善意原则视角下的中菲南海仲裁案

罗 萨

善意原则视角下的中菲南海仲裁案

罗 萨*

文章以善意原则这一抽象的国际法基本原则为视角，分析南海仲裁案中菲律宾和仲裁庭之行为。第一部分研究善意原则在海洋划界背景下所具有的内涵。一方面，海洋划界争端的当事国受到善意原则的规制，特别以善意协商为代表，包括积极开展协商、充分进行协商和持续欢迎协商等；另一方面，善意原则也指引着争端解决机构作出真正合法合理的裁决。具体到仲裁案中，第二部分将菲律宾在仲裁过程中的行动与善意原则蕴含的主要要求相对应，指出菲方在种种方面对善意原则的违背。第三部分阐述仲裁庭作为争端解决机构，在审理过程中展示的做法，表明其判决也绝非善意之裁决。最后，文章以菲律宾和仲裁庭反以善意原则评判中国的行为，总结两者诚信的缺失，是对这一国际法一般原则的根本破坏。

善意原则 中国 菲律宾 仲裁庭 南海仲裁案

一、前 言

善意原则是国际法的基本原则之一，规制着国际法主体行使其权利的方式、履行其义务的态度，在国际法实践中发挥着极为重要的作用。随着《联合国海洋法公约》（以下简称“《公约》”）等海洋法公约逐步界定了专属经济区和大陆架的概念，国家对这些海域的主张也引发了新的分歧与冲突，海洋划界争端不断引发世界关注。而善意原则也指引着海洋划界行动，对于沿海国之间争端的解决具有重大的实践意义。

2013年1月22日，菲律宾依据《公约》第十五部分及附件七，单方面就与中国的南海争端启动仲裁程序。2015年10月29日，仲裁庭公布《关于管辖权和可受理性问题的裁决》。仲裁庭宣布其对菲律宾提交的15项诉求中的7项具有管辖权，并保留对其他8项诉求的管辖权问题的审议至实体问题阶段；也即菲律宾提交的所有15项诉求，被全部送入第二阶段庭审。2016年7月12日，仲裁庭发布了最终裁决，对中国南海断续线等一系列权利主张作出否定。至此，无论是争端当事方菲律宾，还是第三方司法机构仲裁庭，其种种做法都有违善意原则这一国际法基本原则的精神。

中菲南海仲裁案自启动以来，已经引发了学界极大的关注；但相关研究主要侧重于对菲律宾各项诉求，以及对仲裁庭之裁决特别是建立管辖权之初步裁决的深入剖析，即集中于法律依据和法理论证的角度。本文并未就仲裁相关法理依据作深入分析，而是站在善意原则的角度，更多地关注由法律原则产生的、更为抽象的义务，这是文章创新之处；由此，也希望能够对中国应对中菲南海争端作出浅薄的贡献。

二、善意原则与海洋划界

（一）善意原则概述

善意原则作为国际法的一项基本原则，在法律的所有领域和体制中都扮演着重要并且是基础性的角色。首先，自20世纪以来，众多国际性的多边公约都以明示或默示的方式，将善意原则纳入其内涵。例如《联合国宪章》（以下简称“《宪章》”）第2条规定的7项基本原则中，第2项原则即会员国应善意地履行宪章义务；①《联合国宪章》，1945年，第2条第2款。又如，《维也纳条约法公约》（以下简称“VCLT”）序言即规定，善意原则为举世所承认，并在约文中数次明确提到“善意”一词。②《维也纳条约法公约》，1969年，序言；第26条；第31条第1款；第46条第2款；第69条第2款（b）项。另外，涉及国际法不同领域的司法判例，也通过其裁决肯定了善意原则的地位，如国际法院在1974年“核试验案”中指出，善意原则是监督国家履行其法律义务的基本原则之一；③Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 46.在国际贸易领域，世界贸易组织（以下简称“WTO”）的争端解决机构也在其众多裁决中运用了善意原则。最后，该原则是国际法一般原则，也是习惯国际法的要求，这一点也早已为学界所公认。④J. F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1991, p. 124; Reviews of Books, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1957, p. 106; Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 73.可见，善意原则的地位和影响力已得到普遍的肯定；国际法的最基本规范，正是善意之原则。⑤Thomas Cottier、Krista N. Schefer：《WTO中的善意及合法期望之保护》（韩秀丽译、高波校），载于《国际经济法学刊》2005年第3期，第181页。

同样为人们所公认的是，善意原则的具体含义难以进行明确的定义。起源于罗马民法的善意原则，体现了对诚信契约和诚信诉讼的要求。诚信契约意即，契约双方在履行合约时应本着善意的初衷，承担因诚信要求而衍生的补充义务；诚信诉讼则要求，当事方在诉讼中善意行使诉讼权利，同时法官在解释和理解当事人约定和行使自由裁量权时，应本着善意，公平公正地做出裁判。伴随历史的进程，善意原则也普遍融入西方各国的法律制度，并随着国际交往的不断发展而走上国际法的舞台。国际法意义上的善意原则，最先来源于约定必须遵守；①Thomas Cottier、Krista N.Schefer：《WTO中的善意及合法期望之保护》（韩秀丽译、高波校），载于《国际经济法学刊》2005年第3期，第181页。WTO甚至把二者视作同义，并在相当数量的贸易争端中，结合具体案件对善意原则的内涵作出各有侧重的阐述。的确，作为基本法律原则，善意原则关注的不仅仅是行动过程中的某一或某些环节，而是对一切行动的整体规制，因此这一原则的含义是多面的，也是开放而包容的。《布莱克法律辞典》将“善意”一词定义为包含如下几种思想状态：信念或目的的诚实，忠诚于其义务，在贸易或商业中遵守公平交易的合理商业标准，没有欺诈或谋求不合理利益的意图。②Bryan A. Garner ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, Eagan: West Group, 2004, p. 2038.“善意”要求行为主体的合情合理、诚实守信，它难以被赋予客观的衡量标准，而更倾向于主观上的定义。

值得特别注意的是，在国际法实践之中，善意原则不可凭空存在。国际法院指出，善意原则本身并不能单独构成法律义务的来源。③Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 46.对善意原则的违反不是抽象的、凭空的，这种违反可能建立在对条约的违反之上，或与对另一方利益造成损害相关，或是以违背某项义务为基础。例如，在“核试验案”中，法国曾声明停止在南太平洋的核试验，尽管声明是单方面自愿的，国际法院认为善意原则要求法国必须遵守其声明。④Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, paras. 46～51.在“关于《1995年临时协议》的申请案”中，国际法院需要判断当事国马其顿是否违反善意协商的义务，该义务基于一份临时协议的规定。⑤Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 127.正如WTO上诉机构所阐明的，要构成违背善意原则，需要满足两个要件，一是存在对某具体法条或义务的违反，二是不仅仅存在单纯的违反。⑥United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Appellate Body Report, 2003, para. 298.

因此，善意原则作为一项缺乏明确行为模式的概念，其含义还需要结合具体的适用环境，结合国际实践进行探究——正所谓“可以被说明但无法被定义”。⑦Reviews of Books, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1957, p. 106.在海洋划界这一语境下，善意原则也起到了指引作用。

（二）海洋划界中的善意原则之于当事国

国际法的基本原则作为对国际条约与国际习惯的补充，对于国际法的各个领域、各个方面都具有重要意义，①詹宁斯、瓦茨修订，王铁崖等译：《奥本海国际法》，北京：中国大百科全书出版社1995年版，第23页。海洋法自然也不例外。《公约》第300条明文规定，缔约国应善意履行根据公约承担的义务，②《联合国海洋法公约》，1982年，第300条。从而对各国的海洋划界行动提出了总括性的要求，更有着深厚的内涵。当然，善意原则本身并不凭空产生新的法律义务。本文将要探讨的种种义务也都基于实体法而存在，而善意原则支撑着这些义务的实现：它是对履行这些义务的监督，更是对履行义务之态度的监督。③Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 74.

1.善意展开协商的义务

《公约》第74条与第83条，就专属经济区和大陆架界限的划定做出了规定；此两条的第1款均指出，海洋边界应由有关国家协议划定，以便得到公平解决。④《联合国海洋法公约》，第74条第1款，第83条第1款。因此，这一规定蕴含着成员国就海洋划界展开协商的义务；国际法院的多项判例也将该条款下的义务与善意原则联系起来。善意展开协商的含义可进一步具体为以下2点。

第一，善意协商之义务意味着，一国单方面进行的海洋划界可能是无效的。诚然，两国之间可能不会展开正式的协商谈判，而是采取一系列国家行为进行互动：一国单方面主张，而另一国并未表示反对，以默许的方式最终形成了默示的海域边界。但由于《公约》明文规定了海洋边界的确立方式——协定优先的方式，则一旦其他国家对一国的划界主张提出抗议，该国单方面的行为即已经构成了对《公约》的违反。不得单方面采取可能对其他国家造成影响的行动，这是善意履行《公约》义务的要求，也将在国际法的其他领域找到辅证。

适用于WTO成员国的《关税与贸易总协定》（以下简称“GATT”）是WTO的前身，也是WTO法关于货物贸易最重要的协定之一；其第20条引言规定，成员国不应采取任意或不合理歧视的手段。⑤《关税与贸易总协定》，1947年，第20条引言。在“美国龟虾案”的最终判决中，WTO争端解决机构明确指出GATT第20条引言是善意原则的一种表达。⑥United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 1998, para. 158.在该案中，美国针对进口的虾产品设立了一项法规，但并未事先与所有受到影响的国家就法规进行协商。WTO上诉机构认为，美国单方面通过和实施这一法规的行为是不合理的，并且没有考虑各国不同的具体情况，是武断的行为。⑦United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 1998, paras. 172, 177.可见，各国应达成一致，而不是单方面独断地进行主张，这一点在国际法各领域都是不争的事实，与善意原则这一国际法一般原则相符。

既然如此，善意展开协商的第二点含义也就自然而然、不言而喻：各国应当就海洋划界问题进入协商，开启谈判，寻求达成协议。在“北海大陆架案”中，国际法院认为大陆架划界相关的具体法规，以正义和善意的基本原则为基础，各国有进入协商的义务。①North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 85.“缅因湾案”更明确地将协商的义务与善意原则联系了起来：“海域划界应通过善意协商，由协议达成……”②Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, para. 112(1).2002年，“喀麦隆—尼日利亚案”又一次确认了善意协商的义务。③Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, para. 244.

总而言之，在海洋划界中，国家首先应善意地开展协商，寻求与其他相关国家达成共同的协议；而一切单方面行动——包括单方面划界、勘探、开发等等，都是有违《公约》精神的。

2.善意进行协商以寻求达成协议的义务

相比开启协商，在意图达成协议的目标下继续进行协商，才更是一国善意的试金石。国家应就协商付出多大的努力？怎样程度的协商才是“足够的”？是否协商过程中出现任何一点的相持不下，都足以令当事国转而付诸争端解决程序？《公约》无法回答这些更具主观性的问题；但通过这些问题，善意进行协商的重要性已可见一斑。究竟能否和平、友好地完成海洋划界，很大程度上依赖于各国进行协商的善意。本文希望强调的是，善意原则下协商的义务不仅仅是程序上的，有意义的协商才是关键，这要求双方真诚地进行协商，尽一切努力，寻求以协议方式完成划界。

首先，各国都有各自更倾向使用的划界方法，其偏好的方法可能不尽相同，但这并不是当事国逃避协商合作的理由。在第三次联合国海洋法会议漫长的谈判过程中，众多国家围绕大陆架和专属经济区的划界规则展开了激烈争论，并形成了两派观点。巴哈马等24国组成的一派支持中间线法为首要原则，阿尔及利亚等32国为代表的另一派则认为，中间线原则并不优先于其他多种划界原则，海洋划界应将衡平原则放在首位。然而无论支持哪一种划界方法，两派的提案都不约而同地承认，海域界线应由国家间的协议确立。①Informal Proposal by Bahamas, Barbados, Canada, Colombia, Cyrus, Democratic Yemen, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malta, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia (later joined by Cape Verde, Chile, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau and Portugal), UN General Assembly Document NG7/2; Informal Proposal by Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Congo, France, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Syria, Somalia, Turkey, Venezuela and Vietnam, UN General Assembly Document NG 7/10.当事国海洋划界主张中的种种分歧，可以采取灵活变通的方式，善意地协商解决。前国际法院院长布斯塔曼特·伊·里韦罗法官在其关于“北海大陆架案”的独立意见中说，关于大陆架的协商需要引入善意和灵活的要素，这些要素可以协调保持和平睦邻关系的需要与法律的严谨性。②North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Separate Opinion of President J. L. Bustamante Y Rivero, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 58.该案判决更指出，当事国有义务开展有意义的协商，而不是固执己见。③North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 85.在该案中，当事方——丹麦与荷兰两国——在判决前一直坚持中间线原则，而不愿作任何让步，这被判定为与有意义的灵活协商义务相悖。④North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 87.此处也再次体现了善意原则提倡灵活合理、反对独断僵化的内涵，与WTO法对独断和不合理歧视的禁止相互印证，异曲同工。

由此，应当说各国海洋划界之主张无论有怎样的分歧，在协商解决分歧这一点上都不应存在争议。然而，国家实践表明，一些国家更倾向于协商之外的其他方式；但根据上文已列出的《公约》规定，海洋划界问题又必须首先经过协商寻求解决，未果才可付诸其他程序，主要指《公约》第十五部分的争端解决程序。国家是否具有协商的真诚实意，以及这一真意到底到达了何种程度，构成了善意进行协商所面临的第2个问题。

根据国际法院所述，既然需要进行有意义的协商以寻求取得一致，那么在付诸种种努力进行这类协商之前，争端解决机构应避免对实体问题作出不成熟的裁判。法庭审议的初步事宜应为：上诉方是否确实履行了其协商的义务。⑤Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 682.本文认为，上诉方对待协商的态度，是其是否遵循善意原则要求的一项关键证明，这在中菲南海仲裁案中也具有特别的意义。遗憾的是，判例法对此尚没有明确的表述，仅能依靠对判决隐含之意以及学者观点的解读，寻找善意协商的踪迹。

国际法院曾在判决中阐明，协商的义务意味着当事方怀着达成协议的目标参与到谈判中，而并非只为完成这一程序上的前提要件，但实际上却意在进入后续的其他程序。⑥North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 85.据此，在进入第三方争端解决程序之前，国家应充分展开真诚的协商，而非仅仅做“表面功夫”。在国际海洋法法庭审理的“马来西亚—新加坡围海造地案”中，一位法官便明确指出了这点：“交换意见之要求并非一项空洞的形式，不可为争端方随意舍弃。该义务必须善意履行。”①Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Separate Opinion of Chandrasekhara Rao, ITLOS Reports 2003, para. 11.正如《布莱克法律辞典》之释义所说，真诚，是善意协商最基本的要义。

在“爱琴海大陆架案”中，希腊更倾向于以第三方程序解决与土耳其的划界争端，而土耳其则坚持协商优先。当然，希腊更偏好司法程序的解决方法，这一事实本身不能说明其在协商中就不具备真意，并且希腊也确实同意与土耳其协商。但希腊在1975年10月2日的外交照会中也明确表示，争端应“首先提交国际法院”，而“不排除随后继续进行协商”。②Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, para. 20.其一系列的声明和行动也都表明，希腊在没有与土耳其开展充分协商的情况下，就将争端提交了国际法院；从法院自身对事实的陈述也能看出，双方仅仅进行了初步的、程序上的对话，而尚未“充分展开严肃认真、灵活适当的善意协商”。③Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 683.希腊同时也将该问题提交了联合国安理会，安理会在对此作出的决议中“要求”双方恢复直接谈判，并“呼吁它们竭尽力量，保证谈判产生双方都可接受的解决方法”。④Security Council Resolutions, S/RES/395, 1976.应当说，安理会也认为双方在此之前进行的协商并不充分，努力达成特别协定的解决方式应当优先于司法程序。⑤Leo Gross, The Dispute between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 71, Issue 1, 1977, p. 32.

