■ 王忍 徐卓
“藏独”是民族之害、国家之患 (二)
■ 王忍 徐卓
1949年7月8日,在中国革命取得全国胜利的前夜,西藏部分上层加快了与祖国分离的步伐,西藏地方与中央的关系出现了前所未有的严重危机。噶厦官员突然通知国民政府驻藏办事处代理处长陈锡璋说,西藏民众大会决定西藏政府与国民政府暂时断绝政治关系,保留宗教关系,限令办事处全体人员及其他机关于两周之内启程赴印。同时,噶厦还派人捣毁了国民政府交通部设在拉萨的电台,断绝与内地一切通讯和邮件往来。噶厦当局公然草拟了所谓《西藏独立宣言》,准备派员去联合国呼吁,请求支持。同时,国际上一些反华势力也开始鼓噪西藏独立。
鉴于此种情况,毛泽东主席作出“进军西藏宜早不宜迟”的重要指示。就在解放军将士准备进军西藏的同时,西藏地方政府以摄政达扎·阿旺松绕等人为代表的少数分裂势力,却置藏民族的前途命运于不顾,拒绝响应中央政府的呼吁,企图搞西藏独立。他们一方面以和平谈判的名义,荒谬地以西藏“外交代表”的名义要求与中央政府在香港谈判“两国”之间的关系,企图拖延时间,迟滞解放军进军西藏的步伐。另一方面,试图派代表到国外,希望得到外国对“藏独”势力的援助。如伙同原印度政府驻拉萨的商务代表黎吉生和美国人劳尔·汤姆斯密商,策划组织“亲善使团”分赴美、英、印度、尼泊尔等国请求援助。
针对西藏地方政府的分裂行为,中央政府从加强汉藏民族团结、维护西藏社会稳定出发,在进军西藏的同时,也从未放弃和平解放的努力。在政策准备上,中央根据民族团结、民族平等的原则,由邓小平起草了中央政府与西藏地方政府谈判的条件即“十大政策”。在宣传动员上,中央人民广播电台开办了少数民族节目,直接用藏语广播《共同纲领》、中央对西藏的“十大政策”以及新华社有关社论,揭露了帝国主义的阴谋,表达了中央对西藏的关怀。喜饶嘉措大师等爱国人士,也通过发表广播讲话、托人带信等方式,呼吁达赖喇嘛勿听信帝国主义的谣言,速派代表赴京协商解决西藏问题。此外,中央还通过宗教界爱国人士自发组织劝和团,由格达活佛亲自从四川甘孜启程前往拉萨做达赖喇嘛的工作。在军事斗争上,中央政府坚持“以和为上,以打促谈”,于10月6日,发动了昌都战役,经过18天的战斗,一举解放了藏东政治、经济的中心昌都及其周围广大地区,打开了进军西藏的门户,粉碎了帝国主义和西藏亲帝分裂势力企图以武力顽抗的迷梦,加速了西藏上层集团的分化,为和平解放西藏铺平了道路。
昌都战役给西藏上层人士带来了极大的震撼。噶厦官员和拉萨三大寺堪布紧急开会研究对策,亲帝派分裂分子坚持敦请印度政府出面干涉,并策划挟持达赖喇嘛逃亡印度。而噶伦然巴和以三大寺为代表的人士坚决反对这种分裂行径,主张与中央政府进行和平谈判。双方激烈论争,相持不下,于是请护法降神给予“神断”。神的指示是让达赖喇嘛丹增嘉措亲政。1950年11月17日,十四世达赖喇嘛丹增嘉措举行了亲政典礼,年仅17岁的达赖喇嘛接受了全藏的政教事务大权。但刚刚亲政的达赖,在部分噶厦官员和活佛的裹挟下,就离开拉萨,前往与印度毗邻的边境口岸亚东。在英、印、美等国对西藏问题保持中立,噶厦政府宣称西藏“是个独立国家”,要求联合国阻止中国“侵略”的呼吁书得不到国际支持的情况下,达赖与噶厦政府官员反复权衡利弊,决定派出阿沛·阿旺晋美等代表赴北京谈判,迈出了和平解放西藏的第一步。
1951年4月2 9日,关于西藏和平解放的谈判正式开始。经过开诚布公的协商和谈判,中央政府与西藏政府在北京达成了《中央政府和西藏地方政府关于和平解放西藏办法的协议》,也就是著名的十七条协议。协议的条文主要有三个方面的内容:一是西藏人民回到祖国大家庭,积极协助人民解放军开进西藏,守卫边疆,西藏一切涉外事宜,由中央统一处理,中央人民政府在西藏设立军政委员会和军区司令部,除中央人民政府派去的人员外,尽量吸收西藏地方人员参加工作;二是对西藏现行的政治制度及达赖喇嘛的固有地位及职权,中央不予变更,班禅固有地位及职权,应予维持,尊重西藏人民宗教信仰自由,寺庙收入中央不予变更;三是西藏实行民族区域自治,逐步发展西藏民族的语言、文字和学校教育,逐步发展西藏的农牧工商业,改变人民生活;有关各项改革事宜,中央不加强迫。西藏地方政府应自动进行改革,人民提出改革要求时,得采取与西藏领导人员协商的方法解决。
