Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Zhao Huasheng

Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Zhao Huasheng

It is indisputable that Russia is very important to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as it is a Eurasian power and has special relations with Central Asia. It is also correct for many analysts to take Russia and China as two key players in the SCO.

There is a general consensus regarding China, that is, China spares no effort to support the SCO. Unlike China, there are many different comments and views on Russian policy and position toward the SCO. Those views are conflicting: some see it as an active participant, while others see it as a passive player, some even regard it as a competitor with China. Some of those views may be valid, while others may be prejudiced. Anyway, they are revealing a fact that Russia--SCO relations are indeed complicated to some extent.

Russia’s Political Position on the SCO

Russia’s participation in the SCO is driven by many factors, including China--Russia strategic partnership and guidance of“Shanghai five states”. Fundamentally speaking, Russia’s par--ticipation is a strategic choice, not a passive act. On the whole, Russia is an active participant, not a passive observer. From a dynamic point of view, Russia is becoming more active in and paying more attention to the SCO rather than being more passive and reducing its interest.

This judgment is based on the following three facts, namely, Russian official statements, Russian act in the SCO, and perception from Russian elite and mainstream media. It should be pointed out that the benchmark employed to judge Russian position should be its relations with the SCO, rather than whether its policies and proposals are consistent with China or other member states. The SCO is its members’ “public plat--form” through which member states try to achieve their national interests and the common interests that are consistent with national interests. It is a common practice, since no country is going to join a regional organization just for other’s interests. Russia, as a member of the SCO, having its own position is reasonable and can be regarded as an active participant as long as its purpose of participation is for the development rather than obstruction of the SCO. It is a different matter whether its position is consistent with China or other member states.

Russia’s official position with respect to the SCO remains positive. Under certain circumstances, Russia’s official state--ments may not be entirely credible as they might be diplomatic rhetoric. However, its official position toward the SCO can be trusted as it has been consistent for 10 years. It is unnecessary for Russia to make a deliberate gesture and it is impossible for Russia to remain the gesture for 10 years long.

Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the founding ceremony in 2001 when the SCO was established in Shanghai. Afterwards, President Putin issued a statement, expressing his satisfaction with the results of the meeting. He believed that the newly established SCO could be better and more effective in bringing member states’ potential into full play and promoting peace and stability in Central Asia. “Russia will work hard for the consolidation of the new organization,” he added. It was Russia’s earliest political statement on the SCO, which set the tune for Russia’s policy toward the SCO.

Russia hosted the SCO summit in 2002. After meeting with heads of other member states, Putin said that “we definitely know that our organization will attract more and more attention from the world. The development of world situation proves that it is rational and correct to establish the SCO one year ago. The activities of the SCO are in the long--term and fundamental interests of all member states.” This indicates that Russia has not changed its position on the SCO after the“9/ 11” incident and the change of regional situation.

In 2006, on the occasion of the 5thanniversary of the SCO, President Putin published a long article entitled “The SCO—A New Model for International Cooperation” on Russian news--paper Independence in which he expounded the SCO. Putin wrote that “after coming into being in 2001, the SCO has quickly increased its significance and become an influential regional organization. Today the SCO is an important stabi--lizing force in vast Eurasian region and a realistic factor in contemporary regional and global politics.” Putin regarded highly the SCO model, saying that “the cooperation model we has created, in other words, the ‘Shanghai Spirit’, is being widely accepted. Our organization is based on clear principles, among which include mutual trust, frank discussion on any issue, dispute settlement through consultation rather than pressure. In fact, they are comprehensive guiding principles of the SCO and we hope they will help the SCO continue to draw attraction from the international community.” Putin has given the same regard on other occasions. On May 30, 2006 during a meeting with the SCO parliamentary leaders, Putin said that Russia would adhere to its policy of improving the roles and possibilities of the SCO. He believed that the SCO was engaged in political, anti--terrorism and economic tasks and a model for cooperation on the basis of equality.