土耳其在案件审理过程中坚持，协商尚不成熟，双方应当回到谈判中去；只有那些善意协商确实无法解决的问题，并且只有在确实面临这类问题的时刻，才能将其诉诸法庭。⑥Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, paras. 21, 28; UN Doc S/PV.1950, United Nations, 13 August 1976.鉴于土耳其的观点，法庭应有义务检验双方在进入司法程序之前，是否充分履行了它们协商的义务；假如协商是初步的、表面的，甚至有当事方缺乏协商的真意，只是为了满足使用其他方法的程序要件，这类行为就不符合善意原则下协商的要求。

法庭完全有立场裁判争端是否尚处于协商的初步阶段，可能适用的解决方案还远远没有为双方所探讨，也即协商的义务是否被“足够、充分”地履行。⑦Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 686.国际法院并未对此给出明确的观点；⑧Cottier教授因此也将本案称为被国际法院“错过的机会”。但无论是“爱琴海大陆架案”之裁决，还是上文已谈到的“北海大陆架案”等，亦或是学者们的真知灼见，都指向这一完全合理的结论：当事国应以达成一致为目标，真诚地参与协商，这意味着以灵活、合理的态度，充分考虑各种可能的划界方法，而不是使协商沦为一项表面程序。

3.其他争端解决程序不构成对协商的妨碍

上文提到的“爱琴海大陆架案”同时证明，即使争端方已经将争议付诸司法程序，也并不妨碍协商在法庭之外继续进行。实际上，作为上诉方的希腊也并未排除协商，而是优先选择第三方程序而已；在案件审理阶段，当事两国仍然继续进行了多次谈判，甚至同意大陆架划界问题应努力由协商解决。①Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, paras. 20, 24～26.

协商作为最有效也是最自然的争端解决方式，其地位早已为国际社会反复确认。国际法院在1974年“渔业管辖权案”中，将协商称作“显然是和平解决争端的最合适方法。”②Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 73.安理会关于爱琴海大陆架问题的决议，更进一步支持了这一点。仅仅因为一国将争端诉诸协商之外的其他程序，并不能断言其行动是恶意的，③Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 52.这也是善意原则对国家行为进行善意推定的要求；但另一方面，既然并非恶意，该国也就不应放弃协商的努力，在其他争端解决程序之外，协商仍然可以继续或重启，这也是该国的确遵循善意原则的有力证明。

（三）海洋划界中争端解决机构的善意

《公约》第十五部分建立了综合的海洋争端解决机制，由此，各国可以选择的第三方争端解决方法包括调解、国际海洋法法庭、国际法院、附件七仲裁和附件八特别仲裁。这些方法所指向的第三方争端解决机构，也应当根据善意原则行事，探寻能够为所有当事国接受的、真正具有意义的结果。尽管适用于国际司法机构的国际规约并没有明文提到善意原则，但国际争端要真正得以解决，需要争端解决机构与当事方共同的努力，这一点是确凿无疑的。因而争端解决机构不可因其作为“裁判员”，行动可能不会招致惩罚，就任意行事；这类做法也的确鲜有发生，国际司法实践一贯体现出对善意裁决的认同。

上文已经详细分析了协商在海洋划界中的优先地位，这一重要地位正是由国际法院等争端解决机构反复确认的。为了确保协商发挥其应有的作用，不仅当事国应善意进行协商，争端解决机构也应作出相应的努力。

首先，在合理地用尽协商的可能方案之前，也即，未能确定经善意协商后仍存在无法解决的问题时，争端解决机构不应就实体问题作出裁判。这要求判决机构考量当事方是否确实善意履行了协商义务。

第二，第三方机构的善意当然并不代表它们永远不应当作出裁判，或是想方设法逃避裁判。但是，根据不同案件的具体情形，一项最终确定的、没有进一步协商余地的判决，可能无法为当事一方完全接受。在这种情况下，可能产生2种结果：轻则判决效力受到减损，重则有适得其反之效——判决有利的一方要求将结果付诸实施，不利的一方则拒绝实施，双方矛盾加剧，争端解决机构非但未能解决争端，反而弄巧成拙。另外，国际司法的有效性，尚依赖于国家自愿的服从；①Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 688.故司法机构更有必要坚持中立，坚持客观的法律原则作出裁判。鉴于以上原因，第三方机构在面临上述类似情况时，应作出鼓励协商的裁决，而不是不留余地的、终结性的决定。

“北海大陆架案”就是这方面的范例，法庭最终的决定是，海洋界线应当根据衡平原则，经协议达成，协商过程中应考虑法庭指出的各项因素。②North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 101(C), (D).“渔业管辖权案”更明确提出善意协商，判定当事国“有义务进行善意谈判以寻求公平解决分歧”，以及“充分考虑对方所享有的权益”。③Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, paras. 78～79.法庭在最终判决中所提供的也许不是可以直接付诸实施的方法，不是一目了然的明确结果，而是一种指引和鼓励，引导各国就和平解决其争端付出更多努力。

将司法解决争端的方式简单视为直接友善协商的替代方法，这一说法已经不再准确了。它更应当成为一种互动的方法，不仅没有削减争端解决体制的效力，反而为及时、有效的协商助力。④Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 690.以裁决要求各国重回谈判桌，从而取得争端的和平解决，或许这才是争端解决机构所能作出的最有意义之贡献。争端解决机构，正如其名，应当为争端最终获得解决而考虑，为国际法律规则和原则得到遵循和守护而考虑；这是其作为第三方机构对争端方的善意，更是对国际法之长期稳定发展的善意。

（四）条约必须遵守；不得减损条约的目的及宗旨

条约必须遵守，是国际社会赖以存在和运行的一大基石，是国家善意最基本的体现之一；善意原则最初的内涵，就在于条约信守。①J.F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, p. 124; Thomas Cottier、Krista N. Schefer：《WTO中的善意及合法期望之保护》（韩秀丽译、高波校），载于《国际经济法学刊》2005年第3期，第181页。VCLT第26条明文要求国家善意履行有效之条约；《宪章》也有类似的规定。早在百年之前，国际法实践也已确认了这一点：1910年“北大西洋渔业案”判决指出，任何国家均有义务善意履行条约所产生之义务。②李浩培著：《条约法概论》，北京：法律出版社2003年版，第277页。

另一方面，VCLT第31条阐述了条约解释之通则，其第1款规定，条约应依其用语、按其上下文、并参照条约之目的及宗旨所具有之通常意义，进行善意解释。第18条也规定，只要国家表示接纳了条约，则在条约生效之前也不得妨碍其目的及宗旨；该条款也被视为对善意原则的表达。③Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 667, note 53.对条约的遵守，也意味着对其目的与宗旨的认同，意味着促进而不是破坏条约目的及宗旨的实现，这也是善意原则的基本要求之一。④Anthony D’Amato, Good Faith, in Rudolf Bernhardt ed., Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 599.条约的目的及宗旨，代表着缔约国的共同期望；“期望乃法律之命脉”，⑤Stephen M. Schwebel, The Compliance Process and the Future of International Law, in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1981, p. 182.在善意原则之下，缔约国根据条约产生的合法期望应当受到保护。

《公约》序言是对《公约》整体目标的表达，其中明确指出，与海洋法相关的一切问题都应本着互相谅解和合作的精神进行解决。由此可见，《公约》基本目标的实现有赖于国家间的理解与合作，这也再次强调了上文分析的协商之重要地位。此外，保持开明、灵活、诚恳的态度，行动透明而不带有保留或隐藏的目的，等等——凡此种种善意的表现，显然都是“互相谅解与合作精神”的题中之义。

为了实现在海洋划界中达成最终协议的目标，《公约》还做出了更加具体的规定。第74条第3款和类似的第83条第3款，敦促各国作出临时安排，且临时安排不得危害或阻碍最后协议的达成。“圭亚那—苏里南案”仲裁庭认为，以上条款包含2项义务：一是致力于推进临时制度和具体措施，从而为争议地区的暂时开发利用扫除障碍；二是尽一切努力，不危害或阻碍取得最终协议。⑥Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, 2007, paras. 460, 467.这要求善意协商，且双方的一些行为，例如苏里南威胁使用武力的行为，构成了对达成最终协议的危害。⑦Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, 2007, paras. 460, 484.

总之，不得减损条约目的及宗旨很大程度上需要各国努力协商，并有义务避免采取阻碍协商进程的行为。各国有义务信守条约之规定，善意行使自身权利，履行自身义务，促进条约目的及宗旨的实现。

（五）真诚——善意原则之核心

通过以上对善意原则多方面内涵的阐述，应当说，善意原则并不具有清晰、准确的含义，并没有一套客观、严格的检验标准；其一切要求，都与“真诚”这一抽象的品质紧密相连。然而，善意原则作为国际法基本原则的意义也正在于此。为了更好地发挥法律原则的作用，填补国际条约和习惯尚未覆盖的空白，善意原则的范畴恰恰应当是灵活和广泛的。①R. Summers教授就将善意原则称为“安全阀”，指出其定义应当是开放而不是封闭的。See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 54, Issue 2, 1968, p. 266.真心与诚意是善意原则的试金石；②For example, J.F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1991, p. 118; Andrew D. Mitchell, Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 2006, p. 339.以真诚为核心，善意原则总体上要求国家抱着开明的态度，在争议中以灵活的方式考虑所有可能方法，致力于协商合作，并采取诚实的行动。

三、南海仲裁案中菲律宾行为对善意原则之违背

国际法上的善意原则，对海洋划界争端中当事方和第三方仲裁机构的行动，都做出了颇有分量的指导，应当为各方所重视。中国与菲律宾在南海主张的专属经济区和大陆架存在重叠，且对南海诸岛的主权归属存在争议，双方之间的争端是主权争端和海洋划界争端。因而争端当事方菲律宾，以及争端解决机构仲裁庭均应遵循善意原则。但审视案件全程，菲律宾和仲裁庭的行为已屡屡违背了善意原则之于海洋划界的指引。

（一）善意协商的关键地位

争端方开启协商的行动本身，就是善意的表示，而本着寻求协议解决冲突的目标将协商进行下去，也是双方善意的有力体现。在这方面，不得不说菲方的行为已将善意原则破坏殆尽。

1.菲律宾未就仲裁展开协商

首先，争端当事国不仅应启动协商，还应致力于协商的持续开展。中菲已经进行过多次友好协商，双方共同作出的一系列双边声明就是协商成果的代表；这一点也得到了菲律宾的承认。在仲裁案诉讼过程中，菲方代表曾总结道，中菲多年来已就南海争端各个议题展开了协商，包括中国的“历史性权利”、黄岩岛和南沙群岛的海洋权利、相关海域的捕鱼和航行权、在相关海域内进行岛礁建设等方面。①Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, pp. 28～32.

然而，菲方代表在仲裁庭面前隐去的事实是，两国有关南海争端的协商进程，在2012年黄岩岛事件之后几乎戛然而止。该事件发生半年后，菲律宾单方面发起仲裁，在此之前从未就仲裁事项与中国协商；菲方共提出15项诉求，没有任何一项曾与中国协商甚至交换意见。

既然中菲之间已经存在协商的通道，则有任何新的观点或提议，首先都理应继续经这一通道向对方提出，否则两国多年来对协商合作的努力经营和长期付出就将付诸东流。假如菲律宾有意提交仲裁，或认为协商已入僵局、第三方的介入将帮助取得进展，那么应直接向中国做出提议，听取中方对其诉求之意见。但实际情况却是，菲方不仅没有就具体的任何一类诉求与中国商讨，甚至，其准备将整个中菲争端提交仲裁的这一意图都没有向中国吐露。2012年4月26日，菲律宾在其照会中提出要将黄岩岛问题提交第三方司法机构，这也是菲方在发起仲裁前，就进入司法程序一事向中国递交的唯一表述；而就是这唯一的一份文件，从善意原则的角度审视也是漏洞百出。照会仅提出将黄岩岛问题提交司法程序，而没有提及南沙群岛等其他问题；没有说明第三方司法机构具体指国际法院、国际海洋法法庭还是仲裁机构；没有表达任何要与中国谈判的意愿，且文件的性质——由外交部发出的普通照会——本身也表明，菲方之意仅限于做一通知。②《中华人民共和国政府关于菲律宾共和国所提南海仲裁案管辖权问题的立场文件》（以下简称“《立场文件》”），2014年12月7日，第48段。随后，2013年1月22日，菲即声明将发起仲裁。

根据以上事实可知，菲律宾的行动没有履行充分协商的义务；严格地说，就发起仲裁一事而言，菲律宾甚至没有试图与中国开启新的协商。

2.菲律宾之“协商”缺乏真意

即使真如菲律宾所争辩的，在发起仲裁前已经进行了协商，其对待协商的态度也不堪一击。本文强调，上诉方对于协商是否具有真意，是其是否遵循善意原则要求的关键证明，这一点可从两个方面得到检验：一是，作为上诉方的国家是否确实进行了充分协商，还是仅仅协商，以不至于公然违反《公约》规定的程序要件；二是，司法程序启动后如有可能，上诉方是否仍愿意参与到协商中去。菲律宾之行为未能经住任何一项考验。

案件初步审议过程中，仲裁庭曾提问，“若《公约》第283条确实要求当事方首先就争端实体问题进行协商，则这类协商应具体到怎样的程度，以及菲律宾是否已就其具体的每项诉求与中国充分交换了意见。”①Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, p. 32.仲裁庭这一问题问到了点子上。菲方作出了这样的回答：“就诉求实质进行逐项协商是不必要的；只要从整体上就争端交换了意见，就满足了第283条的要求……；就《公约》各项具体条款交换意见也是不必要的。”②Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People's Republic of China, PCA, pp. 34～35.菲律宾将协商贬为浮于表面的程序需要，这一意图在以上回答中可谓呼之欲出。既然诉求反映了菲国在南海争端中的主要观点，其实质自然应在协商中讨论，否则协商意义何在？菲方这一说法已经自证，其仲裁开始前进行的所谓协商根本不具诚意。另外，协商谈判与第三方仲裁同为解决争端的方式，就这一最终目的而言，两者并无二致。既然菲方认为争端涉及多项议题，故而列出林林总总15项诉求请仲裁庭一一裁决，那么，若真意希望和平解决这种种议题，在协商中又怎能不逐项逐条地交换意见？试想，假如一场谈判中，一方甚至连自己的具体主张都没有告知对方，也就更谈不上“听取”或“交换”意见，则谈判的实质内容何在？再者，“只要交换了意见，就满足了第283条要求”的用语，几乎是明确地承认，协商对菲方而言只不过是表面程序。可见菲方已决心倚仗仲裁，在此基础上，即使其就仲裁事宜与中国有过对话，这种对话也失去了意义。因为，菲方根本不是怀着寻求取得一致的目标与中国“协商”（假如还能被称为协商的话）的，甚至可能恰恰相反——毕竟失败的协商更是进入仲裁程序的强大理由。我国不应，更不愿对菲律宾作这样近乎恶意的推定，但菲方对待协商的态度着实难以令人信服。

善意原则之要义，就在于诚意履行条约赋予之义务，避免使条约在事实上归于无效。因此，即使菲方曾经有过所谓“协商”的举动，也仍未善意履行《公约》对于协商的规定。

3.仲裁不妨碍协商的继续

最后，作为上诉方的当事国仍然愿意甚至欢迎继续协商，这也是其善意履行和平解决争端之义务的上佳体现。“爱琴海大陆架案”的当事双方并未因为争端已经进入司法程序，就停止协商的步伐，而是继续进行了数次谈判。③Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, paras. 24～26.正如该案的一位法官在其独立意见中所指明的，由于国家间争端往往错综复杂、涉及多个层面，多种途径相结合的方式可能更有助于争端解决；因此国家可以选择的解决途径是互补的，并非互不相容。④Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 52.也许，有些海洋划界争端在几种争端解决方式同时适用的情况下，反而更能促进争端的解决；无论如何，可以肯定的是，第三方争端解决机构的介入并不阻碍协商的进行，甚至，这些机构往往都鼓励和呼吁继续协商。

不幸的是，南海仲裁案被提交以来数年，中菲之间协商的进程已陷入停滞。对于中国一再呼吁重启协商的意愿，菲国一律一口回绝。2013年1月菲提交仲裁后，中国驻菲大使馆随即请菲方通过双边谈判解决争端，而菲律宾总统府发言人的回应是，中国的邀请来得太迟了，“让我们在法庭见”。①朱晓磊：《中国吁菲律宾就领土争端谈判》，下载于http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/ 2013-01/3577769.html，2017年1月30日。至今，菲律宾在政府新闻发布会等官方场合已多次作出类似的表态，认为中国的立场要求菲首先承认“整个南中国海属于中国”，在仲裁结果出炉之前不会进行双边磋商。②See Response of the DFA Spokesperson to the Recent Statement of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the West Philippine Sea Issue, at http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/ newsroom/dfa-releases/332-response-of-the-dfa-spokesperson-to-the-recent-statementof-the-chinese-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-west-philippine-sea-issue, 1 February 2017；朱艳芳：《菲律宾称2016年前不会和中国重启南海争端双边谈判》，下载于http://news.ifeng.com/a/20141211/42697421_0.shtml，2017年2月1日；Statement before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, at http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/ dfa-releases/6795-statement-before-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration, 1 February 2017.

