英文内容提要

CONTENTS

01 Biden’s “US Industrial Strategy for the 21st Century”: Logic, Framework and Prospects,by Liu Feitao, Senior Research Fellow and Director at the Department for World Economy and Development, CIIS. The Biden administration is the first administration of the United States to openly advocate industrial policies and strategies in the past three decades, marking the decline of “Reaganomics” and the rise of “Biden economics”. As the main pillar of “Biden economics”, industrial policy has become a hot topic of discussion in policy and academic circles, which involves not only an economic logic to confront the polarization of the rich and the poor, the decline of manufacturing industry and other issues at home, but also a political logic to maintain US predominance in the face of China’s rise abroad. These logics have not only provided impetus to and set the main direction for Biden’s contemporary “US industrial strategy”,but also determined that the road of industrial revitalization taken by the US is not a temporary expedient, but a medium- and long-term strategy. However, judging from its framework design and content, the road of industrial revitalization in the United States will be restricted by partisan differences, excessive protectionism and other factors, and its process may meet with setbacks and its effectiveness may be greatly discounted.

26 The Focus, Characteristics and Prospects of America’s Digital Strategy towards China,by Dr. Sun Haiyong, Associate Research Fellow at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. Intensifying competition in the digital industry has become an important part of the US’ strategy towards China. The Biden administration focuses on three aspects to enhance US’ leading position in the global digital industry: first, focusing on improving the domestic semiconductor manufacturing capacity; second, increasing resources investment in domestic digital infrastructure and enhancing the influence of the United States in the field of international digital infrastructure development;third, leading the making of the governance rules for cross-border data flow, artificial intelligence technical standards and ethical guidelines on the basis of alliance. The US’digital strategy towards China is characterized by low-cost mobilization, prioritizing security logic, and suppressing the entire industrial chain. This strategy will not only undermine the mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation between Chinese and US technology industries, but also erode the digital hegemony of the US, face with diversified interest demands of its allies in their China strategy, and increase external credit deficit of the United States. It will also deteriorate the global digital industry ecology and the international digital economic cooperation, and exert negative impacts on the efforts of developing countries to improve digital infrastructure in particular.In the days to come, on the basis of strengthening independent innovation of digital technology, China needs to shape the international environment for digital cooperation to weaken the implementation effect of the US’ digital strategy towards China.

45 The Indo-Pacific Green Alliance Building and New Changes in Climate Security,by Tang Xinhua, Deputy Director at the Center for Climate Change and Eco-security and Associate Research Professor at the Institute of Science, Technology and Cyber Security,CICIR. The Biden administration has elevated the issue of climate change to the priority of national security and the focus of foreign policy of the United States, with a strategic goal of competing for green development power to build a new order of global zerocarbon economy, and reshaping the “global leadership” of the United States under the carbon neutral agenda. Establishing new alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region is the key strategic pillar for the US to regain its “leadership”. The two major strategic goals of the US are to compete for the development “soft power” and build a“solid foundation” for security under the Indo-Pacific economic framework. The US is currently building a multi-layered “green alliance” in the Indo-Pacific region to compete for competitive advantages in clean energy innovation, dominate the Indo-Pacific energy and carbon trading markets, formulate new green rules to suppress China’s green technologies, industries and investments, and build an Indo-Pacific security architecture based on climate security. The new landscape in the Asia-Pacific region, with green development and climate security as its pillars, is undergoing dramatic changes, which calls countries in the region to address this issue jointly based on coordination of development and security.

68 The Evolution of ASEAN’s Non-interference Principle under China-US Competition – Taking ASEAN’s Response to the Political Change in Myanmar as an Example,by Liu Aming, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of International Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. As the cornerstone of ASEAN’s organizational norms, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, on the basis of ensuring the security of Southeast Asian countries’ polity, promotes the unity of member countries, resists external interference, and helps ASEAN maintain its autonomy and centrality in regional affairs. After the Biden administration took office, the United States used ideological tools such as democracy and freedom to intensify competition with China, while reorganizing its geopolitical power under the framework of “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, thus putting “normative pressure” on the principle of non-interference pursued by ASEAN, and bringing its objective root, decades-long value and utility,as well as the most fundamental aspiration of ASEAN to face new challenges. It can be seen from the process of ASEAN’s response to the change of Myanmar’s domestic political situation that although the principle of non-interference is still the core norm that ASEAN collectively emphasizes, its diplomatic discourse has obviously changed to the interventional narrative; specific actions tend to be more intrusive than in the past; and the decision criteria highlight the influence of ideological considerations. In the future, the change of this important norm will affect not only the policy effect of ASEAN to deal with the Myanmar issue, but also the development prospect of ASEAN amid major-country competition.

90 The Global Development Initiative Implemented by China and Arab Countries:Concept and Practice,by Sun Degang, Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES) and Senior Research Fellow at Institute of International Studies,Fudan University; and Zhang Jieying, Doctoral Student at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University. Peace and development deficits are two major challenges facing the Arab world. In the new era of changes unseen in a century intertwined with a pandemic unseen for a hundred years, strategic competition among major countries around the world have affected the development environment in the Middle East, and Arab countries are faced with development challenges such as insufficient driving force for development and weak market demand. Keeping up with the trend of the fourth industrial revolution, China and Arab countries are actively adapting to the “Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”of the UN, implementing the Global Development Initiative, giving priority to development and putting people first, pursuing a new concept of development featuring universal inclusive,innovation-driven development and harmonious coexistence of man and nature, and promoting the synergy of development strategies, mechanisms and projects between China and Arab countries. The economies of China and Arab countries are highly complementary. By implementing the Global Development Initiative and pursuing the concept of “promoting peace through development”, China and Arab countries can turn development dividends into peace dividends and promote infrastructure connectivity, which is conducive to peace and development in the Middle East.

103 The Motivation and Prospect of Japan’s Strengthening Security Cooperation with Europe,by Dr. Sun Wenzhu, Associate Research Fellow at Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, CIIS. Since 2017, affected by “Trump shock”, “Brexit” and the intensified game between China and the United States, Japan has strengthened security cooperation with the EU and NATO in an all-round way, and made multi-level and multi-field progress in bilateral and multilateral security exchanges and institutional building, joint military operation as well as equipment and technology cooperation, which is starting to expand into the field of economic security. By strengthening security cooperation with Europe,Japan aims to take advantage of the changing international order to realize its strategic transformation, expand its sphere of influence and security space in the new world landscape, and ensure that it shares the development dividends of the Indo-Pacific region. However, Japan and Europe disagree on threat cognition and security objectives,their respective internal economic and political pressure is huge, and both of them face strategic constraints from the United States, all of which restrict the security cooperation between Japan and Europe to be further upgraded to a military alliance in the real sense.

122 India’s Push for Militarization of Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Its Prospects,by Li Yibo, Associate Professor at the School of Marxism, Beijing Institute of Graphic Communication. Since India proposed the “Act East” policy and “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, the strategic status of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands has been significantly enhanced. The Modi government, in a shift from its previous policy of “doing nothing and remaining indifferent”, has poured resources into making the archipelago a regional economic hub and a new stronghold of India’s maritime security strategy, in order to achieve the development and utilization of the archipelago’s blue economic potential,strengthen its ability to monitor and control maritime traffic choke points, consolidate its strategic dominance in the Bay of Bengal, further enhance its position in Indo-Pacific security affairs, and use this as a lever to seek strategic balance in the game between China and India. Against the backdrop of the complex and ever-changing Indo-Pacific security order, the rapid “militarization” of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands will be a“game changer” affecting regional security, and should be closely watched by relevant parties.