Since 2007 the SCO has begun to appear on Russian President’s State of the Union address—a phenomenon never occurred before. In the 2007 State of the Union address, Putin emphasized that the “integration process of Eurasian Eco--nomic Community and the SCO should be consolidated.” Presi--dent Dmitry Medvedev, the successor of Putin also mentioned SCO in his first State of the Union address in 2008: “arrogance and power politics are no longer convincing and effective. The world can not be run from a capital. Not understanding this will only create more problems for itself and others. Majority countries turning to pragmatic multilateralism indicate the necessity to consolidate international institutions. We just from this point look at Russia’s participation in multilateral mechanism such as G--8, the SCO, BRIC, and APEC.” Foreign policy occupied a small part on the State of the Union in 2009 on which only some important issues were mentioned, no functional and regional description as in the past and no mentioning of the SCO. At the end of November 2010, Med--vedev in his latest State of the Union address again referred to the SCO, believing its prestige and influence were on the rise and this reflected the high--level development of Russia--China relations.

There are also words about the SCO in Russia’s important foreign policy documents. For example, the SCO appeared in The Survey of Russian Foreign Policy edited by Russian Foreign Ministry in 2007 : “Our work in Central Asia can succeed only through integrated means, including possible use of collective security organizations, the Eurasian Economic Community and the SCO...regional organizations, including the SCO and collective security organizations, play a positive role in Afg--hanistan stability, anti--terrorism, fighting drug trafficking, and realistic cooperation with Afghanistan.”

The Concept of Russian Foreign Policy, a new document signed by Medvedev in July 2008 after he became Russian President, also included the SCO: “Russian attitude toward sub--regional institutions without Russia’s participations with--in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) depends on their contribution to good neighborliness and stability, on if they really consider Russian legitimate interests, and on if they respect cooperation mechanisms here, such as CIS, Collective Security organizations, the Eurasian Economic Community and the SCO... consolidation of the SCO and building partner--ship among Asian and Pacific institutions should continue to be important priorities.”

The SCO was referred to in the Russian National Security Strategy to 2020 released in May 2009: “there are special implications for Russia to enhance the SCO political potential, promote practical steps within the framework of the SCO to consolidate mutual trust and partnerships in Central Asia.”

Russia released Russian Military Doctrine in 2000 and renewed it in February 2010 in which it pointed out: “enhance mutual coordination in international security in the framework of CIS, Organization for Security and Co--operation in Europe (OSCE) and the SCO and develop relations with other inter--national organizations (the EU and NATO) in this area.”

In May 2010, Russian media disclosed a classified document entitled Outlines of Systematic Use of Diplomacy for Russian Long--term Development. The document which proved to be authentic, also valued the role of the SCO: “make all efforts to promote the establishment of more just, balanced and effective global governance system through agreement on rules of the game by all countries and respecting every country’s legitimate interests in the international community. Protecting the roles of critical institutions such as BRIC and SCO, of which Russia is a member, in the process of creating global networks, making efforts to consolidate them and coordinating positions of all the member states.”

Recent statements by Russian leaders showed their increa--sing interest in the SCO. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in his report to Russian Duma in February 2009 that Russia saw the consolidation of the SCO as its first priority and believed the SCO Summit held in Yekaterinburg in 2009 was a milestone event in the process of its development. Prime Minister Putin stressed at the SCO Heads of Government meeting in October 2009 that “Russia makes the development of the SCO as one of its top priorities and we are going to actively take part in all its activities.” President Medvedev stated at the SCO Summit in 2009 that “actively participating in the SCO activities and developing cooperation in all areas within its frameworks have long been one of Russian diplo--matic priorities.” In his remarks at the SCO Summit held in Tashkent in 2010, President Medvedev spoke highly of the SCO:“Our organization is in constant development and full of dynamics. Our comprehensive exchanges benefit the orga--nization. Obviously, the SCO’s reputation and roles in regional and international affairs are increasing.”

We can come to the conclusion based on the above facts that the SCO has become a definite factor and occupied a stable position in Russian diplomacy. At the same time, in Russia’s diplomatic thinking, the SCO is not an “alien” organization, but“our own” one and on this premise Russia makes policy toward the SCO.

Russia’s Interests in the SCO

Bobo Lo, a well--known specialist on Russia--China relations, argued that despite the decline of Russia, the history of Russia as empire and superpower made it accustomed to the diplo--matic thinking on a global level. On the contrary, China was a country in the process of transformation from a regional power to global power, so its diplomatic thinking was mostly from a regional perspective, as was reflected in the SCO.