协议签署后,毛泽东主席在怀仁堂亲切接见西藏和谈代表,并举行盛大宴会,庆祝签订和平解放西藏办法的协议。中央人民政府派驻西藏的代表张经武也取道香港、印度到亚东,会晤了达赖喇嘛,向他面交了协议的副本和毛泽东的亲笔信,并详尽阐述了中国共产党的民族和宗教政策。随着人民解放军的顺利进藏宣告西藏的和平解放,结束了西藏近代以来遭受帝国主义、殖民主义侵略的历史,为新中国的国家统一、民族团结大业奠定了坚实的基础,使西藏各民族人民走上了团结、进步、发展的光明大道。
《十七条协议》签订后,“藏独”分裂分子的分裂活动并没有偃旗息鼓,反而愈加猖獗。以鲁康娃、洛桑扎西等为代表的西藏少数分裂主义分子大做反对十七条协议的文章,在人民解放军刚刚到达、立足未稳、粮食供应极端困难等情况下设置种种障碍,趁机封锁粮食,扬言“要把解放军饿跑”。而一些反对祖国统一的商人、寺庙管事和僧人等,也在西藏反动上层支持下组织起来成立了“人民会议”的反动组织,公开要求人民解放军撤出西藏,进行反对十七条协议、破坏汉藏民族团结、分裂祖国的活动,甚至私自召集藏军,包围中央代表驻地和工委机关,并在拉萨市内寻衅滋事,制造摩擦,挑起事端,以便组织武装骚乱。
虽然在中央政府有力的政治斗争和有效的军事防范下,伪人民会议的这些骚乱阴谋未能得逞,但这次流产的伪“人民会议”事件实际上是西藏上层反动派阴谋策划叛乱的一次预演,从此,伪“人民会议”的一些骨干分子从公开转为隐蔽,继续从事非法活动。不久,鲁康娃借朝佛为名去印度噶伦堡,噶伦堡成了反对祖国、阴谋进行西藏“独立”活动的大本营。以夏格巴为首的叛国分子在噶伦堡与英国、美国、台湾地区,及其他一些欧洲国家的各种人物,其中包括不少间谍分子联系,接受资金及武器的帮助,并秘密地运进西藏,准备进行“独立”活动。
在“藏独”分裂势力与西藏爱国力量的斗争中,达赖的态度也值得关注。事实上,达赖对于中央政府的态度也存在着变化的过程。西藏和平解放后,达赖对在西藏进行的改革其实是抱有一定程度的支持和赞同的态度。1954年达赖到北京参加第一届全国人民代表大会第一次会议,当选为全国人大常务会副委员长。1955年,达赖喇嘛回到拉萨,还写了一首《毛主席颂》,在这篇赞文中他把毛泽东主席比作太阳、慈母和大鹏,称颂毛主席解放了枷锁,指示了和平的道路。1956年,陈毅元帅率领中央代表团抵达拉萨,参加即将召开的西藏自治区筹备委员会成立大会。达赖喇嘛被推选担任筹备委员会的主任委员,班禅喇嘛担任第一副主任委员。年轻的达赖喇嘛也积极热情地投入到了筹委会的工作中去。
但在掌控噶厦政府内部的“藏独”势力的裹挟和左右下,十四世达赖并没有坚守这种立场,反而走上了“藏独”的道路。在达赖参加全国人大会议返回西藏期间,伪人民会议的重要领导人阿乐群则一行5人,打着迎接达赖喇嘛返藏的幌子,也赶到当时西康省的雅安、康定等地进行阴谋活动,并上书达赖喇嘛,公开反对成立西藏自治区筹备委员会,公然要求实现“西藏独立”。在1956年四川甘孜藏区发生叛乱期间,达赖的副官帕拉·土登次登派人与叛乱武装保持联系,并以商队的名义给叛乱武装运送武器弹药。就在西藏自治区筹委会成立大会期间,达赖的三哥洛桑三旦召见江达宗头人齐美公布说:“昌都地区按江东地方行动(指金沙江以东四川藏区的武装叛乱),这是达赖的指令。”1956年11月22日,达赖、班禅应邀到印度参加释迦牟尼涅槃2500周年活动。达赖一进入印度,就同夏格巴、嘉乐顿珠和西方反华势力打得火热,思想动摇,甚至想留在国外。由于班禅大师在1957年1月29日按期乘飞机回到拉萨,打乱达赖分裂集团的部署,他们怕达赖不回西藏,大权旁落,不得不安排达赖回西藏,进一步完成分裂的部署。
