DRAMATIC ELEMENTS IN POLYBIUS’ GENERAL HISTORY:AN ANALYSIS BASED ON THE MODEL OF THE CONNECTIVITY OF THE ANCIENT MEDITERRANEAN WORLD

Houliang Lü

Institute of World History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

In The Histories 2.56, Polybius adopts a harsh and aggressive1Walbank 1962, 1.(yet not uncommon in Hellenistic historiography2Eckstein 2013, 335.) critical approach to Phylarchus and his“tragic history.” Polybius asserts that a responsible historian should not attempt to draw the attention of his audience by exaggeration, or follow the tradition of tragic poetsfabricating plots and speeches. He should record what has been done and said faithfully, regardless how tedious these details might be.3Pol. 2.56.10:As the only Hellenistic historian who ever directly mentioned“tragic history,”4Sacks 1981, 144, 146.Polybius left his statement and definition rather vague and the nature of “tragic history” has stirred debates.5Ibid., 169.John Marincola believes that its core lies in the motivation of readers’ sentiment, the emphasis on unstable human fates,6Marincola 2013, 73–74.as well as the tendency to exaggeration.7Ibid., 80.Boris Dreyer sees Polybius’ criticism of “tragic history” as equivalent to Thucydides’emphasis on the value of pragmatic history.8Dreyer 2013, 202.Éric Foulon interprets “tragic history” as a response of Hellenistic historians to Aristotle’s assertion of poetry’s superiority over history.9Arist. Poet. 1451a 38 – b 11; Foulon 2009, 129, 119.Despite the different perspectives, all three scholars conclude that Polybius’ criticism resulted from his serious attitude to historical compositions. The emergence of his argument should be taken as a milestone in the development of the idea of “objective history” in ancient historiography.

In my opinion, this conclusion is to some extent reasonable. Nevertheless,whichever scholar we side with, we should not ignore the incompleteness of Polybius’ effort to avoid dramatic elements. If we loosely define “tragic history”as borrowing tragic elements, such as fiction, exaggeration and plot design in writing history, we must realize that the theatrical effect of classical drama is also achieved with rhetoric, stage props, plot settings, line designing, and the theme of destiny. Judging by Polybius’ extant corpus, his simple and unadorned style distinguishes his work from the “tragic history” he criticizes.10Walbank and Habicht 2010, xi.At the same time,in order to compose a grand, complete, and original11Pol. 5.33.1–8.general history, Polybius employs the aforementioned elements shared by ancient Greek dramas, and produces a great dramatic history, full of intensities, and ups and downs, of which the rising Roman Republic was the hero, the Mediterranean world was the stage,and fortune (τύχη) functions as the teleological theme in the rapid unification(συμπλοκή) of the Mediterranean world in less than 53 years.12Pol. 1.1.2–6; 1.2.7; 1.4.1; 3.1.4; 3.1.9; 3.2.6; 3.3.9; 3.4.2; 3.118.9; 6.2.3; 8.2.3; 39.8.7; cf. Walbank 1957, 40 (ad Pol. 1.1.5–6); Quinn 2013, 337; Walbank 1985b, 313; Walbank and Habicht 2010, xi;Derow 2012, 1174.

“Es gibt keine Polybiosfrage (there is no Polybius problem).” Ernst Howald bases his famous and decisive (perhaps overconfident) conclusion on the fact that Polybius is an extreme example in the ancient world who rarely misses an opportunity to introduce his historical method to the audience in both Greek and Roman13Pol. 6.11.3; 10.4.9; 31.22.8; cf. Walbank and Habicht 2010, xv.cultural contexts.14Pédech 1964, 5.The criticism of “tragic history” is also one of his numerous comments on historical methodology. Classicists have long taken it for granted that serious history and drama are incompatible concepts in the context of Polybius’ criticism of “tragic history.” Polybius, therefore, is rendered a disciple of “objective historiography” based on the untested claim of the historian himself.15For instance, it is rather striking that Maurice Holleaux could even believe that all orations in Polybius’ work were reproduced word for word from the original diplomatic documents (Holleaux 1921, 17–18).In modern scholarship, only Frank William Walbank has expressed the opinion that Polybius’ historical narrative is occasionally (for instance his depiction of the fall of Demetrius and the tragic destiny of Philip V) overly dramatized.16Dreyer 2013, 209; Ullman 1942, 43.However, as the evidence that Walbank offers appears to be trivial,this constructive perspective does not attract much interest among classicists.