Russia looks at the SCO from the perspective of global politics, taking it as an important factor in shaping inter--national structure in the post Cold War. Not long after the founding of the SCO, Russia has entrusted it an important international mission. Putin said at the SCO Summit in 2003 that “most importantly, the SCO should be a constructive factor in international politics. Our organization should be entrusted with all the necessary means to tackle many issues and effectively deal with risks in the 21stcentury. It is my belief that we can often have dialogue within the framework of the SCO to coordinate our position on important foreign policy issues. In short, our organization should actively participate in international affairs.” During the time when Russia acted as the chairman of the SCO in 2009, it proposed five priority tasks, one of which was “to promote the SCO’s prestige and influence as it is an important factor in emerging international structure and a multi--polar world.” Therefore, international structure is an important perspective from which Russia looks at the SCO. The political and academic circles in Russia widely share this perspective. Vadim Gustov, Chairman of the Federation Council Committee for CIS Affairs said that “the SCO, with its members including Russia, China and Kazakhstan...would play an important role in world affairs.” Gennady Chufrin，deputy director of the Institute of World Economy and Inter--national Relations (IWEIR) commented that “the SCO should be made as one of the most authoritative poles in shaping contemporary political and economic relations. It is not exag--gerating to say that the founding of the SCO is the most important event in the post Cold War era, which has effectively overthrown the uni--polar theory and practice.”

As a matter of fact, Russia pays more attention to the SCO and identifies it with the status much higher than the rest of its members. This may owe to its strategic far--sight or its mindset, but mostly is due to its realistic interests. Russia is quite different from the rest of the SCO members that are mostly medium and small countries without too much international ambition. China is a great power though she is in the process of rising up. As a result, she would like to maintain stable relations with other great powers rather than confronting them. Russia is different. On the one hand, it wants to keep its great power status when its national strength is tremendously decreased; on the other hand, it faces great pressure from the NATO eastern expansion. In this context, Russia makes the SCO as part of its strategy to tackle the problems it is facing and hopes that the SCO will increase its international influence and strategic weight so as to prevent the NATO from expanding into the CIS region. Though Russia does not admit it officially, Russian political and academic circles do not deny it. Mikhail Babich，deputy chairman of the Duma defense committee frankly pointed out: “No one denies the fact that the SCO is a counterbalance to the NATO interests.” At the same time, Russia tries to use the SCO to compensate its power deficiency. As Russian scholar Vladislav L. Inozemtsev said, “The SCO does not care about integration, its purpose is to concentrate potentials of member states to have geo--political scale.”

Security is especially important to Russia. Russia believes that “Central Asia along the southern border is of significant importance for Russia. First and foremost, it is true in terms of safeguarding nation security.” Among the security challenges Russia confronts, terrorism, separatism and extremism in Central Asia are the utmost threats. The reason and back--ground that Russia highlights the fight on these three forces is for the security and stability of North Caucasus in Russia. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the three forces were springing up in Russia, especially its north Caucasus region. Russia has to keep military operations in north Caucasus and engaged two major battles in Chechnya. It was not until April 2009 that Russia declared the end of anti--terror operation and restoration of order in Chechnya，but unrests in north Caucasus have not been finally settled. Russia was optimistic for a time, but since 2009 a series of terrorist incidents occur--red in Ingushetia, Dagestan, Chechnya and neighboring areas. In March 2010, terrorist bombings took place in two Moscow metro stations. Vladikavkaz in north Caucasus was attacked by terrorists in September 2010, causing more than 100 deaths and injuries, while small scale of terrorist incidents have never ceased. According to the information provided by Russian Interior Minister, there are almost 500 terrorist incidents in north Caucasus in the first 9 months of 2010, highlighting the realistic threats of terrorism. Unrests in north Caucasus have become protracted and the three forces have posed a long--term threat to Russia.

Russia considers fighting drug trafficking as one of its important interests in the SCO, a priority on its agenda even higher than anti--terrorism. Out of two essential considerations, Russia was serious about drug trafficking: first, narcotic drugs endanger the health of Russian people; second, drug trafficking is close related to terrorism and is an important source of terrorist funding.

Russia is seriously hurt by drug problem, it is considered as a major threat to Russian national security as it is getting worse. According to Russian official statistics, there are 2.5 million drug addicts in Russia, a country with the most drug addicts in the world. Its annual consumption of heroin is only little less than Europe (70 ton vis--à--vis 88 ton). Among 100 thousand deaths caused by drug addict each year in the world, 30 thousand deaths, most of them are youngsters, are from Russia. Narcotic drugs are jeopardizing the health of Russian people, sharpen the problem of the decrease of population.

