In Search of Consolation寻找慰藉

安德鲁·斯塔克

For each of us， life will end at some point. Should that unavoidable fact affect the way we live？ If so， in what way？ 我們每个人的生命都会在某个时刻终结。这一既定事实会影响我们的生活吗？如果会，又能如何影响呢？

The relationship between a person and his death， said the Greek thinker Epicurus， is a strange one. It is roughly akin1， if we may leap forward a couple of millennia， to the relationship between Superman and Clark Kent2. Whenever one is present， the other is nowhere to be seen. As long as a person is alive， his death has not yet happened. And of course once his death occurs， he is no longer around. Since no one will ever encounter his own demise， Epicurus concluded， it should cause him no concern.

Shelly Kagan’s “Death” furnishes a lucid3 guide to a range of philosophical claims of this sort， such as whether we can know what it’s like to be dead or why life is valuable in the first place. But Mr. Kagan continually returns to one matter that looms over4 all others： whether， for anyone who rejects religious notions of an afterlife， there are ways of consoling oneself about the inevitability of death. He takes no definitive position on this question. Rather his aim—the book is based on a popular Yale philosophy course that Mr. Kagan teaches—is to probe the positions on offer. And in his pages we find two consolations， apart from that of Epicurus.

The first one Mr. Kagan associates with is Buddhism， though it has been advanced as well by Western philosophers such as Schopenhauer. It urges us to cast off our selfish preoccupations5. To hold on to our self-focused projects and attachments is to court suffering whenever they end in disappointment. Far better to abandon any concern with our self， existing instead moment by moment， shorn of any concern for past or future. And since our self is the very thing that we are supposed to lose when we die， death will then become a nonevent， not worth fretting over6.

The other consolation that emerges in Mr. Kagan’s book comes from existentialism7， and it flips the Buddhist consolation on its ear. Existentialists value the individual self， with its own projects and aims. They argue that our death， in particular our constant knowledge that we are moving ever closer to it， is precisely what makes each of us his own unique person. Aware that time does not stretch out limitlessly， we feel an urgency to get started in the world， to make hard choices about what’s important and thus to carve out the narrative arc8 of our singular lives. Death compels us to craft a life-story that resembles a “resolved chord” or “melody，” as Sartre put it. Only with death always looming can we have a self—can we exist as identifiable9 individuals in the first place.

For existentialists and Buddhists， though in different ways， the relationship between the self and death seems more like the “Late Night” relationship between David Letterman and Paul Shaffer. One will be present if the other is too. You can be a full-fledged10 self， existentialists say， only if your death is ever present in your life. If you can manage to make yourself disappear， Buddhists say， then death will as well.

Mr. Kagan sees value in both positions， though he implicitly11 acknowledges that their paths to consolation are hazardous12. Anyone who seeks the Buddhist-style consolation is going to lead a life that， at its end， risks leaving him bereft of13 any feeling of accomplishment. And anyone who tries for an existentialist consolation—leading a chock-a-block life because mortality has concentrated his mind—will feel the loss of something of great value when it ends. “Don’t cry because it’s over; smile because it happened，” said the great existentialist Dr. Seuss. But anyone who can smile because it happened is going to have to cry because it’s over.

Which brings us back to Epicurus. For as long as we exist， the philosopher argued， our death must remain absent. But what would it take to live a life in which death truly wasn’t present to us—not just logically， as Epicurus suggests， but psychologically， internally？ We would live， as Freud believed most in fact do live， not really believing that we will die—believing， as Mr. Kagan notes of Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich， that death is something that happens to other people. Most of us， like Ivan， go merrily along taking on new projects， forming new relationships and scheming new schemes to promote ourselves socially， even though death could interrupt us at any moment. Instead of arriving at one completed narrative， we often risk leaving—to our ultimate sadness—many uncompleted ones. Truly living as if death is absent as long as we are alive is unlikely to console us.

Or take Epicurus’ other claim： once death comes， we will no longer be alive to worry about it. What kind of life would we have to live to be consoled by this idea？ Obviously not Ivan’s. His life， in a real way， continues on after he is dead. What tears at him is the thought that so much of what would otherwise comprise his life—his children， his friends， his projects—will go on to flourish or flounder14 without him： without his being there to enjoy or assist.

The only way that we can avoid that prospect is to follow the advice of the poet Hölderlin （cited by Mr. Kagan）： aim for a “single summer” of intense joy and then， having experienced the heights of what life has to offer， recognize that “more is not needed.” Life’s meaning would be derived from a single moment， and one could then wait in serenity15 for the end. Fine if you can do it. For most， it would be a tedious16 living death.

Mr. Kagan’s book shows， ultimately， that there is no single， all-purpose17 consolation for death. What we do have is the freedom to choose our own consolation by living our life in a particular way， knowing that， in doing so， we will deprive ourselves of all the others.