In my opinion, the research on the ecological history (which in most cases also incorporates the study of certain aspects of economic and social history in the loose sense) of the Mediterranean world since the 1950s suggests that Walbank’s suggestion deserves further discussion. Studies of Mediterranean ecological history focus on the shaping of connectivity and variety of Mediterranean microregions. From ancient to early modern times, the interaction between the environment and the inhabitants of the Mediterranean were never interrupted.While human behavior has also influenced the environment, the latter left its impact on economy, culture, and politics.17Purcell 2013, 98.Although Polybius’ chief interest focuses on political history,18Miltsios 2013, 2.his subject, scope and causal connection are inevitably related to the ecological history of the Mediterranean. Certain elements in Polybius’ general history, such as navigation instruments, the unity and diversity of the Mediterranean world, the communication between the western and eastern halves of the Mediterranean, and the general tendency of the development of Mediterranean political, economic and cultural history(labeled “fortune (τύχη)” in the context of Polybius19Ziegler 1952, 1532–1543; Walbank 1957, 16–26.), are also important issues in Mediterranean social and especially ecological history. At the same time,our standard of Mediterranean ecological history is far superior to Polybius’Hellenistic general history in evidence, approach and theoretical thinking. Of course, it would be anachronistic to cite modern knowledge of the Mediterranean world possessed by us to deny Polybius’ great historical achievement in his age. Nevertheless, the broad vision of current Mediterranean ecological history is helpful for us to recognize the unrevealed difficulties which Polybius had to face in his composition of general history in aspects such as evidence, logic and the organization of materials. The study of Mediterranean ecological history starts in the age of Henri Pirenne, Fernand Braudel and Shelomo Dov Goitein,and their achievements have been theoretically (though still temporarily and rudimentarily) summarized by Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell in their The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History.20Miller 2013, 258; Concannon and Mazurek 2016, 3–7.On the one hand,as a widely discussed and controversial work,21Harris 2005a, vi.The Corrupting Sea and other recent works on ecological history contain quite a lot of problematic assertions.22Relevant examples include Horden and Purcell’s denial of a basic difference between urban and rural settings, and their application of anthropological evidence to define the boundary of the Mediterranean world. Cf. Horden and Purcell 2000, 89–122; 463–523.Nevertheless on the other hand, these classic works on the ecological history of the prehistoric, classical and medieval Mediterranean world offer valuable clues to understand Polybius’ general history. First of all, plenty of recent discoveries confirm that from the 8th century BC (for which age the available archaeological evidence becomes informative enough to suggest something substantial) to the eve of the industrial revolution (after which age the influence of man-made technology profoundly transformed the ecological environment all over the world and severely weakened the distinctive features that provide the justification for calling the Mediterranean region one integral unit for historical research), one permanent key factor of the human societies in the Mediterranean world is the coexistence of the unity linked by sea and the fragmentation caused by climate,geography, and culture.23Braudel 1972, 14; Abulafia 2003, 19; Horden and Purcell 2000, 5.Peoples around the Mediterranean shared the common life pace and communicative network through the sea and other environmental factors. The availability of a resource exchange system is the precondition of every Mediterranean settlement’s survival and development. The system owes its origins to developments in prehistoric times;24Ibid., 24–25; Abulafia 2011, 75; Malkin 2011, 3.but it really only developed significantly in the archaic period,25Horden and Purcell 2000, 346–348.and almost took shape in the mid-5th century BC.26Ibid., 348–350; Broodbank 2013, 506; 2014, 45.The conquest of Alexander the Great and the expansion of Rome were only politico-military actions in an already existing system of connectivity. In turn, those events further consolidated and enriched the political elements of this network whose economic and cultural aspects had already been well established.However, the Mediterranean world unified by the Roman Empire comprised 24 climatic regions27Grove and Rackham 2001, 25.and thousands of fragmentary topographic, economic, and cultural units. Even in her prime, the Roman Empire only had a rather limited assimilation of the economy and culture of her subjects.28Certain degrees of economic exploitation of provinces of course exist and could be important in some instances, see Hoffmann-Salz 2011, 441–498. But the economic and cultural “Romanization”in most eastern provinces remained strikingly slow. See Horden and Purcell 2000, 23; Tac. Ann. 2.88:Graecorum annalibus ignotus, qui sua tantum mirantur.The military conquest of Rome never brought a complete unification of the Mediterranean world,economically or culturally. It cannot even be called the end of general history from a strictly political perspective.29Harris 2005b, 50.If we examine Polybius’ construction of general history from the perspective of ecological history, the fundamental limitation of his historical narrative is easy to detect. On the one hand, the unity of the Mediterranean, in Polybius’ view, is generally restricted to the political and military aspects. He tends to neglect the well-developed economic and cultural network in the Mediterranean world and its influence, direct or indirect,on the development of political history, even though he knows many of these facts well and sometimes reports them to us from other perspectives instead of the discussion of the connectivity of the Mediterranean world (in his context, theof the). The assimilation of the Mediterranean started way before Rome’s expansion beyond Italy, yet the regional features did not disappear in Polybius’ lifetime (or at any point before the 18th century), despite the Roman hegemony.

Besides, recent scholarship in ecological history has re-examined and criticized various values and methodologies generally applied to the Mediterranean studies.These new angles can benefit us in our analysis of Polybius’ general history. In the following section, I shall tease out different dramatic elements in Polybius’work.

Dramatic Elements in Polybius’ Extant Corpus

1. “Raven” and the History of Technical Revolution: The Stage Props for Rome to Dominate the Mediterranean

In classical Greek dramas, supernatural stage props often play important roles in promoting the development of the plot. The wine representing truce in Aristophanes’ Acharnenses30Ar. Ach. 178–202.and the dragon coach symbolizing Medea’s final break from Jason in Euripides’ Medea31Eur. Med. 1405–1414.are both relevant examples. In Mediterranean historiography, in order to explain dramatic change in a short period across wide areas, historians often depict significant transformations in economic,political and social life as the direct consequence of one single technical invention or improvement; therefore, they shape these innovations into indispensable “stage props” to promote the development of dramatic plots in their historical narrative.Such technical renovations listed in The Corrupting Sea include mouldboard,crop rotation, the water mill and double-entry bookkeeping.32Horden and Purcell 2000, 233, 287–297, 365–367.Nevertheless, in light of the ecological view, historic transformation in the Mediterranean region(as well as worldwide) is usually the product of gradual accumulation of multiple factors instead of the historiographical deus ex machina.33Ibid., 297.In my opinion, the “raven” that is claimed by Polybius to have played a key role in the sea battles during the First Punic War, is exactly a “stage prop”with supernatural features.

Modern scholars tend to comment that Polybius attributes Rome’s success to“fortune” and the so-called “mixed constitution.” However, in my opinion, as a politician with rich experience of practical military affairs,34Pol. 12.25e.1–2.Polybius believed that the military advantage of Rome was equally important for her success. In 6.19–41, Polybius exhaustively discusses the superiority of Roman legions on land. He also attempts to explain why the Romans could establish their hegemony on sea by a miraculous stage prop. In his narrative of an early confrontation of the Roman and Carthaginian sea powers, Polybius describes details of the raven(κόραξ) equipment, which is a type of drawbridge recommended by “someone(τις)” to the Roman navy in order to hook enemy warships and transform sea battle into warfare on land.35Pol. 1.22.1–11.The ravens showed their miraculous power in the very first battle, destroying 50 Carthaginian ships,36Pol. 1.23.1–10.and gaining for the Romans a great victory on the sea.37Pol. 1.24.1–2.In his conclusion on the First Punic War, Polybius emphasizes the significance of the control of the sea for this war once again. He points out that the respective investment of Rome and Carthage in their fleets was unprecedented; and that the final victory of the Roman navy laid the basis for the future Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean.38Pol. 1.63.4–9.The consistent logic of Polybius reflected in these scattered pieces of evidence is rather clear: the new-born and inexperienced Roman navy gained military advantage through one single technical innovation, which helped them win the battle against the powerful Carthaginians and finally made them the masters of the Mediterranean. The key stage prop that accomplishes this transformation, was the mysterious raven.