1959年初,在西藏反动上层的支持和策划下,武装叛乱不断加剧,愈演愈烈,殃及了西藏的广大农牧区。叛乱分子利用西藏驻军、机关分散的特点,不仅袭劫道班,袭击兵站,伏击车辆,炸毁桥梁,截断公路,而且不断围攻各地的解放军和党政机关驻地。西藏上层反动集团要发动全面武装叛乱,需要寻找一个能够欺骗群众、蒙蔽群众、煽动叛乱的借口,于是,他们选定在3月10日达赖喇嘛要到军区看戏的时机,公开撕毁协议,背叛祖国,发动全面武装叛乱。3月10日,西藏地方政府上层反动分子鲁康娃、洛桑扎西等人一方面借此造谣惑众,散布“汉人要劫走达赖喇嘛”的谣言,要求每家都要派人去罗布林卡向达赖请愿,另一方面又反过来鼓动达赖,说解放军请看节目是假,乘机扣留他是真。并以保护达赖喇嘛的安全为由,派藏军封锁了达赖的驻地。之后,立即召开所谓“人民代表大会”,会上决定同中央分裂,把争取“西藏独立”的活动搞到底,并决定由索康、雪古巴、噶章、大惹·多阿塔青、凯墨札萨和藏军副司令洛珠格桑等人领导“西藏独立运动”。 3月11日至13日,叛乱头目连续召开所谓“人民代表会议”,加紧组织和扩大叛乱武装;威胁藏族干部、教职员、学员和在自治区筹委会机关工作的人员,要他们限期向所谓“西藏独立国”自首悔过;强迫西藏僧俗人民加入叛乱组织。他们还召开所谓“西藏独立国人民会议”,公开撕毁《十七条协议》,宣布“西藏独立”,全面发动了背叛祖国的武装叛乱。
西藏全面武装叛乱发生后,中共中央和毛泽东主席对西藏形势作了正确分析,对中共西藏工委、西藏军区在政治上、军事上所应采取的措施作了具体指示。在军事上,西藏工委、西藏军区本着“不打第一枪”、“自卫作战”的原则,拟定了机动作战预案,做好了战斗准备;在政治上,则通过各种形式向群众进行广泛宣传,充分揭露西藏上层反动集团发动叛乱的真相;对上层人士进行团结争取工作,争取更多的上层人士站在反对叛乱、维护祖国统一的立场上。当达赖喇嘛在罗布林卡受到叛乱分子控制,同他联系已十分困难时,西藏工委仍设法通过爱国人士,先后送去了中央驻西藏代理代表谭冠三的三封信。谭冠三在信中体谅达赖喇嘛的处境,关心他的安全,并指出反动分子公开地狂妄地进行军事挑衅,要求西藏地方政府立即予以制止。而西藏上层反动集团无视中央提出的要求和警告,按照他们的预谋,继续进行叛乱活动,加紧进行出逃的准备。3月17日夜间,达赖喇嘛和噶伦索康、柳霞、夏苏、副官长帕拉、副经师赤江等从罗布林卡渡过拉萨河向山南逃走。3月21日,达赖逃到隆子宗,立即宣布隆子宗是第二首都,并任命恩珠仓·公布扎西为山南卫教军总司令,然后逃往印度,随后散发了鼓吹“西藏独立”的《达赖喇嘛的声明》。6月20日,达赖第一次公开出面举行记者招待会,声称“要恢复在1950年中国入侵以前西藏所享有的自主和独立地位”。此后,尽管中央对达赖采取了耐心等待的态度,直到1964年12月以前仍保留了他全国人大常委会副委员长的职务,但是达赖长期居住印度,公开组织“流亡政府”,炮制所谓“西藏宪法”,鼓吹“中间道路”和“大藏区”概念,从事分裂祖国、破坏民族团结的活动,在错误的道路上越走越远,成为了“图谋西藏独立的分裂主义政治集团的总头子,国际反华势力的忠实工具,在西藏制造社会动乱的总根源,阻挠藏传佛教建立正常秩序的最大障碍”。(待续)
On July 8, 1949, on the eve of the PLA’s victory in the Chinese revolution, elements of the Tibetan leadership accelerated their split from the motherland,which precipitated an unprecedented crisis in relations between the Tibetan local government and the Chinese central government. Officials from the governing council of Tibet – the Kashag – suddenly informed the Nationalist government acting representative in Tibet, Chen Xizhang,that the Tibetan People’s General Assembly