Afghanistan remains the biggest supplier of heroin to Russia. It is believed that 90% drugs are from Afghanistan. Central Asia has become the major channel for Afghanistan drugs to enter Russia. Therefore, the SCO’s war on drugs will virtually build an isolation strip between Afghanistan and Russia

Russia considers Afghanistan as its vital interests and takes seriously the threat to its national security from Afghanistan, and puts it as the top security priority. Putin goes further as to think that the Afghanistan issue is a major factor propelling the setup of the SCO. Many factors that attract Russia’s attention to Afghanistan, drug and security issues are first and foremost. Some commentator believes that “Russia today looks at Afghanistan mainly from the perspectives of its security and Central Asian security. Russia tries to establish soft leadership in this region. Afghanistan is also a factor that complicates Russia’s relations with the U.S. and NATO. Finally, the deve--lopment in Afghanistan and Pakistan has impact on Russian relations with non--Western countries such as China, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia.... Afghanistan poses two threats to Russia—one is security, the other is drug which is more realistic and lethal.”

The stability of Central Asia is naturally in the interests of Russia. With the development of the situation in Central Asia, the Russian interests in the stability of the region is not declining, but increasing. Medvedev said at the SCO Summit in 2008 that “one of drivers for the establishment of the SCO is to coordinate efforts to improve regional security and stability. Today this task is becoming more realistic.”

The stability of Central Asia has two implications for Russia. On the one hand, Russia considers the maintenance of stability in its neighboring region as its core task. Central Asia adjoins its southern boundary, the stability of Central Asia also means the stability of its southern region. Otherwise, unrests in Central Asia will deteriorate the situation in Russia’s southern region, creating opportunities for terrorists and extremists to infiltrate into Russia and causing greater pressures on Russian security. On the other hand, Central Asia is the “backyard” of the former Soviet Union (now Russia) and is considered by Russia as “its sphere of influence”. Among former Soviet states, Central Asian states maintain the most stable and close relations with Russia and they are the pillars for Russian integration policy in CIS. Russia indicates that “Central Asia occupies an important position in Russian policy toward CIS. It is the backbone for CIS integration mechanisms, for example, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community.…Russia first of all wants the stability and security in Central Asia with an aim to improve partnerships and alliance relations with countries in the region.” Russia does not want to see unrests in its “backyard”. Unrests would challenge the existing structure which could lead to development of extremism and cause the situation in the region out of control. Meanwhile, stability will help keep the existing structure and relations, as well as Russian influence in the region.

The SCO is an important multilateral mechanism for Russia’s regional engagement and is in the interests of Russia.

Russia highly values two multilateral mechanisms in the Central Asian region, namely the Russia--led Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Community. However, these two institutions are exclusive, their functions are limited to former Soviet states, out of which they can not act effectively. In other words, they are different from the SCO and can not take place of it. The SCO is a more inclusive institution both in political geography and membership composition, it is more representative politically and more influential internationally. It is a useful platform and leverage for Russian engagement with Central Asia, Afghanistan, South Asia and West Asia.

Russia can take advantage of the SCO to influence China’s activities in Central Asia. For example, a comment reads as follows, “Through the channel of the SCO, Russia tackles a series of problems, from exclusion of the U.S. from Central Asia, to stability of the region, to cooperation with countries in the region. In addition, Russia has got a leverage to softly and politely limit Chinese infiltration into the Central Asia.”

Russia’s Policy towards the SCO

Russia’s policy and performance in the SCO have explicit features, demonstrating its interests pursuit and the behaving style.

It is reasonable to believe that Russia’s fundamental policy toward the SCO is to make full use of it and prevent it from declining. Therefore, Russia’s basic practice is to try to in--fluence the SCO so as to gain more domination, it does not want to stand by idly as a passive observer. According to a disclosed Russian Foreign Ministry’s classified document,“Russia should consolidate the political leadership potentials accumulated at the time of the Russian presidency of the SCO.”This is a persuasive explanation. Under the guidance of this thinking, Russia is an active player in the SCO and participates in all the activities of the SCO. Some member states from Central Asia would be absent or send lower ranking officials to attend ministerial, parliamentary, judicial meetings, Russia was never absent. Russia has become a major source of initiatives in the SCO. Though there are no accurate statistics, Russia is at least one of the countries—if not the only country—with the greatest number of proposals and many of them are accepted by the SCO.