Nevertheless, the seemingly intact narrative contradicts the evidence provided by Polybius himself, as well as other historians. In his comparison of various constitutions in Book 6, Polybius readily admits that the Roman navy was by and large inferior to its Carthaginian rival,39Pol. 6.52.1–2.which means that the adoption of the ravens by the Roman fleet did not reverse the power contrast at sea during the First Punic War. What is more, no matter how powerfully the ravens could be used, it is beyond doubt that this device did not play a central role in the following events during the first two Punic Wars. According to Polybius’ narrative, after this spectacular victory, the inexperienced Roman fleet immediately met a terrible storm when it was sailing around Sicily; only 80 ships of 364 survived the disaster.40Pol. 1.37.1–6.The Romans rebuilt the fleet in three months;41Pol. 1.38.5–7.however, in sailing back to Italy, the newly built fleet lost 150 ships in a storm again.42Pol. 1.39.1–6.The senate gave up the idea of developing naval force for a time43Pol. 1.39.7–12.and left control of the sea to the Carthaginian fleet. As a third Roman fleet, built in 250 BC,44Pol. 1.41.1–4.was destroyed by a storm again,45Pol. 1.54.1–8.the Carthaginian navy’s control of the sea maintained to the very end of the First Punic War.46Pol. 1.55.1–2.Although a fourth Roman navy47Pol. 1.59.1–8.finally defeated its Carthaginian opponent48Pol. 1.61.1–8.and helped the Romans end the First Punic War as the victor,49Pol. 1.62.1–9.it is quite obvious that the chief reason for the Carthaginians’ surrender was their economic crisis and social conflicts caused by the continuous warfare,50Cf. Pol. 1.65.1–4; 1.66.1–5.not the military advantage of the Roman fleet brought by the ravens. From the perspective of Mediterranean ecological history, we can conclude that the misfortune of Roman fleets during the First Punic War demonstrates the subordinate role of sea battles and navies in the contemporary historical context. In spaces such as the open sea or large islands, where overall and constant surveillance by the naked eye would be impossible, “thalassocracy”in the ancient historical context cannot completely cut off the supply of soldiers and provisions for the enemy (the supply of food to the beleaguered Spartan army, by Helots across the blockade of the Athenian fleet during the siege of the island Pylos, serves as a noteworthy example51Thuc. 4.26.1–9.). For these reasons, the temporary mastery of the sea did not bring total success for the Carthaginians in their contest with the Romans for Sicily. Similarly, the sporadic fighting at sea during the Second Punic War52Pol. 3.95.1–97.5.was not decisive either. The focus of both sides was the more reliable traffic line into Italy via Spain on land. The significance of the ravens and the relevant sea battle is likely to be the adaption of the original narrative provided by Fabius Pictor; while the so-called “raven” is perhaps no more than the improved version of the long-handled hooks used by the Athenian navy in the 413 BC,53Walbank 1957, 77–78 (ad Pol. 1.22.3).where it was clear that the power of hooks was rather limited.54Beck 2013, 133.However, in Polybius’ narrative of his general history, the simple tool becomes a revolutionary technique that reverses the power relations of the rival navies, and a key stage prop to promote a dramatic plot in the narrative. In that sense, the function of the “stage prop” in The Histories is not quite different from Phylarchus’ “tragic history” in nature.

2. Disorientation in Time and Space, and the Subjective Division of Historical Periods: Classical Unity in the Unification of the Mediterranean World

“Classical unity” is a principle of drama. The principle was summarized from Aristotle’s Poetics by the early modern Italian and French literary criticism theory.55Arist. Poet. 1451a 16–35.The principle suggests that a successful drama should keep action, time and place in unity. The principle commands the drama writer to confine the main plot to within 24 hours through omission and the combination of secondary elements. No matter whether this disputed type of classicism is helpful as a guide to literary composition, this requirement is of course not suitable for annalist historical works. The value of historical narrative lies in presenting developing features of historical processes at successive points of time, depicting striking and accidental details beyond the “mainstream” of the historical movements, as well as leading readers to understand the complexity of history at each developing phase. However, in the scholarship of Mediterranean historiography, quite a lot of historians made serious mistakes by combining evidence from different ages and regions to support their opinion or theory. For instance, the impression that Islamic civilization brought the diversity of species to the Mediterranean world in the study of Mediterranean agricultural history is based on a combination of evidence from a variety of ages, regions and historical contexts; but there is no convincing evidence showing that an “agricultural revolution” ever took place with the birth and expansion of the Islamic civilization.56Horden and Purcell 2000, 257–263.The homiletic narrative of environmental history focusing on “environmental crises” caused by earthquakes, floods and vegetation deteriorations in the ancient Mediterranean world is also largely constructed by a mixture of materials about natural disasters in different periods and locations; it cannot convincingly prove that many specific ancient settlements continuously suffered from “environmental crises”due to over-exploitation.57Ibid., 304–308, 311–312, 330–332.In the case of Polybius’ general history, the problem of anachronism is clearly reflected in his introduction of one key element of his narrative of general history, namely the superiority of the Roman mixed constitution.

The superiority of the mixed constitution serves as one core reason for Polybius to demonstrate how Rome could establish its hegemony over the Mediterranean world.58Walbank and Habicht 2010, xv; Alonso-Núñez 1990, 188; Baronowski 2011, 154; Pédech 1964, 500.For Polybius, the choice of constitution can largely determine the fate of ancient powers. Spartans once established hegemony over the Greek world through their excellent constitution set up by Lycurgus, but suffered miserably under the tyranny of Nabis afterwards.59Pol. 4.81.12–13.Book 6 of The Histories points out that the very basis of the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean world in less than 53 years is exactly her unique constitution.60Pol. 6.2.3: …The cooperation of all parts in this distinctive mixed constitution supported the Roman Republic to allow effective responses to crises,61Pol. 6.18.1:and consolidated the senate’s determination to establish a universal empire.62Pol. 1.2.3–6; 1.3.10; 3.2.6; 6.18.4; Balot 2010, 488.The Roman constitution combines the best elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.63Pol. 6.11.11–12.Therefore, for Polybios, it is simply the best constitution ever established.

However, as many modern scholars have already pointed out, besides inaccuracy, Polybius’ narrative of the mixed constitution is also replete with selectivity and anachronisms. For instance, Polybius claims that the Roman people could vote to forbid the resolutions of the senate; but such historical instances never occurred during the period The Histories deals with.64Walbank 1957, 691 (ad Pol. 6.16.3).In his explanation of the cooperation of elements from the three constitutions,65Pol. 6.15.1.Polybius talks about the mutual respect between the senate and Roman people,66Pol. 6.16.1–2; 6.17.1.but does not mention anything about their fierce struggles and conflicts in history.His description of the power of plebeian tribunes is generally accurate; however,his source seems to come from, or reflect circumstances of, the Early Republic and has little to do with the historical context of the First and Second Punic War.67Walbank 1957, 691–692 (ad Pol. 6.16.4–5).His record of the obedience of the senate to plebeian tribunes and the Roman people also differs significantly from relevant historical evidence.68Ibid., 692 (ad Pol. 6.16.5).The delicate cooperation mechanism among the senate, censors and Roman people in The Histories was actually established in mid-2nd century BC, but was displaced by Polybius into the “ideal” constitution of the Roman Republic in the face of the disastrous defeat at Cannae in 216 BC.69Ibid. (ad Pol. 6.17).Some modern classicists believe that the prototype of the Roman mixed constitution in Polybius is taken from the Spartan mixed constitution summarized by Archytas of Tarentum, a pupil of the Pythagorean school. Therefore, Polybius’ account of the Roman “mixed constitution” is in essence ahistorical.70Walbank 2002, 283.This unique constitution appears to be well-knit,71Champion 2004, 67–68.but it is static72Brink and Walbank 1954, 102.and turns out to be a mixture of features belonging to different phases of Roman history.73Cole 1964, 440.Thus, it fails to reflect the dynamic image of the historical constitution of the Roman Republic that used to undergo constant development.74Astin 1989, 6.The selectiveness and anachronism in Polybius’ mixed constitution damage the accuracy and reliability of the author’s historical analysis.

