不妨除去银行的光芒

Ｐａｕｌ　Ｋｒｕｇｍａｎ

Thirty-plus years ago, when I was a graduate student in economics, only the least ambitious of my classmates sought careers in the financial world. Even then, investment banks paid more than teaching or public service - but not that much more, and anyway, everyone knew that banking was, well, boring.

In the years that followed, of course, banking became anything but boring. Wheeling and dealing flourished, and pay scales in finance shot up, drawing in many of the nation's best and brightest young people (O.K., I'm not so sure about the 'best' part). And we were assured that our supersized financial sector was the key to prosperity.

Instead, however, finance turned into the monster that ate the world economy.

Recently, the economists Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef circulated a paper that could have been titled The Rise and Fall of Boring Banking (it's actually titled Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry, 1909-2006). They show that banking in America has gone through three eras over the past century.

Before 1930, banking was an exciting industry featuring a number of larger-than-life figures, who built giant financial empires (some of which later turned out to have been based on fraud). This highflying finance sector presided over a rapid increase in debt: Household debt as a percentage of G.D.P. almost doubled between World War I and 1929.

During this first era of high finance, bankers were, on average, paid much more than their counterparts in other industries. But finance lost its glamour when the banking system collapsed during the Great Depression.

The banking industry that emerged from that collapse was tightly regulated, far less colorful than it had been before the Depression, and far less lucrative for those who ran it. Banking became boring, partly because bankers were so conservative about lending: Household debt, which had fallen sharply as a percentage of G.D.P. during the Depression and World War II, stayed far below pre-1930s levels.

Strange to say, this era of boring banking was also an era of spectacular economic progress for most Americans.

After 1980, however, as the political winds shifted, many of the regulations on banks were lifted - and banking became exciting again. Debt began rising rapidly, eventually reaching just about the same level relative to G.D.P. as in 1929. And the financial industry exploded in size. By the middle of this decade, it accounted for a third of corporate profits.

As these changes took place, finance again became a high-paying career - spectacularly high-paying for those who built new financial empires. Indeed, soaring incomes in finance played a large role in creating America's second Gilded Age.

Needless to say, the new superstars believed that they had earned their wealth. 'I think that the results our company had, which is where the great majority of my wealth came from, justified what I got,' said Sanford Weill in 2007, a year after he had retired from Citigroup. And many economists agreed.

Only a few people warned that this supercharged financial system might come to a bad end. Perhaps the most notable Cassandra was Raghuram Rajan of the University of Chicago, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, who argued at a 2005 conference that the rapid growth of finance had increased the risk of a 'catastrophic meltdown.' But other participants in the conference, including Lawrence Summers, now the head of the National Economic Council, ridiculed Mr. Rajan's concerns.

And the meltdown came.

Much of the seeming success of the financial industry has now been revealed as an illusion. (Citigroup stock has lost more than 90 percent of its value since Mr. Weill congratulated himself.) Worse yet, the collapse of the financial house of cards has wreaked havoc with the rest of the economy, with world trade and industrial output actually falling faster than they did in the Great Depression. And the catastrophe has led to calls for much more regulation of the financial industry.

But my sense is that policy makers are still thinking mainly about rearranging the boxes on the bank supervisory organization chart. They're not at all ready to do what needs to be done - which is to make banking boring again.

Part of the problem is that boring banking would mean poorer bankers, and the financial industry still has a lot of friends in high places. But it's also a matter of ideology: Despite everything that has happened, most people in positions of power still associate fancy finance with economic progress.

Can they be persuaded otherwise? Will we find the will to pursue serious financial reform? If not, the current crisis won't be a one-time event; it will be the shape of things to come.

30多年前，我还是一名在读经济学研究生时，只有最没志向的同学才投身金融界。尽管当时投资银行的薪酬高于教师或公务员的收入——但不是高很多，而且大家都知道银行业很无聊。

以后的岁月里，银行业自然变得一点儿也不无聊了。投机取巧盛行，金融业的薪资标准暴涨，吸引了国内最优秀聪明的青年才俊（我对“最优秀”心存疑问）。我们确信庞大的金融业对于繁荣至关重要。

然而，金融反倒变成怪物，侵吞了世界经济。

最近，经济学家托马斯•费立蓬和阿里尔•雷谢夫发表了一篇论文，题为《1909-2006美国金融业薪酬与人力资本》，其实可以命为《无聊银行业的兴衰》。他们表示，一个世纪以来美国银行业经历了三个时代。

1930年以前，银行业是个激动人心的行业，涌现了一批传奇人物，他们建立了庞大的金融帝国（某些之后经证实属诈骗）。金融业迅猛发展，导致债务激增：一战至1929年间，国内生产总值中家庭债务的比例几乎翻了一番。

这是金融的第一个繁荣期，银行家的收入比其他行业相同职位的人高很多。但在大萧条时期，银行体系崩溃，金融也黯然失色。

崩溃后重生的银行业受到了严格的监管，吸引力远小于大萧条之前，银行老板的收入也少得多。银行业变得无聊，部分是源于银行家对于贷款非常谨慎：家庭债务所占国内生产总值的比例在大萧条和二战时期大幅下降，此时也远低于30年代之前的水平。

说来也怪，对于多数美国人而言，这段银行业无聊乏味的时期却是经济突飞猛进的时代。

然而，80年代之后，由于政治风向改变，许多银行监管措施都取消了——银行业再次变得刺激。债务开始剧增，其在国内生产总值中的比例最终同1929年持平。金融业急剧扩张。80年代中期，它已占到公司总利润的三分之一。

有了这些改变，金融业又成为高薪行业——建立新金融帝国的人收入奇高。的确，金融业利润的飙升很大程度上造就了美国的第二个黄金年代。

不必说，新的超级巨星相信财富是他们自己挣得的。“我绝大多数的财富都来自我们公司，我认为公司业绩证明了我的所得名正言顺，”斯坦福德•威尔2007年说，他于2006年从花旗集团退休。许多经济学家同意他的话。

只有少数人警告说，这种超负荷的金融体系可能下场凄惨。也许最著名的预言家是芝加哥大学的拉古拉迈•拉詹，国际货币基金组织前任首席经济学家，2005年他在一次会议上表示，金融业的迅速发展增加了“巨大灾难”的风险。但其他与会者，包括现任美国国家经济委员会主任劳伦斯•萨默斯则嘲笑拉詹是杞人忧天。

灾难终于降临。

现在看来，金融业表面的风光实则多为假象。（自从威尔先生自夸后，花旗集团股价缩水了90%。）更糟糕的是，脆弱的金融体系崩溃后，严重破坏了其他经济领域，世界贸易和工业产出实际上比大萧条时期下降得还快。灾难发生后，人们呼吁大力加强金融业的监管。

但我觉得决策者考虑的主要还是重整银行监管机构。他们并不大愿意去做需要做的事情——即让银行业再次变得无聊。

问题之一是，如果银行业无聊乏味，银行家的荷包就会缩水，而金融业有很多身居高位的熟人。但这也是理念问题：虽然事态纷纭，大多数掌权者仍把复杂的金融和经济增长联系起来。

能改变他们的观念么？我们能下决心切实进行金融改革么？如果做不到，目前的危机不会如过眼云烟；它预示着更多危机的到来。

《纽约时报》