There is a complex relationship between Russia’s policies toward the SCO and its CIS and Central Asia policies which can be put into three dimensions. The first dimension is its policies towards the SCO without reference to CIS and Central Asia, for instance, international and trans--regional activities in the SCO. The second dimension is its policies that are related to CIS and Central Asia, but can co--exist without contradictions, for instance, in the areas of anti--terrorism, ban on drugs and humanitarian cooperation. The third dimension is its policies towards the SCO that are both related to and conflicting with the CIS and Central Asia. For example, on the issue of the direction of economic integration within the framework of the SCO, there will be no problem for the Russian policy toward the SCO in the first two dimensions as they are not conflicting. The problem lies in the third dimension since there are conflicts in the policies. It is also reasonable to say that under the circumstance of policy confliction, Russian basic thinking is to subordinate its SCO polices to its CIS and Central Asia policies and not vice versa.

Russia’s Policy Position on Security Cooperation

It is not groundless that the public have the opinion that Russia attaches great importance to security. Russia is an active supporter to security cooperation in the SCO, and is firmly behind the initiatives on cooperations especially on the non--traditional security fields such as anti--terrorism, drugs trafficking, anti--transnational crime and illicit immigration. Russia supports the establishment and strengthening of regional anti--terrorist organizations, promoting practical co--ordination among member states in security area such as cooperation between Interior Ministry and Public Security Ministry. Russia actively participates in joint anti--terrorist exercises organized by the SCO. Since 2003, as a major parti--cipant, Russia has taken part in all the anti--terrorist maneu--vers in the SCO. Russia advocates close ties between the SCO and CSTO and close cooperation between the two institutions.

Russia pushes the SCO to fight drug trafficking, takes ini--tiative to establish mechanism for operations against drug trafficking, works out a strategy to combat drug trafficking in the SCO and suggests the SCO should establish an anti--drug safety strip, including a financial safety strip to fight money laundering by drug--trafficking groups. In 2010, Russia pro--posed to work out a strategy and action plan on combating illicit drug trafficking from 2011 to 2016 in the SCO.

Russia’s Policy Position on Economic Cooperation

It is said, unlike its interest in security, Russia does not pay much attention to economic cooperation. However, this kind of statement is too vague, it needs to be more specific. Politically, Russia neither denies nor opposes economic cooperation in the SCO, and it agrees that economic cooperation is an important task of the SCO. Russian President Putin and his successor Medvedev have repeated its importance many times. However, in terms of the direction and emphasis of the economic co--operation, Russia has its own views, which are quite different specially compared with China.

If China is aimed to create favorable conditions to increase trade and free flow of goods, capital, service and technology, and accomplish regional economic integration in the end, Russia is skeptical and not supportive. Russia has doubt about economic integration in the SCO and does not support it. Russia insists that the focus of economic cooperation should be concentrated on energy, infrastructure, transportation and high--tech areas. This kind of thinking came up during Putin period and continues to present. Medvedev once said, “We should consider the characters of our organization in this field and the general direction of economic development. Our views are: we should concentrate on project activities...those projects are promising, such as ground infrastructure, inter--continental highway, energy club in the SCO and development of relations among energy companies in member states first, expanding inter--bank cooperation on project financing, expanding use of modern information technology.” As for the goal of the SCO economic cooperation, Russia believes that it ought to be improving people’s living standards and economic development in Central Asia.

It can be understood in this way: in terms of economic cooperation, Russia does not support focusing on trade and advocates cooperation on energy, transportation, and high--tech, from which Russia can get more benefits and suffer less negative impact. In terms of the aim of economic cooperation, Russia does not agree with the regional economic integration, instead, it believes regional development should be the goal. It is necessary to point out that Russia sometimes uses the terminology “integration” in the SCO economic cooperation, but here it means integration in a specific sector or the substitute for economic cooperation, not in the sense of regional economic integration in the SCO.

It should be pointed out that it is quite normal for Russia to have its own thoughts and ideas on economic cooperation, but it has little material input or less practical actions even in the areas where Russia advocates cooperation. Russia has never explained why it does not invest. Lack of money or unwilling to invest in Central Asia is not a persuasive explanation. As a matter of fact, Russia is not short of money so much. It has invested quite a lot in Central Asia, but only outside of the SCO framework. This raises an important question: what is Russia’s real intention? Is it just a political tactics? In other words, does Russian really want economic cooperation but have different ideas? Or does Russia have no intention for economic cooperation but want to make the economic cooperation collapsing? It is a difficult question and there seems no easy answer.

