alliance system, to supplement the Japan-American Indo-Pacific strategy with the Japan-India Indo-Pacific strategy and Japan-Australian Indo-Pacific strategy.

Japan's government has been more stable and also more flexible under Abe's long rule. Prime Minister Abe is determined to give Japan a bigger leading role. The centerpiece of Abe's foreign policy is to break away from the postwar system, and lead Japan onto the path of normal country. To this end, based on thenew defense law, Japan pushes hard the defense policy with a series of diplomatic practices, such as globe diplomacy, values diplomacy, the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,and active pacifism up to the Indo-Pacific strategy, the purpose of which is only one, namely to maximize Japan's national interests.

Since the U.S.-Japan alliance was established in 1964, its military coloring is obvious, especially since 1996, the U.S.-Japan alliance continuously seeks opportunities to expand the alliance from the Asia-Pacific region to the entire world. Having entered the 21st century, with the relative decline of American power, Japan argues that the pure U.S.-Japan alliance system increases the cost of Japan's alliance, therefore considers to diversify the alliance members, such as bringing in Australia, India, New Zealand, Singapore and South Korea, etc.,35and get free from the dangerous system of too much dependence on America,36relatively strengthen its independent voice on the international stage.

Yoichi Funabash37argues that the Trump presidency may become the biggest challenge to the U.S.-Japan relations since the end of the Second World War. Actually, Japan has repeatedly suffered blows from the United States since Trump took office. In addition to the aforementioned TPP, U.S.-DPRK dialogue and other events, Japan and the United States have been at loggerheads over how to shape future trade negotiations, the Japanese Government opposes the U.S.-Japan FTA negotiations with the United State, because Japan is under tremendous pressure to open up its highly protected agricultural market. In addition, U.S. President Donald Trump has announced reservations about tariffs imposed on Japan’s steel and aluminum imports into the United States. Japan is more worried about U.S. government tariffs imposed on Japanese cars, which would have a huge impact on Japanese industrial production including aluminum.

To this end, Japan began a limited counterattack, advancing more diversified alliance system, building Japan the flagship of free trade, and filling the vacuum left by the United States. After the U.S. quit from the TPP, Japan led the 11 countries to sign the CPTPP agreement on March 8, 2018. On July 4, 2018, Japan hosted the RCEP fifth ministerial meeting, stressed the need to speed up the pace of negotiations and complete the RCEP negotiations as soon as possible, and come up with a package by the end of 2018. In addition, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) was signed with the European Union on July 18.

To sum up, with the constant advancement of Indo-Pacific strategy, there emerge dual ambiguity, dual insurance and dual check between Japan and the United State, produced compound effect to Japan-U. S. alliance, show interaction between tension and synergy. On the one hand, under the pressure from Trump's closed policies, Japan has a grave concern that the United States may bypass itself and lower its strategic position in the U.S.-Japan alliance, thus, Japanese demand for independent diplomacy gets increasingly strong, having adopted to diversify the alliance to achieve relative autonomy and effective autonomy within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan also tries to vigorously guide the United States to continue to consolidate and strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance with "limited autonomy and limited guidance" approach. On the other hand, Japan actively cooperates with the United States to build the Japan-U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, hoping to form a strong synergy to promote the U.S.-Japan-led political and economic order in Indo-Pacific region, and get maximum national interests.

Outlook for the Prospects

So far, the top-level design of the Japan-U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is being carried out, the basic agenda and contents are clarified, but the implementation process is filled with variables.

Firstly, there are policy risks in the Trump Administration. Just as former U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger38worries that the United States, locating between the two oceans, has the potential to become an isolated island under the Trump Administration, that he may end an era, so whether the Indo-Pacific concept can sustain is a complex question.39Trump has repeatedly questioned the current world order, emphasized "America First", renounced multilateralism and withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, put economic pressure on other countries by imposing high tariffs, planned to impose tariffs on imported cars even from Japan and Europe, and threatened to withdraw from NATO.

Trump's policy vision lacks strategic consistency, which for Japan is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, this is an opportunity to shape America's Indo-Pacific strategy. On the other hand, it is also a huge trap. Japan's previous policy judgment of the U.S.-Japan alliance is based on a completely predictable and reliable United States, however, due to the uncertainty of Trump's foreign policy, Japan’s conventional experience of American policy fails. If the United States suddenly gives up the Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan's position and influence in Asia will be weakened and will face greater difficulties in regional diplomacy.40

Secondly, the Indo-Pacific strategy is still in the conceptual stage, the fragmentation of which is obvious.41The Indo-Pacific strategy as outlined above by President Trump and his team42is still fragmented.

Compared to the Asia-Pacific system, the United States must have more strength and resources to support responsibility in order to build a Indo-Pacific system. The costs and responsibilities to maintain the Indo-Pacific system in military security and economic cooperation and other aspects are required by the United States to share among all Allies and India in the Asia-Pacific region, which poses a challenge for its Allies and India in the region. In addition, the future effectiveness of the Indo-Pacific strategy is uncertain,43The United States, Japan, India and Australia are lack of coordination capabilities and experience in collaboration on specific policies and strategies, especially as the Japan-U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy itself also carries many uncertainties, and Japan and the United States have many differences in the design approach toward the Indo-Pacific strategy.

Thirdly, there is uncertainty on the Trump's future policy of U.S.-India relations. The United States forged the U.S.-India joint strategic vision during the Obama Administration.44However, the Trump Administration has yet to identify specific strategic cooperation project. Besides, the Trump Administration has not worked together with India, Japan, Australia, etc. to develop clear-cut infrastructure investments plan. Particularly, there are big differences between the Indian version of the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Japanese version of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Prime Minister of India Modi on June 1, 2018 pointed out at the 17th Shangri-la Dialogue that the Indo-Pacific strategy is not targeted at any country, Indian Ocean-Pacific Ocean is a "natural region," including all regional countries in the geographic sense and other countries with interests in the region, and believed that China-India relations are very important for the future of Asia.

Fourthly, variables of the political situation in the United States and Japan. On the one hand, in November 2018, the U.S. Congress holds the midterm elections. At the moment, the voice of defending Trump is high among active republican voters. But if Democrats can turn the tables in November, they could kill any GOP legislative bill, paving the way for a midterm election in 2021. On the other hand in Japan, the LDP presidential election is scheduled for September 2018. Abe is already backed by the Kishida faction, an important faction within the LDP, so Abe has a good chance of winning re-election as LDP President. But since the election of the leader of the LDP comes at a time when Abe has been implicated in the Japan's Mori Yoshi, and Jiaji Schoolyard Scandal, fermentation of which has led to Abe's Cabinet declining support.

Therefore, both the United States and Japan are now facing the uncertainties of changing domestic political situation, Whether the Japan-America Indo-Pacific strategy shared by President Trump and Prime Minister Abe can be developed sustainably needs to see.

Both Japan and the United States believe that the Indo-Pacific strategy jointly launched by them in line with the maritime strategy and the Asian strategy of the two countries, therefore, provides a material foundation and new cooperation platform for further development of the U.S.-Japan alliance. America is not the Indo-Pacific concept initiator but is the leader of it, constantly release specific policies concerning the Indo-Pacific strategy, having left the region big impact. In addition, compared with the Asia-Pacific strategy, Japan and the United States needs to pay greater cost and price for their Indo-Pacific strategy, but we need to follow up its development.

(Edited excerpt of the article in International Politics, No2. 2019)

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