李璟 贺莺
As the effects of the Spanish ?u2 waned in 1919, Seattles workers agitated. Many were fed up with long hours and poor pay, especially at a time of high inflation. Shipyard workers went on strike, leading others to down their tools in solidarity. Newspapers were filled with stories of machinists, firefighters and painters quitting their jobs. Events in Seattle3 sparked labour unrest across the rest of America and even much of the rich world. Bosses worried that the lower classes had become work-shy anti-capitalists.
Seattle once again seems like ground zero4 for a big shift in labour relations. In October the local carpenters union finished a weeks-long strike over pay and conditions. Hotels and shops remain understaffed. Local tech firms, worried about losing staff, have raised average salaries by nearly 5% since 2020. Microsoft, one of them, claimed earlier this year that 46% of the global workforce was planning to make “a major pivot or career transition”.
Seattle seems like an example of what Anthony Klotz of Texas A&M University5 has called the “great resignation”. That memorable term has quickly become a corporate buzzword, spouted6 on companies earnings calls7 and at cocktail receptions. It has also made waves online. An “anti?work” message board on Reddit, a social-media site, is filled with screeds8 against the demands of greedy bosses. The forum now generates more user comments a day than the “WallStreetBets9” subreddit, which moved stockmarkets earlier this year.
The term is elastic, but in essence it makes the proposition that the pandemic has provoked a cultural shift in which workers reassess their priorities. People in low-status jobs will no longer put up with bad pay or poor conditions, while white-collar types scoff10 at the idea of working long hours. Some people have become lazier or feel more entitled; others want to try something new, or desire money less because they have come to appreciate the joys of a simpler life. This is, supposedly, leading to a tsunami of resignations and dropouts. There is just one catch11: the theory has little hard evidence to support it.
The great-resignation thesis seems strongest in America and Britain. In October 4.2m Americans quit their jobs, equivalent to nearly 3% of total employment, close to the record. In the third quarter of the year nearly 400,000 Britons moved from one job to another after handing in their notice, the highest-ever level. Employers may be responding to the threat of further departures, too. A tracker compiled by Goldman Sachs, a bank, suggests that wage growth in both countries is unusually strong. A weak jobs report for America, released on December 3rd, seemed to con?rm how hard it has become to hire staff even as vacancies remain sky-high. The worlds largest economy added just 210,000 jobs in November, below economists expectations of 550,000.
In other parts of the rich world, however, a great resignation is harder to spot. It is certainly true that millions have dropped out of work. Our best guess is that the labour force in the rich world is 3% smaller than it would have been without covid-19, a deficit of 20m people. Yet outside America and Britain there is little sign that this reflects more people quitting.
In November 107,000 Canadians who had left their jobs within the past year did so because they were “dissatisfied”, down from 132,000 on the eve of the pandemic. In Japan the number of unemployed people who had quit their previous job is near an all-time low. There are hints of a small rise in resignations in Italy, but across the EU as a whole the ?ow of people from work into leisure is lower than before the pandemic.
Data from New Zealand on labour?market ?ows look entirely unremarkable. And in many places there is little sign that workers are getting antsy12, which you might think could presage a rise in resignations. The number of industrial disputes in Australia continues to trend downwards. Collective disputes are “facing extinction”, according to a recent issue of Japan Labour Issues, a journal. If the pandemic has changed workers outlook on the world, they are hiding it pretty well.
Other factors, then, probably help explain the decline in the labour force. Many people still say they are fearful of catching covid-19 and may therefore be avoiding public spaces, for instance. Immigrants have returned to their home countries.
Even if a wave of resignations is largely an Anglo-American phenomenon, is there any evidence that the people who are quitting are doing so because they have become work?shy? Reddit posts aside, this does not seem to be the case. In Britain a tenth of workers say they would like a job with fewer hours and less pay—but that is in line with the long?run average. A recent study by Gallup, in America, suggests that “employee engagement”, a rough proxy13 for job satisfaction, is near its all?time high: hard to square with14 the notion that lots more people are desperate for a way out.
That suggests two more prosaic explanations for soaring quit rates. One relates to vacancies. When there are lots of open positions, people feel more confident about handing in their notice, even if they rather like their job. They may also be poached. Vacancies are high right now partly because the pandemic has led to surging demand in new sectors (say, warehouses for online retail). Analysis of America by Jason Furman of Harvard University and of Britain by Pawel Adrjan of Indeed, a job?search site, suggests that job quits are at the level you would expect them to be, given the number of vacancies.