It is not difficult to find out that Russia has extinct differ--ences with China in terms of the focus and guiding principles of the economic cooperation and the reason is plain. Alexander Lukin，an associate professor of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia), who has studied the SCO for quite a long time, concludes that Russian reservation about the economic cooperation is out of two grounds, one is not willing to waste resources; the other is its concern over the strong influence of Chinese economy. The comments from Russian media and academic circles are frank: “Russia is an economic leader in the Eurasian Economic Community, but in the SCO Russia is in the shade of powerful Chinese economy. Russian government leaders, because of concern over Chinese economic expansion, just wants to concentrate on concrete infrastructure develop--ment instead of creating an integrated economic space in the SCO.”

It should also be pointed out that Russian media is dissatis--fied with the objective of Chinese economic cooperation. Gail Blas，a well--known Russian specialist on China believes that what China pursues is to open Russian and Central Asian markets and get free access to energy and mineral resources in the former Soviet region. That is why China proposes free flow of goods, investment, service, and technology. Alexander Lukin also pointed out that in China the Ministry of Commerce was responsible for economic cooperation in the SCO whose major portfolio was trade. In the eye of the Ministry of Commerce, the member states of the SCO were only the markets for the Chinese goods.

In short, Russia is concerned that the cooperation model advocated by China will help Chinese economic expansion, which will have adverse impact on the integration in the former Soviet states dominated by Russia. That is why Russia is hesitated at the economic cooperation in the SCO: “Beijing takes the SCO as a mechanism to consolidate its presence in Central Asia and increase its energy access, so does Moscow, but with its own interests in mind. China enjoys an indis--putable position in the SCO...therefore, many experts pointed out earlier that Moscow intentionally delay the economic integration process in the SCO, because it understands that every new start will strengthen the position of China, not that of Russia.”

Russia’s Policy Position on Energy Cooperation

At the SCO Summit in 2006, Putin proposed the establishment of energy club in the SCO. In fact, as earlier as September 2004 at the SCO heads of governments meeting, Russia put forth an initiative to set up an energy production and consumption club, and suggested making an integrated system in oil, gas and energy transportation. In his remarks at the SCO Summit in 2009, Medvedev again raised the issue of energy production and consumption club. Russia is very positive about energy cooperation in the SCO and its specific proposal is to establish the energy club.

Russian commentators believe that the major reason behind Russian proposal to establish energy club has something to do with China. China considers energy cooperation as one of the priorities in economic cooperation, therefore, China and Russia share the same view in terms of general direction. In terms of concrete objectives, the two countries have both common grounds and differences. They are both cooperator and competitor. China poses many challenges to Russia in Central Asian energy field. Therefore, “Russia hopes it can use the SCO as an adjusting mechanism for energy export in Central Asia….Moscow political and economic analysts estimate that Russian purpose of establishing energy club is to avoid potential conflicts with China over Central Asian energy.” It can also be seen as Russia’s effort to limit China’s activities in Central Asian energy field. Of course, the implications of the energy club are not entirely directed at China. For example, the United States is worried that the energy club may have the negative implications for the West and the United States. This provides another angle of reasonable explanation.

We can not find any Russian official explanation about the form, function, aim and nature of the energy club. According to Professor Gennady Chufrin, the functions of the energy club will include: 1) exchange and consultation mechanism for energy production, consumption and transportation countries to narrow the gap among member states and balance their interests; 2) working out an energy balance plan in the SCO and improving the security of energy system; 3) to avoid the negative impact from the volatility of international energy prices; 4) using new technology to improve energy efficiency and protect environment; and 5) working out common rules on energy development, etc. From this we can assume that the aim of the energy club is to create a multilateral dialogue me--chanism in the SCO which Russian government at present supports, and to work out a common rule on energy deve--lopment, transportation and import and export in Central Asia.

Russia’s Afghanistan Policy

Russian policy on Afghanistan is an important part of its policy toward the SCO. To some extent, all the member states of the SCO show great interest in the Afghan issue, while Russia pays more attention to it.

Russia not only supports the SCO in focusing more on the Afghan issue, but also insists that the SCO should get more involved in it. Most initiatives relating to Afghanistan in the SCO are raised by Russia, such as setting up liaison group between the SCO and Afghanistan, holding international con--ference on Afghanistan, building a safety strip to stop drug trafficking from Afghanistan and working out action plan for the SCO and Afghanistan to fight terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, etc.