had decided to temporarily sever relations between the Tibetan and Nationalist governments but retain religious ties, and to order staff of representative offices and other organs to depart Tibet for India within two weeks. The Kashag also sent troops to destroy the Nationalist government’s broadcasting station in Lhasa, which effectively cut off all communication with the mainland and put an end to postal exchanges. The Kashag then drafted the Declaration of Independence of Tibet and readied a delegation to be dispatched to the United Nations to request assistance, while international anti-China forces began rallying support for their cause.
In view of the situation, Chairman Mao issued instructions that the PLA should enter Tibet sooner rather than later. As the PLA prepared to march into Tibet, the Taktra Rinpoche, who led a small group of separatists in the Tibetan local government, ignored the CPC central government’s advances without thought for future and destiny of the Tibetan people, and set about achieving Tibetan independence. In an effort to delay the PLA’s entry into Tibet, the Taktra Rinpoche absurdly requested “peaceful negotiations” in Hong Kong between Tibetan “diplomatic representatives” and the central government to discuss the relationship between the “two countries.” He also dispatched representatives to foreign countries in the hope of garnering international assistance for Tibetan independence forces.With the help of the British government in India’s trade representative in Lhasa, Hugh Edward Richardson, and the American Lowell Thomas, a “goodwill mission” from Tibet traveled to the United States, Britain, India, Nepal and other countries to request assistance.