Another feature of The Histories is the neglect of economic, cultural and political evidence incompatible with Polybius’ construction of the general history. As a historian almost contemporary to the subject he deals with,Polybius should be able to recognize quite a lot of signs of the unity and fragmentation of the Mediterranean world through both his historical knowledge and his personal experience. Though we have to allow for his ignorance of the communicative network in the prehistoric and early classical Mediterranean world, his neglect of the mature exchange system in the eastern Mediterranean region after Alexander’s conquests still seems unsatisfactory. As a matter of fact, Greek intellectuals living before Polybius’ age had already given a rudimental impression of the highly developed communicative network in the eastern Mediterranean world that had already taken form long before the Roman conquest75Austin 2006, 397–398 (no. 225); Pol. 12.25a.5–9.– even some scattered evidence mentioned by Polybius himself, by chance, provides some clues. For instance, in the narrative of the mercenary army of the Ptolemaic kingdom against Antiochus III before the Roman conquest of the eastern Mediterranean in Book 5, Polybius lists Magnesians, Boeotians,Achaeans, Thessalians, Cretans, Thracians and even Libyans and Gauls,76Pol. 5.65.1–11.so vividly reflecting the frequent and large-scale mobility of population all around the eastern Mediterranean region and the region’s interaction with the western counterpart.77Horden and Purcell 2000, 386–387.Another instance is the success of the Rhodians in collecting aid funds from Syracuse, the Ptolemies, the Seleucids and Mithridates when their colossus was severely damaged by a terrible earthquake in 227 BC;78Pol. 5.88.1–90.4.and the regent Tlepolemus in Egypt frequently invited famous actors from mainland of Greece to his court by generous rewards.79Pol. 16.21.6–8.Such evidence indicates clearly the preexistence of a traditional communicative network in the eastern Mediterranean world long before the Roman conquest.80Horden and Purcell 2000, 24–25.John Davies comments that although Polybius is by no standard an economic historian, his history still serves as a treasure for the study of the economic relationships across different Mediterranean regions.81Davies 2013, 319.But it would sound a bit ironic if we relate that comment to the central view in the general history of Polybius that the unity of the Mediterranean world was mainly created by the Romans through their conquests. Although Polybius uses these materials to describe military activities or to make moral judgments,82Pol. 5.90.5–8.he strikingly ignores their value as evidence of the connectivity of the Mediterranean world (which is, on the other hand, clearly relevant to Polybius’ system of general history). In fact, both the interference in the Adriatic region by Roman power83Čašule 2012, 226.and the government of the eastern Mediterranean world by the Roman Senate and T. Quinctius Flaminius,84Paus. 7.7–8.Pompey, Mark Antony as well as Octavian represent the Roman conquerors’recognition and utilization of the extant political and economic organization shaped by previous local history.85Syme 1939, 273, 300–301.Nevertheless, while focusing on the subject of his general history, namely the unification of the Mediterranean world by Roman conquest in less than 53 years, Polybius does not make full use of these materials manifesting the unity of the Mediterranean region.

It seems that Polybius only admits the existence of the unity of the Mediterranean world after the establishment of the Roman hegemony; and in his criticism of former historians, he mentions several times his own advantage of gaining a universal vision by living in a unified Mediterranean world.86Pol. 3.59.1–8; 4.40.1–3.However,as a politician who had visited a lot of Mediterranean microregions, Polybius should also have realized that the topographically fragmented, economically imbalanced, culturally mixed world with still many almost isolated microregions could not be unified simply by the military conquest of the Romans. In his record of the mercenary rebellion in Carthage after the First Punic War, he mentions the mountain chains separating Carthage from Libya that is inaccessible to human beings.87Pol. 1.75.4–6.He also introduces the(“island”) on the southern side of the Alps, which is a fertile microregion in itself, but almost isolated from neighboring regions due to physical barriers.88Pol. 3.49.5–7.Isolated microregions, such as fragmentary islands, precipitous mountains, forbidding forests and wetlands cannot obtain connectivity immediately by “short-term” political events, like the defeat of Hannibal or Philip V by Roman generals. As a matter of fact, even for the main theme of The Histories – the political and military conquest of the Mediterranean world by the Romans – Polybius still fails to explain convincingly why there are so many fragmentary elements in his chronological narrative of the single main theme, namely the Roman conquest of theThe spatial scope of the extant part of The Histories includes Italy, Carthage, Spain,Greece, Gaul, Macedonia, Seleucid Dynasty, Egypt, Syria, Judea and even Bactria,89Pol. 11.34.1–16.located beyond the Mediterranean region.90Walbank and Habicht 2010, xiv–xv.As the complex, varied process of the political and military history of the Mediterranean world does not contain a consistent logic at all, it is actually impossible for Polybius to construct a complete general history presenting the core theme of “the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean world” as the single theme of the whole “spezielle Monographie,”91Hatscher 2003, 16–17.which should fully cover every corner of the Mediterranean microregions within his annalist framework. In his extant corpus, Polybius makes two basic attempts in order to settle this problem. First of all, in certain occasions he places simultaneous historical events taking place at different Mediterranean regions side by side, so as to present the “panorama” of the Mediterranean history to his readers. For instance, in 387/386 BC, Sparta made the peace of Antalcidas with the Persian king; Dionysius the Elder was besieging Rhegium; Gauls sacked the city of Rome except the Capitoline hill.92Pol. 1.6.1–3.In the autumn of 218 BC, Hannibal was marching towards the Po; Antiochus was returning to his winter camp;and the Spartan king Lycurgus was expelled to Aetolia.93Pol. 5.29.7–8.In 217 BC, Romans met severe defeats in Etruria in their campaigns against Hannibal; Antiochus was marching around Coele-Syria; Philip V made alliance with Aetolians and the Achaeans.94Pol. 5.105.3–10.Perhaps these “timetables” can provide quite broad visions for Polybius’ readers; but they are not really relevant to the theme of Polybius’general history, namely the political unification of the Mediterranean world. That is because the readers can hardly find any convincing and direct relations among these separate political events. Ironically, in the latter part of The Histories, these timetables reveal the limitation of the Roman dominance: during 188–184 BC,though the Greek world had yielded to the authority of Rome in name, the poleis were still full of mutual conflicts and territorial disputations.95Pol. 22.1.1–9.The hegemony of the Roman Republic over the Greek world failed to end the political division of the latter once and for all.

