Marriage in China Shouldn’t Break the Bank 结婚成本节节高，中国农民难承受

亚当·明特 李婧萍

Getting married isn’t cheap in China. In Da’anliu， a small farming village outside Beijing， the local “bride price”—the fee that a groom’s family pays to a bride’s in advance of their nuptials—recently breached the $30，000 mark. That’s extreme for a village where incomes average $2，900 per year. So， this summer， local officials decreed that bride prices and associated wedding expenses shouldn’t exceed $2，900.

Out-of-control bride prices play to official and popular Chinese anxieties over the country’s plummeting1 marriage and birth rates. Nowhere are those fears stronger than in China’s countryside， home to millions of involuntary bachelors， often known as “bare branches.” High bride prices， and the women who command them， are an easy target to blame for this supposed marriage crisis.

The truth is more complex. Bride prices have existed in China as long as marriage has. Traditionally， more affluent families granted large sums as a mark of prestige; the money was often returned to the groom’s family， or to the married couple in the form of material items for the new household. For lower-income families， especially in rural areas， the bride price served as compensation for a wife’s future service to her husband’s family and wasn’t returned in any meaningful form. Because real value was being exchanged， rural bride prices were typically higher.

Rural Chinese were complaining about bride-price inflation as far back as the 1980s. In 2013， China Vanke Co. Ltd.， a major Chinese real estate developer， and SINA Corp.， developer of the Sina Weibo social network， created a national map of bride prices that quickly went viral online.

These days， news stories， blogs and social media posts about bride prices， the lengths that families go to pay them， and the broken engagements， family tensions and financial crises that sometimes follow， are staples of China’s internet. Bride prices in the hundreds of thousands of dollars are not uncommon and—among the rich—they can reach even higher.

Yet， just as in the past， the most expensive bride prices on average continue to be charged in China’s less-affluent areas. Several factors are to blame. First， decades of coercive2 family-planning policies and centuries of traditional preferences for male children have skewed China’s gender balance. In China’s countryside， so-called “bachelor villages” are reportedly home to 150 boys for every 100 girls. Theoretically， at least， these shortages drive up the value of single women.

At the same time， economic reforms that began in the 1970s allowed millions of women to migrate for work to China’s booming coastal factories. Some even chose to migrate for marriage， usually to wealthier regions with better economic prospects and hard-to-obtain residence permits entitling their families to better schools and other urban services.

This social mobility came at an inopportune time for rural families. The dismantling of China’s social safety net began in the 1980s and left much of China’s rural population without livable3 pensions. In one sense， that was no big change. Traditional Chinese norms hold that a son should remain a member of his parents’ household and contribute to its upkeep. When he marries， his wife transfers her labor to the household.

That’s less of a problem in a society made up of big families. In a country where one-child population controls have shrunk family sizes， though， that traditional mindset has driven up bride prices as daughters are viewed， in essence， as pensions.

The price controls imposed in Da’anliu won’t have any influence on these entrenched social forces. Instead， they’ll likely drive bride-price transactions underground—and possibly to new heights.

For Da’anliu and other Chinese towns worried about how to address declining marriage rates， the better option is to address the underlying issues driving up costs. A good start would be a law that ensures a woman’s claim on marital property in the case of a divorce. Current Chinese law makes no such provision， and thus provides a strong disincentive4 to marry and a very powerful incentive to charge higher bride prices.

Next， China needs to reform its archaic household registration system so that rational economic incentives—not benefits obtained from marriage—promote social mobility. Finally， a concerted nationwide effort to close the wide gap between China’s rural and urban schools would help encourage more women to stay closer to home. If China wants to lower the cost of rural marriages， it needs to make more of them possible first.

在中国结婚并不便宜。在北京城外以农耕为主的小村庄大安六村，当地的“彩礼”——新郎家在举办婚礼前给新娘家的一笔钱——最近突破了3万美元大关。对于年均收入2900美元的农村家庭来说，这笔费用过于高昂。因此，今年夏天村政府规定彩礼和相关的婚礼费用不应超过2900美元。

失控的彩礼一定程度上反映了中国政府和民众对结婚率和出生率大幅下降的忧虑。这种忧虑在中国农村最强烈，那里有数以百万计的男性无奈地沦为单身汉，俗称“光棍”。高额的彩礼以及伸手要彩礼的女性，很容易就被当成这场所谓的婚配危机的罪魁祸首。

然而实情更加复杂。在中国，彩礼是伴随着婚姻制度一同诞生的。传统上，较富裕的家庭会出很多钱以彰显派头;这些钱通常以給新居添置实物的形式返还给新郎的家人或新婚夫妇。对于低收入家庭，特别是在农村，聘礼被当作新娘日后侍奉丈夫家庭的补偿，不会有任何实质性的退还。由于存在真正的价值交换，农村的彩礼通常更多。

早在1980年代，中國农村地区就有人抱怨彩礼礼金增长太甚。到2013年，中国大型房地产开发商万科股份有限公司和新浪微博社交网络的开发商新浪公司共同绘制了一张全国彩礼地图，该地图很快传遍网络。

如今，关于彩礼礼金、给付彩礼的周折以及有时随之而来的悔婚、家庭关系紧张和财政危机等话题的新闻报道、博客和帖子在网上层出不穷。数十万美元的彩礼并不罕见，富人结婚时礼金还会更高。

然而，和以前一样，往往不太富裕的地区彩礼礼金最高，归咎于以下几个因素：首先，数十年的强制性计划生育政策和千百年来的重男轻女传统日渐扭曲了中国的性别平衡。据报道，在中国农村，所谓的“光棍村”里，男孩总数是女孩的1.5倍。至少在理论上这种短缺会抬高未婚女性的身价。

与此同时，从1970年代开始的经济改革使数以百万计的妇女得以到中国繁荣的沿海工厂务工。有些女性甚至选择去异地结婚，通常是冲着在经济前景更好的富裕地区获得来之不易的居留许可，使其子女享受更好的教育和其他城市服务。

这种社会流动性对农村家庭来说不合时宜。中国原有的社会保障体系消解于1980年代，导致中国大部分农村人口没有足够的养老金。从某种意义上说，这不是什么大变化。中国传统观念认为，儿子结婚后仍是父母家庭的一员，应该赡养老人。儿子娶妻后，妻子也成为男方家庭的劳力。

在由大家庭组成的社会中，这不成问题。然而在这个曾实行计划生育的国家，家庭规模已经缩小，这种养儿防老的传统观念抬高了彩礼礼金，因为女儿本质上等同于养老金。

大安六村限制彩礼的一纸村规不会对这些根深蒂固的社会因素产生任何影响。相反，彩礼可能被迫转为地下交易——还可能抬高价码。

对于大安六村和其他中国城镇结婚率下降的问题，最好从致使彩礼金额上涨的根本原因入手解决问题。最好从立法入手，立法明确保障离婚时女性对婚内财产的分配权益。中国现行的法律在这方面不够完善，因而大大遏制了人们结婚的意愿，又使索取更高额彩礼的风气愈演愈烈。

另一个办法是，中国需要改革其户籍制度，以便用理性经济激励的方式——而不是以通过结婚谋利的方式驱使人口流动。最后，全国范围内采取措施缩小中国农村和城市学校教育的巨大差距，这将有助于鼓励更多农村女性留在家乡。如果中国想降低农村结婚成本，就应该先让乡村婚姻成为可能。                                       □