正在进行中的司法程序根本不构成协商之阻碍，问题之根本在于，当事方究竟是否存有以协商优先解决争端的善意。这一善意之于菲方是大有疑问的，显然它根本不愿为双边合作作出努力，一再拒绝与中国协商。自相矛盾的是，菲律宾同时又宣称自己遵守争端解决的相关法律，甚至呼吁国际社会遵循法律规定以和平解决争端。③PHL Stresses Adherence to Rule of Law as Key to Peaceful Settlement of Disputes; Highlights World Development Challenges and Calls on UN Reforms, at http://www.dfa. gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/4202-phl-stresses-adherence-to-rule-of-law-askey-to-peaceful-settlement-of-disputes-highlights-world-development-challenges-and-callson-un-reforms, 1 February 2017.既然如此，菲方就更应当铭记，无论是《宪章》、《公约》等国际公约，还是国际法一般原则善意原则，都要求争端当事国首先致力于有意义的、充分的协商。

（二）条约必须遵守、不减损条约目的及宗旨之义务

1.《公约》的规定、目的及宗旨

《公约》约文反复肯定了协商合作的重要性。第280条声明，不损害当事国任何时候协议采用自行选择的和平方法之权利；第281条指出，如已协议用自行选择的和平方法来谋求解决争端，则只有在诉诸这种方法而仍未解决时才适用《公约》规定的解决程序；第283条，缔约国对《公约》的解释或适用发生争端，则应迅速就以谈判或其他和平方法解决争端一事交换意见。仅在关于争端解决的第十五部分中，明文提到谈判等“和平方法”一词的就有4项条款；④《联合国海洋法公约》，第279～281、283条。表达了应当优先协商之意的，或是指向了要求协商之条款的文字，更比比皆是。例如第286条，已诉诸该部分第一节而仍未解决的、关于《公约》解释及适用的争端，才可提交具有约束力的强制裁判程序；而第一节则强调将双边协商放在优先地位。《公约》以复杂的、相互照应的条款，构建出一套争端解决机制，却又几乎是小心翼翼地确保双边协商的争端解决方法不仅不受这一机制的干扰，更位于这一机制之上。对《公约》的信守，已然要求各国充分展开协商，诚意进行合作。

而关于《公约》的目的及宗旨，其序言和第十六部分的一般规定都作出了指引：与海洋法相关的一切问题都应本着互相谅解和合作的精神进行解决；缔约国应诚意履行其义务，并以不致构成滥用权利的方式，行使其权利、管辖权和自由。如果说《公约》有关自行协商的明文规定，尚能够经任何双边对话得到表面上的满足，而无需关注谈判实质，那么《公约》追求的目的和宗旨，则对成员国的善意提出了更高的要求。

事实表明，菲律宾在仲裁案酝酿期间、启动之时以及进程之中，均未与中国进行协商，或是确实旨在寻求共识的真意协商。因此，首先，假如菲律宾提交仲裁的争端果真如其所称，是关于《公约》的解释及适用的争端，则应根据《公约》第283条，与中方就以和平方法解决争端交换意见。但菲从未就其任何诉求询问中国意见，故而已经违反了《公约》明文条款，违反了条约必须遵守之要求。

退一步讲，即使中菲关于仲裁一事有过交流——如菲方所坚称的——这种交流也毫无诚意。原因在于菲律宾认为没有必要具体商讨其诉求，从而使双方可能开展的任何协商沦为表面功夫。由此，菲律宾抛弃了协商的目标，忽视了合作的真谛，减损了《公约》的目的及宗旨。

2.中菲之间多项双边及多边协议的规定、目的及宗旨

除了《公约》本身，中菲更有一系列《公约》所指的协定，对两国争端的解决方式作了明确要求。中国与菲律宾就以友好协商解决南海争端早有共识；自1995年以来，中菲之间多项联合声明等官方文件都明确指出，双方争议将通过双边友好协商加以解决。①中国关于仲裁案的立场文件引用了多份此类声明，参见《立场文件》，第31～34段。2002年签署的《南海各方行为宣言》（以下简称“《宣言》”）更有如下规定：各方以《宪章》宗旨和原则等公认的国际法原则作为处理国家间关系的基本准则；各方承诺根据公认的国际法原则，通过友好磋商和谈判，以和平方式解决领土和管辖权争议。②《南海各方行为宣言》，2002年，第1、4条。协商的地位也得到了现任菲律宾政府的确认，2011年中菲联合声明重申以和平对话处理争议，并重申将遵守《宣言》。③《立场文件》，第37段。中国坚持认为，中菲一系列双边文件以及包含中菲两国的多边文件，都构成具有约束力的协议，也即《公约》第280条和281条所指的协议，要求两国承担以协商解决争端的义务。以下以《宣言》为例做进一步分析。

首先，《宣言》属于对中菲具有约束力的政治协议。VCLT第2条第1款规定：“称‘条约’者，谓国家间所缔结而以国际法为准之国际书面协定，不论其载于一项单独文书或两项以上相互有关之文书内，亦不论其特定名称如何。”①《维也纳条约法公约》，第2条第1款。一项协议之所以称其为协议，关键在于当事方具有创设国际法上权利与义务的意思表达。②詹宁斯、瓦茨修订，王铁崖等译：《奥本海国际法》，北京：中国大百科全书出版社1995年版，第1203页。未经签署的文件，例如新闻公报，也可能成为协议，③詹宁斯、瓦茨修订，王铁崖等译：《奥本海国际法》，北京：中国大百科全书出版社1995年版，第1209页。包含有法律义务的会议记录等文件，也可能成为协议。④Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, para. 41(1).因此，当事方的意图和文件使用的文字，才是决定文件是否成为具有约束力之协议的要素。

《宣言》明文规定，以《宪章》宗旨和原则以及《公约》等国际法原则，作为处理国家间关系的基本准则；各方经《宣言》承诺，根据公认的国际法原则，由直接有关的主权国家通过友好磋商和谈判，以和平方式解决它们的领土和管辖权争议。⑤《南海各方行为宣言》，2002年，第1、4条。这说明《宣言》包含了明确的行为规则。对“承诺”一词的使用，也彰显了缔约国确立相互之间义务的意图。⑥《立场文件》，第38段。另外，《宣言》是由中国外交部副部长和东盟成员国外交部部长或外交大臣所签署的，也即政府的官方代表。⑦原文为“声明……经由主要官方代表签署，且此声明含有包括明确行为规则这种巳获同意之结论的话，此文件就对当事国家具有约束力。”詹宁斯、瓦茨修订，王铁崖等译：《奥本海国际法》，北京：中国大百科全书出版社1995年版，第1189页。综上，《宣言》应被视为具有法律约束力的协议文件。

因此，《宣言》所规定之“由直接有关的主权国家通过友好磋商和谈判”解决争议的方法，才是菲律宾应当坚持的方式。而《宣言》之序言也宣告了其宗旨所在：为和平与永久解决有关国家间分歧和争议创造有利条件。菲律宾不仅没有主动履行与中国协商的义务，面对中国提出的协商请求也是一律回绝，这一行为是对《宣言》的违背，同时也超出了对《宣言》的违背，是对《宣言》目的及宗旨的破坏。

第二，根据菲律宾在诉讼中的论辩，《宣言》并非有约束力的协议，只是一份政治性文件。菲方也分析了“承诺”一词，认为这一用语和“同意”的效力是不同的，各国仅是“声明”它们的“承诺”。⑧Memorial of the Philippines, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, 2014, paras. 7.51. [hereinafter “The Memorial”]但《布莱克法律辞典》对“承诺”的解释，却无法支撑菲方观点；该词的含义包括承担一项义务，或作出正式的承诺，或以保证的方式行事。①Bryan A. Garner ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, Eagan: West Group, 2004, p. 4741.这些用词是毫不含糊的，无论哪一项解释都表明了行为人确定的意图。菲方扭曲解释《宣言》用语，这已然有违善意解释条约的要求；同时，将《宣言》视作没有约束力的文件从而任意行事，也漠视了《宣言》所有签署国当时创设相关义务的意图。正如前文所述，条约的宗旨反映了所有缔约国共同的期望，而不是某一方任意的观点；对条约目的及宗旨的保护，也是对各国共同的合法期望之保护，这是缔约国相互之间应当展现的善意。

第三，菲律宾还提出，中国与东盟成员国在4个领域多项问题上都无法达成共识，故《宣言》只是妥协的产物，这一签署时期的情况也表明《宣言》不具有约束力。②The Memorial, para. 7.55.然而，《宣言》的实施情况只能证明相反的结论。中国与东盟各国随后继续签订了《宣言》后续行动指南，包括与菲律宾发布联合声明重申遵守《宣言》。③《中华人民共和国和菲律宾共和国联合声明》，2011年9月1日。菲律宾自身持续参与了《宣言》签署以来的协商会议，却从未在会上表示无法与中国沟通的类似意见。恰恰在菲方提交其诉状前夕，2014年3月18日，落实《宣言》的第十次联合工作组会议召开，菲律宾与中国代表双双参会；会议的目的正是要落实《宣言》。假如菲国认为《宣言》不具有约束力从而根本不打算履行其要求，又何必参与落实《宣言》的协商进程？或者，在这一进程中，菲国又为何不提出其异议？毫无疑问，菲方一边参与《宣言》的落实，一边公然背离《宣言》要求，如此行事自相矛盾，毫无诚意。

最后，即使《宣言》被认作不具有约束力的文件——仲裁庭初步裁决也的确如此裁定——如上文所述，当事国自行协商之方式也得到了《公约》的肯定。从而，菲律宾既不主动协商，也不接受中国提议之协商，更明确表示仲裁期间均不参与协商的“三不”行为，仍然证明其置《公约》的目的及宗旨于不顾，违背了善意原则。

四、仲裁庭对善意原则之违背

《公约》既然创建了争端解决机制，致力于海洋和平的宗旨，也需要争端解决机构的守护。面对错综复杂的海洋划界争端，要寻求能够真正为所有当事方接受的解决途径，不仅需要当事国自身的努力，也考验着第三方解决机构的智慧。

（一）对当事方真意履行协商义务之检验

争端解决机构就实体问题作出裁判之前，首先应当判断的是当事方是否已充分合理地进行了协商。这要求判决机构考量，双方是否确实善意履行了协商义务。根据上文的论述，该义务主要分为2步，即双方是否就提交审议之事项进行了协商，以及双方在协商过程中是否付出了真诚的努力。

对第一步的检验相对而言更易于完成，无需裁判机构深入探究协商的实质，只需要确定相关议题是否被摆在了双方的谈判桌上。然而，即便在这一步上，本案仲裁庭的决定也令人不敢苟同。例如，在对《公约》第283条进行审议时，仲裁庭在初步裁决中判定，中菲已经就“菲律宾提交仲裁的争端”交换了意见，从而满足了第283条的要求。①Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 2015, para. 342. [hereinafter “Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility”]作为证据，仲裁庭引用了2012年1月14日，中菲外交部副部长之间进行的一次磋商内容。恰恰在仲裁庭引用的文字里，菲国代表对中国代表说道：“您方提倡双边讨论的方式。而我们已经开始使用法律的途径。”②Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 339.结合英文版本所使用的时态，菲方代表的陈述几乎明白地承认了，甚至早在黄岩岛事件发生之前，菲国就“已经”开始着手法律解决。既如此，仲裁庭怎能将这一陈述视为“与中国交换意见”之证据？第二，菲国在本次磋商中提出的争端解决方式是多边谈判，而不是司法程序。③Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 339.根据仲裁庭之判断，本次磋商是中菲存在交换意见的有效证据；那么只能说，菲律宾在这一磋商中欺骗了中国。《公约》第283条的要求是就解决争端的和平方法交换意见，故菲国至少应在这场磋商中告知中国，它打算将南海争端提交仲裁，但在该磋商中它主张的却是完全不同的另一种解决方法。也就是说，仲裁庭的结论又指出了菲律宾违反善意原则对诚实信用之要求的另一处表现。但是，要把菲国代表在这场协商中所付出的努力归为欺骗，于情于理都委实令人难以接受，因而唯有得出结论：中菲本次协商并不是有关仲裁案事宜之协商，仲裁庭之判断并不合理。

除此以外，仲裁庭还引用了菲律宾2012年就黄岩岛问题向中国发出的照会作为依据。然而，该照会仅仅是关于黄岩岛及其专属经济区的问题，不涉及其他，也没有提出打算采用哪一种司法程序。④Note Verbale from the Department of Foreign Af f airs of the Philippines to the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Manila, No. 12-1137, 26 April 2012.仲裁庭却说道，双方已经“清楚明白地”就“菲律宾提交仲裁的争端”交换了意见。⑤Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 342.种种事实如此明确和显而易见，仲裁庭却能够得出如此结论，这已经不是单纯的观点判断问题，而是对善意原则的漠视。

如果说对争端方是否开展协商的裁判，仲裁庭尚能自圆其说；在第二步也即协商是否真诚、充分的检验上，仲裁庭则几乎对相关证据视而不见，毫无疑问是缺乏善意的裁决。仍然以其对《公约》283条的检验为例，仲裁庭自己指出，外交上的意见交换往往不会注重区分程序性问题和实质性问题；在实践中，双方对实体问题的意见，可能也体现出双方对如何解决或不解决争端的意见。①Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 332.既然仲裁庭已经如此承认，则对双方协商的内容就更有必要认真审议。然而如上文所述，仲裁庭所列举的2项材料，甚至都无法构成菲律宾就仲裁开启了协商的证明，更不必说其协商中的诚意究竟几何。另外，前文也引述了菲方诉讼代表的发言，其认为，就诉求实质进行逐项协商是不必要的，只要从整体上交换了意见就满足了第283条的要求。②Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, pp. 34～35.这些观点已经表明菲律宾仅视协商为一项程序，早已无意在双边合作之中继续投入精力。面对菲国如此明显的态度，仲裁庭仍然判定其满足了协商之要求，只能说仲裁庭也同样抛弃了协商的意义。毫无意义的协商显然不符合《公约》，也不符合任何国际性条约对双边合作、和平解决争端的追求，从这一角度，仲裁庭之裁决也减损了《公约》目的及宗旨，再次与善意原则相背离。

（二）仲裁庭对法律与事实的漠视

仲裁庭对中菲之间这一明显关于领土主权和海洋划界的争端宣布具有管辖权，随后在最终判决中，否定了中国在南海享有之历史性权利，否定了南海U形线之有效性，也否定了南沙群岛拥有专属经济区和大陆架之可能性。实体审议时仲裁庭罔顾法律、历史与事实之处几乎不胜枚举，在此仅以中国的历史性权利问题为例进行分析。

中国尚未对南海U形线的性质，以及在南海享有的历史性权利之内容做出过明确的界定。在仲裁庭看来，中国主张的这种权利具有排他性；仲裁庭进而判定，中国主张的U形线及其范围内的历史性权利无效。③Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, Award, 2016, para. 278. [hereinafter “Award”]

从善意原则的视角出发，这一判决歪曲了事实，未能诚实可信地处理证据。首先，中国的确声明过，我国在南海U形线内享有一系列历史上形成的权利；但中国从未表示，不允许其他国家在南海行使其合法权利。事实上，仲裁庭也注意到中国反复声明，尊重和支持各国依国际法在南海享有的航行自由。④Award, para. 212.结合南海多年来的实际航行状况，事实已表明中国并未妨碍其他国家在南海，包括在U形线范围以内行使其正当权利。然而判决却指，历史性权利“通常是排他的”，⑤Award, para. 268.并推定中国主张的历史性权利也是排他的，从而影响了其他国家的权利。问题在于，仲裁庭从何处得出了历史性权利就是排他的这一结论？判决本身也承认，“历史性权利”的概念在国际法中尚未明确；①Award, para. 226, the text reads “Other ‘historic rights’… are nowhere mentioned in the Convention.”具体到中国的声明和实践，则更无法得出这一论断。显然，这是仲裁庭对历史性权利和中国主张的臆断。