Messrs Furman and Adrjans analysis may nonetheless underestimate how unremarkable the surge in quits truly is. In both countries resignations sank during the worst of the pandemic in mid-2020. Many people who would like to have left a position last year may only now have plucked up the courage to do so. Account for these “pent-up” resignations, and the recent pickup looks even less unusual.
Could a truly “great resignation” ever emerge? It would probably require more radical cultural changes. Households would need to decide, en masse15, that their future consumption needs, and the income needed to fulfil them, were substantially lower. That would mean no more foreign holidays, less dining out and fewer household appliances. It would also mean fewer Christmas presents. Anyone who visited a Black Friday sale, in Seattle or elsewhere, would be quickly disabused of the notion that such a dramatic shift was on the cards16.
1919年,随着“西班牙流感”的影响逐渐减弱,美国西雅图的工人们开始躁动不安。不少人受够了时间长、收入低的工作,尤其是在这个物价飞涨的时代。船坞工人发动罢工,其他行业的工人也放下工具以示支持。报纸充斥着机械师、消防员、油漆工罢工的报道。西雅图总罢工事件引发全美工人动乱,甚至波及全球不少富裕地区。老板们担心下层阶级已成为不愿工作的反资本主义者。
西雅图似乎再次成为劳资关系重大转變的起爆点。2021年10月,当地木匠工会为提高薪资、改善工作条件举行了为期数周的罢工。酒店和商店一直人手不足。当地科技企业由于担心员工流失,2020年以来将平均薪资提高了近5%。微软也在其中,该公司于2021年早些时候宣布,其46%的全球员工正在计划“换工作或转行”。
西雅图似乎正是德州农工大学安东尼·克洛茨所说“大辞职潮”的典型代表。这一说法令人过目难忘,很快成为企业流行语,在公司财报电话会和接待酒会上为人们津津乐道,在网上也引发了轰动。社交媒体红迪网的“反工作”留言板上充斥着抨击老板贪得无厌的长篇大论。该论坛现在每日新增用户评论数超过了“华尔街赌注”这个红迪子论坛,后者在2021年较早时候曾一度撼动了美国股市。
“大辞职潮”这个说法可以有多种解释,从本质上讲,它提出了这样一个命题:疫情引发了文化转向,工薪阶层开始重新评价人生的优先级。从事底层工作的民众将不再容忍低薪或恶劣的工作条件,而白领阶层则对长时间工作这种想法嗤之以鼻。有些人变得游手好闲或自以为是;有些人则想尝试新事物,或降低对金钱的欲望,因为他们已开始享受朴素生活的乐趣。据信,正是这些原因导致了辞职离工的大潮。这其中唯一的坑是:这说法缺乏确凿的证据支持。
大辞职潮论似乎在英美两国表现最为强劲。2021年10月,420万美国人辞去工作,几乎相当于就业总人数的3%,接近历史纪录。2021年第三季度,近40万英国人递交辞呈另谋出路,创下历史新高。雇主们或许也正对更多员工离职的风险做出回应。国际投行高盛集团编制的一份追踪报告显示,英美两国的薪资增长均异常强劲。12月3日发布的一份报告显示美国就业疲软,似乎印证了在岗位空缺居高不下时招聘员工有多么艰难。11月,这一全球最大经济体就业人数仅增长了21万,低于经济学家所预期的55万。
