The Steam Has Gone Out of Globalisation全球化已然失去动力

薛洪君

A new pattern of world commerce is becoming clearer—as are its costs.一種新的世界商业模式正日渐清晰——其代价亦然。

When America took a protectionist1 turn two years ago， it provoked warnings about the miseries of the 1930s2. Today those ominous predictions look misplaced. In 2018 global growth was decent， unemployment fell and profits rose. In November US President Donald Trump signed a trade pact with Mexico and Canada. Such complacency is mistaken. Today’s trade tensions are compounding a shift that has been under way since the financial crisis in 2008-09. As we explain， cross-border investment， trade， bank loans and supply chains have all been shrinking or stagnating relative to world GDP. Globalisation has given way to a new era of sluggishness. Adapting a term coined by a Dutch writer， we call it “slowbalisation”.

The golden age of globalisation， in 1990-2010， was something to behold. Commerce soared as the cost of shifting goods in ships and planes fell， phone calls got cheaper， tariffs were cut and the financial system liberalised. International activity went gangbusters4， as firms set up around the world， investors roamed and consumers shopped in supermarkets with enough choice to impress Phileas Fogg5.

Globalisation has slowed from light speed to a snail’s pace in the past decade for several reasons. The cost of moving goods has stopped falling. Multinational firms have found that global sprawl burns money and that local rivals often eat them alive. Activity is shifting towards services， which are harder to sell across borders： scissors can be exported in 20ft-containers， hair stylists cannot. And Chinese manufacturing has become more self-reliant， so needs to import fewer parts.

Geopolitical rivalry is gripping the tech industry， which accounts for about 20% of world stockmarkets. Rules on privacy， data and espionage are splintering6. Tax systems are being bent to patriotic ends—in America to prod7 firms to repatriate8 capital， in Europe to target Silicon Valley. America and the EU have new regimes for vetting foreign investment. America has weaponised the power it gets from running the world’s dollar-payments system， to punish foreigners such as Huawei. Even humdrum9 areas such as accounting and antitrust are fragmenting.

Trade is suffering as firms use up the inventories they had stocked in anticipation of higher tariffs. But what really matters is firms’ long-term investment plans， as they begin to lower their exposure to countries and industries that carry high geopolitical risk or face unstable rules. There are now signs that an adjustment is beginning. The global value of cross-border investment by multinational companies sank by about 20% in 2018.

The new world will work differently. Slowbalisation will lead to deeper links within regional blocs. Supply chains in North America， Europe and Asia are sourcing more from closer to home. In Asia and Europe most trade is already intra-regional， and the share has risen since 2011. Asian firms made more foreign sales within Asia than in America in 2017. As global rules decay， a fluid patchwork of regional deals and spheres of influence is asserting control over trade and investment. The European Union is stamping10 its authority on banking， tech and foreign investment， for example.

Fortunately， this need not be a disaster for living standards. Continental-sized markets are large enough to prosper. Some 1.2bn people have been lifted out of extreme poverty since 1990， and there is no reason to think that the proportion of paupers11 will rise again. Western consumers will continue to reap large net benefits from trade. In some cases， deeper integration will take place at a regional level than could have happened at a global one.

Yet slowbalisation has two big disadvantages. First， it creates new difficulties. In 1990-2010 most emerging countries were able to close some of the gap with developed ones. Now more will struggle to trade their way to riches. And there is a tension between a more regional trading pattern and a global financial system in which Wall Street and the Federal Reserve12 set the pulse for markets everywhere. Most countries’ interest rates will still be affected by America’s even as their trade patterns become less linked to it， leading to financial turbulence. The Fed is less likely to rescue foreigners by acting as a global lender of last resort13， as it did a decade ago.

Second， slowbalisation will not fix the problems that globalisation created. Automation means there will be no renaissance of blue-collar jobs in the West. Firms will hire unskilled workers in the cheapest places in each region. Climate change， migration and tax-dodging will be even harder to solve without global co-operation.

Globalisation made the world a better place for almost everyone. But too little was done to mitigate its costs. The integrated world’s neglected problems have now grown in the eyes of the public to the point where the benefits of the global order are easily forgotten. Yet the solution on offer is not really a fix at all. Slowbalisation will be meaner and less stable than its predecessor. In the end it will only feed the discontent.