第二，仲裁庭以中国对油气资源、渔业资源等的主张为例，认为中国在解释对这些资源所享有的权利时，并没有提到其权源是由于相关区域位于中国的专属经济区和大陆架范围内，而是由于中国在历史上享有的权利。例如，针对菲律宾在礼乐滩海域GSEC-101区块等多个油气田的开发行为，中国表示反对的声明措辞都是，相关区域位于中国享有历史性权利和管辖权的范围内，而没有言及专属经济区或大陆架。②Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacif i c Af f airs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2011; Note Verbale from the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Manila to the Department of Foreign Af f airs, Republic of the Philippines, No. (11) PG-202, 6 July 2011; Award, para. 209.仲裁庭由此断定，中国对这些权利的主张不是基于《公约》规定的专属经济区和大陆架权利，而是单纯基于历史性权利。③Award, para. 209.问题是，仲裁庭自己也指出，假如中国就南沙群岛主张专属经济区和大陆架，则以上区域均位于中方依据《公约》主张的范围内。④Award, para. 209.中国在论及其对油气资源所享有的权利时，未从专属经济区和大陆架的角度做明言解释，并不一定就代表在事实上就不享有由此具备的权利。

第三，判决认为，在U形线范围内、而在中国专属经济区和大陆架范围外的部分，当中方的权利主张与菲方主张的专属经济区和大陆架范围重叠时，便是中国有违《公约》。⑤Award, para. 232.然而，中菲之间存在海洋划界争端，其各自主张的专属经济区和大陆架范围本来就有争议；既然如此，仲裁庭又怎么能在这一争议获得解决之前，就断言是中方侵犯了菲方权利？在此，判决显然有失公允，也再次违背了善意原则之基本内涵。

《公约》没有明文要求，根据其附件七成立的仲裁庭应遵循善意原则；但前文已经指出，仲裁庭等司法机构既旨在解决争端，维护国际司法之正义，便理应以身作则。应当说，仲裁庭作出有违善意的裁决，所造成的影响比菲律宾更加严重。因为菲律宾仅仅是一项争端的当事方，是国际社会众多成员中的一份子，它对国际法基本原则的违反可以为司法机构所纠正；然而仲裁庭作为国际司法机构，假如不仅不对这类违反行为进行辨别，甚至自己也无视事实、歪曲证据，则是对国际法之一般原则的严重损害。

（三）未能做出真正有利于和平解决争端之裁决

从初步裁决而言，仲裁庭已在相当程度上漠视了善意原则，但这并不代表其不能在实体裁决中有所补救。无论裁判机构对具体事项怎样解读，其最终判决的目的都在于使国际冲突归于平息，使争端双方归于和平，这是作为争端解决机构的最基础义务，可以说也是其最根本之善意。然而，2016年7月出炉的最终裁决，不仅未对初步裁决中善意的缺失进行弥补，甚至变本加厉，通篇毫无善意。至此，本案仲裁庭的做法对于中菲之间争端的和平解决而言，不仅毫无增益，甚至可谓适得其反。

国际法作为国际关系历史发展的产物，永远不能与国际关系相互孤立看待。中菲南海争端，正如所有的国家间争端，都不仅仅是国际法上的问题，同时也牵涉复杂的国际政治考量，牵涉双方未来关系的发展走向。也正是因此，外交途径才始终是解决任何一项争端的优先方式；在合理的情况下，国际司法机构作出鼓励协商的最终裁决是极为必要的，这不是对其责任的逃避，而是根据实际作出最有利于争端解决的决定，代表着国际法对国际社会成员的善意。

从这一角度出发，中菲南海仲裁案，正有必要得到这样一份鼓励性质的最终决定。中国已反复声明不接受、不参与仲裁案，因而即使仲裁庭作出任何不利于中国的判决，中国也有充分立场不将其裁决付诸执行。更何况，鉴于仲裁庭在初步裁决中已然有失善意，其决定早已招致中国乃至外国学者质疑。本案仲裁庭在中国国内几乎已成众矢之的，不仅中国政府坚持仲裁庭没有管辖权，①外交部条法司司长徐宏就菲律宾所提南海仲裁案接受中外媒体采访实录，下载于http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebe/chn/zclc/t1362765.htm，2017年1月17日；2015年10月30日外交部发言人陆慷主持例行记者会，下载于http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1310668.shtml，2017年1月17日。学界更从种种角度深入剖析了管辖权判决的荒谬之处。中国既认定仲裁庭没有管辖权，则其随后做出的最终裁决也将被视为缺乏法律效力。如此一来的结果，轻则中菲双方就裁决结果僵持不下，最终裁决被束之高阁，毫无意义；重则，中国坚持仲裁无效，菲律宾倚仗裁决要求执行——双方有关南海问题的分歧进一步加深，争端反而加剧，裁决适得其反。前者无疑将减损国际司法之有效性和权威性，不利于国际法的发展；后者则进一步损害国际关系友好发展，威胁国际社会之和平稳定。

遗憾的是，本案仲裁庭一意孤行，未能客观评判中菲南海争端过程中的事实。最终裁决发布之后，不仅中国义正言辞地进行批驳，菲律宾在新上任总统的领导下，也转向重回协商，而将裁决束之高阁。仲裁庭的宗旨本应是，促成中菲争端解决，还南中国海以和平安宁；然而其却在与善意原则相背离的道路上愈行愈远，可谓枉费了争端“解决”机构之名。

五、菲律宾与仲裁庭之根本不足

无论是争端当事方善意进行协商的要求、信守条约的要求、促进条约宗旨之实现的要求，还是作为第三方争端解决机构对当事方以上义务进行善意检验的职责，其根基都在于各方行动的诚信。真诚的主观品质，辐射出多方面的要求，涵盖了一项争端的方方面面。

例如，真诚行事还可以解释为，争端方行为透明，客观呈现事实。中菲南海争端中的任何议题，实际上都是关于领土主权和海洋划界之争端；但菲国却竭力包装其主张，提出判定海洋地物法律性质等表面诉求，①关于菲方对其诉求的伪装，罗国强教授详细归纳出4种手法，参见罗国强：《南海仲裁案初步裁决评析》，载于《外交评论：外交学院学报》2016年第2期，第26页。刻意掩藏其背后真实意图。这种对事实的扭曲、对争端本质的掩盖，自然也违反了透明、客观和诚信的要求。

又如，菲律宾在其抗议中国对南海主张的照会中，声明“卡拉延群岛”中的海洋地物所产生的领海、专属经济区和大陆架，其主权或主权权利属于菲律宾。②The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations, Note Verbale 000228, United Nations Documents, 2011.菲方主张的“卡拉延群岛”完全由南沙群岛的一部分岛礁组成；因而，菲律宾已经承认南沙群岛中的部分地物能够产生专属经济区和大陆架。那么，中国在比南沙群岛某一岛礁范围更大，也在比“卡拉延群岛”范围更大的南沙群岛整体的基础上，主张群岛的专属经济区与大陆架，似乎更不应产生异议。因此这一证据根本不足以反映中菲对此存在争端，但仲裁庭却得出了相反结论。③Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 170.这也是仲裁庭未能客观审查事实之体现。

最后也是最具讽刺意味的一点在于，菲律宾和仲裁庭在仲裁过程中多次明言提及善意原则，意指中国行动有违善意。菲国认为，在黄岩岛、仁爱礁、美济礁等海域，中国违反《公约》规定的保护海洋环境之义务，岛礁建设损害海洋环境，且未阻止本国渔民的破坏性行为；据此，中国未能善意履行《公约》赋予的义务。④Day 3 – Hearing on the Merits and Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, p. 45.菲国所提第14项诉求又称，中国在仁爱礁的一系列行动令争端恶化。菲方认为，《公约》第300条是对善意和禁止权力滥用之基本原则的叙述，它要求各国致力于缩小分歧，而不是恶化争议。

显然，善意原则要求争端当事国积极以和平方式化解分歧，而不是相互刺激、加剧争端，这一点毋庸置疑。但问题在于，正是菲律宾自1999年以来，一直以一艘破败军舰在仁爱礁坐滩，甚至试图在此修建固定设施。菲国指责中国，在2013年仲裁启动后继续在仁爱礁采取行动，从而构成加剧、恶化争议的行为，然而，正是菲国于2014年3月公开宣称，要将其在仁爱礁的军舰建成为永久设施。作为南沙群岛的一部分，中国绝不会坐视仁爱礁的领土主权遭此挑衅，因而采取了必要措施。作为挑起争端一方的菲律宾，又有何立场反指中国是南海和平的破坏者？

可悲的是，仲裁庭眼中只看得到中国一方的行动，而对菲国挑衅在先的行为视而不见。仲裁庭认定，不仅菲方明确提出的美济礁、仁爱礁等地，中国在南海共7处地物上的岛礁建设等行动，均为恶化争端之举。①Award, para. 1177.仲裁庭奇怪地“忘记”了，正是菲国一方首先挑战中国主权主张，而单单关注中国一方的行动。这种对事实明显刻意的无视，怎能说是善意的裁决？更进一步，仲裁庭还认为，中国的举措对仲裁构成了阻碍，令仲裁帮助争端获得解决的目的受到损害。但是，真正妨碍争端获得解决的，难道不正是这份虚伪不实的裁决吗？实际上，裁决的核心内容在于推导出中菲两国根本不存在海域划界争端的结论，从而南沙所涉地物位于菲律宾大陆架范围内，因此，这些地物自动归菲国所有。这一结论源于仲裁庭3点关键的认定，即：中国“历史性权利主张”无效；南沙群岛作为整体产生海洋权利之主张无效；南沙所有地物均不属于“岛屿”。然而，此3点认定无一不是罔顾事实之语。中国主张的“历史性权利”绝非排他的权利，但仲裁庭妄加判断；《公约》并未规定远洋群岛不可适用群岛基线，至少不应断言群岛不可作为整体产生自身的专属经济区和大陆架，但仲裁庭武断否定；至于“岛屿”的构成标准，更是缺乏明确规定，但仲裁庭却无视事实证据，有故意抬高“岛屿”标准之嫌。事实上，要充分辨析仲裁在此3项问题中的不实之处，还需长篇累牍；但就本文的主旨而言则不再展开，仅强调一点，即仲裁庭认为中菲两国不存在海域重叠，这一结论虚假不实，荒谬至极。在此基础上的所有裁决，都不可能有利于争端的解决，而只会带来相反效果。

菲律宾和仲裁庭以种种行为肆意践踏善意原则，却还堂皇援引该原则妄议中国行动，其在仲裁过程中的言行前后不一、自相矛盾，其对待善意原则的态度几可谓“合则用、不合则弃”。由此，菲律宾和仲裁庭对这一国际法基本原则、国际社会基本行事准则的破坏，不得不说已是登峰造极。

本文所探讨的善意原则之内涵，还远未穷尽，也无法穷尽。以真心与诚意为核心，善意原则自然体现在行为主体的一举一动之中。中菲南海仲裁案在2016年7月终于落下帷幕，不幸的是，所谓的“最终判决”几乎完全支持了菲方提出的所有诉求。审视菲律宾和仲裁庭行为，其不符善意原则之处早已不胜枚举，本文仅选取了寥寥几例；这不可不谓为善意原则之殇。

六、结 语

国际争端之解决，及其对世界和平的维护，特别需要各行为主体遵循善意原则的指引。具体到海洋划界争端之中，善意原则衍生出层层内涵，主要包括：

1.对于争端当事方，应以取得一致为协商目标，善意开展协商并诚意进行协商；善意履行双方间条约规定之义务，不得减损条约目的及宗旨；此外，其行动始终保持着真诚的本质。

2.对于参与其中的争端解决机构，应充分认识到当事方在善意原则下所负有的责任，并对争端事实做善意的客观检验；其裁决应秉承解决争端的宗旨，真正推动国际社会向和平迈进。

中菲南海争端是领土主权和海洋划界争端。无论当事一方菲律宾还是争端解决机构仲裁庭，其种种行为都有违上述的各项要求，这无疑是对善意原则的极大破坏。

作为国际法一般原则，内涵深邃的善意原则是国际社会运行的一块基石；它是国际行动的最低准绳，也是整个人类社会对美德的崇高追求。善意原则不容漠视与侵犯，而面对中菲南海仲裁案缺乏善意的无效裁决，这一点更应为致力于国际法发展的全体国际社会成员所注意。

I. Introduction

The principle of good faith, a basic principle of international law, governs how the subject of international law exercises its rights and the attitude it has when performing its obligations. This principle plays a significant role in the practice of international law. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, hereinafter referred to as the “UNCLOS” or the “Convention”, as well as other conventions on the law of the sea def i ned the concepts of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. In this context, many States compete to lay claims to these marine areas, giving rise to new conf l icts and confrontations. Unceasing disputes on maritime delimitation have garnered global attentions. The principle of good faith also gives guidance to maritime delimitation, bearing great signif i cances to the settlement of disputes between coastal States in practice.

On 22 January 2013, the Philippines, in accordance with Part XV and Annex VII of the UNCLOS, initiated an arbitral proceeding against China over the South China Sea (SCS) disputes between the two States. On 29 October 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal released the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility. The Arbitral Tribunal stated that it had jurisdiction to consider seven of the Philippines’ 15 Submissions and reserved consideration of its jurisdiction to rule on the left eight Submissions to the merits phase. In other words, all the 15 Submissions of the Philippines would be considered in the second phase of trial. On 12 July 2016, the Tribunal issued its fi nal award, which denied a series of China’s claims, including the dashed-line in the SCS. In this connection, both the Philippines, a party to the disputes, and the Tribunal, a third-party judicial body, have in practice violated the spirit of the principle of good faith, a basic principle of international law.

The SCS arbitration has garnered great attentions from the academia ever since its initiation. However, previous academic researches primarily focus on the analysis of each Submission of the Philippines, as well as the Tribunal’s award, particularly the preliminary rule on the establishment of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Such researches are conducted mainly from the perspectives of legal basis and legal reasoning. This paper will not give an in-depth exploration of the legal basis relating to the SCS arbitration. Instead, it will, from the perspective of the principle of good faith, focus on some more abstract obligations arising out from the legal principle, which is an innovation of the paper. The author hopes that this paper may contribute to China’s ef f orts to deal with the SCS disputes with the Philippines.

II. The Principle of Good Faith and Maritime Delimitation

A. An Overview of the Principle of Good Faith

The principle of good faith, as a fundamental principle on international law, plays an important and basic role in all the spheres and systems of law. Firstly, since the 20th century, this principle has been, explicitly or implicitly, incorporated into many international or multilateral conventions. For example, the second principle of the seven principles provided for in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter “UN Charter”) states that all Members shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter;①Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Article 2(2).the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) states in its preamble that the principle of good faith is universally recognized, and uses the term “good faith”many times in the text.②Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Preface, Articles 26, 31(1), 46(2), 69(2) (b).Additionally, judicial precedents concerning dif f erent fi elds of international law also conf i rmed the status of the principle of good faith in the relevant decisions. For instance, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter“ICJ” or “the Court”) pointed out, in the Nuclear Tests Cases of 1974, the principle of good faith was one of the basic principles governing the performance of legal obligations by States.③Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 46.In international trade, the dispute settlement mechanisms of World Trade Organization (WTO) also applied the principle of good faith in many of their decisions. This principle is a general principle of international law and a requirement of customary international law, which is widely recognized in the academia.④J. F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1991, p. 124; Reviews of Books, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1957, p. 106; Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 73.It follows that the status and the inf l uence of the principle of good faith has been universally recognized, and the most basic norm of international law is the principle of good faith.⑤Thomas Cottier and Krista N. Schefer, HAN Xiuli trans., GAO Bo proofread, Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate Expectations in the WTO, Journal of International Economic Law, No. 3, 2005, p. 181. (in Chinese)

It is also widely recognized that the specific connotations of the principle of good faith are difficult to be def i ned def i nitely. This principle is derived fromRoman civil law, reflecting a requirement on “bona fide contract” and “actio bonae fi dei”. “Bona fi de contract” means that the two parties to a contract, when performing the contract, should undertake any additional obligations incurred by the requirement of honesty, in accordance with their original purpose of goodwill. And the term “actio bonae fidei” requires the parties to an action exercise their litigious rights in good faith during an action, and the judge justly and fairly make his decisions in good faith when interpreting and understanding the agreements reached by the parties, and exercising his discretions. As history progresses, the principle of good faith was widely incorporated into the legal systems of many Western States, and then found its way into international law with the deepening of international exchanges. The principle of good faith in the ambit of international law fi rstly derived from the concept that agreements should be abided by.①Thomas Cottier and Krista N. Schefer, HAN Xiuli trans., GAO Bo proofread, Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate Expectations in the WTO, Journal of International Economic Law, No. 3, 2005, p. 181. (in Chinese)WTO uses the two concepts interchangeably. In a considerable number of trade disputes, WTO expounded, on a case-by-case basis, the good faith principle with emphasis upon different aspects of the principle. Virtually, as a basic legal principle, this principle does not only focus on a step or steps of acts, but also regulates all acts. Therefore, it is an open-ended and inclusive principle with multifaceted connotations. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “good faith” is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting (a) honesty of belief or purpose, (b) faithfulness to one’s duty or obligation, (c) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealings in trade or commerce; and (d) freedom from intention to defraud or seek an unconscionable advantage.②Bryan A. Garner ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, Eagan: West Group, 2004, p. 2038.“Good faith” demands an individual to be reasonable, honest and faithful. With no technical assessment criteria, the term tends to be def i ned subjectively.