Despite the disruptive behavior of the Tibetan local government, the Chinese central government was determined not to give up on its efforts to peacefully liberate Tibet in order to strengthen unity between the Han and Tibetan peoples and safeguard social stability in the region.In preparation, Deng Xiaoping drafted a policy concerning the ten conditions on which the central government would hold negotiations with the local government in Tibet based on the principles of national unity and ethnic equality. In order to communicate the policy, the Central People’s Broadcasting Station put on a special broadcast in Tibetan of China’s interim constitution called the Common Program, the central government’s ten conditions for holding negotiations with the Tibetan side, and a related editorial by the Xinhua News Agency, all of which served to expose the imperialist conspiracy and illustrated the central government’s concern for Tibet. Geshe Sherab Gyatso and other patriots appealed to the Dalai Lama not to be taken in by imperialist lies and to send representatives to Beijing for negotiations on how to solve the Tibetan question.Moreover, the central government put together a group of religious patriots who arranged for the Gedar Tulku to travel to Tibet from Ganzi in Sichuan to do the Dalai Lama’s work. Despite the central government continuing to seek a peaceful resolution and urging the Tibetan side to negotiate,on October 6, the Battle of Qamdo began. After 18 days of fighting, the political and economic center of eastern Tibet and vast areas around the city were liberated, which opened the door for PLA forces to enter Tibet and crush the armed resistance of imperialist and pro-imperialist separatist forces. The victory also caused cracks to appear in the unity of the Tibetan side and paved the way for Tibet’s peaceful liberation.
The PLA’s victory at the Battle of Qamdo came as a great shock to Tibet’s ruling class. Kashag officials and the abbots of Lhasa’s three great monasteries urgently called a meeting to discuss their next move. Pro-imperialist separatists urged the Indian government to intervene, and put together a plan to seize the Dalai Lama and take him to India. However, the Galoin and representatives of Lhasa’s three great monasteries opposed the separatists’ actions and advocated suing for peace with the central government. At loggerheads, the two sides asked the Dharma Protectors to intervene, who instructed that the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, should be aloud to assume the reins of government.On November 17, 1950, the Chikamasa ceremony was held for the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, which meant at the age of only 17 the Dalai Lama assumed supreme power of Tibet’s political and religious affairs. But coerced by certain Kashag officials and tulkus, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa for neighboring India. With Britain, the United States and India remaining neutral on the issue of Tibet, and having failed to garner international support following an appeal to the United Nations for assistance in preventing a Chinese“invasion” after the Kashag declared Tibetan independence,the Kashag and the Dalai Lama were left weighing up their options, and eventually decided to send a delegation of officials, including Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, to negotiate with Beijing in the fi rst step towards the peaceful liberation of Tibet.
On April 29, 1951, negotiations concerning the peaceful liberation of Tibet began. Following frank discussions and negotiations, both sides produced the famous 17-point “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” .There were three main aspects to the provisions of the agreement: First, the Tibetan people would return to motherland; the Tibetan government would actively assist the PLA enter Tibet and guard Tibet’s borders; the Tibetan government would submit itself to the unified authority of the central government; the central government would set up a Military and Political Committee and a military command post in Tibet; and other than personnel sent by the central government, as many Tibetans as possible would be used to carry out the government’s work in Tibet. Second, the central government would not change the existing political system in Tibet or the status, function and powers of the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama; the central government would also safeguard and respect the religious freedoms of the Tibetan people and not interfere with the incomes of monasteries.Third, Tibet would become an autonomous region; Tibetan language and script as well as school education would gradually be developed as well as agriculture, livestock breeding, industries and commerce in order to improve the people’s lives. The central government also promised not to force any of the above reforms on the local population.The agreement stated that the local government in Tibet would implement the reforms, and when people sought reform they would consult with Tibetan leaders to work out solutions.
After signing the agreement, Chairman Mao cordially received representatives from Tibet in Huairen Hall, where a grand banquet was held to celebrate the signing of the agreement. The central people’s government also dispatched their representative to Tibet, Zhang Jingwu, via Hong Kong and India to meet with the Dalai Lama and personally hand him a copy of the agreement and a personal letter from Mao Zedong, as well as explain in detail the CPC’s policies on ethnic minorities and religion. When the PLA peacefully liberated Tibet, it brought an end to Tibet’s modern history of imperialist and colonial aggression and laid a solid foundation for the great causes of China’s unification and national unity, allowing the Tibetan people to set out on the bright path of unity, progress and development.
