For Security’s Sake

The first Nuclear Security Summit forges consensus on nuclear terrorism threats

By LIU CHONG

It was an unprecedented gathering. On April 12-13, the first ever Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, D.C., where representatives from 47 nations—mostly heads of state—convened to address one of the most serious and pressing issues facing the world today.

A subsequent communiqué and accompanying work plan revealed a powerful consensus regarding many aspects of nonconventional nuclear threats and how best to deal with them.

These and other aspects of the meeting,meanwhile, left little doubt that the issue of nuclear security, along with the means to combat nuclear terrorism, will be hot topics well into the future.

An initial success

The concept of nuclear security focuses on combating nuclear terrorism, in particular,protecting nuclear materials and preventing nuclear smuggling.

In recent years, the boom in nuclear power development has increased the possibility that terrorist organizations can access nuclear materials.

Amid rapid gains in global logistics and technology—not to mention the ever-expanding domain of the Internet—preventing the leakage of nuclear technology and the smuggling of nuclear materials and equipment is more challenging than ever. But,nations possess different stances toward nuclear security.

In the United States, the two major parties—the Republican Party and the Democratic Party—have reached a consensus attaching great importance to the threat of nuclear terrorism.

The U.S. National Security Strategy issued under the Bush administration in 2002 pointed out that the gravest danger the United States faces “lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.”

Shortly after assuming office, U.S.President Barack Obama announced “a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years” during a speech in Prague in April 2009.

In addition, he drastically raised the nuclear security-related budget. In Fiscal Year 2011, he raised the budget for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program by 30 percent over the previous fi scal year. The program aims to assist former Soviet states in controlling and protecting their nuclear weapons, weaponsusable materials, and delivery systems. Obama also increased the budget for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, aimed at strengthening the security of nuclear materials worldwide, by 68 percent over Fiscal Year 2010.

Nonetheless, the international community has yet to reach a full agreement on the urgency of nuclear terrorism threats. Some nations have not placed it at the top of their agendas.Some suspect the United States seeks to assert control over their nuclear arsenals.

Others still, especially major developing countries, are concerned the United States may use the opportunity to restrict their right to develop nuclear fuel cycle technologies.So they have remained vigilant against its promotion of nuclear security cooperation.

Just as former U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)Gregory Schulte said, some countries contended the United States and its allies had exaggerated the threat of nuclear terrorism and deemed it barely possible for terrorists to produce dirty bombs, much less nuclear weapons.But even if terrorist organizations really wanted to make nuclear weapons, he added, many nations think it would only be a threat for the United States, and they did not have to join in.

This was impetus for the United States to hold the Nuclear Security Summit—an event Obama said is essential for future international nuclear security cooperation.

Not surprisingly, the communiqué itself was emblematic of the event’s success.

While de fi ning nuclear terrorism as “one of the most challenging threats to international security,” it also underscored the fact that a full consensus between the United States and other nations has yet to be achieved.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review issued by the United States in early April defined nuclear terrorism as “today’s most immediate and extreme danger.”

It is worth noting that the communiqué associated nuclear terrorism with the words“most challenging.” This was a step forward compared with language in previous international documents.

But it also acquiesced in the differences in security perceptions of various nations by adding the conditional expression “one of”before it. In other words, it agreed that there were other major security threats in the world.

In any case, the communiqué itself has laid a solid foundation for future international cooperation, while proving an initial success for President Obama’s nuclear security diplomacy.

A SAFE VIEW: Police officers stand guard outside the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. on April 12

An incremental approach

Prior to the summit, many American academics and analysts expected to see a new—and more binding—international nuclear security framework established at the summit. But Obama gave up his efforts to achieve this elusive goal.

Instead, in his closing speech, the 44th U.S. president emphasized that Washington did not need new mechanisms or overlapping institutions—but that it did need to strengthen the existing mechanisms and cooperative relations, making them more effective.

This provided another excellent example of the “smart power” of Obama’s international diplomacy.

Indeed, nuclear security involves many aspects—from nuclear weapons themselves to nuclear materials, facilities and technologies.

But as the security of nuclear weapons is a highly sensitive subject, most nuclear states have avoided discussing it altogether. This, of course, is a highly disturbing trend.

The security of nuclear technologies,meanwhile, might lead to restrictions on fuel cycle technologies—a sensitive part for the peaceful use of nuclear energy under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Therefore,the summit restricted in the very concept of“nuclear security” within the scope of protecting nuclear materials while preventing nuclear traf fi cking, so as to reduce resistance to cooperation as much as possible.

In the interest of reaching a consensus, the United States has actively adopted multilateral diplomacy. Due to its efforts, Ukraine, Mexico and other developing countries have pledged to surrender their stocks of highly enriched uranium, thus making the summit more fruitful.

The subject of nuclear security is hardly a new one. The September 11 attacks by Al Qaeda terrorists were, among other things, a huge motivator for the international community in this regard. This can be seen in the new and frequent establishment of cooperation mechanisms.

Take UN Security Council Resolution 1540, passed in April 2004. It highlighted the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. Meanwhile, it laid the groundwork for the 1540 Committee, which requires member states to regularly report their progress in implementing the resolution.

The next year, the UN General Assembly passed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.The convention offered a comprehensive de fi nition of acts of nuclear terrorism, while requiring member states to undertake various measures to prevent the threat of nuclear terrorism.

The IAEA has also done its share to ensure the security of nuclear materials. It has formulated a number of nuclear security guidelines, while amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

The United States, for its part, has launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, along with other multilateral frameworks. In addition, the Group of Eight has initiated the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

These mechanisms have played a positive role in the promotion of international nuclear security cooperation. But the problem here is a lack of cohesiveness—as well as other shortcomings.

The IAEA is mainly limited to providing suggestions. So far, only a few countries have approved the agency’s Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. And the multilateral mechanisms proposed by the United States have yet to achieve a broad participation.

So the Nuclear Security Summit was an extremely positive development in that it provided a platform for a full integration of current mechanisms and frameworks.

The work plan issued at the summit emphasized the important role of the mechanisms mentioned above one by one. This proved the integration of existing mechanisms will play a key role in the current international nuclear security cooperation.

Multi-tiered mechanisms

At the opening of the Washington event,Obama announced that the next summit would be held in South Korea in 2012. This shows the international nuclear security cooperation mechanism may become part of a permanent, long-term framework.Furthermore, the very location of the next summit will also facilitate the United States’leading role at the summit.

This event also indicated that the links between non-proliferation and nuclear security may be further strengthened. As non-proliferation and antiterrorism share increasingly similar objectives and means, moreover,related mechanisms of the two may well integrate in the future.

The international media expressed dismay that representatives from North Korea and Iran were not invited to this gathering.At the next summit in South Korea, nonproliferation will naturally be the key topic.And at that time, the United States is unlikely to use the opportunity to impose pressure on these two nations, while carrying out its nonproliferation purpose.

While announcing the host of the next summit, Obama also lauded the South Koreans for what he called their “leadership regionally and globally.”

In addition to hosting the preparatory meeting for the first summit, Japan declared its intention to lead regional nuclear security cooperation. This wish was also echoed by the UK and India.

Future international cooperation will likely be conducted through multi-tiered mechanisms grounded in the nuclear security summits, with UN resolutions and conventions and the IAEA playing leading roles. At the same time, a number of regional nuclear security mechanisms will play supporting roles. ■

Amid rapid gains in global logistics and technology—not to mention the ever-expanding domain of the Internet—preventing the leakage of nuclear technology and the smuggling of nuclear materials and equipment is more challenging than ever