Notably, in the practice of international law, the principle of good faith cannot exist in vacuo. The ICJ stated that the principle of good faith cannot create any legal obligations by itself.③Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 46.A violation of the principle of good faith is not abstract or baseless. Instead, such a violation possibly stems from breaches of treaties, or relates to damages to the interests of another party, or bases on the violation of an obligation. For example, in the Nuclear Tests Cases, the French Government announced its decision to terminate nuclear tests in the South Pacific Ocean.Despite of the unilateral nature of the declaration, the ICJ held that the principle of good faith required that such an declaration be respected.①Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, paras. 46～51.In the Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995, the Court needed to consider whether the Applicant Macedonia had breached its obligation to negotiate in good faith, which was created by an Interim Accord.②Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, para. 127.As stated by the Appellate Body of WTO, to constitute a violation of the principle of good faith, two requirements should be satisfied: the first is that a party should be found to have violated a substantive treaty provision or obligation; the second is that it should be proved to be more than mere violation.③United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Appellate Body Report, 2003, para. 298.

In sum, the principle of good faith is a concept without any def i nite behavior patterns. It should be interpreted under the context where it is used, and explored after considering the relevant international practices. In other words, this principle can be illustrated but not def i ned.④Reviews of Books, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1957, p. 106.It also provides a guiding ef f ect in the fi eld of maritime delimitation.

B. The Principle of Good Faith in Relation to the Parties to a Maritime Delimitation Case

The basic principles of international law, as a supplement to international treaties and customs, play a vital role in every field and aspect of international law,⑤Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., WANG Tieya et al. trans., Oppenheim’s International Law, Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1995, p. 23. (in Chinese)and the law of the sea is no exception in this connection. Article 300 of the UNCLOS explicitly provides that States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under the Convention.⑥United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Article 300. [hereinafter“UNCLOS”]This provision lays out the general requirements on maritime delimitation between States, which contains rich implications. The principle of good faith certainly cannot create new legal obligations in vacuo. Each obligation to be discussed in the following pages exists on the basis of substantive laws, and the principle of good faith supports thefulfillment of such obligations: it supervises on the performance of such obligations, and more on the attitude towards obligation performing.①Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 74.

1. The Obligation to Negotiate in Good Faith

Articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS provide for the delimitation of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves; paragraph 1 of both articles states that the maritime delimitation between States shall be effected by agreement in order to achieve an equitable solution.②UNCLOS, Articles 74(1) and 83(1).Hence, this provision implies an obligation for States Parties to negotiate in respect of maritime delimitation. Many legal precedents of ICJ also link the obligation under this provision with the principle of good faith. The meaning of “to negotiate in good faith” could be further explained in the following two aspects.

First, the obligation to negotiate in good faith means that the maritime boundary delineated by a State unilaterally may be void and null. Admittedly, it is possible that two States may not conduct official negotiations, but may communicate by taking a series of State actions. A State raises a claim unilaterally, which the other State concerned makes no objection to. In this case, a tacit maritime boundary is created ultimately by acquiescence. However, since the UNCLOS has provided for the means to establish maritime boundary (by agreement in priority), the unilateral action of a State, if its maritime claims are opposed by any other States, may breach the UNCLOS. To carry out the obligations under the UNCLOS in good faith requires that a State should not take any actions with possible prejudice to other States. This requirement can also fi nd its supports in other fi elds of international law.

The General Agreement on Tarif f s and Trade (GATT), which is the predecessor of WTO and applicable to WTO Members, is one of the most important agreements concerning goods trades among WTO law. The chapeau of Article XX of GATT provides that Members should not apply such measures in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustif i able discrimination between countries.③General Agreement on Tarif f s and Trade, 1947, Chapeau of Article XX.In the final rulings of the United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, the dispute settlement body of WTO articulated that the chapeau of Article XX was one expression of the principle of good faith.④United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 1998, para. 158.In thiscase, the United States enacted a regulation on the import of shrimp products without negotiating with all the countries affected by the regulation in advance. The WTO Appellate Body opined that the United States’ unilateral adoption and implementation of this regulation was unjustifiable, as it failed to take into account the dif f erent circumstances of the countries af f ected and such a regulation constituted arbitrary discrimination between countries.①United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 1998, paras. 172, 177.It follows that all countries concerned should reach an agreement, and no country may claim unilaterally and arbitrarily. This is an undisputable fact in all fields of international law, and compatible with the principle of good faith, a general principle of international law.

Based on the first meaning described above, the second meaning of “to negotiate in good faith” is self-evident. States concerned should enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement on issues concerning maritime delimitation. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ argued that actual rules of law governing the delimitation of continent shelves were established on a foundation of general precepts of justice and good faith, and the States concerned were under an obligation to enter into negotiations.②North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 85.The Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area case connected the obligation to negotiate with the principle of good faith in even a clearer way: “Such delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted in good faith…”③Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, para. 112(1).In 2002, the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria case further conf i rmed the obligation to negotiate in good faith.④Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, para. 244.

In a nutshell, with respect to maritime delimitation, a State should negotiate in good faith with other States concerned with a view to reaching an agreement. All sorts of unilateral actions, including unilateral delimitation, exploration and exploitation, are in contravention with the spirit of the UNCLOS.

2. The Obligation to Negotiate in Good Faith with a View to Reaching an Agreement

Compared to entering into negotiations, to negotiate with a view to reaching an agreement serves as a better touchstone to test a State’s good faith. How mucheffort should a State make during a negotiation? What kind of negotiation is“sufficient”? Whether any stalemate reached during a negotiation is sufficient to enable a party to a dispute to resort to dispute settlement procedures? UNCLOS cannot provide an answer to such subjective questions. However, these questions highlight the importance of negotiating in good faith. Whether the delimitation of maritime boundary can be ef f ected in a peaceful and friendly manner depends, greatly, on the good faith that the States concerned use in negotiations. The paper underlines that the obligation to negotiate in good faith is not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation, but to conduct meaningful negotiations, which is really critical. This requires that the parties concerned negotiate sincerely and honestly with a view to ef f ecting a delimitation by agreement.

First, each State may favor different delimitation methods. However, such differences cannot be used as the grounds to evade negotiation and cooperation. In the lengthy discussions and negotiations conducted during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the rules regarding the delimitation of continental shelves and EEZs were intensely debated, and two distinct views upheld by two groups of interests appeared. The Bahamas Group of 24 favored equidistance as a general principle. On the other hand, the Algerian Group of 32 considered that equidistance should not have an inappropriate privilege on any other multi-method approach. Instead, the latter Group proposed that delimitation of maritime boundary should be ef f ected based on equitable principles. Despite of such dif f erences, the proposals of both groups affirmed that maritime delimitation should be ef f ected by agreement.①Informal Proposal by Bahamas, Barbados, Canada, Colombia, Cyrus, Democratic Yemen, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malta, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia (later joined by Cape Verde, Chile, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau and Portugal), UN General Assembly Document NG7/2; Informal Proposal by Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Congo, France, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Syria, Somalia, Turkey, Venezuela and Vietnam, UN General Assembly Document NG 7/10.All kinds of conf l icting claims to marine areas could be fl exibly settled by negotiation in good faith. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Former President Bustamante Y Rivero noted, in his Separate Opinion, that factor of good faith and flexibility which reconciled the needs of peaceful neighbourly relations with the rigidity of the law needed to be introduced into the negotiations on the continental shelf.②North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Separate Opinion of President J. L. Bustamante Y Rivero, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 58.The Judgment of the case statedthat the parties were under an obligation to conduct meaningful negotiation, which would not be the case when either of them insisted upon its own position.①North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 85.In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the parties (the Kingdoms of Denmark and the Netherlands) insisted on the equidistance principle and were reluctant to compromise before the day of the judgment. Such actions were found to contradict the obligation to fl exibly conduct meaningful negotiations.②North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 87.This case also shows that the principle of good faith calls for fl exibility and reasonableness, and opposes arbitrariness and rigidity, which is consistent with the prohibition of arbitrary and unjustif i able discrimination between countries as provided in WTO law.

It follows that States should have no controversy over the resolution of dispute through agreement, even if they have conf l icting claims in a delimitation case. Nevertheless, state practices reveal that some States prefer other methods to delimitation by agreement. In accordance with the UNCLOS provisions as listed above, the issues concerning maritime delimitation should fi rst be settled through negotiations. Only when such negotiations fail, can the parties concerned resort to other procedures, mainly the dispute settlement procedures under UNCLOS Part XV. Does a State enter into negotiations with another State with sincerity and honesty, and what is the extent of their sincerity and honesty? This is the second question in terms of negotiation in good faith.

As noted by the ICJ, since the parties concerned should enter into meaningful negotiations with a view to concluding agreements, a dispute settlement body shall refrain from delivering any immature rulings on the merits of a dispute prior to such negotiations. A preliminary issue that a court should consider is whether the applicant has de facto performed its obligation to negotiate.③Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 682.The author asserts that the applicant’s attitude towards negotiations is a critical factor determining whether it has complied with the requirements of the good faith principle. This factor has special significance to the Sino-Philippine SCS Arbitration. Unfortunately, case law contains no explicit provisions in this regard. The obligation to negotiate in good faith is only implied in some judgments or found in the interpretations or understandings of scholars.

The ICJ expressed, in one of its judgments, that the obligation to negotiaterequires that the parties enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely go through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition with an actual intention to proceed to other procedures.①North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 85.In other words, prior to the initiation of any third-party dispute settlement procedure, the States concerned should conduct sincere negotiations, not merely a formal process. In the Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), which was submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), a judge articulated that “The requirement… regarding exchange of views is not an empty formality, to be dispensed with at the whims of a disputant. The obligation in this regard must be discharged in good faith.”②Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Separate Opinion of Chandrasekhara Rao, ITLOS Reports 2003, para. 11.As explained in Black’s Law Dictionary, honesty is the core of negotiation in good faith.

In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey) case, Greece inclined to resolve its delimitation dispute with Turkey through a third-party procedure, while Turkey insisted on resolving their dispute through negotiations first. The fact that Greece favored the method of settling dispute through judicial procedures does not necessarily suggest that Greece lacked good faith during negotiations. Actually, Greece agreed to negotiate with Turkey. Nonetheless, in a Note of 2 October 1975, the Greek Government expressed that their dispute “would fi rst be formally submitted to the Court” and that “talks were not excluded to follow.”③Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, para. 20.A series of declarations made and actions taken by Greece showed that Greece had submitted their dispute to the ICJ before negotiating with Turkey sufficiently. And the facts stated by the ICJ also demonstrated that both parties had only conducted preliminary or procedural talks, but not “sufficiently serious and fl exible negotiations conducted in good faith”.④Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 683.Greece, at the same time, submitted the issue to the UN Security Council. The Security Council called upon, in its resolution on this issue, both parties to resume direct negotiations and “appeals to them to do everything within their power to ensure that these negotiations will result in mutually acceptable solutions.”⑤Security Council Resolutions, S/RES/395, 1976.This could be interpreted as an indicationthat the Council also held that the parties had not conducted sufficient negotiations before submitting the dispute to the Council, and that the dispute should be settled fi rst by means of a special agreement rather than by judicial procedures.①Leo Gross, The Dispute between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 71, Issue 1, 1977, p. 32.

While the case was pending before the Court, Turkey insisted that both parties should resume their talks due to the immaturity of their previous negotiations; only the matters irresolvable through negotiations in good faith may be submitted to the ICJ when such matters arise.②Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, paras. 21, 28; UN Doc S/PV.1950, United Nations, 13 August 1976.In the views of Turkey, the ICJ should be obligated to examine whether or not the parties have fully performed their duties to negotiate before entering into any judicial procedures; if the negotiations are prima facie, and a party even lacks the bona fides to negotiate or negotiate only to meet the procedural requirements so as to resort to other means, such negotiations may not comply with requirements of negotiations in good faith.

The ICJ was in a good position to decide whether the negotiations between the parties were at a preliminary phase, or whether the possible solutions were far from being discussed by the parties. In other words, the ICJ may determine whether or not the obligation to negotiate has been discharged sufficiently and fully.③Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 686.The ICJ failed to give a conclusive answer in this regards.④Prof. Cottier also argued that this case was an opportunity missed by the ICJ.However, the judgments of the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case and North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, as well as the insights of scholars all support a reasonable conclusion: the States concerned should take up negotiations in good faith with a view of reaching agreements, which means that they should take into account, flexibly and reasonably, all possible delimitation methods, rather than making negotiation a prima facie procedure.

3. Other Dispute Settlement Procedures Cannot Constitute an Impediment to Negotiations

The above-mentioned Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case also demonstrates that the submission of a dispute to judicial procedures cannot constitute an impediment to the continuing of negotiations outside the Court. Virtually, the Applicant Greece did not exclude negotiations; it only gave the priority to third-party procedures. While the case was pending before the Court, Greece and Turkey resumed their negotiations, and even agreed that the question of the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf would be resolved through negotiations.①Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, paras. 20, 24～26.

Negotiations are, of course, the most cost-efficient and natural avenue to settle disputes. This status of negotiations has been confirmed repeatedly by the international community. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), 1974, the ICJ proposed that “the most appropriate method for the solution of the dispute is clearly that of negotiation.”②Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 73.The Security Council Resolution on the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf further supports this point. We cannot consider a State’s act to be taken in bad faith, only because it resorted to procedures other than negotiations.③Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 52.This is also a requirement imposed by the principle of good faith to deduce a conclusion about any State’s behaviors in good faith. However, on the other hand, since the State chooses other procedures not in bad faith, that State should not stop negotiation endeavors; apart from other dispute settlement procedures, negotiations may still be continued or restarted, which is a convincing evidence proving that the State has indeed complied with the principle of good faith.

C. The Good Faith of Dispute Settlement Body in Maritime Delimitations

UNCLOS Part XV established a comprehensive mechanism of maritime disputes settlement. Under this mechanism, States may select one or more of the following third-party means for settlement of disputes, including conciliation, ITLOS, ICJ, arbitration under Annex VII and special arbitration under Annex VIII. The third-party dispute settlement bodies involved here should also act in line with the principle of good faith, seeking meaningful solutions acceptable to both parties concerned. Although the principle of good faith is not expressly mentioned in the international statutes for international judicial bodies, the actual settlement of disputes between States, undoubtedly, needs the concerted efforts of dispute settlement bodies and the parties involved. In this connection, a dispute settlementbody should not act arbitrarily by virtue of its status as an “umpire”, who may not be punished for his actions. In fact, such arbitrary acts rarely happened, as international judicial practices always show that judgment in good faith is recognized.

The priority of maritime delimitation by negotiations has been elaborated above. Such a priority has been reiterated by dispute settlement bodies like the ICJ. In order to ensure the ef f ect of negotiations, not only the parties concerned should conduct negotiations in good faith, but the dispute settlement bodies should also make corresponding ef f orts.