After the 17-point agreement had been signed, the separatist activities of some Tibetans intensified, with a small number of separatists, led by Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi, who opposed the agreement, attempting to block food supplies to the newly-arrived PLA in an effort to starve them out of Tibet. With the support of reactionary Tibetan leaders, some merchants as well as abbots and monks who opposed the reunification of the motherland,established a reactionary “Peoples Assembly”, which demanded that the PLA leave Tibet and organized activities in violation of the 17-point agreement in order to destroy Han-Tibetan unity and split the motherland. They even secretly formed a Tibetan army and surrounded the of fi ces of the central government’s representative in Lhasa and the local working committee and organized armed riots in the streets of Lhasa.
Although the pseudo-People’s Assembly’s conspiracy did not succeed due to the political struggle waged by the central government and the PLA’s strong military presence,the incident was a preview of the rebellion being plotted by reactionary Tibetan leaders. Afterwards some of those involved went into hiding to conduct their illegal activities in secret. Lukhangwa used the excuse of going on a pilgrimage to India to travel to Kalimpong, which had by then become the headquarters of opposition to the motherland and Tibetan independence activities. Led by Tsepon Shakabpa,the traitors met with people from the UK, the US, Taiwan and other European countries, including a number of foreign spies, and accepted money and weapons from them, which they smuggled into Tibet for independence activities.
It is worth noting the Dalai Lama’s attitude towards the Tibetan separatist and patriotic forces, and his changing attitude toward the central government. After Tibet was peacefully liberated , the Dalai Lama supported some of the reforms being implemented in Tibet. In 1945, the Dalai Lama traveled to Beijing to attend the fi rst meeting of the first session of the National People’s Congress (NPC),and was elected Vice-Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee. In 1955, the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa where he wrote a song praising Chairman Mao, in which he compared him to the sun and a loving mother, and praised him for liberating Tibet and illuminating the path to peace.In 1956, a Central Committee delegation led by Marshal Chen Yi arrived in Lhasa to attend the forthcoming General Assembly of the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region, at which the Dalai Lama was elected Chairman of the Preparatory Committee and the Panchen Lama was elected First Vice Chairman. Following his nomination, the young Dalai Lama enthusiastically participated in the work of the Preparatory Committee.
But under the coercion of Tibetan separatist forces who controlled the Kashag government, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama did not continue in that vain, instead veering onto the path of Tibetan independence. Following the Dalai Lama’s attendance at the NPC session, under the guise of going to greet the Dalai Lama on his return, fi ve members of the pseudo-People’s Assembly traveled to Ya’an and Kangding in the former province of Xikang to engage in conspiratorial activities and wrote a letter to the Dalai Lama in which they openly opposed the establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region and requested that Tibet declare independence. In 1956, a rebellion broke out in Ganzi in Sichuan Province,and the Dalai Lama’s adjutant, Phala Thupten, gave orders to make contact with the armed rebels and to transport weapons and ammunition to them disguised as a trade caravan. As the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region was being established, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, Losang Samten, summoned the head of Jomda County and announced, “Qamdo Prefecture must act in accordance with the area east of the river (referring to the armed rebellion east of the Jinsha River). This is the order of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama.”On November 22, 1956, the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama were invited to India for the 2500-year anniversary of Sakyamuni’s nirvana. As soon as he arrived in India,the Dalai Lama strengthened his relations with Tsepon Shakabpa, Gyalo Dhondup and Western anti-China forces,and even thought about not returning to Tibet. However, the Panchen Lama returned to Tibet as scheduled on January 29, 1957, which disrupted the Dalai Lama separatist clique’s plans due to concerns that if the Dalai Lama did not return to Tibet power would fall into the hands of others. He therefore had no choice but to return to Lhasa and work on his plans further.