Polybius was not unaware of this explanatory difficulty. In Book 4, Polybius made a second attempt to solve this problem. He points out that the historical events taking place in different regions were independent at first; but the common fate of these lands was to be incorporated into the Roman imperium. In that sense, these affairs are “qualified” to take place in the narrative of the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean world.96Pol. 4.28.1–6.Nevertheless, logical difficulties remain in Polybius’ apology. As the individual events from the local history of scattered Mediterranean microregions do not contain any historical purpose in themselves,even if we can concede that the “fate” of all these regions was to be governed by the Romans, the historians still should not insert earlier independent events into the system of general history in retrospect. As the narrative of later Roman historians (such as Livy and Appian) shows, the Roman military conquest of the Mediterranean is said to have started with the foundation of the city of Rome,and is comprised of a succession of political events including the unification of Italy, three Punic Wars, four Macedonian Wars, the suppression of Greek revolts,and many episodes after Polybius’ lifetime, such as three Mithradatic Wars, the sea battle of Actium as well as the Jewish War in 66–70 BC. That complicated historical procession is full of accidents (for instance the invasions into Italy by the Gauls, Pyrrhus and Hannibal), standstills (such as the Civil War Period in the final years of the Republic) and reversals (for instance the revolts of Italians,Sicilian slaves, Achaean alliance and Jews). It is by no means a concise annalist record covering no more than 53 years. Therefore, the effort of Polybius to set a common starting time for varied microregions in the fragmentary Mediterranean world cannot be absolutely convincing. Furthermore, the later development of Roman history also proved Polybius’ neglect of fragmentary elements in his general history. Long after the establishment of the Roman military hegemony,the pirates still controlled a large part of the sea.97Ormerod 1997, 13; Horden and Purcell 2000, 40; Souza 1999, 178; Syme 1939, 17; Mazurek 2016, 40.Although the legislation of the Roman senate after 100 BC and Pompey’s cleanup operation temporarily consolidated the safety of maritime navigation,98Souza 1999, 242.the kidnap of Caesar99Suet. Iul. 4.and the revival of pirates100Syme 1939, 255.still remind us of the limitation of the so-called political unity of the Mediterranean world, and of the persistence of anarchy in fragmentary and isolated Mediterranean microregions, which is reflected by the existence of pirates.

In sum, the anachronism in Polybius’ presentation of the mixed constitution of Rome and his omission (either consciously or unconsciously) of evidence reflecting the coexistence of unification and fragmentation in the Mediterranean world reveal the dramatic features in The Histories’ plot design. To some extent,Polybius’ subjective arrangement of materials distorts the logical clue of the historical narrative, and damages the accuracy of his general history.

3. Fictional Elements in Speeches: The Construction of the Mediterranean’s Integrity by “Asides”

The third dramatic element in The Histories is a traditional technique in classical Greek historiography that dates back to Thucydides: the insertion of fictional political speeches in the historical narrative. As we have seen in the opening part of this paper, Polybius severely criticizes the abuse of fictional speeches in his own comment on tragic history.101Pol. 2.56.10.He claims that fictional speeches might harm the accuracy of a serious historical narrative.102Pol. 12.25b.1–4.On the other hand,it is certain that some inserted speeches in The Histories also contain fictional elements.103Walbank and Habicht 2010, xviii–xix.These impressive “asides” are spoken by certain characters on behalf of the author, and play key roles in the connection of historical “plots” and the construction of the integrity of the Mediterranean world.

As I have already pointed out, the notion of general history compels Polybius to fix a starting point for the political unification of the divided Mediterranean world.In the narrative of The Histories, Polybius chooses 217 BC, namely the end of the Social War in the Greek world, as the very beginning of the political unification of the Mediterranean world.104Pol. 4.28.1–6.However, as our analysis shows, the actual historical process does not contain a purpose in itself; therefore the choice of Polybius cannot be based on any convincing logical arguments. Polybius’ way to justify this periodization is one piece of fictional political speech delivered by Agelaus of Naupactus to Philip V and his Greek audience:

For it is now evident even to those of us who give but scanty attention to affairs of state, that whether the Carthagians beat the Romans or the Romans the Carthagians in this war, it is not in the least likely that the victors will be content with the sovereignty of Italy and Sicily, but they are sure to come here and extend their ambitions and their forces beyond the bounds of justice.105Pol. 5.104.2–3 (trans. taken from Paton, Walbank and Habicht 2010). This argument was actually adopted by Cato the Elder in his Rhodian speech (Gell. NA. 6.3.15–16) after 169 BC, and the phrasing is likely to have been borrowed either directly or indirectly from the latter.

He also metaphorically uses the term “clouds coming from the westto describe the struggle between Rome and Carthage over the hegemony of the western Mediterranean.106Pol. 5.104.10; 36.1.1–7.As James Davidson points out, this speech provides for the readers a chance to “gaze” at the arena of armies from an “auditorium,” and establishes the connection between Greece proper and the battlefield of the Second Punic War.107Davidson 1991, 15.Through this fictional speech, Polybius manages to construct one type of interaction between the western and eastern halves of the Mediterranean world, whose historical developments were parallel before that time point in his context.108Quinn 2013, 349; Walbank 1985a, 298.However, there are only a few scholars who can accept the historicity of Agelaus’ speech (such as Maurice Holleaux),109Holleaux 1921, 17–18.while most modern classicists firmly hold the belief that this speech must be fictional and was composed by Polybius. As Polybius admits at the very opening of The Histories, even in his own age, most Greeks still knew very little about the history of Rome, Carthage and other countries in the western Mediterranean.110Pol. 1.3.7–10.In the period The Histories records, many Greeks still took Romans for remote barbarians (βάρβαροι).111Champion 2000, 425.It is true that the Greek tradition of historiography since Thucydides allows to some extent for the legitimacy of fictional speeches so long they are in accord with the relevant historical context;112Pol. 12.25i.5; Champion 2000, 436; 1997, 113.but Agelaus’speech still fails to meet this requirement. The direct contact between the Greeks in Asia Minor and the Romans was established long after 217 BC; the first Roman envoy to the Aegean area was reportedly sent in 200 BC.113Walbank 1985b, 316.Therefore, it is quite safe for us to take the emphasis of the significance of Rome or Carthage through the mouth of a Greek envoy in 217 BC as an inserted “aside” of Polybius to promote the development of the historical plot. Another example of the same kind is the rhetorical praise of the Roman Senate as the protector of the freedom and justice of the Greek world made by a Rhodian envoy.114Pol. 21.23.1–12.These “asides” play key roles in connecting the western and the eastern halves of the Mediterranean world in Polybius’ system of general history, and become a third important dramatic element in The Histories.