First, a dispute settlement body is not supposed to deal with the merits before the avenue of negotiations has been reasonably exhausted, or before it is not able to conf i rm that a issue cannot be settled upon good faith negotiations. This needs the settlement body to consider whether or not the parties concerned have discharged their duties to negotiate in good faith.

Second, the good faith of third-party bodies, certainly, does not mean that they should never deliver any judgments, or avoid rendering any judgments by all means. However, considering the circumstances of dif f erent cases, a fi nal judgment without any room for further negotiations may not be fully acceptable to one of the parties concerned. This situation may lead to two consequences: the ef f ect of a judgment would be jeopardized or impaired if the consequence is mild; and it would have an ef f ect exactly opposite of its wish, if it is severe. Specif i cally, the party to which the judgment is favorable would request to implement the judgment, but the other party would refuse to do so. In that way, the conf l icts between the two would be aggravated. The dispute settlement body would fail to resolve the dispute; worse still, it would exacerbate the situation. Additionally, the ef f ect of international judiciary function is dependent on voluntary compliance and acceptance of States.①Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 688.Therefore, it is essential for judicial bodies to contribute an intermediate step towards a more acceptable settlement based on objective legal principles. For these reasons, third-party bodies, when in similar situations, can render judgments encouraging negotiations, rather than trying to bring about fi nal settlement.

The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases is an example in this regard. In the case, the Court found that delimitation should be effected by agreement inaccordance with equitable principles, and in the course of negotiations, the factors indicated by the Court should be taken into account.①North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 101(C), (D).In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the Court expressly proposed for negotiations in good faith, and held that the States concerned “are under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their dif f erences” and “to pay due regard to the interests of other States”.②Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, paras. 78～79.The Court may not provide, in the final judgment, a direct solution or clear-cut settlement, but a guide or encouragement calling upon States to put greater ef f orts in peaceful settlement of their disputes.

It is no longer accurate to say that judicial settlement is simply an alternative to direct and friendly negotiations. It should be seen and perceived as a matter of interaction, which does not impair the ef f ect of dispute settlement mechanism, but instead contributes to timely and effective negotiations.③Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 690.To render a judgment, which requires the States involved to resume negotiations pursuing to peacefully settle their disputes, may be the most meaningful contribution that a dispute settlement body can make. The dispute settlement body, as its name suggests, should act in consideration of the fi nal resolution of disputes, and the compliance and observance of international legal rules and principles. This is the good faith that a third-party body should have towards the disputants for the long-term and stable development of international law.

D. Pacta Sunt Servada and Non-impairment of the Objects and Purposes of Treaties

The rule that treaties should be observed is the cornerstone for the existence and functioning of the international community. It is one of the basic manifestations of the good faith of States. The principle of good faith means, originally, pacta sunt servada (agreement should be respected).④J.F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, p. 124; Thomas Cottier and Krista N. Schefer, HAN Xiuli trans., GAO Bo proofread, Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate Expectations in the WTO, Journal of International Economic Law, No. 3, 2005, p. 181. (in Chinese)Article 26 of VCLT requires explicitly that States perform every treaty in force in good faith. The UN Charter containssimilar provisions. Practice of international law confirmed this point as early as more than one hundred years ago: the award of the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case of 1910 pointed out that every State must have the duty to perform the obligations arising out of a treaty.①LI Haopei, An Introduction to Treaty Law, Beijing: Law Press China, 2003, p. 277. (in Chinese)

On the other hand, Article 31 of VCLT provides for the general rule of interpretation of treaties, and paragraph 1 of this article states that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. And Article 18 provides that a State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty. This article is also an expression of the principle of good faith.②Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 667, note 53.Observing a treaty implies a recognition to the objects and purposes of the treaty, and gives pushes rather than injuries to the achievement of such objects and purposes, which is also a basic requirement of the good faith principle.③Anthony D’Amato, Good Faith, in Rudolf Bernhardt ed., Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 599.The objects and purposes of a treaty represent the common expectations of the States to a treaty. “Expectations are the vitals of the law”.④Stephen M. Schwebel, The Compliance Process and the Future of International Law, in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1981, p. 182.Under the principle of good faith, the legal expectations of States Parties arising from a treaty should be protected.

The UNCLOS articulated its overall object in its Preamble, which explicitly provides that all issues relating to the law of the sea should be settled in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation. This shows that the attainment of the basic object of UNCLOS depends on the mutual understanding and cooperation between States, and also reiterates, as analyzed above, the importance of negotiations. In addition, among others, adopting an open, fl exible and sincere attitude, and taking transparent actions without reserved or hidden purposes, obviously, are inherent in the “spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation”.

In order to obtain the goal of concluding a final agreement on maritime delimitation, the UNCLOS sets out more specific provisions. Articles 74(3)and 83(3), similar in text, urge the States concerned to enter into provisional arrangements, and not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the fi nal agreement. The Arbitral Tribunal of the Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname held that the provisions above include two obligations: The first obligation was designed to promote interim regimes and practical measures that could pave the way for provisional utilization of disputed areas; the second obligation was to try every ef f ort not to hamper or jeopardize the reaching of a fi nal agreement on delimitation.①Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, 2007, paras. 460, 467.The obligation imposed on the Parties a duty to negotiate in good faith. And some of the Parties’ conducts, such as Suriname’s threat of force, jeopardized the reaching of a fi nal agreement.②Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, 2007, paras. 460, 484.

In short, not to defeat the objects and purposes of a treaty, to a great extent, needs the negotiation ef f orts of the States concerned, which are also obligated to evade actions that may hamper negotiations. Every State has the duty to observe the provisions of a treaty, and perform its rights and obligations in good faith, so as to promote the obtainment of the objects and purposes of the treaty.

E. Honesty – the Core of the Good Faith Principle

The description of the multi-faceted meanings of the good faith principle, as mentioned above, indicates that the principle does not have clear and accurate connotations. We cannot fi nd a set of objective and strict standards to assess the principle. All the requirements of the principle are closely associated with the abstract quality of honesty, which, however, is precisely the meaning of it as a basic principle of international law. In order to better play the function of legal principles, and fi ll up the gaps of international treaties and customs, the scope of the good faith principle should be fl exible and broad.③Professor R. Summers called the principle of good faith a “safety valve” and argued that this principle should be open-ended rather than sealed off in a definition. See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 54, Issue 2, 1968, p. 266.Bona fi des serves as the touchstone of theprinciple.①For example, J.F. O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1991, p. 118; Andrew D. Mitchell, Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 2006, p. 339.With honesty as its core, the principle generally requires every State to be committed to negotiations and cooperation by taking up honest actions in a dispute, fl exibly taking into account all possible avenues with an open attitude.

III. The Philippines’ Violation of the Good Faith Principle in the SCS Arbitration

Since the principle of good faith under international law gives considerable guidance to the parties to a maritime delimitation dispute and third-party arbitral bodies, it should be paid due attentions. The EEZs and continental shelves claimed by China in the SCS overlap with those claimed by the Philippines. Both States have disputes over the sovereignty of some SCS islands. Such disputes fall into the category of sovereignty and maritime delimitation disputes. Consequently, the Philippines, a party to the dispute, and the Arbitral Tribunal, acting as a dispute settlement body, should comply with the principle of good faith. Nevertheless, a review of the whole case reveals that both the Philippines and the Arbitral Tribunal have acted, repeatedly, against the guidance of the good faith principle to the delimitation of marine boundary.

A. The Critical Status of Negotiation in Good Faith

The start of negotiations by the disputants is, in itself, a symbol of good faith. And the continuing of such negotiations with a view to reaching a settlement by agreement also fully manifests the good faith of both parties. In this connection, the Philippines has greatly jeopardized the principle of good faith.

1. The Philippines’ Lack of Negotiations with Respect to the Arbitration

First, the parties to a dispute must enter into negotiations, and also try every effort to continue such negotiations. China and the Philippines have conducted friendly negotiations on many occasions, whose results include a series of bilateral declarations jointly made by them. This fact is acknowledged by the Philippines. In the course of the arbitration, a Philippine representative concluded that bothparties have, over many years, negotiated on every issue involved in the SCS disputes between them, including China’s claim of “historic rights”, the maritime entitlements generated by Huangyan Island and the Nansha Islands, fishing and navigation rights in the relevant waters, and the construction of artif i cial islands in the relevant waters, etc..①Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, pp. 28～32.

However, the fact that the Philippine representative hid from the public is that after the Huangyan Island Event happened in 2012, negotiations regarding the SCS disputes stopped abruptly. Six months after the event, the Philippines unilaterally initiated an arbitration against China, without any prior negotiations with China over the matters submitted to arbitration. The Philippines has never negotiated or exchanged views with China on any one of its 15 Submissions.

Since there is an avenue for China and the Philippines to negotiate with each other, any new views or proposals are supposed to be mutually exchanged through this avenue. Otherwise, the longstanding and huge ef f orts made by both States on negotiation and cooperation over the years would be wasted. When the Philippines intended to initiate an arbitration against, or believed that their negotiations had reached an impasse whose progress needed the intervention of a third party, it was supposed to propose directly to China and hear China’s views in respect to its Submissions. However, the truth is that the Philippines failed to negotiate with China regarding any sort of its Submissions; further, it even did not express its intention to submit their disputes before an arbitral tribunal. On 26 April 2012, the Philippines delivered a note verbale to China, proposing that the issue of Huangyan Island be referred to a third-party judicial body for resolution. This is the only document that the Philippines, before its initiation of the arbitration against China, delivered to China concerning the start of a judicial procedure. However, from the perspective of good faith principle, this only document is also full of loopholes. The note verbale merely proposed to submit the issue of Huangyan Island to a judicial procedure, without mentioning the Nansha Islands and other issues, or saying that the third-party judicial body refers to the ICJ, ITLOS or an arbitral body, nor indicating any willingness to negotiate with China. The nature of the document, i.e., an ordinary note verbale issued by the Ministry of Foreign Af f airs, shows in itself that this document was intended by the Philippines to be no morethan a notif i cation.①Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, 7 December 2014, para. 48. [hereinafter “Position Paper”]However, the Philippines declared, on 22 January 2013, that it would start an arbitration process against China.

The above facts demonstrate that the Philippines has failed to fulfill its obligation to sufficiently negotiate with China. Technically, it even did not attempt to start negotiations with China regarding its initiation of arbitration.

2. The Absence of Honesty in the Philippines’ Negotiations Even if, quod non, the Philippines, as alleged by itself, has conducted negotiations before the start of the arbitration, its attitude towards negotiations is questionable. The paper contends that the degree of honesty which the applicant has towards negotiations is a critical factor to determine whether it has observed the good faith principle. This point may be assessed in two aspects: fi rst, whether the applicant State has actually conducted sufficient negotiations, rather than mere negotiations aiming not to openly violate the procedural requirements under the UNCLOS; second, whether the applicant remains willing to enter into negotiations, if possible, after the start of an judicial procedure. However, the deeds of the Philippines cannot stand the test in any one of two aspects above.

During the preliminary review of the case, the Tribunal asked: assuming Article 283 requires an negotiation on the substance of the parties’ dispute, at what level of specificity must such a negotiation occur, and whether the Philippines has sufficiently exchanged views with respect to each of its specific, individual submissions”.②Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, p. 32.This question is right to the point, to which the Philippines answered: “it is not necessary to exchange views on the substance of each and every submission per se; as long as there has been an exchange of views on the general subject matter of the dispute, broadly construed, Article 283 is satisf i ed…; there is no need for an exchange of views to touch upon specific articles of the Convention.”③Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, pp. 34～35.The Philippines degraded negotiations into a prima facie procedural requirement, which can be seen clearly in its answers presented above. Now that the Submissions reflect the Philippines’ primary arguments in its disputes with China in the SCS, the substance of the disputes must naturally be discussed in their negotiations. Otherwise, such negotiations would lose their meanings. The aboveanswer of the Philippines proves per se that the so-called negotiations conducted prior to the initiation of the arbitration totally lack honesty and sincerity. On the other hand, both negotiations and third-party arbitration are means to settle disputes, which are identical in terms of their fi nal aims. The Philippines alleged that its disputes with China involved a number of issues, and therefore it presented 15 Submissions to the Tribunal for resolution. In that case, if it sincerely hoped to settle such issues, how could it fail to exchange views with China on each and every Submission? Assuming that in a negotiation, if one party fails even to inform the other party of its specif i c claims, then how to mention a “hearing” or “exchange”of views, and what is the substance of such a negotiation? Furthermore, the saying that “Article 283 is satisfied as long as there has been an exchange of views”admitted unequivocally that negotiation is a prima facie procedural requirement to the Philippines. It follows that the Philippines has resolved to submit the dispute before an arbitral body. Given such a resolution, its talk with China on the issue of arbitration, if any, becomes meaningless. That is because the Philippines did not “negotiate”, if it can be called “negotiate”, with China with a view to reaching an agreement, maybe even the opposite. A failed negotiation is, after all, a strong excuse to enter into an arbitral process. China should not and is unwilling to make such a presumption that is nearly malicious; however, the Philippines’ attitude towards negotiations is indeed unconvincing.

The substance of the good faith principle is to perform one’s obligations assumed under a treaty in good faith, so as not to make the treaty de facto null and void. Hence, even if, quod non, the Philippines has conducted the so-called“negotiations”, it has failed to implement the provisions concerning negotiations under UNCLOS.

3. Arbitration Does Not Hamper the Continuing of Negotiations Finally, that the applicant State remains willing to negotiate and even welcomes such negotiations also best demonstrates that it has fulf i lled the obligation to settle disputes in good faith through peaceful means. The parties to Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case did not, as their dispute had been submitted to judicial process, stop their negotiations; instead they continued their negotiations on several occasions.①Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, paras. 24～26.Just as a judge of this case noted in his separate opinions, since State to State disputes frequently involve intricate and multi-dimensional issues, itis desirable to apply several methods at the same time or successively; thus the various instruments and fora to which States may resort are not incompatible, for all are mutually complementary.①Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 52.In some maritime delimitation disputes, applying several methods at the same time, if all are applicable, may better contribute to the resolution of such disputes. Anyway, it is certain that the intervention of a third-party dispute settlement body would not hamper the conducting of any negotiations; instead, such bodies often encourage and call for the resumption of negotiations.

Unfortunately, the negotiations between China and Philippines had stagnated during the years after the initiation of the SCS arbitration. The Philippines rejected all of China’s proposals to restart negotiations. Immediately after the Philippines’fi ling of the arbitration in January 2013, the Chinese embassy in Manila invited the Philippines to resolve their disputes through bilateral negotiations. However, the Philippine presidential spokesman said that China’s invitation was too late; “let’s meet at the tribunal”.②ZHU Xiaolei, China Calls on the Philippines to Talk on Their Territorial Disputes, at http:// world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2013-01/3577769.html, 30 January 2017. (in Chinese)To date, the Philippines has made similar declarations at its government press conferences and on other occasions. Asserting that China insisted to demand it to fi rstly recognize that “the SCS in its entirety belongs to China”, the Philippines would not continue bilateral discussions prior to the release of the fi nal award of the arbitration.③See Response of the DFA Spokesperson to the Recent Statement of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Af f airs on the West Philippine Sea Issue, at http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/ newsroom/dfa-releases/332-response-of-the-dfa-spokesperson-to-the-recent-statementof-the-chinese-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-west-philippine-sea-issue, 1 February 2017; ZHU Yanfang, The Philippines Said that It Would Not Restart Bilateral Talks with China on the South China See Disputes before 2016, at http://news.ifeng.com/ a/20141211/42697421_0.shtml, 1 February 2017 (in Chinese); Statement before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, at http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/dfareleases/6795-statement-before-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration, 1 February 2017.

An ongoing judicial process does not, in the slightest sense, impede the conduction of any negotiations. The fundamental question lies in whether the parties concerned have the good faith to settle their disputes through negotiations fi rst. In this connection, the good faith of the Philippines is greatly questionable; it is, apparently, reluctant to make efforts in bilateral cooperation, since it has repeatedly rejected to talk with China. Paradoxically, the Philippines, at the same time, alleged that it adhered to the laws in relation to settlement of disputes, andeven called upon the international community to peacefully settle disputes by complying with the rules of laws.①PHL Stresses Adherence to Rule of Law as Key to Peaceful Settlement of Disputes; Highlights World Development Challenges and Calls on UN Reforms, at http://www.dfa. gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/4202-phl-stresses-adherence-to-rule-of-law-askey-to-peaceful-settlement-of-disputes-highlights-world-development-challenges-and-callson-un-reforms, 1 February 2017.Such being the case, the Philippines should keep in mind that both the international conventions such as the UN Charter and the UNCLOS, and the principle of good faith (a general principle of international law) require the disputants to fi rst negotiate in a meaningful and sufficient fashion.