In early 1959, with the support and planning of Tibet’s reactionary leaders, the armed rebellion intensified and spread to rural areas of Tibet. The insurgents took advantage of the scattered locations of Chinese forces and organs to not only rob road maintenance crews, attack military depots, ambush vehicles, blow up bridges and render roads impassible, but also constantly besiege PLA troops and government organizations. Tibet’s reactionary leaders were keen to launch an all-out armed rebellion but needed an excuse that would fool the masses and fan the flames of rebellion. They therefore decided to use the Dalai Lama’s visit to the military command area to watch an opera performance on March 10 to openly break the 17-point agreement, betray the motherland and launch a full-scale armed rebellion. On March 10, local government reactionaries Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi began spreading unfounded rumors that the Han Chinese wanted to kidnap the Dalai Lama and encouraged people to travel to Norbulingka to petition the Dalai Lama not to travel. They also told the Dalai Lama that the event he had been invited to by the PLA was a ruse and that they actually intended to capture him. Using the excuse that they wished to protect the Dalai Lama from harm, they then kept the Dalai Lama locked in his residence surrounded by Tibetan soldiers. The reactionaries then convened a socalled “People’s Congress”, at which they decided to split with the Chinese central government and fight to the end for Tibetan independence. Between March 11 and 13, the leaders of the rebellion convened the “People’s Congress” to organize the expansion of the armed rebellion. The leaders also threatened Tibetan cadres, teachers, students and people working for organs related to the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region, demanding that they join the cause of Tibetan independence, and forced monks and lay people alike to join the rebellion. The leaders of the rebellion also held a so-called “Tibetan Independence People’s Assembly” ,during which they publicly tore up the 17-point agreement, declared Tibetan independence, and betrayed the motherland by launching an armed rebellion.
After the full-scale armed rebellion was launched,the CPC Central Committee and Chairman analyzed the situation in Tibet and issued specific instructions on the political and military measures that should be taken by the CPC Tibet Work Committee and the Tibet Military District Command. Militarily, based on the principles of not firing first and fighting only in self-defense, the Tibet Work Committee and the Tibet Military District Command prepared a plan for mobile operations. Politically, the truth about the reactionary clique who had incited the rebellion was widely publicized through various forms of communication. Work was also carried out to unite people in positions of power in Tibet against the rebellion and in support of national uni fi cation. While the Dalai Lama was being controlled by rebels in Norbulingka, making contact with him proved extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the Tibet Work Committee managed to get three letters through to him from Beijing’s acting representative in Tibet, Tan Guansan, with the help of those still loyal to the motherland.In the letters, Tan Guansan sympathized with the Dalai Lama’s plight and expressed concern for his safety. He also pointed out that reactionaries were fl agrantly and arrogantly provoking a military confrontation, and demanded that the local government put an end to such actions immediately.However, the reactionary leaders in Tibet ignored the central government’s warning and continued to carry out rebellious acts and fi nalize their plans for fl eeing Tibet. On the night of March 17, the Dalai Lama and others crossed the Lhasa River and escaped into Lhoka Prefecture. On March 21, the Dalai Lama arrived in Lhunzhe County,which he proclaimed to be second capital of Tibet and appointed Andrug Gompo Tashi the commander in charge of Lhoka Prefecture’s army. The Dalai Lama then fled to India, from where he issued a statement calling for Tibetan independence. On June 20, the Dalai Lama held his first public press conference and claimed that he wanted Tibet to enjoy the autonomy and independent status it had enjoyed prior to the Chinese invasion in 1950. Afterwards, despite the fact the Chinese adopted a patient attitude and held open his post of Vice Chairman of the NPC until December 1964,he decided to take up long-term residence in India and went on to set up a “government in exile”, concoct a so-called“Tibetan Constitution” ,advocate the concepts of a “middle way” and “Greater Tibet” ,and engage in activities aimed at splitting the motherland and undermining national unity. He walked further and further down the wrong path to become the leader of the separatist political group behind the Tibetan independence conspiracy, a loyal tool of international anti-China forces, the source of social unrest in Tibet and the greatest obstacle to achieving normal order in the region. (To be continued)
TIBETAN INDEPENDENCE IS HARMFUL TO THE NATION AND A MENACE TO THE STATE
■ Wang Ren and Xu Zhuo
(孙显辉 译)