4. General History as Propaganda and Teleology: The Theme of the Roman Conquest of the Mediterranean World

Various ideologies have left their marks on Mediterranean historiography.Famous instances include the overemphasis of “minimalism” in the study of ancient economy guided by Darwinism,115Cf. Günther 2017a, 60–61; 2017b, 69.exaggerated description in the moralized narrative of physical disasters in the ancient Mediterranean microregions influenced by environmentalism, and the absurd opinion that excessive deforestation hampered the modernization of the Islamic civilization created by Orientalism.116Horden and Purcell 2000, 146–147, 336–337, 337–341, 359–362.In sum, the Mediterranean serves as an important geographical and political concept to express imperial ideologies throughout cultural history.According to the basic notions of Hellenistic geography, the Mediterranean sets natural frontiers and living spaces for all kinds of civilized ethnicities;117Strab. 2.5.17.it is also the natural cradle of the Roman Empire.118Gordon 2016, 15; McCormick 2001, 83.In the Greek cultural context of the fourth century BC, the political sense of the Mediterranean was already discernible;119Horden and Purcell 2000, 11.in the Late Roman Republic, mare nostrum gradually became the equivalence ofor orbis terrarum;120Ibid., 12.the notion of the Mediterranean as a complete political unity finally took shape in the work of Isidorus of Seville.121Isid. Etym. 13.16.1.The apologetic, teleological and dramatic theme of τύχη in Polybius’The Histories represents an important phase in this development.

One basic task of Polybius’ general history is to explore how Rome could conquer thein less than 53 years.122Pol. 1.3.1–6; Hartog 2010, 39; Astin 1989, 5.In that sense, Polybius’ general history is unprecedented,123Pol. 5.33.1–8.as the degree of the Mediterranean unity established by Rome far surpasses the former models created by regional powers such as Persia, Sparta and Macedonia.124Pol. 1.2.2–8.Besides military and constitutional advantages,the validity of Roman hegemony is also carried by his explanation of τύχη in The Histories. To some extent, τύχη in Polybius serves to justify Roman imperialism.First of all, The Histories partially emphasizes the natural advantage of Italian topography, praises her fertile lands and rich products.125Pol. 2.14.4–15.7.In the second place, the favour of fortune126Pol. 3.118.1–9.bestows moral high ground upon the Roman conquests. For every war in which the Roman Republic participated in The Histories, the moral responsibilities were taken by Rome’s opponents without exception.127Walbank 1972, 163.In the context of Polybius, the cause of the Second Punic War is Hannibal’s personal will and his oath to be enemy of Rome all his life;128Pol. 3.11.5–12.6; 9.22.1.the blame of the Third Punic War is ascribed to the foolishness of Hasdrubal.129Pol. 38.7.1–2.On the other hand, the Romans gained moral advantages in these conflicts by their perfect heroes such as Scipio Africanus the Elder130Pol. 10.40.7–9.and the favor of τύχη.131Pol. 6.56.6–15.Thirdly, Polybius claims that the political conquest of Rome brought happiness to the Mediterranean residents;132Erskine 1994, 86–87.he also inserts propagandistic plots into his historical narrative, such as the celebration of Greeks at Isthmian Games for the benevolence of Roman conquerors,133Pol. 18.45.1–46.15.and the praise of the Rhodian envoy to the Roman senate for their protection of justice and freedom in the Greek world.134Pol. 21.23.1–12.This propaganda is not at all compatible with the later anti-Roman revolt of the Achaean League135Pol. 38.1.1–9.and the slaughter of the Roman army after their sack of Corinth.136Pol. 39.2.1–3.Although Polybius does occasionally offer some mild criticism of Roman imperialism, his overall attitude is still in favor of the Roman expansion137Baronowski 1995, 30–31; 2011, 78, 86, 113.and is biased, e.g. in respect of environmental determinism, moralization, hero worship, and a theory of racial superiority as well as the embellishment of imperialism. Though we cannot be sure whether these views reflect Polybius’ real feelings, or are deliberate distortion of the facts under the pressure of the Roman authority, it is certain that the dramatic and fictional mode of historical narrative mixing Roman propaganda and τύχη together is by no means as objective as Polybius himself claims.138Pol. 8.2.1–11.

What is more, the concept of τύχη corresponds to the theme of fate in classical tragedy and creates the difficulty for Polybius to set an end for his general history; it damages the completeness of his historical narrative. According to Polybius’ theoretical explanation, the will of τύχη always attempts to organize the Mediterranean world into a συμπλοκή;139Pol. 1.4.1–2; cf. Ziegler 1952, 1515; Walbank 1985b, 313–314; Dreyer 2003, 45–46.but she only manages to achieve that goal through the conquests of the Roman Republic.140Pol. 1.4.4–5.In order to support this hypothesis, Polybius has to set convincing starting and ending points for his general history. As Polybius himself points out, the periodization of general history is both difficult and important.141Pol. 1.5.4; 5.31.1–8; 5.32.1–5.And he sets a series of time-points to construct his periodic system. In Book 1, Polybius roughly sets the period of his general history between 220–167 BC, the “less than 53 years” from the start of the Roman expansion beyond Italy to the establishment of her dominance over the whole Mediterranean world.142Pol. 1.1.2–6.In Book 4 and through the fictional oration of Agelaus, Polybius fixes 217 BC as the end of independent histories of different Mediterranean regions and the very beginning of the unification of the οiκουμνη.143Pol. 4.28.1–6.In his narrative of the Second Punic War, Polybius further recognizes the defeat of the battle of Cannae (216 BC) as the turning point of the Roman τύχη, and takes the battle of Zama (202 BC) as a phased ending of the establishment of Roman hegemony over the whole Mediterranean world.144Pol. 15.9.2–5; cf. Walbank and Habicht 2010, xv.According to Polybius’ explanation, the victory over Carthage in the Second Punic War enabled the Roman army to march towards the Aegean area in around 200 BC, and towards Asia Minor in around 190 BC.145Pol. 1.3.1–6.However, in the second“preface” in The Histories (Pol. 3.4), Polybius’ theme did not end in 167 BC,which was the time limit he had set earlier. Although Rome had become the master of the Mediterranean by then, a serious historian would have to go on to explore the influence of the political unification on the Mediterranean residents and the effect of the Roman government.146Pol. 3.4.1–13.As a historian with a Greek cultural background, the “unification” of the Mediterranean world in his context does not necessarily demand Rome to crush every opponent, but only requires to establish and maintain hegemony such as Sparta had enjoyed in the Greek world after the Peloponnesian War. This standard is highly subjective in itself; and the emergence of the influence of political unification and the effect of government is extremely difficult to be fixed to any given year. In that case, we must ask why Polybius stuck to the task of finding a satisfactory termination of his historical narrative, and let his ending point slip down to 145/144 BC. In my opinion, this dilemma reflects the conflict between the philosophical notion of τύχη and the fragmentary nature of Mediterranean history within Polybius’ system of general history.