B. Pacta Sunt Servada and the Obligation Not to Impair the Objects and Purposes of Treaties

1. The Provisions, Objects and Purposes of UNCLOS

The language of the UNCLOS repeatedly affirmed the importance of negotiation and cooperation. Article 280 states that the right of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them by any peaceful means of their own choice would not be impaired. Article 281 provides that if the States Parties have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided for in the UNCLOS apply only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means. Article 283 stipulates that when a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS, the parties to the dispute shall proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means. A mere Part XV (Settlement of Disputes) contains four articles mentioning expressly negotiation or other “peaceful means”.②UNCLOS, Articles 279～281, 283.Words expressing the priority of settlement by negotiation or referring to the articles providing for the settlement by negotiation can be found in numerous provisions of the UNCLOS. For example, Article 286 provides that any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS may, only when no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted to compulsory procedures entailing binding force; while section 1 stresses the priory of bilateral negotiations. The UNCLOS established a dispute settlement mechanism by setting out complex and mutually complementary provisions. It carefully ensures that the settlement of disputes through bilateralnegotiations would not be jeopardized by this mechanism; instead, the former would enjoy a priority over the mechanism. It has already become a fact that the adherence to the UNCLOS requires the States Parties to sufficiently negotiate and sincerely cooperate.

Regarding the objects and purposes of the UNCLOS, its Preamble and the general provisions of Part XVI have laid down the guiding principle: all issues relating to the law of the sea should be settled in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation. States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right. If the express requirement on voluntary negotiation can be said to be prima facie satisf i ed by conducting any bilateral dialogues, without focusing on the substance of such dialogues, then the objects and purposes of the UNCLOS impose higher demands on the States Parties in respect of their good faith.

A number of facts indicate that the Philippines, when preparing to file the arbitration and initiating the arbitration, and during the consideration of the case, had never talked with China, or sincerely negotiated with China with a view to concluding an agreement. In this connection, first, where the disputes submitted by the Philippines really, as it alleged, concern the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS, then it shall, in accordance with Article 283, exchange views with China regarding the settlement of their disputes by peaceful means. However, the Philippines, in fact, has never consulted China concerning any one of its Submissions. Consequently, it has breached the express provisions of the UNCLOS, and the rule of Pacta Sunt Servada.

Even if, quod non, the Philippines has, as alleged by itself, talked with China over the arbitration, such talks lack sincerity, to say the least. Since the Philippines asserts that it is not necessary to exchange views to touch upon specif i c contents of its Submissions, any negotiations that may be taken up by the parties become prima facie. In that case, the Philippines has abandoned the object of negotiation, ignored the true meaning of cooperation and impaired the objects and purposes of the UNCLOS.

2. Provisions, Objects and Purposes of Many Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements between China and the Philippines

Aside from the UNCLOS, China and the Philippines have signed a series of agreements referred to in the UNCLOS, which set out the explicit requirements on the means to settle disputes between States. There has been a long-standingagreement between China and the Philippines on resolving their disputes in the SCS through friendly consultations and negotiations. The joint statements between the two States, as well as other official documents issued since 1995, all specif i ed that their disputes should be settled through friendly consultations and negotiations.①China’s Position Paper invoked a number of such statements, see Position Paper, paras. 31～34.The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), signed in 2002, contains the following provisions: The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations which shall serve as the basic norms governing State-to-State relations; the Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means through friendly consultations and negotiations, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law.②Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 2002, Articles 1, 4.The importance of negotiation has also been acknowledged by the current Philippine Government. The 2011 Joint Statement between China and the Philippines reiterated their commitment to addressing their disputes through peaceful dialogue and reaffirmed their commitments to respect and abide by the DOC.③Position Paper, para. 37.China insists that the bilateral instruments and multilateral instruments to which China and the Philippines are parties, constitute agreements with binding force, i.e., the agreements within the meaning of UNCLOS Articles 280 and 281. On that basis, they have undertaken a mutual obligation to settle their disputes through negotiations. The following pages will provide a further analysis taking the DOC as an example.

Firstly, the DOC is a political agreement having binding force upon China and the Philippines. Article 2(1) of the VCLT states: “‘treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”.④Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 2(1).An agreement is called an agreement mainly because the parties to the agreement have expressed to create rights and obligations on international law.⑤Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., WANG Tieya et al. trans., Oppenheim’s International Law, Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1995, p. 1203. (in Chinese)An unsigned instrument, such as a press communiqué, can also constitute an agreement.⑥Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., WANG Tieya et al. trans., Oppenheim’s International Law, Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1995, p. 1209. (in Chinese)Documents, including minutescreating legal obligations for the parties concerned, may also become agreements.①Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, para. 41(1).Therefore, the intentions of the parties concerned, along with the words used in a document, are the factors determining whether or not the document constitutes an agreement entailing binding force.

The DOC articulates that the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the UNCLOS, and other principles of international law shall serve as the basic norms governing State-to-State relations; that the Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign States directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law.②Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 2002, Articles 1, 4.These provisions demonstrate that the DOC contains clear rules of conduct. The employment of the term “undertake” also evinces an intention to establish an obligation between the two States in this regard.③Position Paper, para. 38.Additionally, the DOC was jointly signed by the Vice Foreign Minister of China, and the foreign ministers or secretaries of the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), i.e., government representatives.④A declaration, if signed by the primary government representatives, and including def i nite rules of conduct and other conclusions agreed, this document should be binding upon the States involved. Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., WANG Tieya et al. trans., Oppenheim’s International Law, Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1995, p. 1189. (in Chinese)To sum up, the DOC should be considered as an agreement with legal force.

Therefore, the Philippines should insist that the disputes be settled “through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign States directly concerned”, as provided for in the DOC. The Preamble of the DOC also declares its purpose: to enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of dif f erences and disputes among countries concerned. The Philippines not only failed to proactively perform its obligation to negotiate with China, but also refused all of China’s requests for talk. In this connection, the Philippines violated the DOC, and beyond that, it impaired the objects and purposes of the DOC.

Secondly, the Philippines argued, in the proceeding, that the DOC was not intended to be a legally binding agreement, but nothing more than a political instrument. It also analyzed the term “undertake”, contending that it was dif f erentfrom the term “agree” in ef f ect in that States solely “state” their “undertakings”.①Memorial of the Philippines, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, 2014, paras. 7.51. [hereinafter “The Memorial”]Nevertheless, the explanation given by the Black’s Law Dictionary to the word“undertake” is unable to support the Philippines’ argument; the word “undertake”denotes the assumption of an obligation, the making of a formal promise, or acting in surety.②Bryan A. Garner ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, Eagan: West Group, 2004, p. 4741.The words used in the explanation is unambiguous, whichever indicates the intention of the doer. The Philippines distorted the interpretation of the terms employed in the DOC, which obviously breached the requirement that a treaty be interpreted in good faith. In addition, acting arbitrarily by regarding the DOC as a document without binding force, also overlooked the intention of the signatory States to DOC when creating the relevant obligations. As described previously, the purpose of a treaty mirrors the common aspiration of all States Parties, rather than the viewpoints of a single party. The protection of a treaty’s objects and purposes is also a kind of protection to the legal aspiration of all States Parties, which is the mutual good faith that should be shown by States Parties.

Thirdly, the Philippines argued that the DOC was signed as something of a stop-gap measure in light of the inability of the ASEAN member States and China to achieve consensus on four major areas of disagreement; that the circumstances surrounding the DOC’s adoption indicated that it was not a legally binding instrument.③The Memorial, para. 7.55.However, the implementation of the DOC provides a different story. ASEAN member States and China, subsequently, signed the guidelines for future actions of the DOC. For example, China issued a joint statement with the Philippines, reaffirming their commitments to the DOC.④Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines, 1 September 2011.The Philippines has participated in numerous consultations held after the conclusion of the DOC, where it has never expressed the kind of views indicating that it was impossible to negotiate with China. Right before the Philippines’ submission of its memorial, the 10th ASEAN-China Joint Working Group Meeting on the Implementation of the DOC was held on 18 March 2014. Representatives from both the Philippines and China participated in the meeting. The object of the meeting was precisely to implement the DOC. If the Philippines believed that the DOC was not legally binding and thus did not intend to discharge the requirements thereunder, whybother to participate in the consultations concerning the implementation of the DOC? Or, why did the Philippines fail to raise any objections during such consultations? On one hand, the Philippines participated in the implementation of the DOC; on the other hand, it blatantly deviated from the requirements of the DOC. Such self-contradictory actions show, indisputably, the absence of good faith on the Philippines’ side.

Finally, even if, quod non, the DOC was considered a document without binding force, as the Tribunal found in its preliminary decision, the means of settlement by negotiation between the parties is also affirmed by the UNCLOS. However, the Philippines refused to take the initiative to talk with China, rejected China’s proposal for negotiation, and clearly expressed its decision not to enter into negotiations. Such facts provide further evidence that it has disregarded the objects and purposes of the UNCLOS, and further gone against the principle of good faith.

IV. The Tribunal’ Breach of the Good Faith Principle

Given that the dispute settlement mechanism is established, the UNCLOS, which is committed to the peace of the oceans, also needs the protection from dispute settlement bodies. Maritime delimitation disputes are intricate and complex, the seeking of settlement means acceptable to all parties involved, hence, requires the efforts of all parties and the wit and intelligence of third-party settlement bodies.

A. The Examination of the Parties’ Fulf i llment of Their Obligation to Negotiate in Good Faith

Before rendering any judgment on the merits of a dispute, the dispute settlement body should fi rst decide whether the parties concerned have, sufficiently and reasonably, conducted negotiations. It requires the adjudication body to examine whether or not the parties concerned have actually performed their obligation to negotiate in good faith. Based on the statement above, this obligation can be examined through two steps: the first is to examine whether the parties have negotiated over the matters submitted to a third party body; the second is to consider whether the parties have good faith during the course of negotiations.

The fi rst step is easier to complete, since it is not necessary for the adjudication body to explore the substance of negotiations, which only needs to decide whetherthe relevant issues have been put on the negotiation table. However, the decision of the Tribunal of the present case, even in this step, is unconvincing. For instance, when considering Article 283 of UNCLOS, the Tribunal held, in its preliminary award, that China and the Philippines had exchanged views regarding the disputes that “the Philippines has presented in these proceedings”, and thus Article 283 had been satisf i ed.①Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 2015, para. 342. [hereinafter “Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility”]The Tribunal quoted as evidence the content of a consultation between the vice foreign ministers of the two States made on 14 January 2012. Nevertheless, exactly in this quotation, the Philippine representative said to the Chinese counterpart: “You are for bilateral discussion. We have embarked on a path that uses the law…”②Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 339.The tense used in this statement of the Philippines suggests that it almost acknowledged unequivocally that the Philippines “had”, even before the occurrence of the Huangyuan Island Event, embarked on a path that uses the law. Under this circumstance, how can the Tribunal employ this statement as an evidence to prove that the Philippines has exchanged views with China? Additionally, the Philippines, in that consultation, proposed to adopt multilateral dialogue, rather than judicial process, to settle its disputes with China.③Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 339.That consultation, as determined by the Tribunal, is an ef f ective evidence proving that the Philippines has exchanged views with China. Then we have to say that the Philippines deceived China in the consultation. UNCLOS Article 283 requires an exchange of views regarding dispute settlement by peaceful means. Consequently, the Philippines should, at least, inform China in that consultation that it intended to submit their disputes in the SCS to arbitration. Nonetheless, it proposed, in that consultation, another dispute settlement means which is totally dif f erent from arbitration. That is to say, the conclusion of the Tribunal reveals another aspect indicating that the Philippines has gone against the requirement on honesty and credibility imposed by the good faith principle. Yet it is still hard to accept the conclusion that the ef f orts made by the Philippines in that consultation are nothing more than a fraud. Therefore, we can only conclude: that consultation was not concerning the issue of arbitration, and thus the decision of the Tribunal in this regard is unreasonable.

Apart from the consultation mentioned above, the Tribunal also invoked the note verbale issued by the Philippines in 2012 to China concerning the issue of Huangyan Island. However, the note verbale involved nothing more than the issues of Huangyan Island and its EEZ, without mentioning other issues or its intention to adopt which judicial proceedings.①Note Verbale from the Department of Foreign Af f airs of the Philippines to the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Manila, No. 12-1137, 26 April 2012.However, the Tribunal stated that the Parties had “unequivocally” exchanged views regarding the disputes that “the Philippines has presented in these proceedings”.②Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 342.The facts are clear and obvious, but the Tribunal still made such an incredible conclusion. This is not purely a question of the Tribunal’s misjudgment on an argument; instead, it is also the Tribunal’s disregard of the good faith principle.

If the Tribunal’s decision on whether the parties have conducted negotiations can still be said to sound plausible, then in the second step where the sincerity and sufficiency of the negotiations are examined, the Tribunal nearly turned a blind eye to all relevant evidences, whose award, therefore, is undoubtedly absent of good faith. Here, we will also take the consideration of UNCLOS Article 283 as an example. The Tribunal pointed out that diplomatic communications and exchanges did not divide neatly between procedural and substantive matters; that in practice, the Parties’ views on the substantive matters between them may shed a great deal of light on their respective views on how the dispute may – or may not –be settled.③Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 332.Now that the Tribunal acknowledged this fact, it is of more necessity to carefully review the contents of negotiations between the Parties. However, the two evidences provided by the Tribunal, as previously mentioned, cannot even prove that the Philippines has started the negotiations with China, not to say how much good faith it has made in such negotiations. Furthermore, the agent of the Philippines, as quoted above, argued that “it is not necessary to exchange views on the substance of each and every submission per se; as long as there has been an exchange of views on the general subject matter of the dispute, broadly construed, Article 283 is satisf i ed.”④Final Transcript Day 2 – Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, pp. 34～35.These arguments indicate that the Philippines has perceived negotiation as a mere procedure, with no intention to put more ef f orts in bilateral cooperation for a long time. Seeing such obvious attitudes of thePhilippines, the Tribunal still held that the Philippines satisf i ed the requirement on negotiation. We have no choice but to say that the Tribunal has also ignored the meaning of negotiation. Meaningless negotiation, apparently, is neither consistent with the spirit of the UNCLOS, nor with the goals of any international treaties to seek bilateral cooperation and resolution of disputes through peaceful means. In this connection, the award of the Tribunal impaired the objects and purposes of the UNCLOS, and went against the principle of good faith once again.

B. The Tribunal’s Disregard of Law and Facts

The Tribunal declared that it had jurisdiction over the disputes between China and the Philippines which obviously concerned with the territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation. Subsequently, the Tribunal, in the fi nal award, denied China’s historic rights in the SCS, the validity of the U-shaped line, as well as the possibility that the Nansha Islands may have EEZ and continental shelf. In the merits phase, the Tribunal acted in defiance of laws, history and facts on uncountable occasions. The following pages will provide an analysis taking the issue of China’s historic rights as an example.

China has not clearly def i ned the nature of the U-shaped line and contents of its historic rights in the SCS. In the view of the Tribunal, such rights claimed by China were exceptional, and therefore the U-shaped line and China’s claims to historic rights encompassed by the relevant part of the U-shaped line were without lawful ef f ect.①Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, Award, 2016, para. 278. [hereinafter “Award”]

From the perspective of good faith, the Tribunal’s decision above distorted the facts, and failed to deal with the evidences honestly. Firstly, it is true that China declared that it had historic rights in the areas enclosed by the U-shaped line. However, it has never said that other States were not allowed to exercise their legal rights in the SCS. In fact, the Tribunal also noted that China had repeatedly stated that it respected and safeguarded the freedom of navigation in the SCS to which all countries were entitled under international law.②Award, para. 212.The actual navigation situations of the SCS for years show that China has not impeded any other States’ exercise of their legal rights in the SCS, including the areas enclosed by the U-shaped line. TheTribunal however asserted, in the award, that historic rights were, in most instances, exceptional rights.①Award, para. 268.It then presumed that the historic rights claimed by China were exceptional, which affected the rights of other States. The problem is that how can the Tribunal conclude that historic rights are exceptional? The Tribunal, in the Award, also admitted that the notion of “historic right” had not been defined on international law.②Award, para. 226, the text reads “Other ‘historic rights’… are nowhere mentioned in the Convention.”Then, after considering China’s specif i c statements and practice, it has less grounds to reach the conclusion above. Such a conclusion is, evidently, the Tribunal’s assumption on historic rights and China’s claims.