然而,在世界其他富裕地区,大辞职潮并未显现。确实有数百万人辞去工作,但充其量只能说,相比无新冠肺炎影响的正常情况,全球富裕地区劳动力减少了3%,缺口为2000万人。但除英美两国外,几乎无迹象表明会有更多的人离职。
截至2021年11月,加拿大因对工作“不满意”而在过去一年内离职的人数为10.7万人,低于疫情暴发前夕的13.2万。在日本,辞职待业人数接近历史最低水平。在意大利,有迹象表明辞职人数略有上升,但就整个欧盟而言,离职待业人数比疫情前还要少。
新西兰的劳动力市场流动数据也平平无奇。在许多地方,几乎没什么迹象表明员工蠢蠢欲动从而预示辞职率上升。澳大利亚的劳资纠纷总数持续呈下降趋势。最近一期《日本劳工问题》称,集体纠纷正“濒临消亡”。如果说新冠疫情改变了劳动者们的世界观,那他们把这一点隐藏得相当好。
那么,其他因素也许有助于解释劳动力减少的情况。比如,不少人依然表示由于害怕感染新冠肺炎可能会避免前往公共场所。许多移民都已返回自己的祖国。
即便辞职潮在很大程度上是一种英美现象,但究竟有没有证据表明人们辞职是因为不愿工作?抛开红迪的帖子不谈,事实似乎并非如此。在英国,有1/10的劳动者表示自己想要一份工时更短、薪资更低的工作——但这与长期以来的平均水平是一致的。盖洛普最近在美国进行的一项研究表明,“员工敬业度”(衡量工作满意度的粗略指标)已接近历史最高水平:这与越来越多的人急于另谋出路的说法背道而驰。
这表明,对于不断飙升的离职率,还有两种更为平淡无奇的解释。其中一种与职位空缺有关。当有岗位大量空缺时,人们即使很喜欢现在的工作,也会更有信心地递交辞呈。他们还有可能是被挖走的。而目前岗位空缺率居高不下,部分原因是疫情导致新兴行业(如网络零售仓储业)人力需求激增。哈佛大學杰森·弗曼对美国的分析和Indeed求职网帕维尔·阿德里安对英国的分析均表明,考虑到岗位空缺的数量,目前的离职率符合预期水平。
尽管如此,弗曼和阿德里安先生的分析可能还是低估了这一事实:离职率激增实际上并不值得大惊小怪。在2020年年中疫情最严重的时候,英美两国辞职人数均有所下降。许多在2020年就想离职的人,可能直到现在才鼓起勇气这么做。考虑到这些“被压抑”的辞职,最近的增长也就更不足为奇了。
真正的“大辞职潮”会出现吗?这可能需要更激进的文化变革。家家户户都需要共同做出决定,大幅减少未来消费需求以及满足需求所需的收入。这意味着不再出国度假,减少外出就餐,减少购买家电。这还意味着要减少圣诞礼物。但是看看西雅图或是其他地方举行的“黑色星期五”大促销,人们就会立刻打消如此巨变已露端倪的念头。
(译者单位:宁波大学)
1 be all mouth and no trousers〈习语〉意思是“光说不练”,标题使用该词指大辞职潮的提法炒作得很厉害,但实际并没有流行起来。译文为保留修辞效果,根据文意翻译为“雷声大雨点小”。 2 1918年到1920年,一场名为“西班牙流感”的疫情横扫全球,造成约5亿人感染,4000万到1亿人死亡,而当时世界总人口仅有17亿。“西班牙流感”实际上并非源自西班牙,世卫组织现已将之更名为“1918年大流感”。 3 1919年美国西雅图总罢工,当时工人发动罢工并接管了整座城市5天。革命席卷了墨西哥和俄罗斯,德国爆发了工人起义,匈牙利革命政府上台,意大利和荷兰工人掌控了工厂,加拿大温尼伯也发生了大罢工。故而文中有波及其他富裕地区的说法。 4 ground zero原指(核弹的)爆心投影点,引申为“起点”之义。
5得克萨斯州农工大学建立于1876年,世界著名综合性研究型公立大学。安东尼·克洛茨为该校梅斯商学院组织心理学教授,2021年5月接受彭博社采访时创造了great resignation这个短语,用以描述新冠疫情引发的离职潮。 6 spout喋喋不休地说,滔滔不绝地说。 7 earnings call财报电话会议,是上市公司、分析师、投资者和媒体进行的电话会议,讨论公司在给定报告期内的财务结果。 8 screed冗长的文章。 9“华尔街赌注”论坛(WSB)是美国最大的散户论坛。2021年年初,大量WSB散户通过加仓抱团拉升股价,创造了反杀华尔街空头的金融界奇观。该论坛从此声名大噪,用户数量从170万暴涨到300多万。 10 scoff嘲笑,讥笑。
11 catch隐藏的问题;暗藏的不利因素。
12 antsy烦躁的;坐立不安的。
13 proxy代表。 14 square with与……相符合。
15 en masse〈法语〉全体地;一同地。 16 on the cards〈习语〉有迹象预示可能会发生。