古希腊思想家伊壁鸠鲁认为，人与其死亡之间关系奇特。如果以几千年后的现代视角来看，这一关系大概类似于氪星之子超人与地球人克拉克·肯特之间的关系。一方存在，另一方便不见踪影。只要人活着，死亡就尚未来临。当然，一旦死亡来临，人也就不再存在。伊壁鸠鲁认定，没人会活着与自己的死亡相遇，因此死亡不会令人恐惧。

谢利·卡根在其《死亡哲学》一书中就此类哲思提供了明白易懂的导览，例如我们能否知道死亡是什么样，或者生命为何从一开始就如此珍贵。然而卡根教授不断回到一个困扰所有人的问题：那些不相信有关来生的宗教信条的人，面对必然到来的死亡，是否有办法慰藉自己。卡根并没有明确答复这个问题。他想做的是探讨现有的那些立场。除了伊壁鸠鲁的享乐主义，这本书还探讨了另两种慰藉方法。此书是依据卡根在耶鲁大学开设的颇受欢迎的哲学课撰写的。

卡根提到的第一种是佛教，而叔本华等西方哲学家也提到过。佛教敦促我们抛弃私心杂念。如果坚持以自我为中心待人处事，一旦结果令人失望，就会招致痛苦。最好放弃关注自我，而专注于活在当下，不念过去，无谓将来。既然死亡来临时，本该消逝的就是我们的自我，那么死亡也就没有什么大不了，不值得为此烦恼。

卡根教授书里提到的另一种慰藉源自存在主义，它跟佛教的慰藉完全不同。存在主义者重视个体的自我，以及个体自身的事务和目标。他们认为，正是人的死亡——特别是不断认识到自己离死亡越来越近——让每个人成为独一无二的个体。明白时间并非无穷无尽，我们就会急迫地开始人世的打拼、艰难抉择事物的轻重，从而打造我們自己的人生轨迹。正如法国哲学家萨特所说，死亡迫使我们谱写出一段如“铿锵和弦”或“旋律”般的生命故事。正因为死亡总是步步进逼，我们才能拥有自我——才能从一开始就作为与众不同的个体存在。

对存在主义者和佛教徒来说，虽然观点各异，但都认为自我与死亡的关系似乎更像美国午夜聊天节目《深夜秀》中的大卫·莱特曼和保罗·谢弗。只要一方存在，另一方也会存在。存在主义者认为，只有生命中出现死亡，你才能拥有成熟的自我。佛教徒则认为，如果你能让自己消失，死亡同样可以。

卡根教授认为两种观点都有可取之处，但也含蓄地指出以它们的方式寻求慰藉的危险性。任何寻求佛教式慰藉的人都可能终其一生毫无成就感。而那些寻求存在主义慰藉的人，由于死亡萦绕于心而过着争分夺秒的窒息生活，生命终结时会觉得怅然若失宝贵之物。著名的存在主义者苏斯博士说过：“不要因为已结束而哭泣，要因为经历过而微笑。”但任何会因经历过而微笑的人都必会在结束时哭泣。

这将我们带回伊壁鸠鲁的观点。这位哲学家认为，只要人存活于世，死亡必然缺席。但倘若死亡并非真正来临——真正的死亡不仅指伊壁鸠鲁所言的逻辑上的死亡，还指心理即内在的死亡——要如何度过一生？我们会活着，正如弗洛伊德所认为的，大多数人实际上会好好活着，并不真正相信自己会死，卡根教授在提到托尔斯泰笔下的人物伊凡·伊里奇时也写道，人们认为死亡总是发生在别人身上。我们大多数人都像伊凡一样，会开心地开始新工作、结交新朋友、制订新计划，以期获得更高的社会地位，即便死亡可能随时降临，破坏这一切。我们往往无法拥有完满的人生，总是冒险留下很多缺憾——这是最令人悲哀的。只要活着，就像死亡并不存在那样好好生活，这似乎并不能带给我们慰藉。

或者，看看伊壁鸠鲁的另一个观点：一旦死亡来临，我们就不再会活着为死亡担忧。如果接受这种慰藉，我们的生活得是什么样？显然不是伊凡那样的。在他死后，他的生活实际上仍不停歇。令他撕裂般痛苦的是这样一种想法：生前生活的种种——孩子、朋友和事业——在他死后仍将延续，或荣或衰，都与他无关，他既无法分享快乐，也无法施以援手。

为避免这种情况，我们只能遵从诗人弗里德里希·荷尔德林的建议（卡根教授引用了他的诗句）：尽情享受“一夏”的欢乐，在体验人生的高潮后，便会感悟“别无他求”。人生真谛就得自某一时刻，之后便可静待终结。如果能做到，就太好了。对大多数人而言，生活单调乏味，生不如死。

卡根教授的书最终传达了这样一个观点：对于死亡，没有单一、普适的慰藉。我们拥有的是选择的自由，以自己的方式过自己的日子，以此选择适合自己的慰藉，并知晓如此一来就将放弃其他所有选项。