The immediate goal of Russia’s Afghanistan policy is to protect its national security and Central Asian security. Besides, with the help of the SCO, Russia would like to increase its role, influence and bargaining chips with the U.S. in the Afghan issue. Russia considers the SCO as a useful multi--lateral platform to deal with the Afghan issue. CSTO is a military organization, which is exclusive in terms of function and geography. Eurasian Economic Community is an economic organization that has nothing to do with Afghanistan. “Six plus Two” or “Six plus Three” mechanisms are not controlled by Russia. The SCO, with its influence covering the whole region, has the unique resources in terms of politics, geography and representation, to deal with the Afghan issue and can play a unique role. As one of the key players in the SCO, Russia often stresses the important role that the SCO can play in the Afghan issue in an attempt to make full use of the SCO. This reveals its real intention.

Russian policy on Afghanistan can be summarized into four points: 1) strengthening direct ties between the SCO and Afghanistan; 2) the SCO should carry out practical cooperation on Afghanistan threat and work out action plans; 3) expanding cooperation on Afghanistan with other countries and organizations through the SCO; 4) using the SCO as a platform to discuss the Afghanistan issue.

Russia’s Policy on SCO Enlargement

There was ever a consensus in the SCO that it should focus on consolidating the organization and improving its efficiency, and not considering its enlargement at the present stage. Russia once shared this consensus. However, since 2008, it has be--come evident that Russia leans to enlargement. The SCO decided at its 2008 summit held in Dushanbe to set up an expert working group to study the issue of enlargement, which broke the ice on the issue of the enlargement. In 2010, because of the push from Russia, the SCO approved the Regulations on Receiving New Members of the SCO which has settled the issue of enlargement criteria and procedures, provided legal basis for enlargement and opened the door for enlargement. After the SCO Summit held in Tashkent in June 2010, President Med--vedev talked about the issue of enlargement, saying that Russia believed “some major countries’ participation in the SCO is in the interests of the SCO on the whole and will be conducive to increasing its prestige.” This indicates that Russia is ready to support some countries to join the SCO.

Russia does not point out clearly which countries are its preferred candidates. If Turkmenistan and Mongolia apply for membership, Russia would not vote against them. But Russia is most interested in India as it has friendly relations with India and there is no any major strategic competition between them. India’s membership would have a breakthrough impact on the SCO. Russian academic circles believe that there are two reasons why Russia wants India to join the SCO: One, India is a rising world power, its membership in the SCO would make it as the most important player in the world political arena and increase its geopolitical weight. Two, adding India to the membership list would balance China’s strong influence in the SCO.

Russia’s Policy on Regional Intervention

How to cope with regional turmoil has become an important issue confronting the SCO since Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip Revo--lution” in 2005 and Andijon mass demonstration in Uzbekistan. The SCO again faced the issue in 2010 when political unrests and mass turmoil took place in Kyrgyzstan. Of course, the SCO is concerned at the regional unrests, but it becomes an important theoretical and practical issue whether it should intervene or take specific actions.

Russia advocates active intervention. President Medvedev said at the SCO Summit in 2010: “we have set the task from very beginning to protect the stability and security of every member state and the region. Therefore, we cannot stand idle toward what is happening in Kyrgyzstan. The reaction from the SCO to this event should be clear and specific.”

The immediate goal of Russian proposal is to restore stability in Kyrgyzstan and maintain regional security, but there are some important questions to be clarified. One question: is it a special case or standard operation procedure for the SCO? Another question: what kind of specific actions the SCO should take and in what way? To these important questions, Russia does not give concrete answers.

It is presumed that Russia’s proposal is out of practical needs and has no long--term consideration. Russian academic circles have many suggestions for specific actions, from function similar to the UN Security Council to take extreme action to“temporarily take over” Kyrgyzstan by the SCO. But neither of these is endorsed by the Russian government. A more reason--able explanation would be that the specific actions mentioned by Russia should be political help and material assistance. In Kyrgyzstan case, Russia’s first reaction is to utilize the CSTO and CIS. In case of the crisis that needs direct intervention, Russia also first goes to these two institutions. The CSTO did not forcefully intervene in Kyrgyzstan because it was Kyrgyzstan’s internal affair as Russia explained. Under such circumstance, Russia would not like to ask the SCO to intervene in Kyrgyzstan by force—that was unrealistic and impossible.

Zhao Huasheng is Professor at Center for Russia and Central Asia Studies, Fudan University.