Most modern researchers on Polybius believe that his historiography was highly influenced by classical and Hellenistic philosophy.147Pédech 1964, 97, 507; Walbank 1985b, 314; Hartog 2010, 36; Alonso-Núñez 1990, 189.Besides Polybius,later Hellenistic historians and geographers, such as Posidonius,148Posidonius F67 (in Edelstein and Kidd 1989); Clarke 1999, 188–190; Laffranque 1962, 112.Strabo,149Strab. 17.1.36.and Appian150App. praef. 1–12.also attempted to take certain philosophical ideas as guidelines for their works. In his discussion of the Roman mixed constitution in Book 6 of The Histories, Polybius openly admits the influence of Platonic political philosophy on his theory.151Pol. 6.5.1–3.Classicists often emphasize the positive aspect of philosophical ideas leading Polybius to explore the àιτία of historical events.152Walbank and Habicht 2010, xix.But on the other hand, the philosophical notion of τύχη also demands his historical narrative to present a logical structure like the theme of fate in classical tragedy. That is to say, a complete historical narrative must show history as a real drama, and clearly indicate the origin, development, climax and end of a certain historical process.153Hartog 2010, 36–37.From that perspective, Polybius originally decided to set 167 BC as the establishment of the Roman hegemony and the climax as well as end of his general history.154Walbank 1957, 301 (ad Pol. 3.4.2).Nevertheless, as long as Polybius wanted to offer a complete narrative of the Roman expansion, the omission of the Carthaginian and Achaean military activities against Roman dominance must be inexcusable.155Pol. 38.1.1–9.For that reason, Polybius had to abandon the original terminal date (167 BC), which is relatively easy to justify, and to set a new ending (145 BC) for his The Histories.Therefore, ironically, according to Polybius’ final periodization, not only had the Roman expansion still failed to annex independent Ptolemaic Egypt, but the holy unification of the Mediterranean world that was claimed by the historian to have brought peace and prosperity to the Mediterranean residents, ended in the flames of the ruins of Carthage and Corinth, and in a desperate and undecided atmosphere.156Some scholars propose that Pol. 38.22.1–3 expresses Polybius’ prediction that the Roman hegemony over the Mediterranean world would be substituted in the end. I agree that this idea suits classical Greek cycle theory very well. But the decline of the Roman hegemony does not belong to the theme of Polybius’ universal history; and Polybius did not and cannot offer any clear description to this future process. Cf. Gruen 2013, 263; Walbank 2002, 210.

The ending time-point of “general history” set by Polybius was abandoned by all later historians. In the eyes of Diodorus who created another system of general history, general history must be a universal history starting from the earliest known age of the Assyrian and Egyptian empires down to the contemporary period.157Sheridan 2010, 41, 50.Later historians, such as Pompeius Trogus and Florus,adopted Diodorus’ model of universal history without hesitation (Florus’ Roman History dates from the foundation of Rome, though).158Just. Epit. 1.1.1: principio rerum gentium nationumque imperium penes reges erat, quod ad fastigium huius maiestatis non ambitio popularis, sed spectata inter bonos moderatio provehebat.Flor. 1.1.1: Populus Romanus a rege Romulo in Caesarem Augustum septingentos per annos tantum operum pace belloque gessit, ut, si quis magnitudinem imperii cum annis conferat, aetatem ultra putet.Strabo and Tacitus more reasonably set the end of the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean world at the battle of Actium (of course Polybius could not know that event taking place after his death);159Clarke 1999, 254; Tac. Ann. 1.3.and in its context, this historic event only marks the transition of the Mediterranean region from the divided period into an unified empire, but by no means represents the logical end of general history in any sense. Ironically,in the notions of Sallust and Appian, the very end of general history in Polybius’eyes (the fall of Carthage in 146 BC) is actually the starting point of the decline of Roman morality.160Sall. Cat. 10; App. Pun. 132.No matter how we shall evaluate these various opinions of later historians, it is certain that Polybius’ choice of the ending time points of general history (either 167 BC or 146/145 BC) is not perfectly satisfactory in either a logical nor a historical sense.161Besides considering philosophical integrality and dramatic effects, Polybius’ “unnatural” choice of the starting and ending points of his general history might also be influenced by the obligation to praise certain aristocratic heroes, for example Scipio Africanus the Younger and L. Aemilius Paulus.

In fact, 146/145 BC does not mark the Roman political unification of the Mediterranean world, nor even a successful assimilation of Greek intellectuals,Jewish Rabbis, Spanish bandits, Sicilian slaves, Numidian princes and Italian allies within the Roman imperium into this fragmentary empire. On the other hand, a new phase of Roman military expansion towards Transalpine Gaul,Britain and Germania was about to take place. The development of political history is full of continuities and accidents. Any claim that a single event marks the end of general history must be arbitrary and unconvincing. The conflict between the theological sense of the theme of τύχη and the objective fact of the continuous development of history causes confusion and difficulty at the very end of Polybius’ system of general history.162Walbank 1957, 25–26; Pédech 1964, 498.The former keeps asking the author to seek “everlasting” elements and principles of the οiκουμνη and points out the end of history like philosophers, so as to make his theory into a complete, closed system; while the latter forced the historian Polybius to record the confusion of the Mediterranean world as it was after the sack of Carthage and Corinth, which was full of accidents and potential. Seen from that perspective, the treatment of the theme of τύχη in The Histories is not and cannot be totally successful and positive.

Conclusion: Polybius between History and Literature

Together with Thucydides and Tacitus, Polybius is among the greatest classical historians known for their spirit of seeking historical truths and causes.163Ziegler 1952, 1557; Walbank and Habicht 2010, xi; Rood 2012, 50–51; Longley 2012, 68–69.In contrast to the contemporary rhetorical, antiquarian and anecdotal style of historical composition, Polybius developed his own concise and simple narrative style.164Walbank and Habicht 2010, xxvi.He assembled a large quantity of diplomatic documents for his research.165Ibid., xxvii–xxviii.Polybius considered seeking the truth as the very basis of the value of history;166Pol. 1.1.1; 14.1–9.he also made serious field investigations in order to check the relevant geographical information for his historical narrative.167Pol. 3.47.6–48.12; 5.21.4–10; cf. Clarke 1999, 108.He also made reasonable criticism of the limitations of early historians from the perspective of general history. These achievements are outstanding in his age. In ancient scholarship,both Posidonius and Strabo took Polybius’ history as the starting point of their own historical works; they both call their own subject “affairs after Polybiusto show their respect to this forerunner.168Alonso-Núñez 1990, 191; Clarke 1999, 77.His work was widely cited by later historians such as Diodorus, Appian, Pausanias and Cassius Dio.169Walbank and Habicht 2010, xxvii; Briscoe 2013, 117.Influenced by the Roman imperial ideology,170Engels 2010, 71; Prontera 2015, 239; Malkin 2011, 354; Alonso-Núñez 1990, 173.Strabo, Cicero, and Pliny the Elder all accepted Polybius’ view that Roman expansion created the unity of the Mediterranean world.171Clarke 1999, 213; cf. Strab. 6.4.1; Cic. Prov. cons. 12.31; Plin. HN. 14.1.2.Undoubtedly, these facts reflect the achievements of Polybius and the wide influence of his general history.

In spite of this, we must bear in mind that what Polybius seeks is not an objective reality in the sense of modern historiography, but several “realities”172Davidson 1991, 10.which cannot always be satisfactorily compatible with one another. In the case of the relationship between history and drama, Polybius on the one hand firmly believes that there should be an impassible barrier between tragedy and serious history, and manages to exclude the rhetorical language style of tragedy from his “serious” historical work; but on the other hand, he still adopts (consciously or unconsciously) many dramatic elements, such as àπό μηχανñς θεός,deliberate cutting and anachronistic piling up of materials, insertion of fictional“asides” as well as the dramatic theme of τύχη. In my opinion, this outcome is inevitable and is due to the nature of Polybius’ idea of “general history” and his“limitations” (weakness from the standpoint of modern standards, but not fault in his contemporary cultural context) as a Hellenistic historian.173Hatscher 2003, 17–21.

First of all, like almost all other classical historians, Polybius’ work focuses on political subjects. This preference would not cause serious problems for historical works on Peloponnesian War or the policies of Philip II; but it should be taken as a limitation for Polybius’ unprecedented general history of the συμπλοκή of the οiκουμνη. As the study of ecological history shows, there cannot be any universal system within the Mediterranean world that is purely political and has no economic or cultural basis at all. Polybius on the whole neglects the economic, social and cultural unities established in the Mediterranean world long before the Roman conquest as well as the contrary, the fragmentation of the Mediterranean region in respect of politics, economy, culture and ethnical distribution. With this orientation and these constraints, Polybius constructed a highly dramatic general history of the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean world in less than 53 years. To some extent, the one-sidedness of Polybius’historical view was the result of the classical Greek historical tradition. Since the age of Thucydides, the majority of Greek historians took political history as the only serious object of historical study, and excluded economic, social and cultural elements in the historical process from their works as the objects of erudite research. Judging from Polybius’ narrative of the succession of the hegemonies of Persia, Sparta, Macedonia and Rome,174Pol. 1.2.2–8.as well as the struggle between Rome and Macedonia for the sovereignty over the Mediterranean world,175Eckstein 2005, 228.Polybius’understanding of the unity of the Mediterranean world is strictly limited to the political aspect.176Alonso-Núñez 1990, 190.This limitation inevitably led to the one-sidedness of Polybius’structure of general history. In fact, the origin of the economic, cultural and ethnical basis of the connectivity of the Mediterranean can be dated back as far as the prehistoric period.177Broodbank 2014, 57; Broodbank 2013, 578.Regardless of these basic facts and their profound influence on the political unification of the Mediterranean world, one ancient historian’s description of the rise of the Roman imperialism must be to some extent “dramatic” and a-historical in itself.

Secondly, early Greek historical studies often ignored historical depth. Thucydides claims in the opening part of his historical narrative of the Peloponnesian War that no memorable events whatsover took place before this disastrous war due to the universal poverty.178Thuc. 1.11.2; 1.2.1–3.5.The themes of Thucydides, Xenophon and early Hellenistic historians are mostly contemporary history. In their minds, there is no logical necessity to distinguish history from present, as the full length of the human history was rather limited. In the context of Thucydides and Polybius,many historical events were believed to be unprecedented or without parallel in history.179Thuc. 1.1.2; 1.21.2; Pol. 1.63.4; 1.88.7; 2.35.2; 3.1.10; cf. Walbank 1957, 211 (ad Pol. 2.35.2).The historical notion of a lack of depth and continuity led Polybius to believe that significant historical events, such as the unification of the Mediterranean world, could to be completely realized in less than 53 years under the leadership of the Roman Republic.180Sacks 1981, 187.

Thirdly, the central notion of τύχη in Polybius’ explanation of general history is ambiguous in itself in the early Greek cultural context. In Polybius’ narrative,τύχη is sometimes an irresistible deity (θεός τις or τò δαιμόνιον),181Fowler 1903, 448.and is on other occasions purely irrational contingency.182Pol. 2.7.1–3; cf. Walbank and Habicht 2010, 24–25; Walbank 2002, 248; Dreyer 2003, 45.The capriciousness of τύχη made her favorite, Hannibal, refuse to trust her blindly.183Pol. 15.15.4–5.And king Eumenes of Pergamum could govern his subjects well by his own diligence without any help from τύχη at all.184Pol. 32.8.1–4.In Polybius’ analysis of the outcome of the First Punic War, the victory of the Roman Republic was brought about by her perfect mixed constitution and had nothing to do with τύχη;185Pol. 1.63.4–9.while in another context, the Roman expansion was led by the will of τύχη.186Pol. 1.4.1–2.This logical confusion, striking to modern readers, is a common feature of ancient Greek mythology and religion,ever since Homer and Hesiod.187Cf. Hom. Il. 85–144; Hes. Op. 44–200.

Last but not least, Polybius’ relative lack of literary and philosophical taste might also have been partially responsible for the inadequacy of the theoretical criticism and the historical methodology in The Histories. Modern classicists generally agree that the lack of literary grace is one weakness of Polybius’historical work;188Hartog 2010, 32–33; Dreyer 2003, 46–47.even the fictional speeches he composed in The Histories are tedious and monotonous.189Holleaux 1921, 17–18.Besides, Polybius seldom shows any interest in classical literary tradition in his extant text. Therefore, we can safely conclude that Polybius was lacking in literary and philosophical taste. In that case, when Polybius severely criticized the harmful tradition of tragic history, it is very likely that he did not have a thorough understanding of the full scope of dramatic features and their profound influence on Hellenistic historiography in all aspects.While Polybius objected to the tradition of tragic history, he might have adopted certain elements of dramatic style of historical composition for his own work unconsciously. For his philosophical knowledge, we can conclude that his understanding of the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, as well as Stoic cosmopolitanism was rather superficial and far inferior to the true philosopher Posidonius after him.190Clarke 1999, 168–169.These limitations further harmed the logical integrity of Polybius’ structure of general history. In spite of all these shortcomings, Polybius can still be justly called an admirable pioneer in the field of general history and one of the greatest historians in the classical world.

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