两年前，美国转向贸易保护主义，引发了诸多的警告：当心20世纪30年代的灾难重演。今天看来，这些不祥预言并不合乎情势。综观2018年，全球仍保持一定增长，失业减少，利润增加。11月，美国总统特朗普同墨西哥、加拿大签署了贸易协定。但若因此沾沾自喜就错了。当前全球贸易关系紧张，加剧了自2008—2009年金融危机肇始至今一直持续着的一种变化。正如我们介绍的，与全球GDP相比，跨境投资、贸易、银行贷款和供应链均一路萎缩或陷于停滞。全球化已让位于一个新的萧条时代。我们借用一位荷兰作家创造的新词，称之为“全球化放缓”。

1990—2010年，这是全球化的黄金时代，可谓引人注目。船只和飞机货运成本走低，电话费日趋便宜，关税削减，加上金融系统的放宽，使得商业突飞猛进。国际商业活动激增，各类公司全球开花，投资者无所不至，超市为消费者提供货品的选择之多，足以打动菲莱亚斯·福格。

过去十年，全球化从光速发展减慢到了蜗牛一般的速度，有几多原因。貨物运输的成本已停止下降。跨国公司发现，全球肆意扩张不光烧钱，还常落得被当地竞争对手鲸吞。业务正逐步转向服务类，而对其实施跨境营销较难：剪刀能装进20英尺集装箱出口，发型师则不行。中国制造业已然更加自给自足，需进口的零部件减少。

地缘政治对抗正席卷约占全球股市20%的技术工业。有关隐私、数据和间谍行为的规则正在分崩离析。税收体系被扭曲只为报国——在美国用以刺激企业把资本调回本国;在欧洲则以硅谷为攻击目标。美国和欧盟推出了新的外资审查制度。美国作为世界美元支付系统的维护者，已不惜拿这种威势作武器，惩罚诸如华为这样的外国企业。甚至会计和反垄断这类安常习故的领域也不断走向分化。

随着企业逐步用光为防关税提高而囤积的库存，贸易受到损害。不过真正关乎大局的是企业的长期投资计划，它们正纷纷着手调低对存在较高地缘政治风险或规则不稳定的国家或行业的依赖。目前已出现启动调整的迹象。2018年，跨国公司全球跨境投资总额下降约20%。

新世界将依循不同的运作方式。“全球化放缓”会导致区域性集团的内部联系加深。北美、欧洲和亚洲的供应链将更多地从靠近家门口的地方采购。亚洲和欧洲大多数贸易早已是区域内贸易，并且份额自2011年以来呈增长趋势。2017年，亚洲企业的国外销售额中，亚洲国家的占比比美国更高。随着全球规则效力变弱，地区协议层出不穷，势力范围划分不一，仿佛不断变化的拼缀图，掌控起贸易和投资。例如，欧盟正收揽对银行、技术和外国投资的管辖权。

幸运的是，这并不一定会殃及人们的生活水平。大陆级的市场足够大，能够自行繁荣。1990年以来，大约有12亿人受助摆脱赤贫，同时没有理由认为贫困人口的比例会再度回升。西方消费者将继续从贸易中获取巨大的净收益。在某些情况下，在区域层面将实现比全球层面更深入的一体化。

不过，“全球化放缓”有两大弊端。第一，它会制造新的难题。1990至2010年间，大多数新兴国家都得以在某种程度上缩减了与发达国家的差距。现今更多的国家会更难靠贸易致富。再者，一方面是贸易模式愈发区域化，一方面是全球金融体系下各方市场唯华尔街和美联储马首是瞻，两者之间无疑存在对立。对大多数国家来说，即便自身贸易模式可以逐步与美国脱钩，但其利率仍会继续受美国影响，进而引发金融动荡。不过，美联储已不太可能再像十年前那样充当全球最终贷款人，来拯救其他国家。

第二，“全球化放缓”解决不了全球化造成的问题。自动化意味着西方不会再出现蓝领工种的复兴。企业将从每个地区最廉价的地方招募非技术工人。没有了全球合作，气候变化、移居和避税等问题将更难解决。

全球化让世界更美好，惠及几乎每一个人。但减低其代价的工作却鲜有人做。一体化世界中那些被忽略的问题在公众眼中日益凸显，以致人们轻易忘却了全球秩序的好处。而提出的解决方案远非奏效之举。“全球化放缓”将比它之前的阶段更严苛动荡，到头来只会助长不满情绪。

（译者为“《英语世界》杯”翻译大赛获奖选手）