Secondly, the Tribunal took China’s claims to petroleum and fi shery resources as an example, holding that China did not mention that its rights with respect these resources were based on the fact that the relevant areas were located within its EEZ and continental shelf, instead, China considered its rights to stem from historic rights. In the view of the Tribunal, China’s objections to the Philippines’ exploration of the Reed Bank/GSEC101 and other petroleum blocks, for instance, were merely based on the claim that these blocks were situated in the waters of which China has historic rights and jurisdiction, without mentioning EEZ or continental shelf.③Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacif i c Af f airs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2011; Note Verbale from the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Manila to the Department of Foreign Af f airs, Republic of the Philippines, No. (11) PG-202, 6 July 2011; Award, para. 209.The Tribunal then concluded that China’s claims to these rights were not based on a theory of entitlement to EEZ and continental shelf rights under the UNCLOS, but on historic rights.④Award, para. 209.However, the question lies in that the Tribunal has also pointed out that the area of the Philippines’ petroleum blocks was covered by entitlements claimed by China under the Convention, if China claimed EEZ and continental shelf from the Nansha Islands.⑤Award, para. 209.The fact that China did not explain its rights to the petroleum resources from the perspective of EEZ and continental shelf does not, necessarily, represent that China does not enjoy the rights derived from its entitlement to EEZ and continental shelf.

Thirdly, the Tribunal argued, in the award, that with respect to the part of area encompassed by the U-shaped line but outside the EEZ and continental shelf of China, when China’s claim for rights extended to areas that would be consideredto form part of the entitlement of the Philippines to an EEZ or continental shelf, China would be at variance with the UNCLOS.①Award, para. 232.Nevertheless, since China and the Philippines have dispute over the delimitation of their marine boundaries, the scope of the EEZ and continental shelf claimed by the two States, respectively, is controversial in itself. In that case, how can the Tribunal, before the settlement of the delimitation dispute, decide that China infringed the rights of the Philippine side? In this regard, the award is apparently unfair to China, which goes against the basic connotation of the good faith principle once again.

The UNCLOS does not specify that the arbitral tribunal constituted under its Annex VII should comply with the principle of good faith. However, as described above, judicial bodies, including arbitral tribunals, which are established to resolve disputes and maintain the fairness of international justice, are supposed to set themselves an example to others. It should be said that the Tribunal may exert more severe impacts than the Philippines, if it renders its award not in good faith. The Philippines is only a party to a dispute and a member of the international community. Its violation of the basic rules of international law can be corrected by the judicial bodies. In contrast, the Tribunal is an international judicial body per se. It will extensively impair the general rules of international law, if it fails to identify such violations and even ignores facts and misinterprets evidences.

C. The Tribunal’s Failure to Issue an Award Really Contributing to the Peaceful Resolution of Disputes

The preliminary award of the Tribunal is indicative of the Tribunal’s def i ance of the good faith principle to a great extent. However, it does not mean that the situation cannot be remedied in the award delivered at the merits phase. No matter how the adjudication body interprets each specif i c issue, its fi nal award is aimed at appeasing international conf l icts, and encouraging the parties to a dispute to make peace, which is the most fundamental obligation of the dispute settlement bodies, and also their basic good faith. However, the final award released in July, 2016, failed to make up the good faith that was absent in the preliminary award. Instead, it even went further, as no good faith can be found in the whole text of the award. To this point, the Tribunal of the present case cannot contribute to the resolution of the disputes between China and the Philippines. The result will even turn out to bejust the opposite of its wish.

The international law, as a result of the historical development of international relations, cannot be treated separating from the latter. The Sino-Philippine disputes in the SCS, like all State-State disputes, are not solely an issue of international law. They also involve complex international political considerations and future development of the relations between the Parties. For these reasons, any disputes should always be addressed by diplomatic means in priority. In a similar vein, under reasonable circumstance, it is extremely necessary for an international judicial body to make a final award encouraging negotiations. By doing so, the judicial body is not evading its responsibilities, but making a decision based on the actual situation that will best contribute to the settlement of disputes. It is a signal of good faith from the international law to the members of the international community.

From the perspective above, the SCS arbitration between China and the Philippines needs nothing more than such a award encouraging negotiations. Given that China has reiterated that it would not accept or participate in the arbitration, it has sufficient grounds not to implement the award, even if the Tribunal delivered any award unfavorable to China. Moreover, due to the lack of good faith in the preliminary award of the Tribunal, its decisions have already invited the question and doubts from academia home and even abroad. The Tribunal of the case has almost become the target of public criticism in China. The Chinese Government insists that the Tribunal lack jurisdiction over the case;①Transcript of the Chinese and Foreign Media’ Interview with XU Hong, the Director-General of Department of Treaty and Law of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regarding the SCS Arbitration Initiated by the Philippines, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ cebe/chn/zclc/t1362765.htm, 17 January 2017(in Chinese); Foreign Ministry Spokesman LU Kang’s Regular Press Conference on 30 October 2015, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1310668.shtml, 17 January 2017. (in Chinese)and scholars explored, from various perspectives, the fallacies of its award on jurisdiction. Since China holds that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction, the fi nal award it issued later should also be considered to be without legal ef f ect. In that case, the parties would be locked in a stalemate regarding the final award, which would be eventually laid aside and become meaningless, if the consequence is mild. On the other hand, it would have an ef f ect exactly opposite of its wish, if the consequence is severe enough. Specif i cally, China would insist that the award be null and void, but the Philippines would request to implement the award. In that way, their conflicts and disputesconcerning the issue of SCS would be further aggravated or exacerbated. The former consequence would undoubtedly impair the ef f ect and authoritativeness of international justice, and prejudice the development of international law; the latter would further undermine the friendly development of international relations, and threaten the peace and stability of the international community.

Regretfully, the Tribunal of the present case, acting arbitrarily and willfully, failed to objectively review the facts of the Sino-Philippine disputes. After the release of the fi nal award, China rightly criticized it, and the Philippines, under the leadership of its newly elected president, also determines to renegotiate with China and put the award aside. The purpose of the Tribunal is supposed to contribute to the resolution of the Sino-Philippine disputes, and to restore the peace of SCS. However, the Tribunal went farther and farther on the way deviating from the good faith principle. It is appropriate to say that the Tribunal has abused its name as a dispute settlement body.

V. The Philippines and the Tribunal’s Fundamental Def i ciency

Be it the requirement imposed on the parties to a dispute to negotiate in good faith, the rule of pacta sunt servada, the requirement to contribute to the attainment of a treaty’s purpose, or the duty of a third-party dispute settlement body to review the obligations above in good faith, the very foundation is the honesty of each party when taking actions. The objective quality of bona fi des ref l ects many requirements, covering multiple aspects of a dispute.

For example, acting in good faith can also be interpreted that the disputants act transparently and depict facts objectively. Any issues involved in the Sino-Philippine disputes in the SCS are, in practice, concerning the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation. However, the Philippines spared no effort to package its claims into some prima facie submissions, such as the consideration of the legal nature of certain marine features,①Professor LUO Guoqiang lists four ways that the Philippines employed to disguise its real submissions. See LUO Guoqiang, A Comment on the Preliminary Award on the South China Sea Arbitration, Foreign Af f airs Review, No. 2, 2016, p. 26. (in Chinese)deliberately hiding its true intention behind. Such distortion of facts and hiding of the substance of the disputes, naturally, goes against the requirements on transparency, objectivity andhonesty.

For another example, the Philippines, in its note verbale protesting against China’s claims in the SCS, stated that it enjoyed the sovereignty or sovereign rights to the territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf generated by the marine features of “Kalayaan Island Group”.①The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations, Note Verbale 000228, United Nations Documents, 2011.The “Kalayaan Island Group” claimed by the Philippines is entirely composed by some features of the Nansha Islands. It follows that the Philippines has admitted that some features of the Nansha Islands are entitled to EEZ and continental shelf. In that case, it should not be disputable for China to claim EEZ and continental shelf on the basis of the Nansha Islands in its entirety, which is larger than any one feature of the Nansha Islands, and also bigger than the “Kalayaan Island Group”. Therefore, this evidence is insufficient to prove that China and the Philippines have disputes in this regard. Nevertheless, the Tribunal made an opposite decision.②Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 170.This also demonstrates that the Tribunal failed to examine the facts in an objective way.

The last but the most ironical point is that the Philippines and the Tribunal, during the course of the arbitration, expressly mentioned the good faith principle on several occasions, implying that China had not acted in good faith. In the view of the Philippines, China violated its obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment in the waters surrounding Huangyan Island, Ren’ai Reef, Meiji Reef and other features; China’s land creation and construction work damaged the marine environment; and it made no ef f ort to control the harmful activities of its fi shermen; therefore China has not performed the obligations under the UNCLOS in good faith.③Day 3 – Hearing on the Merits and Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Republic of Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA, p. 45.In its Submission No. 14, the Philippines alleged that China had aggravated the dispute by taking a series of actions in the waters at, and adjacent to, Ren’ai Reef. The Philippines argued that UNCLOS Article 300 articulated the basic principle of good faith and the prevention of abuse of rights, which required States to narrow their dif f erences, rather than aggravate their disputes.

The good faith principle, indisputably, calls for the parties to a dispute to actively address their dif f erences through peaceful means, rather than to provoke each other to exacerbate their dispute. However, the problem is that the Philippines illegally ran an old warship aground on the Ren’ai Reef in 1999 and has neveracted to remove the warship from the Chinese reef for the last 18 years, but even attempting to build facilities there. The Philippines accused China of continuing actions on or around the reef after the start of the arbitration in 2013, which aggravated or escalated their disputes. However, the truth is that the Philippines publicly declared, in March, 2014, that it would build the warship aground on the Ren’ai Reef into a permanent facility. In this context, China took necessary measures, since China would never sit by and watch other States challenge its territorial sovereignty over the Ren’ai Reef, which is a part of its Nansha Islands. On what grounds can the Philippines, being the party provoking the dispute, accuse China of destroying the peace in the SCS?

Sadly, the Tribunal only saw the actions on the Chinese side, but turned a blind eye to the prior provocation made by the Philippines. The Tribunal considered that China’s construction of artif i cial islands on seven features in the SCS, in addition to the Meiji Reef, Ren’ai Reef and other features identified by the Philippines, aggravated the disputes between the Parties.①Award, para. 1177.The Tribunal, weirdly, “forgot” the fact that the Philippines fi rst challenged China’s claims of sovereignty, but solely focused on the actions on the Chinese side. In view of such deliberate disregard of facts, how can the award be considered to be made in good faith? Further, the Tribunal held that China’s actions obstructed the progress of arbitration, which impaired its purpose to help the settlement of disputes. However, does not the deceptive award really hamper the resolution of disputes? In fact, the award primarily aims to conclude that China and the Philippines do not have disputes over maritime delimitation, therefore the relevant features of the Nansha Islands are located within the Philippine continental shelf, and these features would belong to the Philippines automatically. This conclusion is based on three critical fi ndings of the Tribunal: China’s claims of historic rights are ineffective; China’s claims of maritime rights generated by the Nansha Islands in its entirety are invalid; no feature of the Nansha Islands qualifies as an “island”. Nonetheless, none of the three fi ndings is well-founded in facts. The “historic rights” claimed by China is by no means exceptional; but the Tribunal arbitrarily decided otherwise. No provisions can be found in the UNCLOS that archipelagic baselines do not apply to mid-ocean archipelagos. A group of islands, at least, cannot be assumed to be not entitled to EEZ and continental shelf in its entirety. However, the Tribunal arbitrarily denied this entitlement. There is no express stipulation on the criteria of “island”, yet theTribunal seems to have elevated the criteria on purpose by disregarding the factual evidences. In fact, a sufficient exploration of the problems lying in the Tribunal’s three fi ndings needs much more pages, which would not be pursued in this paper. For the purpose of the paper, we only underscore the falsehood and absurdity of the Tribunal’s fi nding that there is no overlapping sea areas between China and the Philippines. No decision based on this fi nding can contribute to the settlement of disputes; instead, it will only bring ef f ect opposite to its wish.

The Philippines and the Tribunal recklessly infringed on the principle of good faith, nevertheless they still invoked this principle to falsely discuss China’s actions without respect. In the course of the arbitration, their words and actions were inconsistent and self-contradictory. They employed the principle of good faith when convenient and abandoned it on unfavorable conditions. As such, the damages that they brought to this basic principle of international law and fundamental rule of conduct for the international community have attained a level never known before.

The connotations of the good faith principle under discussion are far from exhaustion and cannot be exhausted. With sincerity and honesty as its core, the principle is, naturally, mirrored in every move and action of the doer. The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on SCS Disputes was closed eventually in July, 2016. Regrettably, the so called “f i nal award” nearly supports all the Submissions raised by the Philippines. An examination of the behaviors of the Philippines and the Tribunal reveals numerous violations of the good faith principle, from which the paper only cited a couple of examples. Such violations will hugely impair the principle.

VI. Conclusions

The settlement of international disputes, and accordingly the maintenance of world peace, needs, especially, each doer to comply with the good faith principle. In the context of maritime delimitation disputes, this principle involves multiple connotations, mainly including:

Firstly, the parties to a dispute should enter into and conduct negotiations in good faith, with a view to arriving at agreements. They should perform their obligations assumed under the treaties between them in good faith, without prejudice to the objects and purposes of such treaties. Furthermore, their actions should always keep the essence of sincerity.

Secondly, the dispute settlement body involved should be fully aware of theduties assumed by the parties under the principle of good faith, and objectively examine the facts associated with the dispute in good faith. Its award or judgment should aim to resolve the dispute, and really advance the peace progress of the international community.

The Sino-Philippine disputes in the SCS concern territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation. Be it the Philippines (a party to the disputes), or the Tribunal (a dispute settlement body), their behaviors failed to meet the requirements above, which, undoubtedly, enormously undermined the principle of good faith.

As a general principle of international law, the good faith principle, which has profound connotations, is a cornerstone supporting the functioning of the international community. It is the minimal criteria for international actions, also the goodness highly pursued by the entire human being. This principle should not be ignored or infringed. In the context of the invalid award of the Sino-Philippine Arbitration on SCS Disputes made not in good faith, this principle should be paid more attention by all the members of the international community which is committed to the development of international law.

Translator: XIE Hongyue

Sino-Philippine Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes: A Perspective from the Principle of Good Faith

LUO Sa*

This paper, from the perspective of the principle of good faith, an abstract and basic principle on international law, examines the deeds of both the Philippines and the Tribunal in the Arbitration on South China Sea Disputes. The fi rst section explores the connotations of the principle in the context of maritime delimitation. On the one hand, the parties to a maritime delimitation dispute are governed by this principle. For example, the parties are obligated to negotiate in good faith, including to actively enter into negotiations, conduct sufficient talks and keep welcoming negotiations. On the other hand, the principle also requires dispute settlement bodies to make their decisions in a legal and reasonable manner. The second section identif i es the Philippines’ violation of the good faith principle in multiple aspects, by checking its actions taken during the course of the proceedings against the primary requirements of the principle. The third section showcases the absence of good faith in the Arbitral Tribunal’s award, by presenting the behaviors of the Tribunal, as a dispute settlement body, during its review of the case. Lastly, the paper mentions that the Philippines and the Tribunal even check China’s behaviors against the principle of good faith. And the paper concludes that the lack of honesty and integrity of both the Philippines and the Tribunal causes fundamental detriment to this general principle of international law.

Principle of good faith; China; The Philippines; Arbitral Tribunal; South China Sea Arbitration

* 罗萨，武汉大学中国边界与海洋研究院2015级硕士研究生。电子邮箱：lovirosa@163. com。本文获《中国海洋法学评论》批判南海仲裁案征文比赛二等奖。

© THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

* LUO Sa, master degree candidate enrolled in 2015 of Wuhan University China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies. E-mail: lovirosa@163.com. This paper won the second prize of the COLR Open Submission Contest for Criticizing the SCS Arbitration.

© THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW