Indian Response to Iraq War:Lessons and Implications

LIU Jun

Indian Response to Iraq War:Lessons and Implications

LIU Jun

The September 11 terrorist attacks and America’s military intervention in Iraq has catalyzed major changes in the Middle East and had profound implications for Asia, but the ramifications of its military campaigns around the world,particularly in Asia, remain understudied. Throughout major capitals in Asia discussions relating to America’s presence and influence are becoming more pronounced. This paper seeks to examine Indian re-engagement with the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and concludes with reflections on how Indian perceives and responed on the Iraq war, and what lessons India has learned or absorbed from the Iraq War.

Background

The oil-rich Gulf region and the wider Middle East are of vital political, economic, security and energy importance for India.①See: Abbas Amirie (ed.), The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics, Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, 1975; Subhash Narula, Gulf Economies in Indian Perspective, Stosius Inc/Advent Books Division, 1988; Barin De, Gulf War & Indian bureaucracy, Mona Lisa Publishers, 1997.Binod Khadria, The Migration of Knowledge Workers:Second-Generation Effects of India’s Brain Drain, Sage Publications, 2000; Joel Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East, Cambridge University Press, 2001.About 3.5 million Indians are employed in the region, with over1.5 million in Saudi Arabia alone.①See: Liu Jun, “The Contemporary Labor Migration in the Gulf States and its Impacts”, World Ethno-National Studies, No.6, 2008, p.70-77.They send back remittances,which The World Bank estimates for 2008 putting India in the lead at $45 billion, with China and Mexico closely behind at $34 billion and $26 billion, respectively.②“Indian remittances likely to fall in 2009: World Bank”, India Today, March 25, 2009.India, Asia’s third largest oil consumer after Japan and China, imported 121.67 million tones of crude oil during 2007-08 of which 73.74% came from the Middle East with Saudi Arabia being the single largest supplier. India’s oil imports from the Middle East increased to 89.73 million tones in 2007-08, up by 11%, compared to 80.81 million tones in 2006-07.③“India’s Middle East crude imports surge by 11%”, Commodity Online, August 7, 2008.Also Middle East is the third largest destination for Indian goods,after the European Union and the U.S.④Address by Foreign Minister K. Natwar Singh at the Indian Association for Central and West Asian Studies, Jamia Milia Islamia, October 6, 2004. accessed at http://www.meaindia.nic.in/speech/2004/10/06ss02.htm.India also has the world’s second largest Islamic population, next only to Indonesia.⑤Carin Zissis, “India’s Muslim Population”, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, June 22, 2007.Thus,India has vital political, economic and strategic interests in peace and tranquility in the Middle East region.

Historically, there have always been good relations between India and Iraq. Iraq was one of the few countries in the Middle East with which India established diplomatic relations at the embassy level immediately after 1947. India has always made a point of highlighting its friendship with Muslim nations. “Among Muslim nations, Saddam Hussein has been India’s best friend, and has consistently supported India’s stand on Kashmir since the mid-1970s.”⑥Saba Naqvi Bhaumik, “Backdoor friendship”, Al-Ahram, Issue No. 625, February 13-19, 2003.⑦ Yashwant Sinha, “Resurgent India in Asia”, speech at Harvard University, September 29, 2003.accessed at http://www.meaindia.nic.in/speech/2003/09/29ss09.htm.In pre-1990 days, Iraq once provided 30% of total Indian oil imports and was home to 100,000 Indians.⑦Reliance Industries, India’s top exploration firm, intends to expand its presence in the Iraqi crude oil market and the Indian company has signed contracts to develop energy resources in the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq. Therefore, when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, India was in a big dilemma. Neither did India want to offend Saddam Hussein nor did it want to go against the UN. India decided to toe the middle line for sometime by making a statement that, “India was opposed to the use of force in any form of relations between states.”①“The United Nations, India and the Gulf War (1990-2001)”, October 14, 2008. accessed at http://www.articlesbase.com/politics-articles/the-united-nations-india-and-the-gulf-war-19902001-602704.html# .The major policy objective of India under Prime Minister VP Singh was the repatriation of the 170,000-180,000 Indians stranded in Kuwait and Iraq. From August 1990, Air India started massive airlifting operations, probably the largest airlift operation since the end of the Second World War. By October 1990, almost 160,000 Indians were returned home. The VP Singh government later denounced the Iraqi invasion and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi force from Kuwait. However, India did not take any further steps to resolve the crisis. After resolution 661 was adopted,India’s import of crude oil from Iraq stopped. This greatly affected India’s earnings. On November 1990, VP Singh was replaced by Chandra Shekhar. The Chandra Shekhar government too remained a passive spectator and took no active diplomatic efforts to diffuse the Gulf Crisis. India allowed American aircraft to refuel at Indian airports en route to the Gulf from airbases in the Philippines, but retracted it when this became public. Rajiv Gandhi put forward his peace-package while criticizing the government for reducing India to a “hapless spectator”, appealing the replacement of the U.S.-led coalition by a U.N. force and the withdrawal of Iraqi forces.

The Soviet collapse undermined India’s autarkic approach to economic development, which, in turn, had serious consequences with respect to its foreign policy options. Almost simultaneously,in 1991, India faced an unprecedented financial crisis. India was a closed economy on the eve of the Gulf Crisis but the impact was severe. The high cost of purchasing oil on the global spot market,the expenses incurred in repatriating thousands of workers from the Persian Gulf states before the onset of the first Gulf War, the loss of their remittances, and loan payments to multilateral banks drained India’s exchequer. The then Indian Finance Ministry Manmohan Singh estimated that the Gulf crisis alone cost India $2.5 billion.②Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Foreign Policy Grows Up”, World Policy Journal, Winter 2003/04,p.43.In sum, the Gulf Crisis exposed the Middle East’s strategic relevance for India.①See: J. K. Baral and J.N. Mohanty, “India and the Gulf Crisis: The Response of a Minority Government,” Pacific Affairs, Vol.65, Fall 1992, p.368-384; J. Mohan Malik, “Indian Response to the Gulf Crisis: Implications for Indian Foreign Policy”, Asian Survey, Vol.31, No.9, September 1991, p.847-861; Bandela Rajini and A. Balaramaiah, “India’s Policy towards the Gulf Crisis”,India Quarterly, Vol.48, No.4, October-December 1992, p.77-84; A. K. Pasha (ed.), The Gulf in Turmoil: A Global Response, Lancer’s, New Delhi, 1992, p.148-162.

India has for decades professed a desire to participate in the international system as a global power. However, India’s surprisingly equivocal reaction to the 1990 Gulf Crisis and subsequent military conflict did not reflect these aspirations.

Response and Lessons Indian Response to Iraq War

Prior to the Iraq War, the U.S. and the UK claimed that Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed a threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional allies.②“In Their Own Words: Iraq’s ‘Imminent’ Threat”, Center for American Progress, January 29,2004.In 2002, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1441 which called for Iraq to completely cooperate with U.N. weapon inspectors to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD and long-range missiles. Weapons inspectors found no evidence of WMD, but could not verify the accuracy of Iraq’s weapon declarations.③See: “Transcript of Blix’s U.N. presentation”, CNN, March 7, 2003; Walter Pincus and R.Jeffrey Smith, “Official’s Key Report On Iraq Is Faulted: ‘Dubious’ Intelligence Fueled Push for War”, Washington Post, February 9, 2007.In response the U.S. government asserted that“diplomacy has failed”,④“Bush Officially Notifies Congress: Iraq Diplomacy Has Failed”, VOA, March 19, 2003.abruptly advised the U.N. weapons inspectors to immediately pull out of Iraq⑤“U.S advises weapons inspectors to leave Iraq”, USA Today, March 17, 2003.and initiated a military invasion of Iraq.⑥See: Thomas R. Mockaitis, “The Iraq War: Learning From The Past, Adapting To The Present,And Planning For The Future”, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), February 2007, p.23-25; Joseph J.Collins, “Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath”, Occasional Paper 5,Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2008.

As the crisis in Iraq unfolded, India maintained that Iraq“must cooperate actively” with the inspection process and“comply fully” with all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions,including Resolution 1441 providing for the disarmament of Iraq and a stringent regime of inspections to ensure the elimination of WMD from its territory. It stressed that all decisions on Iraq must be taken under the authority of the U.N. It did not favor military action as it would have several negative consequences, including the radicalization of Islamic opinion in the Middle East and world-wide.①“Challenges Ahead: India’s Views on Regional Development”, address by Indian Foreign Secretary at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris, December 17, 2002.accessed at http://indianembassy.ru/cms/index.php?Itemid=626&id=263&option=com_content&task=view.India was also concerned about the implications of possible military action in Iraq on the volatility of oil prices and security of oil supplies. Characterizing the Iraq crisis as one of the biggest challenges ever faced by the U.N., New Delhi expressed the hope that the international community would show the wisdom to prevent an erosion of the credibility and legitimacy of the U.N. by striking “a balance” between the objective of achieving Iraq’s full compliance with the U.N. resolutions and the means adopted to reach this goal.②“Indian Foreign Policy Today,” Address by Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha at the Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, February 20, 2003. accessed at http://www.meadev,buc,ub/speeches/spbyeam-moscow.htm.New Delhi expressed the hope that the members of the Security Council would harmonize their positions to ensure that its final decision enhanced the legitimacy and credibility of the U.N. “If unilateralism prevails, the U.N.would be deeply scarred, with disastrous consequences for the world order. The government of India would strongly urge that no military action be taken, which does not have the collective concurrence of the international community.”③“Regime change can’t be forced, says PM”, Indian Express, March 13, 2003.India criticized American policy of regime change. Atal Behari Vajpayee ruled out support for a regime change brought about by outsiders in Iraq.“If a change has to come about, it should be done by the people of that country. No outside power has the right to do that.”④“We’ll not back regime change in Iraq by outside forces: PM”, The Hindu, March 13, 2003.

If you read between the lines, you’ll find that the Indian government has made the most muted of criticisms of Washington’s unilateral decision to launch war against Iraq. The Vajpayee government rejected opposition demands for a parliamentary resolution on the crisis. The prime minister scrupulously avoided mentioning the name of the U.S. in any of the war-related statements made inside or outside the Parliament.The Indian government would have preferred not to voice any“opposition” at all. It was only after the global antiwar protests in mid-February that Vajpayee criticized talk of unilateral war by the U.S. on Iraq. Speaking to a group of MPs from his Bharathiya Janatha Party (BJP) on February 18, 2003, he declared that it would be “the moral death of U.N. if it succumbed to the pressure of U.S.”①Wije Dias, “India offers half-hearted criticism of US war on Iraq”, World Socialist Web Site,March 25, 2003.India did not even support the position the 114-member-nation Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) adopted at its recent summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in which Vajpayee had participated. The NAM, endorsing the concerns expressed by“millions in our countries as well as in other parts of the world”,affirmed that it “rejected war” and declared that “the war against Iraq would be a destabilizing factor for the whole world with far-reaching political and economic consequences”.②“2003 NAM XIII/Summit/Statement on Iraq”, XIII Conference Of Heads Of State Or Government Of The Non Aligned Movement Kuala Lumpur, February 25, 2003. accessed at http://www.nam.gov.za/media/030227d.htm.Meanwhile,the then India Prime Minister Vajpayee took advantage of the summit to lecture Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on the need to disarm and spoke not a word of criticism against those who--in violation of the U.N. Charter--were resorting to the threat of force to carry out their will. After a meeting between the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and senior ministers on March 19,2003, an official statement cautiously declared that “the military action lacks justification” and was “avoidable”. The statement carefully avoided any direct reference to the U.S. and instead expressed “grave concern” that differences in the U.N. Security Council had “prevented a harmonization of the positions of its members,” and were “seriously impairing the authority of the U.N.system”. At the same time, New Delhi reiterated its acceptance of the U.S. pretext for the war—alleged “weapons of mass destruction.”③Wije Dias, “India offers half-hearted criticism of US war on Iraq”, World Socialist Web Site,March 25, 2003.

During a visit with Ali Akbar Veliyati, the special envoy of Iranian President Mohammed Khatami on March 23, 2003, three days after the war started, members of the Indian government made it clear that India was not willing to take any initiative on Iraq that could jeopardize its ties with the U.S. By making the fearof U.S. displeasure the operative factor in dealing with the most critical international issue of our times, India has totally abandoned principles. The threat posed by the war on Iraq to the integrity of the international legal order established at the end of World War II is apparently of no concern to the rulers in New Delhi. Thus, as the Gulf crisis transformed into a war, the Indian government’s response was a cautious “middle path” since India’s commitment was to the people of Iraq and not to the regime of Saddam Hussein.①C.Raja Mohan, “India and the Iraq War”, The Hindu, March 30, 2003.

In early May 2003, the U.S. requested India to send a full army brigade of around 20,000 troops to take on the responsibility of administering the northern sector of Iraq. Though New Delhi sought further clarifications about its proposed role in Iraq and the command and control structure within which the troops would operate, the Cabinet Committee on Security seriously considered the American request. However, as the situation on the ground worsened with Iraqi resistance on the occupation escalating, India backed off amidst growing domestic opposition,insufficient political consensus at home and apprehensions that Indian troops become bogged down in a brutal neo-colonial occupation, memories of the calamitous Indian peacekeeping mission in Sri Lanka in 1987, and concerns that India’s reputation and good name would be tarnished if Indian troops were sent to prop up the occupation of Iraq.②See: Shyam Bhatia, “UK may send more troops to Iraq”, Rediff, June 25, 2003; K. Ratnayake,“Washington presses India to send troops to Iraq”, World Socialist Web Site, June 30, 2003; “69%Are Against Sending Indian Troops To Iraq”, Outlook, July 21, 2003; “US urges other countries to send troops to Iraq”, Xinhua News Agency, July 25, 2003;“India links sending troops to Iraq with cross border terrorism”, Global Security, September 12, 2003; “India May Not Send Troops To Iraq Despite UN Nod”, Financial Express, September 19, 2003; “U.S. asks for foreign troops for Iraq”, China Daily, September 20, 2003; “Who might send troops to Iraq?”, BBC News, October 7, 2003.In stead, India continued commitment to provide assistance to the people of Iraq in their humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. By mid-2005, India had committed a total of U.S. $30 million in assistance: U.S. $20 million bilaterally for humanitarian relief in Iraq in response to the appeal made by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2003, and U.S. $10 million multilaterally through the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI).③“India gives $20 million humanitarian aid to Iraq”, The Hindu, April 5, 2003.On the other hand, India felt thatthe U.S. alone would not be able to adequately address the problems in Iraq and its neighborhood. The inherent nature of the problems called for the involvement of the U.N., which India deemed to be of critical importance. The challenge was to create a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic secular democracy, while preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity. A break-up of Iraq on ethnic, sectarian or religious grounds, they warned, would be a catastrophe for the region and for the world. “India and Russia fear that the war in Iraq will lead to ‘radicalization’ of Islamic extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”①Vladimir Radyuhin, “Iraq war will spur terrorism: India, Russia”, The Hindu, March 30, 2003.India seems to link American support for its position on Pakistan and Kashmir to its statements on the ongoing military invasion of Iraq. India’s concerns in the immediate neighborhood are far more important than simply sticking to principles as far as the war on Iraq is concerned.②Amit Baruah, “Why different yardsticks for Iraq & Pak., India asks U.S.”, The Hindu, March 28,2003.In fact, Vajpayee had given this message unambiguously to the All-Party Meeting on March 22, 2003. “We should be careful that neither our internal debate nor our external actions deflect our attention, or those of the world, away from the real source of terrorism in our neighborhood,” he said.③Ninan Koshy, “India’s Middle Path Through Iraq War: A Devious Route to the Bush Camp”,Foreign Policy in Focus, April 14, 2003.

This “middle path” in the war between the U.S. and Saddam Hussein enabled India to gain space to defend India’s long-term interests in Iraq and the Gulf. Neither supporting the U.S. nor openly criticizing it for its aggression against Iraq, India had again taken the “middle path”, an indirect route to the U.S. post-war camp. Indian, in fact, shared an acute appreciation of America’s predicament with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The U.S. would have liked to have received India’s support in the war against Iraq, but it recognizes that the middle path in effect endorses the U.S position.

India’s Lessons Learned from Iraq War

The American war on terror led to intensive debates about the legitimacy of the military action, unilateralism versus multilateralism, and the doctrine of preventive war, and regime change. The Iraq war offered an excellent case. “In this larger plan to establish American hegemony, the Iraq war had an indispensable role. If the world was to be orderly, then proliferation must be stopped; if force was the solution to proliferation, then pre-emption was necessary (to avoid that mushroom cloud); if pre-emption was necessary, then regime change was necessary (so the offending government could never build the banned weapons again); and if all this was necessary,then Iraq was the one country in the world where it all could be demonstrated.”①Jonathan Schell, “The Empire Backfires”, Alternet, March 12, 2004.The so-called U.S.-led global war on terror imposed profound influence on two types of countries, i.e., the terror afflicted countries and the ambitious powers. India,combined these two features, was deeply involved in the war on terrorism. Terrorism in India has grown to a great extent in the last two decades, and terrorism in India has been understood either as a constituent of the country’s multiple conflicts –nationalist, separatist and ideological – or as part of state patronage through proxy wars. From 1994 to October 6, 2009,totally 57,088 civilians, security force personnel and terrorists died in terrorist attacks.②“India Fatalities”, October 20, 2009. accessed at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/indiafatalities.htm.India is Washington’s close strategic ally in South Asia. In late 2001, then President Bush and then Indian Prime Minster Atal Vajpayee agreed that “terrorism threatens not only the security of the U.S. and India, but also our efforts to build freedom, democracy and international security and stability around the world.”③“Joint Statement of U.S., India on Terrorism, Bilateral Ties”, U.S. Department of State Washington File, November 9, 2001.Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a “strategic partnership” since January 2004. One facet of the emerging partnership is greatly increased counterterrorism cooperation. The U.S. State Department’s “Country Reports on Terrorism 2007” identified India as being “among the world’s most terror afflicted countries” and counted more than 2,300 Indian deaths due to terrorism in 2007 alone.④“Country Reports on Terrorism”, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S.Department of State, April 30, 2008.Admiral Mike Mullen has appreciated the positive role being played by India in Afghanistan. “I also believe India plays an important role here (in Afghanistan).”①“US appreciates India’s role in Afghanistan”, Indian Express, January 28, 2009.

India’s perception of U.S.-led war on terrorism in Iraq illuminates many important trends that are likely to animate India’s future domestic and foreign policy trajectory. The challenges and opportunities presented by the Iraq War might influence India’s future engagement with the world. On April 3,2003, India’s then Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha concluded,“… I suppose equally importantly we (India) are concerned at how this whole thing (war on Iraq) is going to effect future international behavior and that is where the international community needs to put its heads together and think about the future.”②“Response of Indian Government -- War on Iraq: South Asia Impact”, South Asia Terrorism Portal. accessed at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/exclusive/iraq/india_gov.htm.Although India has managed challenges from inside and outside thus far, the Iraq War experience has exposed some major changes in Indian strategic thinking. So, what lessons has India learned or observed from the Iraq War?

Pre-Emptive War

As the Bush Administration began to argue in favor of ousting Saddam Hussein and waging a preventive and pre-emptive war, there was an intense debate in the international community. The pre-emptive U.S. war in Iraq is not yet over but its international fallout has already begun. After the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks and December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, the mobilization of its military forces in the summer of 2002 was premised in the conviction that New Delhi had no option but threaten a preventive war against Pakistan if it did not stop cross-border terrorism. In fact, India’s coercive diplomacy since December 13, 2001, was an attempt to judiciously combine the threat of war with an effort to draw in the international community to put pressure on Islamabad to end its support to cross-border terrorism.③Rajendra K. Jain (ed.), India, Europe and South Asia, Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 2007,p.45.New Delhi will have little problem with the case laid out by the U.S. on why new approaches might be needed to deal with terrorism. Many in India began to ask if the U.S. could conduct a war in distant Afghanistan to root out the Al Qaeda, then why should not India have the right to conduct a war against the sanctuaries provided in Pakistan to various terrorist groups? A number of Indian analysts raised the issue of a pre-emptive strike against Iraq, arguing that if there was a pre-emptive attack case, India has a better case against Pakistan than any other country. If the possession of weapons of mass destruction, absence of democracy and export of terrorism justified a pre-emptive strike against Iraq, then Pakistan fell in a“much worse category” than Iraq. So India reserved the right for pre-emptive strikes “if Pakistan continued to abet and sponsor terrorism”.①Luv Puri, “India has right to pre-emptive strike”, The Hindu, April 7, 2003.The then Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes warned that Pakistan was a prime case for pre-emptive strikes because “There are enough reasons to launch such strikes against Pakistan, but I cannot make public statements on whatever action that may be taken”.②B. Muralidhar Reddy, “Fernandes statement a lie, says Pak.”, The Hindu, April 14, 2003.States like India, Israel, and Russia might embrace the new logic of preemption and employ it to justify attacks on various foes. This would likely make the world much more dangerous.

Unilateralism

Unilateralism is a tendency of nations to conduct their foreign affairs individually, characterized by minimal consultation and involvement with other nations, even their allies.③See: David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong (ed.), Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy:International Perspectives, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003; M. Crahan, The Wars on Terrorism and Iraq: Human Rights, Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy, Routledge, 2004; Clyde V.Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism And The Failure Of Good Intentions, Basic Books, 2004; John Attanasio and Joseph Jude Norton (ed.), Multilateralism V Unilateralism,British Institute for International & Compara, 2005.Bush’s warning shortly after September 11, 2001 of “You are either with us or against us”④“You are either with us or against us”, CNN, November 6, 2001.must ring very sharply in some parts of the world.As the world’s only superpower, America pursued a “go it alone”foreign policy strategy in the past eight years. As the Bush Administration seemingly avoided international undertakings that it did not control and forsaked multilateral arrangements that did not suit its agenda, America is perceived as both uniquely strong and yet vulnerable.⑤See: Frank C. Schuller and Thomas D. Grant, “Executive Diplomacy: Multilateralism,Unilateralism and Managing American Power”, International Affairs, Vol.79, No.1, January 2003,Just before the outbreak of the Iraq War, Senator Robert Byrd, warned: “This coming battle, if it materializes, represents a turning point in U.S. foreign policy. The doctrine of preemption—the idea that the U.S. or any other nation can legitimately attack a nation that is not imminently threatening but may be threatening in the future—is a radical new twist to the traditional idea of self-defense. It appears to be in contravention of international law and the U.N. Charter.”①Seema Sirohi, “Draw! Dirty Dubya and The Thief Of Baghdad”, Outlook, March 3, 2003.While the ruling establishments are content to be America’s “sleeping partners”,almost all sections of the media in the UK, Europe and Japan have been strident in their criticism of the U.S. for letting its unilateralism run amok and for getting into full battle gear to eliminate regimes standing athwart its pursuit of “heightened global hegemony”.②Seumas Milne, “Can the US be defeated? America’s global power has no historical precedent,but its room for manoeuvre is limited”, The Guardian, February 14, 2002.

As U.S. unilateralism has asserted the role of the U.S. as the sole global superpower, the rest of the world is exploring a variety of ways of pushing back. If it is Iraq today, can other countries be far behind? Other nations may fear that if they don’t “fall into line” maybe they will be the next. As mentioned above, “The decision of the Indian government to oppose unilateral U.S.action... is not warranted purely by either economic concerns or the political consequences of the collapse of the post-Second World War security framework.”③“Response of Indian Media -- War on Iraq: South Asia Impact”, South Asia Terrorism Portal.October 18, 2009. accessed at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/exclusive/iraq/india_media.htm.In November 2007, in a break from the Indian government’s cautious handling of its U.S. policy,Indian Vice-President Hamid Ansari has come out strongly against Washington by saying it has given an “impetus to terrorism” through its policy of “unilateralism” and“pre-emption” in West Asia.④“US unilateralism giving impetus to terrorism: Ansari”, Indian Express, November 23, 2007.Manishankar Aiyer, petroleum and natural gas minister of India concluded, “None of us in Asia should fall victim to the strategies of outsiders. The only way tocounter the geopolitics of others is to have our own geopolitics.”①Daniel Woreck and Zora Parwini, “India Joins the Scramble for Oil”, World Socialist Web Site,April 12, 2005.The “China-India-Russia Alliance”②See: Harsh V. Pant, “The Moscow–Beijing–Delhi ‘Strategic Triangle’: An Idea Whose Time May Never Come”, Crossroads, Vol.5, No.2, 2005, p.19-46; Harsh V. Pant, “Feasibility of the Russia-China-India ‘Strategic Triangle’”, International Studies, Vol.43, No.1, 2006, p.51-72;Matthew Rudolph, “Asia’s New Strategic Triangle: US-China-India Relations in Eclectic Perspective”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,Philadelphia, August 31, 2006; Vidya Nadkarni, “Implications of the Sino-Indian Strategic Partnership for Russia’s Relations with China and India”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 49th Annual Convention, San Francisco, March 26, 2008.and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are among such new creations and ways. The SCO is a security alliance led by Russia and China, with several non-voting members including India. Its rising economic, political and military profile can serve as a useful lens through which to view this geopolitical pushback. It is based on promoting a multipolar world, distributing power along multiple poles in the international system and advocated for a multipolar and multilateral alternative.

Energy Security

Britain and America have always insisted the Iraq War had nothing to do with oil. “Everyone knows: The Iraq war is largely about oil”, former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan emphasized in his new book The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World.③See: Peter Beaumont and Joanna Walters, “Greenspan admits Iraq was about oil, as deaths put at 1.2m”, The Observer, September 16, 2007; Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World, Penguin Press HC, 2007; Bob Woodward, “Greenspan: Ouster Of Hussein Crucial For Oil Security”, Washington Post, September 17, 2007; David Leonhardt, “Economist’s Life, Scored With Jazz Theme”, New York Times, September 18, 2007.Through diplomatic maneuvers aimed at securing transnational pipeline routes and overseas crude oil and natural gas production deals, Indian officials and companies are seeking a larger share of the world’s energy resources. It is also carrying out a major restructuring of the national energy industry, including a recent plan to merge state-run oil firms.④See: “India Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis - Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal”, Energy Information Administration (EIA), March 2009; Ligia Noronha and Anant Sudarshan (ed.),India’s Energy Politics, Routledge, 2009; China, India and the United States: Competition for Energy Resources, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, March 2009.The Iraq War has also demonstrated that India’s economic and foreign policy is heavily influenced search for secure supplies of foreign oil and natural gas.“For India, the most important question is whether we are doing enough to ensure that the war will not disrupt oil supplies form abroad and within the regions of India.”①“The Economic Impact of an Iraq War”, Financial Express, February 10, 2003.As long as India remains dependent on foreign energy suppliers, its government will not risk alienating relations with the supplier countries.Evidence of this can be seen in India’s continued economic ties with Iran and Sudan, despite U.S. disapproval of the relationship.

But oil is perhaps not the only factor. The Middle East has been battle field of power geopolitics for centuries. The then Indian Ambassador the U.N. V.K. Nambiar said that India firmly opposes any unilateral action by the U.S. in Iraq and such a move would have “unforeseen and destructive geopolitical implications” beyond the region.②“India opposes unilateral action on Iraq”, The Tribune, October 19, 2002.

Double Standards

Before the Iraq War, Iraq supplied on average 800,000 barrels of crude oil a day to the U.S., or about 8.6% of total U.S. crude oil imports, that made it the sixth-largest supplier to the U.S., after Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Canada, Venezuela and Nigeria.③“Greenspan’s book asserts ‘Iraq war is largely about oil’ - The administration disputes the former Fed chief’s comments”, Los Angeles Times, September 17, 2007.Then President Bush insisted the objective of the Iraq War was to disarm Iraq of WMD, end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism and topple Saddam’s dictatorship.④“In quotes: Reasons for the Iraq war”, BBC News, May 29, 2003.In fact, “We’ve installed our military as a kind of mega police force in the region.Our official reason for being there is to ensure ‘stability’, one of the great buzzwords in the history of business, but this is nothing more than spin — the military is in the Middle East to guarantee that whatever comes out of the ground is exploitable and controlled by American multinationals.”⑤Johnny Angel, “It’s the Oil, Stupid”, Los Angeles Weekly, September 26, 2001.Former White House press secretary Scott McClellan also writes in a new memoir that the Iraq war was sold to the American people with a sophisticated“political propaganda campaign” led by President Bush and aimed at “manipulating sources of public opinion” and“downplaying the major reason for going to war.”⑥See: Scott McClellan, What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception, PublicAffairs, 2008; Michael D. Shear, “Ex-Press Aide Writes That Bush Misled U.S. on Iraq”, Washington Post, May 28, 2008; Gilbert Cruz, “The Skimmer: Scott McClellan’s What Happened”, Time, May 28, 2008; Tim Rutten, “‘What Happened’”, Los Angeles Times, May 29, 2008.Double standards pave the way for U.S. control of oil and other strategic resources, which are strong pillars of its hegemony.

India strongly disapproved the double standards pursued by the U.S. and some other countries in the fight against terrorism.“In the global war against terrorism, there can be no room for double standards, of distinction between terrorism that can be tolerated and one that cannot, of terrorism directed against the West and that directed against the others, of the former being untarnished evil and the latter requiring resolution of its root causes.”①“Indian Foreign Policy Today,” Address by Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha at the Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, February 20, 2003. accessed at http://www.meadev,buc,ub/speeches/spbyeam-moscow.htm.And “the global war against terrorism can only be won when it is pursued without double standards.”②“India disapproves US ‘double standards’ in fighting terrorism”, Xinhua News Agency, March 26, 2003.In the aftermath of the Iraq War, then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said in an address to members of the German parliament, “India has suffered both from terrorism and from the consequences of the double standards applied by countries to deal with terrorism in different places.”③“Vajpayee decries double standards in combating terrorism”, SiliconIndia, May 29, 2003.He was apparently referring to how the West,particularly the U.S., dealt with terrorism directed against it while“not doing enough” to pressure Pakistan to end cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Misfortunes never come singly.The November 2008 attack in Mumbai underscores its regional nature and the already thriving transnational operational linkages.

CONCLUSION

Since its independence, India has always tried to take advantage of various regional and international situations to exert its regional and international goals, and to be recognized as a major international player. In the context of global war on terrorism, it took advantage of the Iraq war. Famous Indian political commentator Dr. Ninan Koshy pointed out: “India’s political leaders’ responses to the U.S.-led war in Iraq are notablefor what they say about the country’s willingness to sacrifice traditional concerns regarding nonalignment and international law for the opportunity to raise its profile and power on the world stage. They have, in all but words, chosen to side with empire.”①Ninan Koshy, “India’s Middle Path Through Iraq War: A Devious Route to the Bush Camp”,Foreign Policy in Focus, April 14, 2003.The middle path is a euphemism for a Washington-approved policy that India has adopted with the clear intent of attaining a prominent position in the new imperial world order made in the name of the War on Terrorism and being fashioned by the military might of the U.S. The Mumbai incident “forced India onto front lines of global war on terror”.②Paul Wiseman, Siddharth Philip, Richard Wolf and Thomas Frank, “Attack forces India onto front lines of global war on terror”, USA TODAY, November 28, 2008.President Barack Obama’s new policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan elicited more vocal calls for deepening U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation.③See: “India a key element in Obama’s new ‘Af-Pak’ strategy”, Latest News from around the World, March 28, 2009; “India seen as key stakeholder in Obama’s new Afghan strategy”, Latest News from around the World, March 28, 2009; “Holbrooke seeks India’s view on US AF-PAK strategy”, Thaindian, April 8, 2009; Office of the Spokesman, “U.S.-India Joint Statement Following Clinton’s New Delhi Meetings”, U.S. Department of State, July 20, 2009.During their meetings in November 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Barack Obama renewed their commitment to expand cooperation on security and terrorism.④Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet on U.S.-India Actions on Security, Terrorism”, The White House, November 24, 2009.Although the middle path and draw support from the U.S. will not be smooth way, India will continue to limp forward.

Liu Junis Postdoctor of the Institute for International Studies, Yunnan University. The author is grateful for the support and assistance from Professor Zhao Bole, director of the Center for India Studies, Yunnan University.

p.37-51; Ralph G. Carter, “Leadership at Risk: The Perils of Unilateralism”, Political Science and Politics, Vol.36, No.1, January 2003, p.17-22; Michael Dunne, “The United States, the United Nations and Iraq: ‘Multilateralism of a Kind’”, International Affairs, Vol.79, No.2, March 2003,p.257-277; David Hastings Dunn, “Myths, Motivations and ‘Misunderestimations’: The Bush Administration and Iraq”, International Affairs, Vol.79, No.2, March 2003, p.279-297; Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.118, No.3, Fall 2003,p.365-388.